Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellee Candice Johnson suffered a lost pregnancy at 20 weeks’ gestation, and on behalf of herself and the deceased fetus, Baby Johnson, sued Defendant-Appellant Rajan Pastoriza, M.D. and his professional corporation alleging negligence. Defendant moved for summary judgment; the circuit court refused to grant the motion, but ordered Plaintiff to appoint a personal representative for the estate of the baby and to amend the complaint to bring the negligence claim that had been brought on behalf of the baby through Michigan's wrongful-death statute. Defendant appealed. The appellate court held that the wrongful-death statute as amended in 2005, applied retroactively to Plaintiff's claim for wrongful death. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the 2005 amendment to the wrongful-death statute did not apply to claims arising before the effective date of the amendment. Further, because Defendant would be subjected to liability that did not exist at the time the cause of action arose, the amendment was not remedial, and therefore could not be deemed retroactive. The case was remanded to the circuit court for entry of summary judgment in favor of Denfendant on the wrongful-death claim.View "Johnson v. Pastoriza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted leave in three cases to consider the substantive and procedural aspects of the affirmative defense of medical use of marijuana under section 8, MCL 333.26428, of the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA). Given the plain language of the statute, the Court held that a defendant asserting the section 8 affirmative defense is not required to establish the requirements of section 4, MCL 333.26424, which pertains to broader immunity granted by the Act. The Court of Appeals erred by reaching the opposite conclusion in "People v King," and the Court therefore reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment in that case. Further, to establish the affirmative defense under section 8, the Court held that a defendant must show under section 8(a)(1) that the physician’s statement was made after enactment of the MMMA but before commission of the offense. View "Michigan v. Kolanek" on Justia Law

This case involved a policy for uninsured-motorist (UM) coverage issued by Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company which contained a 30-day notice provision regarding hit-and-run motor vehicle claims. Upon review, the Court held that an unambiguous notice-of-claim provision setting forth a specified period within which notice must be provided is enforceable without a showing that the failure to comply with the provision prejudiced the insurer. Therefore, State Farm properly denied the claim for UM benefits sought in the instant case because it did not receive timely notice, a condition precedent to the policy's enforcement. In this case, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in favor of State Farm.View "DeFrain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the death of a coperpetrator of a crime may be scored under offense variable (OV) 3, MCL 777.33, which concerns "physical injury to a victim." Upon review, the Court concluded that a coperpetrator is properly considered a "victim" for purposes of OV 3 when he or she is harmed by the criminal actions of the charged party, in this case, Defendant Marteez Laidler. Because the Court concluded that the coperpetrator's death constituted such a harm, the Court reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated Defendant's sentence. The trial court properly assessed 100 points for OV 3 because the coperpetrator was harmed by the criminal actions of Defendant.View "Michigan v. Laidler" on Justia Law

In four cases, each involving a ballot proposal to amend the Michigan Constitution, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether the groups proposing the amendments properly exercised their right to petition for constitutional amendments in compliance with the constitutional and statutory safeguards. Upon review of the cases, the Court reaffirmed prior caselaw holding that an existing provision is only altered when the amendment actually adds to, deletes from, or changes the wording of the provision. Furthermore, the Court reaffirmed that an amendment only abrogates an existing provision when it renders that provision wholly inoperative. Applying the meanings of "alter" and "abrogate" to the cases at issue, the Court concluded that none of the ballot proposals altered an existing provision of the Constitution because none of them actually "add to, delete from, or change the existing wording of the provision . . . ." View "Protect Our Jobs v. Bd. of State Canvassers" on Justia Law

Christina McCahan was injured in an automobile accident on the campus of the University of Michigan in 2007. The other driver, Samuel K. Brennan, was driving a car owned by the university and was on university business at the time. In 2008, McCahan’s counsel sent a letter to the university indicating that counsel intended to represent McCahan in a lawsuit concerning the accident. After McCahan brought the action against Brennan and the University of Michigan Regents in the Court of Claims, the university moved for summary judgment on the basis that the notice of intent had not been filed within the six-month period provided in MCL 600.6431(3). The court agreed with the university and granted summary judgment in its favor. McCahan appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals correctly determined that when the Legislature conditions the ability to pursue a claim against the state on a plaintiff’s having filed specific statutory notice, the courts may not require an "actual prejudice" component onto the statute as a precondition to enforcing the legislative prohibition: "such statutory notice requirements must be interpreted and enforced as plainly written and that no judicially created saving construction is permitted to avoid a clear statutory mandate." View "McCahan v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was a passenger on a bus operated by the Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transportation (SMART) when the bus was involved in an accident. Plaintiff filed an application for no-fault benefits with SMART's insurer soon thereafter, but waited more than seven months to notify SMART that she might pursue liability in tort. SMART moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that the notice provision of the Metropolitan Transportation Authorities Act required notice of plaintiff’s tort claims within 60 days of the accident as a condition precedent to maintaining those claims. The circuit court granted SMART partial summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed. Upon review of the applicable statute and Plaintiff's appeal brief, the Supreme Court concluded that notice of plaintiff’s application for no-fault insurance benefits, even when supplemented with SMART’s presumed "institutional knowledge" of the underlying facts of the injury, did not constitute written notice of a third-party tort claim against SMART sufficient to comply with MCL 124.419. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed. View "Atkins v. Suburban Mobility Authority for Regional Transp." on Justia Law

Defendant Shawn Thomas Brown pled guilty to second-degree home invasion as a second-offense habitual offender. He was not informed by the court of his maximum possible sentence as an habitual offender before the plea was accepted. Rather, Defendant had been informed that the maximum penalty for the home-invasion offense was 15 years in prison, but he was ultimately sentenced to a prison term of 6 years and 3 months to 22 years and 6 months in accordance with the habitual offender enhancement. Defendant did not object at sentencing, but later moved to withdraw his plea or for resentencing, which the court denied. Defendant appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that there was a clear defect in the plea proceeding in this case, and defendant’s plea was not an understanding plea as required by MCR 6.302(B)(2) because he was not properly informed of the potential maximum sentence for second-degree home invasion as enhanced by his second-offense habitual-offender status before his plea was accepted. Accordingly the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Brown" on Justia Law

Marcy Hill, Patricia Hill, and Christopher Hill brought an action against Sears, Roebuck & Co., Sears Logistic Services, Inc., Merchant Delivery, Inc., Exel Direct, Inc., Mark Pritchard, Timothy Dameron, and others, seeking to recover damages for injuries and property damage incurred when Marcy Hill released natural gas through an uncapped gas line and plaintiffs’ home burned down following Patricia Hill’s attempt to light a candle. Defendants were prior owners of the home and the parties who sold, delivered, and installed an electric washer and dryer purchased by Marcy Hill in 2003. Hill’s mother had directed the installers to place the washer and dryer in the same location where the prior owners’ gas dryer had been situated. The prior owners had turned off the gas to the line supplying their dryer, but had not capped off the line when they moved, taking their dryer with them. In 2007, four years after the electric dryer’s installation, during which time it had functioned without incident, Hill inadvertently opened the valve on the gas line. Marcy and Patricia Hill smelled gas throughout the day but did not act on this information, despite both women’s knowledge that the smell of natural gas required safety precautions. Plaintiffs’ home exploded that night when Patricia Hill attempted to light the candle with a lighter. Plaintiffs asserted that the installers had negligently installed the dryer and failed to discover, properly inspect, cap, and warn plaintiffs about the uncapped gas line. The court denied the retailers’, delivery companies’, and installers’ motions for summary judgment. The installers, Mark Pritchard and Timothy Dameron, appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The retailers, delivery companies, and the installers filed separate applications for leave to appeal. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court concluded that the delivery and installation of the washer and dryer did not create a new dangerous condition with respect to the uncapped gas line or make an existing dangerous condition more hazardous. The hazard associated with the uncapped gas line was present when the installers entered the premises and when they left; the danger posed by the uncapped gas line was the same before and after the installation. Any liability of the retailers or the delivery companies would have resulted from their agency relationship with the installers. The circuit court erred by denying the summary judgment motions. The case was reversed and remanded for entry of an order granting defendants summary judgment. View "Hill v. Sears, Roebuck & Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Stand Up for Democracy petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of State Canvassers to certify its referendum petition for inclusion on the November 2012 ballot. Intervening defendant Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility, challenged the certification of plaintiff’s referendum petition, alleging that it failed to comply with the type-size requirement of MCL 168.482(2) and that the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby technical deficiencies are resolved in favor of certification, did not apply. The Court of Appeals agreed with both assertions, but concluded it was required to follow its decision in "Bloomfield Charter Township v Oakland County Clerk" and conclude that the petition substantially complied with MCL 168.482(2) and that certification was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, overturning "Bloomfield Charter" and dismissed the case: "because MCL 168.482(2) uses the mandatory term 'shall' and does not, by its plain terms, permit certification of deficient petitions with regard to form or content, a majority of [the] Court [held] that the doctrine of substantial compliance is inapplicable to referendum petitions submitted for certification." View "Stand Up for Democracy v. Mich. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law