Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Richard Hartwick was charged with manufacturing marijuana and possessing it with the intent to deliver it. Hartwick was a registered qualifying patient under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA). He served as his own primary caregiver and the primary caregiver for five other registered qualifying patients to whom he was properly connected under the MMMA. The police, acting on a tip, confronted Hartwick and later conducted a consent search of his home where the police discovered a disputed number of marijuana plants and approximately 3.69 ounces of marijuana. Hartwick moved to dismiss the charges, claiming immunity under section 4 of the MMMA, and the affirmative defense under section 8. In the alternative, Hartwick sought permission to present a section 8 defense at trial. The trial court denied the motions. Robert Tuttle was charged with three counts of delivering marijuana, one count of manufacturing marijuana, one count of possessing marijuana with the intent to deliver it, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Tuttle was a registered qualifying patient under the MMMA who served as his own primary caregiver. It was unclear whether he was properly connected as the primary caregiver to one or two other registered qualifying patients. Tuttle was arrested for selling marijuana on three occasions to an individual with whom Tuttle was not properly connected under the MMMA. Tuttle claimed immunity under section 4 and the affirmative defense under section 8 of the MMMA. The trial court rejected both claims and denied Tuttle’s request to present a section 8 defense at trial. According to the court, immunity was not appropriate because Tuttle’s illegal conduct (selling marijuana to an individual outside the protection of the MMMA) tainted Tuttle’s conduct with regard to the other charges. The trial court denied Tuttle use of the affirmative defense in section 8 because Tuttle failed to present prima facie evidence of each element of the defense. The Michigan Supreme Court granted certiorari review in these cases, not "to limit or extend the [MMMA's] words," but "merely bring them meaning derived from the plain language of the statute." After review of the specific facts of each defendant's case and their claims of immunity under the MMMA, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the Court of Appeals properly held that Hartwick was not entitled to raise the affirmative defense under section 8 because he failed to present prima facie evidence of each element of the defense; (2) the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that Tuttle’s unprotected conduct with the unconnected individual tainted what might otherwise be protected conduct on which additional separate charges were based; (3) the Court of Appeals properly held that Tuttle could not claim the affirmative defense under section 8 because he failed to establish prima facie evidence of at least one of the elements of the defense for each of his possibly connected patients. For Hartwick, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine Hartwick's entitlement to section 4 immunity. For Tuttle, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the trial court to determine Tuttle's entitlement to section 4 immunity. View "Michigan v. Hartwick" on Justia Law

Adam Stevens was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and second-degree child abuse. The charges stemmed from the death of defendant’s three-month-old son, Kian. The prosecution alleged that defendant caused Kian’s death by either shaking him or slamming him against an object. Defendant alleged that he tripped and fell while holding Kian, and that as he fell, he lost control of Kian, who fell to the floor. Defendant denied shaking or slamming Kian. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial because the trial judge, through his questioning of defendant and defendant’s expert, demonstrated partiality in front of the jury. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial judge’s conduct with respect to defendant’s expert witness pierced the veil of judicial impartiality, depriving defendant of the right to a fair trial. View "Michigan v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Brandon Cain was of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of torture, two counts of unlawful imprisonment, carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At the start of the trial, the court stated to the jury, “I will now ask you to stand and swear to perform your duty to try the case justly and to reach a true verdict.” The court clerk then proceeded to swear in the jury, but mistakenly read the oath given to prospective jurors before voir dire (that they would answer the questions concerning juror qualifications truthfully) rather than the juror’s oath set forth in MCR 2.511(H)(1). There was no objection to the failure to administer the proper oath. Defendant raised the issue of failing to properly swear the jury for the first time on appeal, moving for peremptory reversal of his convictions. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in an unpublished order, concluding that the failure to properly swear the jury was a structural error requiring a new trial. The prosecution sought leave to appeal, which the Supreme Court granted. Because the jurors were conscious of the gravity of the task before them and the manner in which that task was to be carried out, the two primary purposes served by the juror’s oath, the Supreme Court concluded the error of failing to properly swear the jury in this case did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. As such, the Court reversed the appellate court's ruling. View "Michigan v. Cain" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Miller was convicted by a jury of operating while intoxicated (OWI), and operating while intoxicated causing serious impairment of another person’s body function (OWI-injury), for an accident that resulted when he grabbed the steering wheel of the car that his girlfriend was driving. The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of five years’ probation, with the first nine months to be served in jail. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction for OWI-injury but vacated defendant’s OWI conviction on the ground that it violated defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy by convicting defendant of both OWI and OWI-injury. "When read as a whole, MCL 257.625 expresses a clear legislative intent not to allow conviction of and punishment for multiple offenses arising from the same incident except where explicitly authorized by the statute, and MCL 257.625(1) and MCL 257.625(5) do not specifically authorize multiple punishments." The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals correctly vacated defendant’s conviction, but for the wrong reason. View "Michigan v. Miller" on Justia Law

Defendant Leo Ackley was convicted by jury of first-degree felony murder and first-degree child abuse after his live-in girlfriend's three-year-old child died under his care. At trial, the prosecution called five medical experts who testified that the child had died as the result of a head injury that was caused intentionally, while defense counsel called no experts, despite having been provided court funding for expert assistance and the name of a well-known forensic pathologist who could support the defense theory that the injuries had resulted from an accidental fall. Defendant appealed, arguing he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for his lawyer's failure to challenge the government's experts. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that defense counsel’s failure to attempt to engage a single expert witness to rebut the prosecution’s expert testimony, or to attempt to consult an expert with the scientific training to support the defendant’s theory of the case, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and created a reasonable probability that this error affected the outcome of the defendant’s trial. Defendant's convictions were vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Ackley" on Justia Law

Defendant Cynthia Mazur, wife of David Mazur, was both a registered qualifying patient and a registered primary caregiver for two medical marijuana patients. David grew marijuana in their marital home. Officers of the Holly Police Department, acting on a tip, searched the residence for marijuana. Marijuana plants, dried marijuana, and pipes with marijuana residue were found. In executing the search, an officer questioned defendant, who used the first-person plural pronoun "we" when describing the marijuana operation. Although the use of this pronoun led the officers to conclude that defendant was a participant in her husband's marijuana operation, defendant contended her involvement was limited to writing the date of harvest for marijuana plants on several sticky notes. Both defendant and David were charged with marijuana-related offenses. The issue defendant's appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review required an examination of immunity under the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA); specifically whether the application of the MMMA's immunity provisions applied to individuals who were neither registered qualifying patients nor primary caregivers. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant claiming that he or she is solely in the presence or vicinity of the medical use of marijuana is not entitled to immunity under MCL 333.26424(i) when the medical use of marijuana was not in accordance with the act. Nor is a defendant entitled to immunity under MCL 333.26424(i) when the defendant's conduct goes beyond assisting with the use or administration of marijuana. However, the Court held that "marihuana paraphernalia," as that phrase was defined in MCL 333.26424(g), included items that were both specifically designed or actually employed for the medical use of marijuana. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Mazur" on Justia Law

In Case Number 149772, Michelle Fairley brought an action against the Michigan Department of Corrections after an MDOC employee driving an MDOC vehicle struck her car, seriously injuring her. Counsel filed a notice of intent to file a claim against MDOC in the Court of Claims, but Fairley herself did not sign the notice, as required by MCL 600.6431(1). MDOC moved for summary judgment on grounds that the notice was defective, and the Court of Claims denied the motion. In Case Number 149940, Lori Stone brought an action against the Michigan State Police, when she was seriously injured when her stopped vehicle was struck by two patrol cars. Stone also filed a notice of intent to file a claim against the MSP in the Court of Claims; the notice did not indicate that it had been verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths, as required by MCL 600.6431(1). MSP moved for summary judgment on grounds that the notice was defective, but the Court of Claims granted this motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute did not require evidence of the oath or affirmation on the face of the notice. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases to determine whether a claimant's failure to comply with the notice verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 provided a complete defense to an action against the state or one of its departments. The Court concluded that a notice lacking any indication that it was signed and verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths is defective and, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, was a complete defense that could be raised at any time by a defendant entitled to governmental immunity. Accordingly, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in both Stone v Michigan State Police and Fairley v Department of Corrections and remanded the cases to the Court of Claims for reinstatement of the order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the former and for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the latter. View "Fairley v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

Defendant Deandre Woolfolk was convicted by a jury for first-degree murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony for his part in a fatal shooting that took place two hours before his 18th birthday. He was sentenced for life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the possession charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because he was not yet 18 when the crime was committed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing. The State appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that for the purposes of "Miller," defendant remained under the age of 18 at the time he committed murder, and therefore was entitled to be treated in accordance with the Miller rule. View "Michigan v. Woolfolk" on Justia Law

Levon Bynum was charged with first-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to murder, carrying a concealed weapon, and felony-firearm following a shooting that had occurred outside a party store in Battle Creek. Bynum and some of the others present were alleged to be members of the Boardman Boys gang, whose territory bordered the party store. Bynum claimed that he acted in self-defense. An officer in the Battle Creek Police Department's Gang Suppression Unit, was proffered at trial as an expert witness on gangs, gang membership, and gang culture with a particular expertise about Battle Creek gangs. The court allowed the officer's testimony and his PowerPoint presentation, concluding that the evidence was relevant to prove Bynum's motive for shooting the victims. Defense counsel did not specifically object to any of this testimony after the initial, general objection to the testimony, and the jury found Bynum guilty as charged. Bynum's appellate defense counsel subsequently moved for a new trial, arguing the ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the officer's testimony as improper propensity evidence. The court rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because it was satisfied that trial counsel's objections had preserved the claimed error in the testimony. The court also held that the expert witness testimony was appropriate. Bynum appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed Bynum's convictions in an unpublished opinion per curiam. The Supreme Court held that if the prosecution presents fact evidence to show that the crime at issue is gang-related, expert testimony about gangs, gang membership, and gang culture may be admitted as relevant under MRE 402 and of "assist[ance] [to] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" under MRE 702. In applying MRE 402 and MRE 702 to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court appropriately exercised its role as gatekeeper in determining that expert testimony about gangs and gang culture would assist the jury in understanding the evidence. The Court also held that MRE 404(a) precludes testimony that is specifically used to show that, on a particular occasion, a gang member acted in conformity with character traits commonly associated with gang members. The expert witness in this case exceeded these limitations when he provided his opinion that defendant committed the crimes at issue because he acted in conformity with his gang membership. The Court therefore affirmed the result of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Bynum " on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jeffery Douglas of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (victim under the age of 13) and second-degree criminal sexual conduct (victim under the age of 13). The charges arose from statements by his daughter, KD, that defendant had made her touch his penis on one occasion and perform fellatio on him on a separate occasion. Defendant appealed, challenging the admission of certain testimony and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals held that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel during both the pretrial and trial proceedings and that the cumulative effect of the trial errors denied him a fair trial. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant's convictions and sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for reinstatement of a plea offer made by the prosecution before trial. The Court of Appeals ordered that if defendant refused to accept the plea offer, he was entitled to a new trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that a new trial was warranted in light of the errors by both the court and defense counsel at trial. The Court held, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the prosecution’s prior plea offer must be reinstated, as the Supreme Court saw no reversible error in the trial court’s determination to the contrary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Douglas" on Justia Law