Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Darnell Hairston was seriously injured while operating machinery at Zeeland Farm Soya, Inc. He sued Zeeland Farm Services, Inc. (ZFS) and an employee, later adding Specialty Industries, Inc. as a defendant for negligence and products liability. ZFS settled, but the case against Specialty Industries proceeded to trial, resulting in a jury awarding Hairston over $13 million. Specialty Industries had insurance policies with Burlington Insurance Company and Evanston Insurance Company, which paid their policy limits, leaving a significant portion of the judgment unpaid.The Ottawa Circuit Court denied Hairston and Specialty Industries' motion for supplemental proceedings to pursue a bad-faith refusal to settle claim against the insurers, suggesting they file a separate lawsuit. Hairston then served writs of garnishment on the insurers, which the trial court quashed, stating there was no judgment of bad faith. The trial court also imposed sanctions on Hairston for filing the writs.The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to quash the writs, relying on the precedent set in Rutter v King, which allowed bad-faith refusal to settle claims to be litigated through garnishment. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the sanctions against Hairston.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that unresolved claims of bad-faith refusal to settle are not subject to garnishment under MCR 3.101(G)(1) because they are not sufficiently liquidated. The Court found that the Court of Appeals erred in relying on Rutter, which was decided before the current court rules were adopted. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Hairston v. Lku" on Justia Law

Jeremy Woods was injured in a car accident in 2017 and received medical care from Spine Specialists of Michigan PC. Woods assigned his right to payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits to Spine Specialists, but MemberSelect Insurance Company refused to pay. Spine Specialists sued MemberSelect for payment. MemberSelect argued that the claims were barred by the one-year-back rule, which requires claims to be filed within one year of the medical services being rendered. The trial court granted MemberSelect's motion for summary disposition for services rendered before June 11, 2019, but denied it for services rendered between June 11, 2019, and August 12, 2020.The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, reasoning that the tolling provision added to the one-year-back rule in 2019 did not apply to claims that accrued before the amendment's effective date. The court held that PIP benefits accrue when the medical services are rendered, not when payment is denied.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the tolling provision added to MCL 500.3145 in 2019 does not apply retroactively to causes of action that began to accrue before the amendment became effective on June 11, 2019. The court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, concluding that the claims for services rendered between June 11, 2019, and August 12, 2020, were barred by the one-year-back rule. The court emphasized that the Legislature did not indicate an intent for the tolling provision to apply retroactively and that applying it retroactively would impose new obligations on insurers for past transactions. View "Spine Specialists Of Michigan PC v. Memberselect Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Karen Carter filed a lawsuit against DTN Management Company after she slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk at her apartment complex on January 10, 2018. She alleged negligence and breach of statutory duties. Carter filed her complaint on April 13, 2021. DTN Management moved for summary disposition, arguing that the claim was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Administrative Order No. 2020-3, which extended certain filing deadlines during the COVID-19 state of emergency, was within the Michigan Supreme Court's authority. The appellate court found that the order excluded days from the computation of time under MCR 1.108, making Carter's filing timely. DTN Management appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that Administrative Orders 2020-3 and 2020-18 were constitutional exercises of the Court's authority under Const 1963, art 6, §§ 4 and 5. The Court determined that these orders affected the computation of time rather than tolling the statute of limitations, which is within the Court's power to regulate practice and procedure. The Court concluded that Carter's lawsuit was timely filed, as the days during the state of emergency were not counted in the limitations period. Consequently, the trial court's grant of summary disposition was improper. The Court of Appeals judgment was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the Ingham Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Carter V DTN Management Company" on Justia Law

Jane Doe, a minor, alleged that the Alpena Public School District and the Alpena Board of Education created a sexually hostile educational environment by failing to adequately respond to repeated unwanted sexual contact by another student, John Roe. Doe claimed this violated the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA). The defendants sought summary disposition, arguing that student-on-student harassment is not actionable under the ELCRA and that Doe failed to meet the elements of a hostile-environment claim.The Alpena Circuit Court granted the defendants' motion for summary disposition, agreeing that the ELCRA does not cover student-on-student harassment and that Doe did not establish a genuine issue of material fact. The Michigan Court of Appeals partially reversed, holding that the ELCRA could apply under the in loco parentis doctrine, but affirmed the summary disposition on the grounds that the defendants took appropriate remedial action.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the ELCRA does not provide a vicarious-liability cause of action against educational institutions for student-on-student sexual harassment. The Court found no statutory basis for applying the in loco parentis doctrine to impose vicarious liability on schools under the ELCRA. The Court reversed the part of the Court of Appeals' judgment that relied on vicarious liability and vacated the part affirming summary disposition. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine if the trial court correctly granted summary disposition under a direct liability theory and whether such a claim exists under the ELCRA. View "Doe V Alpena Public School District" on Justia Law

In the first case, a young woman with severe headaches due to excess brain fluid had a shunt catheter implanted. She later returned to the emergency room with worsening symptoms, and a brain scan was performed. Dr. Swofford, a diagnostic radiologist, verified the scan results, but the emergency procedure to relieve her brain pressure failed, and she died. The plaintiff, representing the decedent's estate, sued Dr. Swofford and his practice for medical malpractice. The trial court ruled that the relevant specialty was diagnostic radiology, not neuroradiology, and thus excluded the plaintiff's neuroradiologist expert. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding neuroradiology to be the relevant specialty, allowing the expert to testify.In the second case, a plaintiff sued Dr. Colton for medical malpractice after multiple rhinoplasties resulted in a nasal deformity. Dr. Colton was certified in otolaryngology and facial plastic and reconstructive surgery. The plaintiff's expert, Dr. Armstrong, had the same certifications but spent most of his time on otolaryngology. The trial court found the expert's qualifications unclear and denied a motion to strike his testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the relevant specialty was facial plastic and reconstructive surgery, and excluded the expert because he did not spend the majority of his time in that specialty.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed both cases. It held that the Woodard decision, which conflated "specialty" and "subspecialty," was incorrect. The Court clarified that "specialty" refers to general board certifications recognized by major certifying entities and does not require matching subspecialties. In Stokes, the Court affirmed that diagnostic radiology was the relevant specialty, allowing the neuroradiologist to testify. In Selliman, the Court remanded the case to determine whether facial plastic and reconstructive surgery is a subspecialty, requiring further fact-finding by the trial court. View "Estate Of Horn v. Swofford" on Justia Law

In 2021, Brian McLain filed a negligence lawsuit against the Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, and Father Richard Lobert, alleging sexual abuse by Lobert in 1999 when McLain was a minor. McLain claimed he only discovered the causal link between the abuse and his psychological injuries in 2020 during therapy. The defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing the claims were time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations. McLain countered that MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) allowed the claim because it was filed within three years of discovering the causal link.The Livingston Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions, agreeing with McLain that MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) changed the accrual date for claims by minor victims of criminal sexual conduct. The Diocese and the Archdiocese appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) did not change the accrual date and did not apply retroactively to revive McLain's claim. McLain then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that MCL 600.5851b(1)(b) creates a discovery rule for measuring the accrual date for claims related to criminal sexual conduct occurring after the statute’s effective date. However, it does not apply retroactively to revive expired claims. Therefore, McLain's claim, which accrued in 1999 and was subject to a three-year statute of limitations, was untimely. The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, remanding the case for entry of summary disposition in favor of the Diocese. View "Mclain v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Lansing" on Justia Law

Lynda Danhoff and her husband, Daniel Danhoff, filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Daniel K. Fahim, M.D., and others, alleging that Fahim and Kenneth P. D’Andrea, D.O., had committed malpractice by perforating Lynda’s sigmoid colon during a surgical procedure. Following the procedure, Lynda experienced complications, including pain, fever, and elevated body temperature and blood pressure. A CT scan revealed that there was “free air and free material” outside Lynda’s colon, and Lynda had to have another surgical procedure to correct this issue. Lynda had four more surgeries to correct the perforation, which led to permanent medical conditions.The defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiffs had failed to establish the standard of care or causation. The trial court found that the affidavit of merit submitted by plaintiffs’ expert was not sufficiently reliable to admit his testimony because the expert had failed to cite any published medical literature or other authority to support his opinion that defendants had breached the standard of care. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration and submitted another affidavit from their expert. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that the opinions of plaintiffs’ expert still were not supported by reliable principles and methods or by the relevant community of experts. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.The Michigan Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower courts' decisions. The Supreme Court held that the trial court abused its discretion by inadequately assessing the reliability of a standard-of-care expert witness without appropriately analyzing the proposed testimony under MRE 702 or the reliability factors of MCL 600.2955. The court emphasized that neither MRE 702 nor MCL 600.2955 requires a trial court to exclude the testimony of a plaintiff’s expert on the basis of the plaintiff’s failure to support their expert’s claims with published literature. The court concluded that the lower courts erred by focusing so strictly on plaintiffs’ inability to support their expert’s opinions with published literature such that it was inadmissible under MRE 702. The case was reversed and remanded. View "Danhoff v. Fahim" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute over who should pay for the personal injury protection (PIP) benefits of Justin Childers, who was severely injured in a car accident. Initially, Childers' PIP benefits were covered by American Fellowship Mutual Insurance Company, but the company was declared insolvent in 2013. The Michigan Property and Casualty Guaranty Association (MPCGA) then assumed responsibility for Childers' PIP benefits. The MPCGA, after an investigation, concluded that Progressive Marathon Insurance Company was next in line to provide Childers' PIP benefits. However, Progressive denied Childers' claim.The trial court granted summary disposition to Progressive, ruling that while the actions were not time-barred, Progressive was not within statutory priority for Childers' benefits. The Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that the one-year limitations period did not apply because the MPCGA is not generally subject to the no-fault act, and the MPCGA did not bring the action under the no-fault act. Instead, the Court of Appeals reasoned that the MPCGA’s right to proceed against Progressive came from the guaranty act, which allows the MPCGA to claim reimbursement from another insurer in the chain of designated priority insurers.The Michigan Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals. It held that the one-year limitations period in MCL 500.3145(1) applies where either an insured or the MPCGA brings an action for PIP benefits against a lower priority no-fault insurer after the higher priority insurer becomes insolvent. The court concluded that both the action brought by Childers' conservator and the MPCGA's action were time-barred. The court reversed part of the Court of Appeals' opinion, vacated the remainder, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Childers v. Progressive Marathon Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Long Lake Township and Todd and Heather Maxon. The township alleged that the Maxons were storing junk cars on their property, violating a zoning ordinance, a nuisance law, and a 2008 settlement agreement. As the property was not visible from the street, the township hired a drone operator to take aerial photographs and video of the property without the Maxons' permission or a warrant. The Maxons moved to suppress the aerial photographs and all other evidence obtained by the township from the drone, asserting that the search was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.The Grand Traverse Circuit Court denied the Maxons’ motion, reasoning that the drone surveillance did not constitute a search. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that the drone surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. The township appealed to the Supreme Court, which ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding whether the exclusionary rule applied to the facts of this case. The Supreme Court then vacated its earlier order and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the exclusionary rule applied. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in a split decision, held that the exclusionary rule did not apply and that the photographs and video could not be suppressed regardless of whether the township unreasonably searched the Maxons’ property.The Michigan Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that the exclusionary rule may not be applied to civil enforcement proceedings that effectuate local zoning and nuisance ordinances and seek only prospective, injunctive relief. The court found that the costs of excluding the drone evidence outweighed the benefits of suppressing it, and the exclusionary rule therefore did not apply. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Long Lake Township v. Maxon" on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, addressed the applicability of the Recreational Land Use Act (RUA) and the owner-liability provision of the Michigan Vehicle Code to a case involving a fatal off-road vehicle (ORV) accident. The accident occurred on private land owned by the defendants, also the grandparents and vehicle owners, and involved their 12-year-old granddaughter. The plaintiff, mother of the deceased, sought to hold the defendants liable.The court held that the RUA, which limits a landowner's liability for injuries occurring during recreational activity on their property to instances of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, applies in this case. It found that the RUA applies to the plaintiff's proposed owner-liability claim, which is premised on the defendants' ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. The court reasoned that the longstanding nature of owner liability when the RUA was enacted, the RUA's detailed provisions and lack of an exception for owner liability, and the optimal effect given to both statutes under this interpretation, indicate that the legislature intended the RUA to limit owner liability under the Michigan Vehicle Code.Since the plaintiff did not challenge the lower court's finding that there was no factual support for gross negligence on the part of the defendants, the court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. View "Estate Of Riley Robinson v. Robinson" on Justia Law