Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The case involves a dispute over the issuance of medical marijuana dispensary licenses in the city of Warren. In 2019, the Warren City Council adopted an ordinance to regulate these licenses, which involved a Review Committee scoring and ranking applications. The Review Committee held 16 closed meetings to review 65 applications and made recommendations to the city council, which then approved the top 15 applicants without further discussion. Plaintiffs, who were denied licenses, sued, alleging violations of the Open Meetings Act (OMA) and due process.The Macomb Circuit Court found that the Review Committee violated the OMA and invalidated the licenses issued by the city council. The court held that the Review Committee was a public body subject to the OMA and that the city council's approval process was flawed. Defendants and intervening defendants appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the Review Committee was not a public body under the OMA because it only had an advisory role, and the city council retained final decision-making authority. The appellate court also upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' due process claims.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that the Review Committee was a public body subject to the OMA because it effectively decided which applicants would receive licenses by scoring and ranking them, and the city council merely adopted these recommendations without independent consideration. The court emphasized that the actual operation of the Review Committee, rather than just the language of the ordinance, determined its status as a public body. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to consider whether the open meetings held by the Review Committee cured the OMA violations and to address other preserved issues. View "Pinebrook Warren LLC v. City Of Warren" on Justia Law

In 2018, Michigan's Legislature received initiative petitions proposing the Improved Workforce Opportunity Wage Act and the Earned Sick Time Act. The Legislature adopted these initiatives without changes, preventing them from appearing on the ballot. However, during the lame duck session after the election, the Legislature significantly amended both laws, effectively nullifying their original intent.The plaintiffs challenged these amendments in the Court of Claims, arguing they were unconstitutional under Article 2, § 9 of the Michigan Constitution. The Court of Claims agreed, ruling that the Legislature could not adopt and then amend an initiative in the same session. The court declared the amendments void and reinstated the original initiatives. The state appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the decision, holding that the Legislature could amend an initiative in the same session since the Constitution did not explicitly prohibit it.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that Article 2, § 9 provides the Legislature with only three options upon receiving a valid initiative petition: adopt it without change, reject it, or propose an alternative to be voted on alongside the original. The Court ruled that adopting and then amending an initiative in the same session violated the people's right to propose and enact laws through the initiative process. Consequently, the amendments were declared unconstitutional. The Court ordered that the original initiatives would go into effect 205 days after the opinion's publication, with adjustments for inflation and a revised schedule for minimum wage increases. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed. View "Mothering Justice v. Attorney General" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Wayne Circuit Court of three counts of torture, three counts of unlawful imprisonment, one count of felonious assault, and one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The defendant held his wife and their two children at gunpoint in their home, threatening to kill them and burn down the house. The court sentenced the defendant to various prison terms for these convictions and placed him on the sex-offender registry as a Tier I offender under the Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA) because two of the unlawful imprisonment convictions involved minors.The defendant appealed his convictions, arguing insufficient evidence for the torture convictions and that his placement on the sex-offender registry violated constitutional protections against cruel or unusual punishment. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded the case to remove the defendant from the sex-offender registry, concluding that imposing SORA for a crime lacking a sexual component constituted cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution. The defendant sought further appeal, and the prosecution cross-appealed regarding the removal from SORA.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the application of SORA to non-sexual offenders like the defendant constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution. The Court found that the 2021 SORA, despite legislative intent as a civil regulation, imposed punitive effects that outweighed this intent when applied to non-sexual offenders. The Court emphasized that the registry's requirements and the social stigma attached to being labeled a sex offender were excessive and not rationally related to the nonpunitive purpose of public safety. Consequently, the Court vacated the part of the Court of Appeals opinion that extended beyond non-sexual offenders and affirmed the judgment that the defendant and similar offenders should be removed from the sex-offender registry. View "People Of Michigan v. Lymon" on Justia Law

Karen Carter filed a lawsuit against DTN Management Company after she slipped and fell on an icy sidewalk at her apartment complex on January 10, 2018. She alleged negligence and breach of statutory duties. Carter filed her complaint on April 13, 2021. DTN Management moved for summary disposition, arguing that the claim was time-barred by the three-year statute of limitations. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that Administrative Order No. 2020-3, which extended certain filing deadlines during the COVID-19 state of emergency, was within the Michigan Supreme Court's authority. The appellate court found that the order excluded days from the computation of time under MCR 1.108, making Carter's filing timely. DTN Management appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that Administrative Orders 2020-3 and 2020-18 were constitutional exercises of the Court's authority under Const 1963, art 6, §§ 4 and 5. The Court determined that these orders affected the computation of time rather than tolling the statute of limitations, which is within the Court's power to regulate practice and procedure. The Court concluded that Carter's lawsuit was timely filed, as the days during the state of emergency were not counted in the limitations period. Consequently, the trial court's grant of summary disposition was improper. The Court of Appeals judgment was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the Ingham Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Carter V DTN Management Company" on Justia Law

In the first case, Kent County foreclosed on the homes of Matthew Schafer and Harry and Lilly Hucklebury for unpaid taxes. The properties were sold at auction in 2017, and the county retained the surplus proceeds beyond the owed taxes. Following the Michigan Supreme Court's 2020 decision in Rafaeli, LLC v Oakland Co, which held that retaining surplus proceeds from tax-foreclosure sales is an unconstitutional taking, the Schafer plaintiffs filed a lawsuit seeking those proceeds. The Kent Circuit Court denied the county's motion to dismiss, ruling that Rafaeli applied retroactively. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.In the second case, the state of Michigan, acting as the foreclosing governmental unit (FGU) for Shiawassee County, foreclosed on property owned by Lynette Hathon and Amy Jo Denkins in 2018. The state retained the surplus proceeds from the sale. The Hathon plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit in the Court of Claims, which certified the class and denied the state's motion for summary disposition. After Rafaeli, the plaintiffs moved for summary disposition, and the state moved to revoke class certification. The Court of Claims granted the state's motion to revoke class certification but later recertified an amended class. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Claims' decisions.The Michigan Supreme Court held that Rafaeli applies retroactively to claims not yet final as of July 17, 2020. The court also ruled that MCL 211.78t, which provides a procedure for processing claims under Rafaeli, applies retroactively, while the new two-year limitations period in MCL 211.78l applies prospectively. Claims that arose before December 22, 2020, but expired between that date and the court's decision must be allowed to proceed if filed within a reasonable time. The court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision in Schafer and remanded the case for further proceedings. In Hathon, the court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment affirming class recertification and remanded the case to the Court of Claims for reconsideration. View "Schafer v. Kent County" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury of being a violent felon in possession of body armor after driving from Michigan into Canada without paying a toll. He was arrested by a Canadian customs agent, Officer Lavers, and returned to the U.S., where American customs agent Officer Stockwell took custody of him and a bulletproof vest. The Canadian government did not allow Lavers to testify at trial. The defendant moved to exclude evidence of the vest, arguing it violated the Confrontation Clause since Lavers could not testify. The trial court denied the motion but barred testimony about statements made by Lavers. At trial, Stockwell testified about taking custody of the defendant and the vest based on communications with Lavers. Other evidence included the defendant’s statements about wearing the vest due to threats.The trial court denied the defendant’s motion to vacate the conviction, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, finding that Lavers’s out-of-court statement was testimonial and admitted in violation of the Confrontation Clause. The court also found the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because the only other evidence supporting the vest’s admission violated the corpus delicti rule. The case was remanded for a new trial. The prosecution appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that a defendant’s right to confrontation is violated when a trial witness’s testimony introduces the substance of an unavailable witness’s out-of-court statement if it leads to a clear and logical inference that the statement was testimonial. The court affirmed that the Confrontation Clause was violated but found the Court of Appeals erred in applying the corpus delicti rule to the defendant’s statements. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to determine if the Confrontation Clause violation was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "People of Michigan v. Washington" on Justia Law

Police officers observed a parked car with its engine running in an elementary school parking lot at 10:00 p.m. They parked their patrol car 10 feet behind the parked car at a 45-degree angle, with headlights and a spotlight directed at the car. The officers approached the car, noticed signs of intoxication from the driver, and arrested him after he failed field sobriety tests. The driver later consented to a blood draw and admitted to drinking alcohol.The Oakland Circuit Court denied the defendant's motion to suppress evidence of intoxication, arguing it was the result of an unlawful seizure. The Court of Appeals denied interlocutory leave to appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine when the defendant was first seized for Fourth Amendment purposes. On remand, the trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the defendant was seized when the patrol car parked behind him. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the defendant was not seized when the patrol car parked 10 feet away at a 45-degree angle.The Michigan Supreme Court held that a seizure may occur when a police vehicle partially blocks a defendant’s egress if the totality of the circumstances indicates that a reasonable person would not have felt free to leave. The Court found that the defendant was seized before the officers observed signs of intoxication, considering the police conduct, the time, and the setting. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to determine whether the officer had reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct when the defendant was initially seized. View "People of Michigan v. Duff" on Justia Law

Stephanie Wilson was driving a 2006 Saturn Ion with Malcolm Smith as a passenger when they were pulled over by a police officer surveilling a house for narcotics activity. The officer observed what he believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction involving Smith. After stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer found five empty syringes but no drugs. Wilson denied the officer's claim that she admitted to driving Smith to purchase drugs. The vehicle was seized, and nearly four months later, forfeiture proceedings were initiated.The Wayne Circuit Court granted summary disposition in favor of Wilson, finding that the officer's observation of a hand-to-hand transaction did not necessarily involve drugs. The court did not specify the grounds for its ruling. The plaintiff's motions for reconsideration and relief from judgment were denied. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Wilson used her vehicle to facilitate a drug purchase, making it subject to forfeiture.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that under MCL 333.7521(1)(d), a vehicle is subject to forfeiture only if it is used to transport illicit property for the purpose of its sale or receipt. The Court found that the elements of the statute were not concurrently fulfilled in this case. Specifically, while Wilson's vehicle was used to drive to a location where drugs were purchased, there was no evidence that the vehicle was used to transport drugs for the purpose of sale or receipt. Therefore, the vehicle was not subject to forfeiture under the statute. The Wayne Circuit Court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of Wilson was reinstated. View "In Re Forfeiture Of 2006 Saturn Ion" on Justia Law

In 1993, William E. Neilly was convicted of first-degree felony murder, felon in possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. However, subsequent rulings by the United States Supreme Court deemed mandatory life without parole sentences for defendants who committed crimes when under the age of 18 years old as unconstitutional. As a result, Neilly was resentenced to 35 to 60 years in prison. The trial court also ordered Neilly to pay $14,895.78 in restitution to the victim’s family for funeral expenses.Neilly appealed the restitution order, arguing that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. He contended that the trial court ordered restitution under the current restitution statutes rather than the former restitution statutes in effect when he was originally sentenced in 1993. The Court of Appeals rejected Neilly’s argument, reasoning that restitution is a civil remedy and not punishment, and its imposition did not result in an increase in punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clauses.The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that restitution imposed under the current statutes is a civil remedy, not a criminal punishment. Therefore, applying the restitution statutes to defendants whose criminal acts predate the enactment of the restitution statutes does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. The court concluded that the trial court’s restitution order was affirmed. View "People v. Neilly" on Justia Law

John M. Burkman and Jacob A. Wohl were charged with bribing or intimidating voters, conspiracy to bribe or intimidate voters, and two counts of using a computer to commit a crime. The charges stemmed from a robocall they designed and financed in 2020, which targeted voters in Michigan areas with significant Black populations. The robocall claimed that voting by mail would result in the voter’s personal information becoming part of a public database used by the police to track down old warrants, by credit card companies to collect debt, and potentially by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to track people for mandatory vaccines. The district court found probable cause to believe that the defendants had committed the charged offenses and bound them over for trial. The defendants moved to quash the bindovers, arguing that the robocall was not a “menace” or “other corrupt means or device” under the relevant statute and that the statute was unconstitutional. The circuit court denied the motions.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the defendants’ conduct fell within the term “menace” as used in the relevant statute. However, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the defendants’ conduct fell within the statutory catchall term “other corrupt means or device.” The Supreme Court also held that the defendants’ conduct was not excluded from constitutional free-speech protections under the true-threat exception, but erred by holding that the defendants’ conduct was excluded from constitutional free-speech protections under the speech-integral-to-criminal-conduct exception. The Supreme Court adopted a limiting construction of the statute’s catchall provision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "People v. Burkman" on Justia Law