Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Joshua L-J Stewart was convicted by jury on three counts of armed robbery; assault with intent to commit murder; receiving and concealing stolen property valued between $1,000 and $20,000; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant allegedly aided and abetted two other individuals in two armed robberies by serving as the getaway driver. Two of the victims were shot by the perpetrators during the robberies, and one of the victims died as a result of his injuries. Defendant was arrested and questioned after he drove one of the perpetrators to the hospital in the vehicle used in the robberies. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress statements he made during his police interview, arguing that the statements were involuntary because of coercive interview techniques and promises of leniency by the interrogating officers. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence given in the police interview. The totality of the circumstances of defendant’s interrogation, including his age, the timing of the interview, the officers’ references to leniency, the officers’ use of falsehoods, and the officers’ overall tone and use of language, created an environment in which defendant’s free will was overborne and the statements he gave were involuntary. "The use of these statements at trial violated defendant’s constitutional rights, and he was entitled to a new trial." View "Michigan v. Stewart" on Justia Law

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Defendant Dametrius Posey and a codefendant were tried jointly before a jury on multiple counts of assault with intent to murder; assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder; carrying a weapon with unlawful intent; being a felon in possession of a firearm; and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. While the appeal was pending, defendant and the prosecution moved jointly to remand for resentencing because of several errors during the sentencing hearing. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded for resentencing. The trial court ultimately imposed the same minimum sentence as defendant’s original sentence, 264 months, which was within the revised guidelines range. The Court of Appeals then affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court found this case "unique: Unlike in prior cases, the witness who identified defendant at trial did not identify defendant before trial; the witness’s first recorded identification of defendant as an assailant occurred at trial. In fact, the witness identified different individuals as possible assailants before trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that the reliability criteria could not be applied given that there was no improper law-enforcement activity and no pretrial identification of defendant obtained through an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial process." The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court on that point and vacated that portion of its opinion. However, the Court nonetheless affirmed defendant’s convictions because he has not shown plain error affecting his substantial rights. The Court opined on defendant's request for review of his sentence: challenges to within-guidelines sentences may be reviewed for reasonableness. The case was remanded to the appellate court for such reasonableness review. "n all other respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court." View "Michigan v. Posey" on Justia Law

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Frank King was charged as a fourth-offense habitual offender with breaking and entering. Before trial, defendant moved to proceed in propria persona and to terminate his relationship with his appointed counsel. The trial court granted defendant’s motion but kept appointed counsel to serve as defendant’s advisory counsel. On the first day of trial, defendant pleaded no contest in exchange for an agreement pursuant to Michigan v. Cobbs, 443 Mich 276 (1993), capping his minimum sentence at 72 months, to be served concurrently with a sentence defendant was already serving in an unrelated case. Defendant’s advisory counsel apparently handled details of the plea negotiations, and advisory counsel indicated during sentencing that he had worked out the Cobbs agreement with the prosecution. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the Cobbs agreement, but he later filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals. Defendant argued that his conviction should have been reversed because he was denied the right to counsel at critical stages of the proceeding because his waiver of counsel was invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was indeed invalid, and he was deprived of counsel during critical stages of the proceedings, requiring automatic reversal. View "Michigan v. King" on Justia Law

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Defendant Menayetta Yeager was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of her boyfriend, Jonte Brooks. In 2017, Brooks punched defendant in the face with a gun when defendant informed him, while they were sitting in defendant’s minivan, that she no longer wanted to be in a relationship with him. Brooks then pulled defendant out of the van by her hair and repeatedly hit her, after which he got back into defendant’s van and used it to chase after her, attempting to run her over before eventually driving away. A neighbor, who witnessed some of the encounter, went over to defendant and agreed to take her to try to retrieve her van. While defendant was talking on her cellphone with Brooks to make those arrangements, Brooks repeatedly threatened to kill both defendant and the neighbor. Ultimately, Brooks pulled into a gas station behind the neighbor’s vehicle, defendant got out of the neighbor’s vehicle during the continued argument with Brooks, and defendant pulled out a gun and shot at Brooks multiple times. Brooks ultimately died from a bullet wound to his chest. After appealing her conviction, the Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court for a Ginther hearing to determine whether trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. On remand, trial counsel testified that he did not request a voluntary manslaughter instruction because he believed that instruction to be mutually exclusive of the self-defense theory asserted at trial. The court then concluded that trial counsel erred by not requesting the voluntary manslaughter instruction because, had the instruction been requested, a reasonable juror could have found defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than first-degree murder. For that reason, the trial court granted a new trial. After remand, the prosecution cross-appealed the trial court order, arguing that trial counsel was not ineffective, and that even if he was, defendant had not been prejudiced. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a new trial. View "Michigan v. Yeager" on Justia Law

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Two freelance journalists, Spencer Woodman and George Joseph, brought separate actions at the Michigan Court of Claims against the Michigan Department of Corrections (the MDOC), arguing that the MDOC wrongfully denied their requests under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiffs sought video and audio recordings of a prisoner altercation that resulted in the death of inmate Dustin Szot. The MDOC denied their FOIA requests, claiming the records were exempt from disclosure. Plaintiffs and the MDOC both moved for summary judgment. The Court of Claims ordered the MDOC to disclose the audio recording to plaintiffs and to produce the videos for an in camera review. The trial court permitted the MDOC to submit the videos in a format that obscured the faces of the employees and prisoners in the videos to protect those individuals. However, the MDOC provided the unredacted videos for in camera review. The Court of Claims ultimately ordered the MDOC to disclose the unredacted videos to plaintiffs. The MDOC moved for reconsideration, arguing that it did not need to disclose the videos or, alternatively, that it should have been allowed to redact the videos by blurring the faces of the individuals in the videos. The Court of Claims denied the motion but nevertheless permitted the MDOC to make the requested redactions and permitted plaintiffs’ counsel to view both the redacted and unredacted videos. Plaintiffs challenged the trial court’s reduced amount of attorney fees and the denial of punitive damages. The MDOC cross-appealed, challenging only the trial court’s determination that plaintiffs prevailed in full and thus were entitled to attorney fees under FOIA. The Michigan Supreme Court determined plaintiffs prevailed under MCL 15.240(6) because the action was reasonably necessary to compel the disclosure of the records and because plaintiffs obtained everything they initially sought; accordingly, the court was required to award reasonable attorney fees. Furthermore, pro bono representation was not an appropriate factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of attorney fees; accordingly, the Court of Claims abused its discretion by reducing the attorney-fee award to plaintiffs' law firm on the basis of the firm's pro bono representation of plaintiffs. View "Woodman v. Department Of Corrections" on Justia Law

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Carrie Pueblo brought an action against her former domestic partner, Rachel Haas seeking joint custody and parenting time for a child whom Haas conceived through in vitro fertilization and gave birth to in 2008, during the parties’ relationship. Haas moved for summary judgment, arguing that because the parties had never married and Pueblo had no biological or adoptive relationship to the child, Pueblo lacked standing to sue and also failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted. The trial court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice. After Haas moved for reconsideration, the trial court dismissed the action with prejudice. Pueblo then filed her own motion for reconsideration, arguing that she had standing as a natural parent, despite the lack of genetic connection, following the Court of Appeals decision in LeFever v. Matthews, 336 Mich App 651 (2021), which expanded the definition of “natural parent” to include unmarried women who gave birth as surrogates but shared no genetic connection with the children. Pueblo also argued the trial court order violated her Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection, as well as those of the child. Furthermore, Pueblo argued that any dismissal should have been without prejudice. The trial court denied reconsideration, distinguishing LeFever on the ground that Pueblo had not given birth to the child. Pueblo appealed, reasserting her previous arguments and further asserting that the equitable-parent doctrine should extend to the parties’ relationship, which had been solemnized in a civil commitment ceremony when it was not yet legal in Michigan for same-sex partners to marry. The Court of Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the trial court. Because Michigan unconstitutionally prohibited same-sex couples from marrying before Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 US 644 (2015), the Michigan Supreme Court narrowly extended the equitable-parent doctrine as "a step toward righting the wrongs done by that unconstitutional prohibition. A person seeking custody who demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the parties would have married before the child’s conception or birth but for Michigan’s unconstitutional marriage ban is entitled to make their case for equitable parenthood to seek custody." The trial court's judgment was reversed and the case remanded for that court to apply the threshold test for standing announced here. View "Pueblo v. Haas" on Justia Law

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The Macomb County Prosecutor sought to appeal the Parole Board’s grant of parole to Richard McBrayer, a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. The Parole Board intervened. In 1994, McBrayer pleaded guilty of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving his stepdaughter when she was 12 to 14 years old. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 to 40 years in prison; the minimum sentences represented the top of the then-controlling judicial sentencing guidelines range. McBrayer became eligible for parole in January 2010 after accumulating disciplinary credits through the years. In 2011, 2015, and 2018, the Parole Board granted McBrayer parole, but the board’s grant of parole was overturned each time after the victim, or the prosecutor, appealed. In 2020, the board again considered McBrayer for, and granted him, parole. McBrayer’s parole-guidelines score of +11, indicated a high probability of parole, and the board found facts to support the grant. The prosecutor again appealed the board’s decision. After reviewing the evidence in the record, the court reversed the board’s grant of parole, reasoning that there had been no improvement in McBrayer’s circumstances from the time he was last considered for parole. In a split unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, reasoning that there were substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the parole guidelines—namely, the heinous nature of the crimes, the impact of the crimes on the victim, skepticism about McBrayer’s rehabilitation, and concerns with the efficacy of his parole plans. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals majority applied the wrong analysis and ignored the discretion that the Legislature has assigned to the Parole Board. Applying the proper analysis, the Supreme Court concluded the Parole Board did not abuse its discretion. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Parole Board’s grant of parole. View "In re Parole of Richard Allen McBrayer" on Justia Law

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Defendant Candace Guyton pled guilty to one count of armed robbery. As part of the plea deal, the prosecution agreed not to pursue charges against defendant in an unrelated case and to recommend a sentence within the guidelines minimum range of 51 to 85 months in prison. The prosecutor also agreed to dismiss the supplemental information charging defendant as a third-offense habitual offender. However, the amended felony information wrongly classified defendant as a third-felony offender by counting a single prior conviction twice; in fact, defendant was eligible to be charged only as a second-offense habitual offender. The trial court sentenced defendant at the top of the agreed-upon guidelines range to 84 months to 60 years in prison. Defendant later moved to withdraw her plea, arguing that it was involuntary and unknowing given that defendant was told she was avoiding a third-offense habitual-offender enhancement. The trial court denied the motion, agreeing with the prosecution that defendant had received benefit from the plea despite the error. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion. After its review, the Michigan Supreme Court determined the misinformation regarding defendant’s habitual-offender enhancement rendered defendant’s guilty plea involuntary and unknowing. Accordingly, the case had to be remanded to the trial court to give defendant the opportunity to elect to allow her plea to stand or withdraw her plea. View "Michigan v. Guyton" on Justia Law

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Robert Yarbrough, Jr., was convicted by jury of: kidnapping; assault with intent to do great bodily harm; felonious assault; and three counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct. During voir dire, the trial court informed counsel for both parties that neither party would be allowed to exercise peremptory challenges to excuse any prospective jurors other than newly seated prospective jurors who had replaced those prospective jurors who had been previously dismissed. Defense counsel objected to the court’s policy and requested a new venire, but the court overruled counsel’s objection and a jury was empaneled. Defendant appealed his convictions and the Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Defendant appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, which initially held defendant’s application for leave to appeal in abeyance pending its decision in Michigan v. Kabongo, 507 Mich 78 (2021). Following its decision in Kabongo, the Court granted defendant’s application. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's policy was unconstitutional: "because the right to exercise peremptory challenges would be virtually eliminated by the application of that standard, automatic reversal is the appropriate remedy for the erroneous denial of a defendant’s peremptory challenge when the error was preserved and no curative action was taken." View "Michigan v. Yarbrough" on Justia Law

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Defendant Roberto Dupree and two accomplices robbed a store in Clinton Township, Michigan in late 2012. Only one of the three robbers was armed.The issue in this case was the proper scoring of Offense Variables 1 and 2, which concerned the possession or use of a weapon during the commission of a crime. Because there was no contention that defendant possessed a weapon during the offense at issue, and because no other offender was assessed points for either offense variable, both offense variables should have been scored at zero points. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this regard and remanded for resentencing. View "Michigan v. Dupree" on Justia Law