Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Christina McCahan was injured in an automobile accident on the campus of the University of Michigan in 2007. The other driver, Samuel K. Brennan, was driving a car owned by the university and was on university business at the time. In 2008, McCahan’s counsel sent a letter to the university indicating that counsel intended to represent McCahan in a lawsuit concerning the accident. After McCahan brought the action against Brennan and the University of Michigan Regents in the Court of Claims, the university moved for summary judgment on the basis that the notice of intent had not been filed within the six-month period provided in MCL 600.6431(3). The court agreed with the university and granted summary judgment in its favor. McCahan appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals correctly determined that when the Legislature conditions the ability to pursue a claim against the state on a plaintiff’s having filed specific statutory notice, the courts may not require an "actual prejudice" component onto the statute as a precondition to enforcing the legislative prohibition: "such statutory notice requirements must be interpreted and enforced as plainly written and that no judicially created saving construction is permitted to avoid a clear statutory mandate." View "McCahan v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger on a bus operated by the Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) when the bus was involved in an accident. Plaintiff filed an application for no-fault benefits with SMART's insurer soon thereafter, but waited more than seven months to notify SMART that she might pursue liability in tort. SMART moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the notice provision of the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act required notice of plaintiff’s tort claims within 60 days of the accident as a condition precedent to maintaining those claims. The circuit court granted SMART partial summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review of the applicable statute and Plaintiff's appeal brief, the Supreme Court concluded that notice of plaintiff’s application for no-fault insurance benefits, even when supplemented with SMART’s presumed "institutional knowledge" of the underlying facts of the injury, did not constitute written notice of a third-party tort claim against SMART sufficient to comply with MCL 124.419. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "Atkins v. Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transp." on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Thomas Brown pled guilty to second-degree home invasion as a second-offense habitual offender. He was not informed by the court of his maximum possible sentence as an habitual offender before the plea was accepted. Rather, Defendant had been informed that the maximum penalty for the home-invasion offense was 15 years in prison, but he was ultimately sentenced to a prison term of 6 years and 3 months to 22 years and 6 months in accordance with the habitual offender enhancement. Defendant did not object at sentencing, but later moved to withdraw his plea or for resentencing, which the court denied. Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was a clear defect in the plea proceeding in this case, and defendant’s plea was not an understanding plea as required by MCR 6.302(B)(2) because he was not properly informed of the potential maximum sentence for second-degree home invasion as enhanced by his second-offense habitual-offender status before his plea was accepted. Accordingly the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Brown" on Justia Law

Marcy Hill, Patricia Hill, and Christopher Hill brought an action against Sears, Roebuck & Co., Sears Logistic Services, Inc., Merchant Delivery, Inc., Exel Direct, Inc., Mark Pritchard, Timothy Dameron, and others, seeking to recover damages for injuries and property damage incurred when Marcy Hill released natural gas through an uncapped gas line and plaintiffs’ home burned down following Patricia Hill’s attempt to light a candle. Defendants were prior owners of the home and the parties who sold, delivered, and installed an electric washer and dryer purchased by Marcy Hill in 2003. Hill’s mother had directed the installers to place the washer and dryer in the same location where the prior owners’ gas dryer had been situated. The prior owners had turned off the gas to the line supplying their dryer, but had not capped off the line when they moved, taking their dryer with them. In 2007, four years after the electric dryer’s installation, during which time it had functioned without incident, Hill inadvertently opened the valve on the gas line. Marcy and Patricia Hill smelled gas throughout the day but did not act on this information, despite both women’s knowledge that the smell of natural gas required safety precautions. Plaintiffs’ home exploded that night when Patricia Hill attempted to light the candle with a lighter. Plaintiffs asserted that the installers had negligently installed the dryer and failed to discover, properly inspect, cap, and warn plaintiffs about the uncapped gas line. The court denied the retailers’, delivery companies’, and installers’ motions for summary judgment. The installers, Mark Pritchard and Timothy Dameron, appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The retailers, delivery companies, and the installers filed separate applications for leave to appeal. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the delivery and installation of the washer and dryer did not create a new dangerous condition with respect to the uncapped gas line or make an existing dangerous condition more hazardous. The hazard associated with the uncapped gas line was present when the installers entered the premises and when they left; the danger posed by the uncapped gas line was the same before and after the installation. Any liability of the retailers or the delivery companies would have resulted from their agency relationship with the installers. The circuit court erred by denying the summary judgment motions. The case was reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendants summary judgment. View "Hill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stand Up for Democracy petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of State Canvassers to certify its referendum petition for inclusion on the November 2012 ballot. Intervening defendant Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility, challenged the certification of plaintiff’s referendum petition, alleging that it failed to comply with the type-size requirement of MCL 168.482(2) and that the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby technical deficiencies are resolved in favor of certification, did not apply. The Court of Appeals agreed with both assertions, but concluded it was required to follow its decision in "Bloomfield Charter Township v Oakland County Clerk" and conclude that the petition substantially complied with MCL 168.482(2) and that certification was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, overturning "Bloomfield Charter" and dismissed the case: "because MCL 168.482(2) uses the mandatory term 'shall' and does not, by its plain terms, permit certification of deficient petitions with regard to form or content, a majority of [the] Court [held] that the doctrine of substantial compliance is inapplicable to referendum petitions submitted for certification." View "Stand Up for Democracy v. Mich. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

These three cases involved the felony of failure to pay court-ordered child support (felony nonsupport) under MCL 750.165 and the rule of "Michigan v. Adams." The Supreme Court granted leave to consider the constitutionality of the Court of Appeals' ruling in "Adams" and now clarified that, while inability to pay is not a defense to felony nonsupport pursuant to MCL 750.165, "Adams" does not preclude criminal defendants from proffering the common-law defense of impossibility. The Court endorsed the well-established common-law defense of impossibility as the proper defense to felony nonsupport. "Consistently with the Legislature's expressed intent in the child support statutes, [the Court] believe[d] that to avoid conviction for felony nonsupport, parents should be required to have done everything possible to provide for their child and to have arranged their finances in a way that prioritized their parental responsibility so that the child does not become a public charge." View "Michigan v. Likine" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether newly discovered impeachment evidence could constitute grounds for a new trial and, if so, under what circumstances. Defendant sought a retrial on the basis of newly discovered impeachment evidence. The trial court and the Court of Appeals concluded that this evidence could not be used as a basis for granting a new trial because, in part, it was impeachment evidence. The Court of Appeals also concluded that the evidence did not warrant a new trial because if it were admitted on retrial, there was no reasonable chance of a different result. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that impeachment evidence may be grounds for a new trial if it satisfies the four-part test set forth in "Michigan v. Cress." Furthermore, the Court held that a material, exculpatory connection must exist between the newly discovered evidence and significantly important evidence presented at trial. It may be of a general character and need not contradict specific testimony at trial. Also, the evidence must make a different result probable on retrial. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded this case to the trial court for determination of whether the newly discovered evidence satisfies "Cress." View "Michigan v. Grissom" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) recommended that the Supreme Court remove Respondent 22nd District Court Judge Sylvia A. James from office for judicial misconduct. Judge James filed a petition asking the Court to reject that recommendation. The evidence established that respondent misappropriated public funds, some of which were intended for victims of crime in the city of Inkster. She inappropriately spent much of this money on self-promoting advertisements and travel expenses for herself and various other court employees. She treated these funds, as the master phrased it, as her own "publicly funded private foundation." In addition, she: (1) denied people access to the court by instituting and enforcing an improper business-attire policy; (2) employed a family member in violation of court policy; and (3) made numerous misrepresentations of fact under oath during the investigation and hearing of this matter. The Court concluded that cumulative effect of respondent's misconduct, coupled with its duration, nature, and pervasiveness meant that respondent was unfit for judicial office. "Although some of her misconduct, considered in isolation, does not justify such a severe sanction, taken as a whole her misconduct rises to a level that requires her removal from office." Therefore, the Court adopted the recommendations of the JTC, except with respect to costs respondent will be ordered to pay, as would be detailed later. View "In re Hon. Sylvia James" on Justia Law

"Michigan, being above the 42nd parallel of north latitude, is prone to winter. . . . This case tests the extent of a premises owner's liability for [a] winter-related accident." In this case, plaintiff recognized the danger posed by ice on a sidewalk, yet chose to "confront the hazard" by walking across the ice to enter the premises. Plaintiff claimed that the premises' owners should be liable for her injuries, while the premises' owners argued that they are not liable because plaintiff's accident occurred as the result of an ordinary, open and obvious condition. "In many regards, this case is unremarkable both in its simplicity and its frequent occurrence in Michigan. Yet there has been some confusion surrounding the application of the open and obvious doctrine to wintry conditions." Upon review, the Supreme Court rejected plaintiff's argument that the hazard in this case was effectively unavoidable because plaintiff had a business interest in entering the premises. The Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to enter judgment in favor of the premises' owners. View "Hoffner v. Lanctoe" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted leave in two cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (PIP benefits) under the no-fault act, notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP benefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she "had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code (including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, the "joyriding" statutes) has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Furthermore, the Court held that the use of the phrase "a person" in MCL 500.3113(a) "clearly and plainly" includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precludes that person from receiving PIP benefits. View "Progressive Marathon Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Health Hospitals" on Justia Law