Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Business Law
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Vectren Infrastructure Services Corporation, the successor in interest to Minnesota Limited, Inc. (ML), sued the Department of Treasury (the Department) in the Michigan Court of Claims, alleging that the Department had improperly assessed a tax deficiency against ML after auditing ML’s Michigan Business Tax returns for 2010 and part of 2011. Following an audit, the Department determined that ML had improperly included its gain from a sale of its assets in the sales-factor denominator, resulting in an overstatement of its total sales and the reduction of its Michigan tax liability. The auditor excluded ML’s sale of assets from the sales factor and included it in ML’s preapportioned tax base, which increased ML’s sales factor from 14.9860% to 69.9761% and consequently increased its tax liability. ML asked the Department for an alternative apportionment for the period in 2011 before the sale, January 1, 2011 to March 31, 2011 (the short year), but the Department denied ML’s request and determined that ML had not overcome the presumption that the statutory apportionment fairly represented ML’s business activity in Michigan for the short year. The Court of Appeals ultimately held the Court of Claims had correctly analyzed the relevant statutes and applied the apportionment formula; however, the Court of Appeals concluded that Vectren was entitled to an alternative apportionment because applying the formula extended Michigan’s taxing powers beyond their acceptable scope, and ordered the parties to work together to determine an alternative method of apportionment. The Michigan Supreme Court held: (1) the income from the asset sale was properly attributable under the MBTA; and (2) the MBTA formula, as applied, did not impermissibly tax income outside the scope of Michigan’s taxing powers. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "Vectren Infrastructure Services Corp v. Department Of Treasury" on Justia Law

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MSSC, Inc., sued Airboss Flexible Products Co., alleging anticipatory breach of contract and seeking to enforce a purchase order between the parties after Airboss threatened to stop filling orders unless MSSC agreed to a price increase. Airboss supplied products to MSSC, and MSSC used those products to manufacture parts for their customers. The parties’ purchase order for the Airboss products was identified as a “blanket” order that listed the parts to be supplied but did not include specific quantities. Instead, the purchase order indicated that quantities would be based on the needs of an MSSC customer. MSSC was obligated to create and send “releases” per the terms and conditions, but neither the purchase order nor the terms and conditions obligated MSSC to send any number of firm orders to Airboss—either as a raw number or as a percentage of MSSC’s total need. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of MSSC, finding that the contract was a requirements contract and was likely enforceable. Airboss moved for summary judgment, arguing that the purchase order failed to satisfy the statute of frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code, MCL 440.1101 et seq. In response, MSSC moved for summary judgment, arguing that the blanket purchase order was a requirements contract that satisfied the statute of frauds. The trial court granted MSSC’s motion, concluding that because the purchase order was identified as a “blanket” order, it contained a “quantity term” that satisfied the statute of frauds. Airboss appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Contrary to the lower courts, the Michigan Supreme Court found the parties entered into a release-by-release contract, which allowed Airboss to stop selling parts to MSSC. View "MSSC, Inc v. Airboss Flexible Products Co." on Justia Law

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Leslie Murphy, a former shareholder of Covisint Corporation, brought an action against Samuel Inman, III and other former Covisint directors, alleging they breached their statutory and common-law fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff when Covisint entered into a cash-out merger agreement with OpenText Corporation in 2017. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff lacked standing because his claim was derivative in nature and he did not satisfy the requirements for bringing a derivative shareholder action under MCL 450.1493a. Plaintiff responded that he was permitted to bring a direct shareholder action under MCL 450.1541a, and that defendants owed common-law fiduciary duties to plaintiff as a shareholder. The trial court granted defendants’ motion, ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a direct shareholder action because he could not demonstrate an injury to himself without showing injury to the corporation, nor could he show harm separate and distinct from that of other Covisint shareholders. The court also rejected plaintiff’s common-law theory because it arose out of the same alleged injury as his statutory claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that a shareholder who alleges the directors of the target corporation breached their fiduciary duties owed to the shareholder in handling a cash-out merger could bring that claim as a direct shareholder action. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that plaintiff’s claim was derivative. View "Murphy v. Inman" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff TOMRA of North America, Inc., brought two separate actions in the Court of Claims against the Michigan Department of Treasury, seeking a refund for use tax and sales tax that plaintiff had paid on the basis that plaintiff’s sales of container-recycling machines and repair parts were exempt from taxation under the General Sales Tax Act, and the Use Tax Act. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, seeking a ruling on the question whether plaintiff’s container-recycling machines and repair parts performed, or were used in, an industrial-processing activity. The Court of Claims denied plaintiff’s motion and instead granted summary disposition in favor of defendant, holding that plaintiff’s container-recycling machines and repair parts were not used in an industrial-processing activity and that plaintiff therefore was not entitled to exemption from sales and use tax for the sale and lease of the machines and their repair parts. The Court of Claims found that the tasks that plaintiff’s machines performed occurred before the industrial process began, reasoning that the activities listed in MCL 205.54t(3) and MCL 205.94o(3) were only industrial-processing activities when they occurred between the start and end of the industrial process as defined by MCL 205.54t(7)(a) and MCL 205.94o(7)(a), respectively. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, declining to interpret MCL 205.54t(7)(a) and MCL 205.94o(7)(a) as placing a temporal limitation on the activities listed in MCL 205.54t(3) and MCL 205.94o(3), respectively. To this, the Michigan Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The matter was remanded to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "TOMRA of North America, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Paulette Stenzel was injured after her new refrigerator began to spray water out of its water dispenser onto her kitchen floor, causing her to slip and fall. She filed a timely complaint alleging negligence, breach of contract, and breach of warranty against defendant Best Buy Co., Inc., which had sold and installed the refrigerator. Best Buy filed a notice of nonparty fault, identifying defendant-appellant Samsung Electronics America, Inc., as the refrigerator’s manufacturer. Plaintiff added a claim against Samsung in an amended complaint, and Samsung moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff’s claim against it was untimely because plaintiff had not first moved to amend under MCL 600.2957(2) and therefore was not entitled to the relation-back privilege set forth in that statute. The trial court granted Samsung’s motion, but the Court of Appeals reversed. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals: a party may amend a pleading upon receipt of notice of nonparty fault pursuant to MCR 2.112(K) without filing a motion for leave to amend, and the amended pleading relates back to the original action pursuant to MCL 600.2957(2). View "Stenzel v. Best Buy Company, Inc." on Justia Law

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Defendant Samer Shami was charged with violating the Tobacco Products Tax Act (TPTA) for possessing, acquiring, transporting, or offering for sale tobacco products with an aggregate wholesale price of $250 or more as a manufacturer without a license in violation of MCL 205.423(1) and MCL 205.428(3). Defendant was the manager of Sam Molasses, a retail tobacco store owned by Sam Molasses, LLC. Investigation revealed that the labels on several plastics tubs of tobacco in the store’s inventory did not match those listed on the invoices from tobacco distributors. Defendant explained that he had mixed two or more flavors of tobacco to create a new “special blend,” which was then placed in the plastic tubs and relabeled. Defendant also explained that he repackaged bulk tobacco from a particular distributor by taking the packets of tobacco out of the boxes, inserting them into metal tins, and placing his own label on the tins, which were then sold at the store. The issue presented in this case for the Michigan Supreme Court's review was whether an individual who combined two different tobacco products to create a new blended product or repackages bulk tobacco into smaller containers with a new label was considered to be a manufacturer of a tobacco product and must have the requisite license. The Court of Appeals held that, in either instance, such a person was a manufacturer. According to that Court, manufacturing simply requires a change from the original state of an object or material into a state that makes it more suitable for its intended use, and a person who changes either the form or delivery method of tobacco constitutes a manufacturer for purposes of the TPTA. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that an individual combining two different tobacco products to create a blended product, relabeling that new mixture, and making it available for sale to the public is a manufacturer of a tobacco product, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals that merely repackaging bulk tobacco into smaller containers renders an individual a manufacturer under the TPTA. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This case was remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Shami" on Justia Law

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Defendant Samer Shami was charged with violating the Tobacco Products Tax Act (TPTA) for possessing, acquiring, transporting, or offering for sale tobacco products with an aggregate wholesale price of $250 or more as a manufacturer without a license in violation of MCL 205.423(1) and MCL 205.428(3). Defendant was the manager of Sam Molasses, a retail tobacco store owned by Sam Molasses, LLC. Investigation revealed that the labels on several plastics tubs of tobacco in the store’s inventory did not match those listed on the invoices from tobacco distributors. Defendant explained that he had mixed two or more flavors of tobacco to create a new “special blend,” which was then placed in the plastic tubs and relabeled. Defendant also explained that he repackaged bulk tobacco from a particular distributor by taking the packets of tobacco out of the boxes, inserting them into metal tins, and placing his own label on the tins, which were then sold at the store. The issue presented in this case for the Michigan Supreme Court's review was whether an individual who combined two different tobacco products to create a new blended product or repackages bulk tobacco into smaller containers with a new label was considered to be a manufacturer of a tobacco product and must have the requisite license. The Court of Appeals held that, in either instance, such a person was a manufacturer. According to that Court, manufacturing simply requires a change from the original state of an object or material into a state that makes it more suitable for its intended use, and a person who changes either the form or delivery method of tobacco constitutes a manufacturer for purposes of the TPTA. Although the Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that an individual combining two different tobacco products to create a blended product, relabeling that new mixture, and making it available for sale to the public is a manufacturer of a tobacco product, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals that merely repackaging bulk tobacco into smaller containers renders an individual a manufacturer under the TPTA. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals. This case was remanded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Shami" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Marlette Auto Wash, LLC claimed it had an easement through a parking lot owned by defendant Van Dyke SC Properties, LLC, for customers to access a car wash that plaintiff had purchased in 2007. Defendant counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title and obtain monetary damages for expenses relating to maintenance of the lot. The parties’ parcels were originally owned as a single unimproved tract of land; in 1988, land was to B & J Investment Company, which was owned in part by James Zyrowski, and split into two parcels. B & J opened a car wash on the corner parcel in 1989. Although the car wash was initially accessible from both the highway and the street, car wash customers generally used the parking lot of the adjoining parcel to get to and from the car wash. This adjoining parcel was sold to Marlette Development Corporation in 1988, which opened a shopping center in 1990. When Marlette Development’s deed was recorded, no easement was reserved for the benefit of the car wash property, and car wash customers continued to use the parking lot for access. In 2000, the village of Marlette closed the street entrance to the car wash. Car wash customers continued to use the parking lot for access without incident until Marlette Development sold its property to defendant in 2013. At this point, defendant’s sole owner, James Zyrowski informed plaintiff that unless it contributed money to maintain the parking lot, Zyrowski would close off access to the car wash through the parking lot. Plaintiff claimed a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress over defendant’s property on the basis of plaintiff’s open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use of that property for at least 15 years. The question presented for the Michigan Supreme Court was whether such use created a prescriptive easement that was appurtenant, without regard to whether the previous owner of the dominant estate took legal action to claim the easement. The answer to that inquiry is yes; the Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred by requiring plaintiff to establish privity of estate with the previous owner, regardless of whether plaintiff could establish that the elements of a prescriptive easement were satisfactorily met by that prior owner. Moreover, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the previous owner of the dominant estate must have taken legal action to claim the prescriptive easement in order for plaintiff to prove that a prescriptive easement had vested during the preceding property owner’s tenure. “Title by adverse possession is gained when the period of limitations expires, not when legal action quieting title to the property is brought.” View "Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v. Van Dyke SC Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

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MCL 450.4515(1)(e) provided alternative statutes of limitations: one based on the time of discovery of the cause of action and the other based on the time of accrual of the cause of action. Plaintiffs were former employees of defendant ePrize who acquired ownership units in the company. Plaintiffs alleged founder Jeff Linkner orally promised them that their interests in ePrize would never be diluted or subordinated. In its fifth operating agreement, executed in 2009, ePrize stock issued in Series C and Series B Units carried distribution priority over the common units held by plaintiffs. The Operating Agreement further provided that if the company were ever sold, Series C Units would receive the first $68.25 million of any available distribution. In 2012, ePrize sold substantially all of its assets and, pursuant to the Operating Agreement, distributed nearly $100 million in net proceeds to the holders of Series C and Series B Units. Plaintiffs received nothing for their common shares. Plaintiffs thereafter sued, bringing claims for LLC member oppression, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment, concluding that the three-year limitation period in MCL 450.4515(1)(e) constituted a statute of limitations, rather than a statute of repose, and that plaintiffs' claims accrued in 2009. The Court of Appeals disagreed, finding plaintiffs’ claims did not accrue until 2012, when ePrize sold substantially all of its assets, because until that sale plaintiffs had not incurred a calculable financial injury and any damage claim before that time would have been “speculative.” Accordingly, the Court concluded that plaintiffs’ claims were timely filed before the expiration of the three-year limitation period. The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the trial court's reasoning: plaintiffs’ actions for damages under MCL 450.4515(1)(e) were barred by the three-year statute of limitations unless plaintiffs could establish on remand that they were entitled to tolling. View "Frank v. Linkner" on Justia Law

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In 2007, plaintiff Innovation Ventures, LLC engaged defendants Andrew Krause and K & L Development of Michigan (K & L Development) to design, manufacture, and install manufacturing and packaging equipment for the production of "5-Hour ENERGY" at Liquid Manufacturing’s bottling plant. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether agreements between sophisticated businesses were void for failure of consideration and whether the noncompete provisions in these agreements were reasonable. Innovation Ventures alleged a variety of tort and breach of contract claims against Liquid Manufacturing, LLC, K & L Development of Michigan, LLC, Eternal Energy, LLC, LXR Biotech, LLC, Peter Paisley, and Andrew Krause based on the defendants’ production of Eternal Energy and other energy drinks. Contrary to the determination of the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court concluded that the parties’ Equipment Manufacturing and Installation Agreement (EMI) and Nondisclosure Agreement were not void for failure of consideration. The Court nevertheless affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants for the claims against Krause, because there was no genuine issue of material fact on the question whether Krause breached the EMI or the Nondisclosure Agreement. Likewise, there was no issue on the question whether K & L Development breached the EMI. The Court concluded the Court of Appeals erred in failing to evaluate the noncompete provision in the parties’ Termination Agreement for reasonableness. The Court therefore reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for consideration of those questions of fact remaining regarding whether K & L Development breached the Nondisclosure Agreement and whether Liquid Manufacturing breached the Termination Agreement with respect to its production of products other than Eternal Energy. View "Innovation Ventures, LLC v. Liquid Manufacturing, LLC" on Justia Law