Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves Jeffery S. Armstrong, who was charged with carrying a concealed weapon, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony after police discovered a handgun under the passenger seat of a vehicle in which he was sitting. Corporal Treva Eaton claimed she approached the vehicle because she smelled marijuana emanating from it. Armstrong moved to suppress the gun as evidence, arguing it was obtained through a search that violated the Fourth Amendment.The Wayne Circuit Court ruled that Armstrong was seized when officers surrounded the vehicle and that probable cause was required before ordering him out. The court concluded that the smell of marijuana alone did not establish probable cause to search or justify removing Armstrong from the vehicle and ruled that the plain-view exception did not apply. Consequently, the trial court granted Armstrong’s motion to suppress and dismissed the case.The prosecution appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision. The appellate court held that the rule from People v. Kazmierczak, which allowed the smell of marijuana alone to establish probable cause, was superseded by the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA). The court concluded that the smell of marijuana is no longer necessarily indicative of unlawful activity and that the trial court did not clearly err in finding that the gun was not discovered in plain view.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the Kazmierczak rule is no longer valid in light of the MRTMA. The court ruled that the smell of marijuana is one factor in the probable-cause determination but is insufficient on its own to support a search. The court affirmed the lower courts' decisions, upholding the suppression of the evidence and the dismissal of the charges against Armstrong. View "People Of Michigan v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

John A. Poole was convicted in 2002 of first-degree murder, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. He was 18 years old at the time of the crime and was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed his convictions, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied his application for leave to appeal. Poole filed multiple motions for relief from judgment, which were denied.Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decisions in Miller v. Alabama and Montgomery v. Louisiana, which addressed mandatory life sentences for juveniles, Poole sought relief again. The Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to determine if Poole was entitled to relief under the state constitution's prohibition on cruel or unusual punishment, as extended to 18-year-olds in People v. Parks. The Court of Appeals held that Parks applied retroactively and vacated Poole's sentence, remanding for resentencing.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed whether Parks should apply retroactively to cases where the period for direct review had expired. The court held that Parks, which extended Miller's protections to 18-year-olds under the Michigan Constitution, announced a substantive rule and should be applied retroactively. The court overruled the state retroactivity analysis in People v. Carp to the extent it survived Montgomery. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision to vacate Poole's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing under MCL 769.25a. View "People Of Michigan v. Poole" on Justia Law

Natalie C. Nelson was convicted of felonious assault, possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and domestic violence. The incident involved Nelson and her boyfriend, Aaron Lewis, at Nelson's home. Nelson discovered Lewis was in contact with a cousin she believed had engaged in child sexual abuse. An altercation ensued, with conflicting testimonies about who was the aggressor. Nelson claimed self-defense, stating Lewis threatened to kill her and physically assaulted her, prompting her to retrieve a firearm.The Wayne Circuit Court sustained the prosecution's hearsay objection when Nelson attempted to testify about Lewis's threat during direct examination. However, Nelson mentioned the threat during recross-examination. The jury was instructed to consider all evidence but not to consider stricken testimony. Nelson was convicted and sentenced to probation, imprisonment, and time served for the respective charges. On appeal, the prosecution conceded the hearsay objection was erroneous. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding the error was not outcome-determinative since the threat was eventually introduced, and jurors are presumed to follow instructions.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether the trial court's error was outcome-determinative under People v. Lukity. The Court held that the error was outcome-determinative, as the threat was central to Nelson's self-defense theory, and the jury likely did not know whether to consider the once-excluded evidence. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for a new trial, emphasizing that the trial court's error deprived Nelson of a meaningful opportunity to support her self-defense claim and likely confused the jury. View "People Of Michigan v. Nelson" on Justia Law

The defendant, a 16-year-old student, was charged with assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder (AWIGBH) under an aiding and abetting theory. The incident involved two other students, TI and CB, who attacked the victim by hitting and kicking him. The defendant did not participate in the physical attack but recorded the incident on his cell phone and shared the video with other students. The prosecution argued that the defendant's recording of the attack encouraged the assailants. Instead of filing a juvenile petition, the prosecution sought to try the defendant as an adult under the automatic waiver statute, arguing that the shoes worn by the assailants were used as dangerous weapons.The 53rd District Court found probable cause to believe that the defendant had aided and abetted the assault and bound him over to the criminal division of the circuit court. The circuit court denied the defendant's motion to quash the bindover and dismiss the charges, concluding that a shoe could be used as a dangerous weapon. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's decision, with a dissenting opinion arguing that the shoes did not constitute dangerous weapons and that the defendant was not armed with a dangerous weapon.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that for the criminal division of the circuit court to have jurisdiction under the automatic waiver statute, the juvenile defendant must be armed with a dangerous weapon. The Court found no evidence that the defendant was armed with a dangerous weapon during the assault. Consequently, the statutory requirements for automatic waiver were not met, and the criminal division of the circuit court did not have jurisdiction over the defendant. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part, vacated it in part, and remanded the case to the circuit court to grant the defendant's motion to quash the bindover and transfer the case to the family division of the circuit court. View "People Of Michigan v. Oslund" on Justia Law

During an altercation at a party, the defendant pushed the victim in the chest, causing the victim's chest to bleed. Although no one saw the defendant with a knife, the victim's treating physicians concluded that the victim had been stabbed. The defendant was convicted by a jury of assault with intent to do great bodily harm (AWIGBH) and felonious assault.The Isabella Circuit Court sentenced the defendant to concurrent prison terms of 5 to 10 years for AWIGBH and 2 to 4 years for felonious assault. The defendant appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals vacated the felonious assault conviction, reasoning that convictions for both AWIGBH and felonious assault were inconsistent because the offenses are mutually exclusive. The prosecutor then applied for leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, which granted the application.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the defendant's convictions for both AWIGBH and felonious assault did not violate double-jeopardy protections because the AWIGBH statute authorizes multiple punishments for the same conduct. The court noted that the AWIGBH statute explicitly states that it does not prohibit a person from being charged with, convicted of, or punished for any other violation of law arising out of the same conduct. Therefore, the conflicting intent requirements of the two statutes did not render the convictions mutually exclusive. The court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals to the extent it addressed the mutually exclusive verdicts doctrine and reinstated the defendant's conviction of felonious assault. View "People of Michigan v. Mckewen" on Justia Law

In 2015, the defendant drove his vehicle on a freeway while speeding and under the influence of alcohol and controlled substances. He struck the back of another vehicle, resulting in the deaths of two individuals and serious injuries to three others. The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Genesee Circuit Court of multiple charges, including two counts of involuntary manslaughter and two counts of reckless driving causing death.On direct appeal, the defendant argued for the first time that his convictions violated the multiple-punishments strand of double jeopardy, specifically challenging the convictions for both involuntary manslaughter and reckless driving causing death. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the defendant’s convictions.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that under Michigan common law, the mens rea requirement for reckless driving causing death (willful or wanton disregard) is the same as the mens rea requirement for involuntary manslaughter (criminal gross negligence). Therefore, when an involuntary manslaughter charge is based on a theory of gross negligence, the offense does not have an element that reckless driving causing death does not have. Consequently, the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions prohibit convicting a defendant of both offenses. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the appropriate remedy for the double-jeopardy violation. View "People of Michigan v. Fredell" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Wayne Circuit Court of three counts of torture, three counts of unlawful imprisonment, one count of felonious assault, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The defendant held his wife and their two children at gunpoint in their home, threatening to kill them and burn down the house. The court sentenced the defendant to various prison terms for these convictions and placed him on the sex-offender registry as a Tier I offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) because two of the unlawful imprisonment convictions involved minors.The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing insufficient evidence for the torture convictions and that his placement on the sex-offender registry violated constitutional protections against cruel or unusual punishment. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded the case to remove the defendant from the sex-offender registry, concluding that imposing SORA for a crime lacking a sexual component constituted cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution. The defendant sought further appeal, and the prosecution cross-appealed regarding the removal from SORA.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the application of SORA to non-sexual offenders like the defendant constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution. The Court found that the 2021 SORA, despite legislative intent as a civil regulation, imposed punitive effects that outweighed this intent when applied to non-sexual offenders. The Court emphasized that the registry's requirements and the social stigma attached to being labeled a sex offender were excessive and not rationally related to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety. Consequently, the Court vacated the part of the Court of Appeals opinion that extended beyond non-sexual offenders and affirmed the judgment that the defendant and similar offenders should be removed from the sex-offender registry. View "People Of Michigan v. Lymon" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of being a violent felon in possession of body armor after driving from Michigan into Canada without paying a toll. He was arrested by a Canadian customs agent, Officer Lavers, and returned to the U.S., where American customs agent Officer Stockwell took custody of him and a bulletproof vest. The Canadian government did not allow Lavers to testify at trial. The defendant moved to exclude evidence of the vest, arguing it violated the Confrontation Clause since Lavers could not testify. The trial court denied the motion but barred testimony about statements made by Lavers. At trial, Stockwell testified about taking custody of the defendant and the vest based on communications with Lavers. Other evidence included the defendant’s statements about wearing the vest due to threats.The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the conviction, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Lavers’s out-of-court statement was testimonial and admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The court also found the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the only other evidence supporting the vest’s admission violated the corpus delicti rule. The case was remanded for a new trial. The prosecution appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to confrontation is violated when a trial witness’s testimony introduces the substance of an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement if it leads to a clear and logical inference that the statement was testimonial. The court affirmed that the Confrontation Clause was violated but found the Court of Appeals erred in applying the corpus delicti rule to the defendant’s statements. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine if the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People of Michigan v. Washington" on Justia Law

Police officers observed a parked car with its engine running in an elementary school parking lot at 10:00 p.m. They parked their patrol car 10 feet behind the parked car at a 45-degree angle, with headlights and a spotlight directed at the car. The officers approached the car, noticed signs of intoxication from the driver, and arrested him after he failed field sobriety tests. The driver later consented to a blood draw and admitted to drinking alcohol.The Oakland Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of intoxication, arguing it was the result of an unlawful seizure. The Court of Appeals denied interlocutory leave to appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine when the defendant was first seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. On remand, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the defendant was seized when the patrol car parked behind him. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant was not seized when the patrol car parked 10 feet away at a 45-degree angle.The Michigan Supreme Court held that a seizure may occur when a police vehicle partially blocks a defendant’s egress if the totality of the circumstances indicates that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. The Court found that the defendant was seized before the officers observed signs of intoxication, considering the police conduct, the time, and the setting. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct when the defendant was initially seized. View "People of Michigan v. Duff" on Justia Law

In 2005, the defendant's infant daughter, Nakita, died while under the defendant's care. The defendant claimed Nakita was choking, but after an autopsy, the medical examiner concluded that Nakita died from shaken baby syndrome (SBS). The defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder in 2006 and sentenced to life in prison without parole. In 2017, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment, presenting new expert testimony that challenged the SBS diagnosis and suggested alternative causes of death, such as choking.The Wayne Circuit Court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately denied the defendant's motion, ruling that the new expert testimony was inadmissible under Michigan Rule of Evidence (MRE) 702. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the biomechanical engineering evidence was inadmissible and that the new evidence did not make a different result probable on retrial.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony. The Court held that the biomechanical engineering evidence was relevant and reliable under MRE 702, as it was based on sufficient facts and reliable principles. The Court also determined that the new evidence, including the changed opinion of the original medical examiner and other expert testimony, made a different result probable on retrial. The Court concluded that the defendant had demonstrated "good cause" and "actual prejudice" as required by Michigan Court Rule (MCR) 6.508(D)(3) and satisfied all four prongs of the test established in People v. Cress.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing the new expert testimony to be considered. View "People Of Michigan v. Lemons" on Justia Law