Articles Posted in Labor & Employment Law

by
Plaintiffs were former recipients of unemployment compensation benefits who allege that the Michigan Unemployment Insurance Agency (the Agency) unlawfully seized their property without affording due process of law. The issue their appeal presented for the Michigan Supreme Court’s review centered on whether plaintiffs gave timely notice of their due-process claims to the Agency, and therefore were entitled to consideration of the merits of their claims. More specifically, the issue concerned whether plaintiffs filed notices of intention to file their claims or the claims themselves “within 6 months following the happening of the event giving rise to the cause of action.” The Supreme Court held that the “happening of the event giving rise to the cause of action” for a claim seeking monetary relief was when the claim accrued, and a procedural-due-process claim seeking monetary relief accrued when the deprivation of life, liberty, or property occurred. Here, plaintiffs were deprived of their property when their tax refunds were seized or their wages garnished. As a result, plaintiffs Bauserman and Broe timely filed their claims within six months following the deprivation of their property, while plaintiff Williams did not. Accordingly, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Bauserman v. Unemployment Insurance Agency" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff David McQueer brought a negligence action against his employer, Perfect Fence Company, to recover damages after he was injured on the job. Perfect Fence moved for summary judgment on the ground that the exclusive-remedy provision of the Worker’s Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.101 et seq., barred plaintiff’s action. Plaintiff responded that his action was not barred because defendant had violated MCL 418.611 by failing to procure workers’ compensation coverage for him and had violated MCL 418.171 by encouraging him to pose as a nonemployee. Plaintiff additionally moved to amend his complaint to add claims of intentional tort and breach of an employment contract. Plaintiff argued that the evidence raised a question of fact about whether defendant intended to injure him in a way that brought plaintiff’s claim within the scope of the intentional tort exception to the exclusive-remedy provision of the WDCA. The trial court granted Perfect Fence’s motion, concluding that the company had not violated MCL 418.611 because defendant had provided workers’ compensation coverage. The court also ruled that MCL 418.171 was not applicable to plaintiff’s claims. The court denied plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, concluding that amendment would be futile because the undisputed facts did not demonstrate that defendant intended to injure plaintiff. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment and denial of plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The panel agreed with the trial court that defendant had not violated MCL 418.611, but concluded that plaintiff had established a question of fact regarding whether defendant had improperly encouraged him to pose as a contractor for the purpose of evading liability under WDCA in violation of MCL 418.171(4). The panel also concluded that because plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to create a question of fact regarding whether an intentional tort had occurred, the trial court abused its discretion by not allowing plaintiff to amend his complaint. The Michigan Supreme Court held MCL 418.171 did not apply in this case: because plaintiff was not the employee of a contractor engaged by defendant, he had no cause of action under MCL 418.171. For this reason, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals judgment only as to whether MCL 418.171 applied. View "McQueer v. Perfect Fence Company" on Justia Law

by
In 2014, Bruce Millar brought an action against the Construction Code Authority (CCA), Elba Township, and Imlay City, alleging violation of the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA); wrongful termination in violation of public policy; and conspiracy to effectuate wrongful termination and violate the WPA. Millar had performed mechanical and plumbing inspection services for the CCA, which had contracts with Imlay City and Elba Township to provide licensed inspections. Imlay City and Elba Township each wrote letters to the CCA directing it to terminate Millar’s inspection services within their communities. In response, the CCA drafted a letter to Millar stating that he would no longer perform inspections in those communities, but it was not until Millar arrived at work on March 31 that he was given a copy of the CCA. That same day, he was prevented from working in Imlay City. The circuit court granted summary judgment on all counts to defendants, ruling that the WPA claim was time-barred because the WPA violation occurred, at the latest, on March 27, when the CCA drafted its letter, and therefore Millar had filed his claim one day after the 90-day limitations period in MCL 15.363(1) had run. The court also concluded that the WPA preempted Millar’s public-policy claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding the limitations period on plaintiff's WPA claim did not begin to run until the CCA letter was given to him, or March 31. Because plaintiff's complaint was filed 87 days later, it was timely filed under MCL 15.36.(1). View "Millar v. Construction Code Authority" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff Clifton Arbuckle sustained a work-related back injury while working for General Motors Corporation (GM), and in May 1993 began receiving a disability pension. He retired that month and was subsequently awarded workers’ compensation benefits. Later, he also received Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. GM and the International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace and Agricultural Implement Workers of America (UAW) had executed a letter of agreement in 1990 in which GM agreed not to coordinate workers’ compensation and disability pension benefits for its employees under MCL 418.354. This letter of agreement was incorporated into the 1990 collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between GM and the UAW and was intended to remain in place until termination or amendment of the CBA, which expired in November 1993. When the CBA expired, however, the provision against coordination was continued in subsequent letters of agreement and incorporated into subsequent CBAs. In 2009, GM and the UAW adopted a formula (incorporated into the 2009 CBA) by which GM would coordinate benefits, using disability pension benefits to reduce the amount of workers’ compensation benefits for all workers and retirees, regardless of when they had retired. GM advised Arbuckle that effective January 1, 2010, his benefits would be reduced using the formula in the 2009 agreement. Arbuckle appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Agency, which ultimately concluded that GM was improperly using Arbuckle’s SSDI benefits to offset his workers’ compensation benefits, in violation of MCL 418.354(11). A workers’ compensation magistrate reversed the director’s ruling but nevertheless concluded that GM was prohibited from reducing Arbuckle’s workers’ compensation benefits by his disability pension benefits because Arbuckle had never agreed to coordination of benefits and no evidence established that the UAW had the authority to bargain on Arbuckle’s behalf after his retirement. The Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) reversed in part, holding that irrespective of the UAW’s authority to bind retirees, GM was permitted to coordinate Arbuckle’s disability pension benefits. Arbuckle sought leave to appeal, but after the Court of Appeals granted his application, he died. Robert Arbuckle, the personal representative of the estate, was substituted as plaintiff. The Court of Appeals reversed in an unpublished opinion per curiam and remanded the case for further proceedings. GM then appealed. The Supreme Court concluded after its review that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that GM lacked the authority to coordinate Arbuckle’s benefits under the 2009 CBA. The Court reversed and reinstated MCAC's order. View "Arbuckle v. General Motors, LLC" on Justia Law

by
In 1993, plaintiff Dean Altobelli began working as an attorney for Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C. (“the Firm”). Upon joining the Firm, plaintiff signed the “Miller Canfield Operating Agreement” (“Operating Agreement”), a document governing the Firm’s internal affairs. By January 2006, plaintiff had become a senior principal at the Firm. However, in late May or early June 2010, plaintiff decided he wanted to pursue a new opportunity as an assistant coach for the University of Alabama football team. Plaintiff proposed a 7- to 12-month leave of absence from the Firm to defendant Michael Hartmann, the Firm’s CEO, and defendant Michael Coakley, who was the head of the Firm’s litigation group but was not a managing director. Plaintiff suggested that the Firm permit him to maintain his ownership interest and return to the Firm as a senior principal any time before June 1, 2011. Plaintiff avers that Hartmann initially promised plaintiff that he could spend as much time at the University of Alabama as he wanted and still receive certain allocated income from his clients. Hartmann disputed this, claiming that plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from the partnership. Plaintiff claimed he was improperly terminated, and that the Firm shorted plaintiff's income as a result. Plaintiff's attempt to resolve the matter through the direct settlement and mediation process, as outlined in the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement, was unsuccessful. In November 2011, plaintiff filed a demand for arbitration as provided for in the arbitration clause. Despite having made the demand for arbitration, he filed suit alleging that the seven individuals named as defendants were responsible for engaging in tortious conduct with regard to plaintiff's request for a leave of absence and retention of his equity ownership in the Firm. Defendants moved for summary judgment and a motion to compel arbitration as required by the arbitration clause. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment too. The circuit court denied defendants’ motions and granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that plaintiff did not voluntarily withdraw from the Firm. Rather, the circuit court concluded that defendants had improperly terminated plaintiff's ownership interest without authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the part of the Court of Appeals’ opinion regarding the motion to compel arbitration and instead held that this case was subject to binding arbitration under the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement. Accordingly, the lower courts should not have reached the merits of plaintiff’s motion for partial summary disposition, as the motion addressed substantive contractual matters that should have been resolved by the arbitrator. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Altobelli v. Hartmann" on Justia Law

by
Defendant city of Lansing enacted an ordinance requiring contractors working on city construction contracts to pay employees a prevailing wage. Plaintiff Associated Builders and Contractors, a trade association, filed suit against Lansing, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional because municipalities did not have the authority to adopt laws regulating the wages paid by third parties, even where the relevant work is done on municipal contracts paid for with municipal funds. The Court of Appeals majority disagreed, and ruled that subsequent changes to state law had caused the controlling caselaw precedent, Attorney General ex rel Lennane v Detroit, to be “superseded.” The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Court of Appeals erred by exceeding its powers for refusing to follow a decision from the Michigan Supreme Court that both applied and had not been overruled. Even so, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to overrule Lennane because subsequent constitutional changes "undercut its viability." The Court therefore vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision but affirmed the result. View "Associated Builders & Contractors v. City of Lansing" on Justia Law

by
The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review in this matter focused on the application of Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA) to an employee who alleged that she was terminated because she reported a coworker’s plan to violate the law. Because "a violation or a suspected violation" refers to an existing violation of a law, the plain language of MCL 15.362 contemplated an act or conduct that has actually occurred or was ongoing. "MCL 15.362 contains no language encompassing future, planned, or anticipated acts amounting to a violation or a suspected violation of a law." Because plaintiff in this case merely reported another’s intent to violate a law in the future, plaintiff had no recourse under the WPA. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remanded this case to that court for further proceedings. View "Pace v. Edel-Harrison" on Justia Law

by
The Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions and others brought an action in the Court of Claims against the State and various state agencies and officers, alleging that portions of 2011 PA 264, which amended the State Employees’ Retirement Act (SERA, MCL 38.1 et seq.), were unconstitutional because the resulting changes to retirement benefits altered rates of compensation or conditions of employment, which were within the exclusive authority of the Civil Service Commission to regulate. The Court of Claims granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that SERA retirement benefits were properly classified as both “rates of compensation” and “conditions of employment,” neither of which was subject to legislative alteration. The Supreme Court reversed. "While the [Civil Service Commission] has considerable constitutional powers to manage the civil service system and to preserve its sphere of constitutional authority, the commission has no legislative powers. It may neither enact legislation nor revise an enactment, nor may it dictate that the Legislature repeal or modify an enactment. Therefore, we hold that because the commission has acquiesced in the application of SERA to the employees of the civil service system, plaintiff’s objections fail to establish a basis for relief." View "Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions v. Michigan" on Justia Law

by
The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and others brought an action in the Court of Appeals against Nino Green and other members of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, the Governor, and the Attorney General, seeking a declaratory judgment that portions of 2012 PA 349 (which amended the public employment relations act (PERA, MCL 423.201 et seq.), to prohibit public employers from requiring their employees to join a union or pay union-related expenses) were unconstitutional with respect to employees in the classified state civil service. The Court of Appeals held that the challenged portions of 2012 PA 349 were constitutional. Although the Supreme Court concluded that public collective bargaining was a method by which the Civil Service Commission (could choose to exercise its constitutional duties, the Court held that the commission could not effectively require civil servants to fund the commission’s own administrative operations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "UAW v. Green" on Justia Law

by
The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether defendant lifeguard's failure to intervene in the deceased's drowning was "the proximate cause" of his death. While governmental agencies and their employees are generally immune from tort liability under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1407(2)(c) provided an exception to this general rule when a governmental employee's conduct is both (1) grossly negligent and (2) "the proximate cause" of an injury, which the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted to mean the "most immediate, efficient, and direct cause". Plaintiff sued defendant, a governmental employee, arguing that governmental immunity did not apply because defendant's grossly negligent behavior while lifeguarding and resulting failure to rescue plaintiff's drowning son was the proximate cause of his death. Subsequently, defendant moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds, but the trial court denied defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals, in a split opinion, affirmed, concluding that a jury could reasonably find that defendant's failure to intervene constituted the proximate cause of the deceased's death. The Court of Appeals dissent instead concluded that defendant was immune from liability. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by denying summary judgment to defendant, because the exception to governmental immunity articulated in MCL 691.1407(2) was inapplicable in this case. View "Beals v. Michigan" on Justia Law