Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involves a dispute between Darren Findling, a professional guardian, and Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Findling was appointed as the guardian for two individuals, Mary Ann Malloy and Dana Jenkins, who were incapacitated due to automobile accidents. Findling, along with employees of his law firm, provided various guardianship services to Malloy and Jenkins, and sought reimbursement from Auto-Owners for these services under the no-fault act. Auto-Owners declined to reimburse for the services performed by the employees of Findling’s law firm, arguing that the services were not lawfully rendered.The Oakland County Probate Court granted Findling’s motions for partial summary disposition, ruling in favor of Findling. Auto-Owners appealed, but the Court of Appeals initially denied the appeal. The Supreme Court then remanded the cases to the Court of Appeals for consideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that a guardian is only required to comply with certain statutory provisions to lawfully delegate guardianship powers, but not duties, to employees.The Supreme Court of Michigan, in a unanimous opinion, held that a professional guardian cannot, without executing a power of attorney complying with certain statutory provisions, lawfully delegate to employees their final decision-making authority over a guardianship “power” that is explicitly listed in the statute or over any guardianship task that alters or impairs the incapacitated individual’s rights, duties, liabilities, or legal relations. However, a professional guardian may lawfully have employees assist in exercising a guardianship power and may have employees perform any other guardianship task on behalf of the professional guardian. The Supreme Court vacated the decisions of the lower courts and remanded the cases for further proceedings. View "In Re Guardianship Of Mary Ann Malloy" on Justia Law

Two employees, Richard Miller and Brent Whitman, filed a lawsuit against the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC), alleging they were terminated in retaliation for their close friendship with Cedric Griffey, a deputy warden who was targeted by the MDOC after his wife, Lisa Griffey, filed a complaint and lawsuit against the MDOC for racial harassment. The plaintiffs claimed their termination was a violation of the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (ELCRA).The Genesee Circuit Court denied the MDOC's motion for summary disposition, which argued that the plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the ELCRA because they had not personally engaged in any protected conduct. The MDOC appealed this decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court's ruling, concluding that the ELCRA did not authorize the plaintiffs' claims.The Michigan Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court held that the ELCRA does provide a cause of action for associational or "third party" retaliation claims. The court found that the plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged such a claim, stating that they had a close relationship with Cedric Griffey and that the MDOC took adverse action against them in response to Griffey's protected acts. The court concluded that the plaintiffs' firings were part of the effort to retaliate against Griffey, and thus, they had stated a cause of action under the ELCRA. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Miller v. Michigan Department Of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Long Lake Township and Todd and Heather Maxon. The township alleged that the Maxons were storing junk cars on their property, violating a zoning ordinance, a nuisance law, and a 2008 settlement agreement. As the property was not visible from the street, the township hired a drone operator to take aerial photographs and video of the property without the Maxons' permission or a warrant. The Maxons moved to suppress the aerial photographs and all other evidence obtained by the township from the drone, asserting that the search was illegal under the Fourth Amendment.The Grand Traverse Circuit Court denied the Maxons’ motion, reasoning that the drone surveillance did not constitute a search. The Court of Appeals, in a split decision, reversed the lower court's ruling, holding that the drone surveillance violated the Fourth Amendment. The township appealed to the Supreme Court, which ordered the parties to file supplemental briefs regarding whether the exclusionary rule applied to the facts of this case. The Supreme Court then vacated its earlier order and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration of whether the exclusionary rule applied. On remand, the Court of Appeals, in a split decision, held that the exclusionary rule did not apply and that the photographs and video could not be suppressed regardless of whether the township unreasonably searched the Maxons’ property.The Michigan Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, held that the exclusionary rule may not be applied to civil enforcement proceedings that effectuate local zoning and nuisance ordinances and seek only prospective, injunctive relief. The court found that the costs of excluding the drone evidence outweighed the benefits of suppressing it, and the exclusionary rule therefore did not apply. The decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Long Lake Township v. Maxon" on Justia Law

The case involves Daniel L. Renner, a groundskeeper for Saginaw County, Michigan, who was part of a bargaining unit represented by the Technical, Professional, and Officeworkers Association of Michigan (the Union). Renner opted out of dues-paying membership with the Union in 2017. In 2018, Renner filed a complaint with his employer, alleging that a coworker smoked around him, which was injurious to his health. When Renner attempted to commence a formal grievance procedure, he was informed that only the Union could pursue the grievance procedure. The Union, however, required Renner to pay a fee for its assistance with the grievance under its pay-for-service policy for nonmembers. Renner refused to pay the fee, the Union did not provide assistance, and the deadline for pursuing the grievance expired.Renner filed an unfair labor practice charge with the Michigan Employment Relations Commission (MERC) against the Union, alleging that the Union violated its duty of fair representation by refusing to represent him in a grievance with his employer unless Renner paid a fee for direct representation services. An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of Renner, concluding that the direct service fee was not permitted under the public employment relations act (PERA) or the collective bargaining agreement and that it constituted an unfair labor practice. MERC adopted the decision of the ALJ, and the Union appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed MERC’s decision.The Union sought leave to appeal in the Michigan Supreme Court, which granted the Union’s application in part. The Supreme Court held that under the 2014 version of PERA, a public sector union that is the exclusive bargaining representative of a bargaining unit violates the union’s duty of fair representation by requiring an employee in that bargaining unit who is not a member of the union to pay a fee for the union’s representative services when the union’s pay-for-service policy denies the nonmember employee access to the grievance administration process under the collective bargaining agreement. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and the decision of MERC. View "Technical, Professional, and Officeworkers Assn v. Renner" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Pegasus Wind, LLC's request for variances to construct eight additional wind turbines near the Tuscola Area Airport. The Tuscola Area Airport Zoning Board of Appeals (AZBA) denied the variances, citing that the turbines would pose a danger to pilots during in-flight emergencies, create potential choke points for pilots flying under visual flight rules (VFR) restrictions, increase the minimum descent altitude, and interfere with the airport's primary radar. Pegasus appealed the decision to the circuit court, which affirmed the AZBA's denial.The circuit court's decision was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's decision, concluding that the evidence supporting Pegasus's position was more persuasive than the evidence relied on by the AZBA. The Court of Appeals conducted its own factual review and concluded that the addition of eight new turbines would not create additional risk to the airport.The case was then brought before the Michigan Supreme Court. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals' conclusion, stating that the Court of Appeals had essentially conducted a de novo review of the facts, which was inappropriate. The Supreme Court found that there was substantial evidence supporting the AZBA's decision and that the circuit court did not err in affirming the AZBA's findings. Therefore, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and reinstated the AZBA's denial of the variances. View "Pegasus Wind LLC V Tuscola County" on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, addressed the applicability of the Recreational Land Use Act (RUA) and the owner-liability provision of the Michigan Vehicle Code to a case involving a fatal off-road vehicle (ORV) accident. The accident occurred on private land owned by the defendants, also the grandparents and vehicle owners, and involved their 12-year-old granddaughter. The plaintiff, mother of the deceased, sought to hold the defendants liable.The court held that the RUA, which limits a landowner's liability for injuries occurring during recreational activity on their property to instances of gross negligence or willful and wanton misconduct, applies in this case. It found that the RUA applies to the plaintiff's proposed owner-liability claim, which is premised on the defendants' ownership of the vehicle involved in the accident. The court reasoned that the longstanding nature of owner liability when the RUA was enacted, the RUA's detailed provisions and lack of an exception for owner liability, and the optimal effect given to both statutes under this interpretation, indicate that the legislature intended the RUA to limit owner liability under the Michigan Vehicle Code.Since the plaintiff did not challenge the lower court's finding that there was no factual support for gross negligence on the part of the defendants, the court affirmed the trial court's decision granting the defendants' motion for summary disposition and denying the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint. View "Estate Of Riley Robinson v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Vectren Infrastructure Services Corporation, the successor in interest to Minnesota Limited, Inc. (ML), sued the Department of Treasury (the Department) in the Michigan Court of Claims, alleging that the Department had improperly assessed a tax deficiency against ML after auditing ML’s Michigan Business Tax returns for 2010 and part of 2011. Following an audit, the Department determined that ML had improperly included its gain from a sale of its assets in the sales-factor denominator, resulting in an overstatement of its total sales and the reduction of its Michigan tax liability. The auditor excluded ML’s sale of assets from the sales factor and included it in ML’s preapportioned tax base, which increased ML’s sales factor from 14.9860% to 69.9761% and consequently increased its tax liability. ML asked the Department for an alternative apportionment for the period in 2011 before the sale, January 1, 2011 to March 31, 2011 (the short year), but the Department denied ML’s request and determined that ML had not overcome the presumption that the statutory apportionment fairly represented ML’s business activity in Michigan for the short year. The Court of Appeals ultimately held the Court of Claims had correctly analyzed the relevant statutes and applied the apportionment formula; however, the Court of Appeals concluded that Vectren was entitled to an alternative apportionment because applying the formula extended Michigan’s taxing powers beyond their acceptable scope, and ordered the parties to work together to determine an alternative method of apportionment. The Michigan Supreme Court held: (1) the income from the asset sale was properly attributable under the MBTA; and (2) the MBTA formula, as applied, did not impermissibly tax income outside the scope of Michigan’s taxing powers. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "Vectren Infrastructure Services Corp v. Department Of Treasury" on Justia Law

Michael Andary, conservator and guardian of Ellen Andary; Ronald Krueger, guardian of Philip Krueger; and Moriah, Inc., doing business as Eisenhower Center, brought an action against USAA Casualty Insurance Company and Citizens Insurance Company of America, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Michigan Legislature’s 2019 amendments of the no-fault act, MCL 500.3101 et seq., that placed new limitations on in-home family-provided attendant care in MCL 500.3157(10) and the non-Medicare fee schedule of MCL 500.3157(7) could not be applied to limit or change plaintiffs’ rights to benefits under the insurance policies defendants had issued to them before the 2019 amendments. Andary and Krueger, suffered traumatic injuries in automobile accidents before 2019, had been provided uncapped lifetime medical care covered by personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under insurance policies and the no-fault act in effect at the time of their injuries. Plaintiffs argued that the retroactive application of the 2019 amendments to them was improper and would also violate their constitutional rights under the Contracts Clause of Const 1963, art 1, § 10 and their due-process and equal-protection rights. Additionally, plaintiffs all challenged the prospective application of the 2019 amendments on behalf of future motor vehicle accident victims and medical providers. Defendants moved to dismiss the case, and the trial court granted defendants’ motion. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the circuit court. The Michigan Supreme Court found that the 2019 no-fault amendments of MCL 500.3157 did not impact services and care that were already being provided to Andary and Krueger and that had been reimbursable prior to the amendments. Andary’s and Krueger’s rights to the PIP benefits at issue in this case were both contractual and statutory in nature, and the 2019 no-fault amendments did not retroactively modify their vested contractual rights. Plaintiffs’ constitutional challenges to prospective application of the amended statutes were dismissed. View "Andary v. USAA Casualty Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Joshua L-J Stewart was convicted by jury on three counts of armed robbery; assault with intent to commit murder; receiving and concealing stolen property valued between $1,000 and $20,000; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant allegedly aided and abetted two other individuals in two armed robberies by serving as the getaway driver. Two of the victims were shot by the perpetrators during the robberies, and one of the victims died as a result of his injuries. Defendant was arrested and questioned after he drove one of the perpetrators to the hospital in the vehicle used in the robberies. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress statements he made during his police interview, arguing that the statements were involuntary because of coercive interview techniques and promises of leniency by the interrogating officers. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence given in the police interview. The totality of the circumstances of defendant’s interrogation, including his age, the timing of the interview, the officers’ references to leniency, the officers’ use of falsehoods, and the officers’ overall tone and use of language, created an environment in which defendant’s free will was overborne and the statements he gave were involuntary. "The use of these statements at trial violated defendant’s constitutional rights, and he was entitled to a new trial." View "Michigan v. Stewart" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (the JTC) filed a formal complaint against Third Circuit Court Judge Tracy E. Green, alleging that she covered up evidence of child abuse (Count I) and that she made false statements about her knowledge of the abuse (Count II). Respondent admitted she was aware that her son had slapped one of her grandsons, GD, across the face, and she further admitted that she covered the resultant handprint with makeup, claiming that she had done so after her other grandson, RD, had teased GD about the handprint. In March 2019, respondent testified at a juvenile court hearing as a witness for her son; she denied that she had ever seen bruises on her grandsons’ bodies but admitted to seeing the handprint on GD’s face. Respondent also denied that any of her grandchildren had ever told her that they had been abused. The master concluded that respondent committed misconduct in office with respect to Counts I and II but not III. The JTC unanimously accepted and adopted the master’s findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to Counts I and II. Although the JTC was troubled by the allegations in Count III, it concluded that disciplinary counsel did not satisfy its burden of proving the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. It therefore adopted the master’s conclusion that there was insufficient evidence that respondent intentionally made false statements to the JTC in her answer. The JTC addressed the factors set forth in In re Brown, 461 Mich 1291 (2000), and concluded that the totality of the factors weighed in support of respondent’s removal from office. Respondent petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court, requesting that the Court reject the JTC’s recommendation and dismiss the amended complaint against her. The Supreme Court concluded the JTC proved by a preponderance of the evidence that respondent knowingly covered up evidence of child abuse. The JTC’s finding that respondent lied under oath at the juvenile court proceeding was rejected; however, the JTC sustained its burden of proving that respondent knowingly made false statements about evidence of child abuse in her answer to the JTC’s requests for comment. A six-month suspension without pay, along with a public censure, was imposed after consideration of the JTC’s recommendation, the Brown factors, and similar and dissimilar judicial sanctions that have previously been imposed. View "In Re Tracy E. Green, Judge" on Justia Law