Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

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Defendant Samuel Elliott was convicted of armed robbery for holding up a gas station. He had been on parole for a prior conviction, and was arrested the day after the alleged robbery for a parole violation. Defendant's brother called police to inform them of Defendant's misdeed. Police interrogated Defendant until he invoked his right to counsel. While in jail, Defendant confessed his crime to a parole officer when she asked about the gas station robbery and the ramifications of having violated parole. The parole officer did not inform Defendant of his Miranda rights before questioning him. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements made to the parole officer at trial. The appellate court reversed, finding the statements should have been suppressed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in its conclusion that because Defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation by the parole officer, even if she was a law enforcement officer, neither Defendant's right to be given a series of warnings before custodial interrogation nor his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation was violated. View "Michigan v. Elliott" on Justia Law

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Defendant Rayfield Clary was convicted by jury of assault with intent to commit murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant's first trial ended in mistrial; after his second, he appealed the outcome. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, concluding that defendant had been improperly impeached with his silence. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the prosecution’s references at trial to defendant’s postarrest, post-Miranda silence with the police were improper. View "Michigan v. Clary" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court combined several taxpayers' appeals for the purpose of this opinion. In each, taxpayers owned two (or more) separate S-corporations, and attributed profits and losses from each businesses to their Michigan tax returns, arguing that the multiple businesses were unitary corporations. In each case, plaintiffs owned a Michigan company and a foreign company, but combined the profits and losses from both for credits on their Michigan returns. The Department of the Treasury disallowed the unitary classification. The Supreme Court held that under Michigan tax law, individual taxpayers may combine the profits and losses from unitary flow-through businesses and then apportion that income on the basis of those businesses’ combined apportionment factors. View "Malpass v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

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Thomas Petipren sued the police chief of Port Sanilac Rodney Jaskowski and the Village itself alleging Jaskowski assaulted and wrongfully arrested him for resisting, obstructing and disorderly conduct. Jaskowski filed a separate suit against Petipren alleging assault and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Petipren's band had been scheduled to perform at a fundraiser hosted by the Village. Attendees complained about the before Petipren's took the stage. A decision was made to stop the music; Petipren, claimed he was unaware of the decision to stop the performances, and was warming up on his drum set when Jaskowski approached him. Jaskowski arrested Petipren. The parties' respective versions of the facts surrounding the arrest were completely different. Petipren alleged that he did not resist arrest, but that Jaskowski barged through the drum set and then pushed him off his seat and into a pole before pushing him off the stage and onto the grass where he was handcuffed. Jaskowski alleged that Petipren refused to stop playing, swore at him, struck him in the jaw, and then resisted arrest. Jaskowski moved for summary judgment on Petipren's claims on the grounds of governmental immunity. The trial court denied that motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Jaskowski. View "Petipren v. Jaskowski" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Robert Smitter applied for workers' compensation benefits after being injured on the job working as a firefighter for Thornapple Township. At the time of his injury, Petitioner also worked for General Motors. He earned eleven percent of his income from the township and 89 from GM. The township did not reduce its workers’ compensation obligation by coordinating Petitioner's benefits with his disability benefits under MCL 418.354(1)(b). The township sought reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund under the dual-employment provisions for the entirety of Petitioner's wage-loss benefits. The fund agreed to pay the amount it would have owed if the township had coordinated Petitioner's benefits. The township filed an application for a hearing with the Worker’s Compensation Board of Magistrates, seeking reimbursement from the fund for the uncoordinated amount. The magistrate ordered the fund to reimburse the township for 89 percent of Petitioner's uncoordinated benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied the fund’s application for leave to appeal. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that when the injury employment provided less than 80 percent of the employee’s wages, the fund is required to reimburse its portion of the coordinated amount of benefits. Because the Township did not coordinate in this case, the appellate court erred in its analysis. Accordingly the appellate court was reversed and the case remanded to the magistrate for further proceedings. View "Smitter v. Thornapple Township" on Justia Law

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The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) issued a formal complaint against Judge Deborah Adams of the Third Circuit Court for misconduct (misrepresentations under oath, forgery and the filing of forged and unauthorized pleadings, and misrepresentations to the commission). The JTC found two of the three counts against Judge Adams were established by a preponderance of the evidence, and recommended that she be suspended without pay for 180 days and ordered to pay costs. The Supreme Court affirmed the JTC's findings of fact and conclusions of law. However, the Court rejected the JTC's recommendation of suspension and instead removed her from office. View "In re Adams" on Justia Law

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Defendant David Burns was tried by jury and convicted of first-degree sexual conduct. The victim, his four-year-old daughter, told a bible school teacher, who happened to be a forensic interviewer and sexual-assault nurse examiner. The teacher conditionally testified at trial regarding the child's out-of-court statements before the child herself was called to testify. The prosecutor then tried to have the child testify, but was unsuccessful. The teacher's testimony was admitted, on the grounds that defendant told the child "not to tell" of the alleged abuse, rendering her unavailable to testify, and making the teacher's statement admissible under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State failed to establish by a preponderance defendant had both specific intent to cause the child's unavailability, and that the wrongdoing in fact caused her unavailability. The State appealed, but the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court and affirmed that court's reversal. View "Michigan v. Burns" on Justia Law

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Several union groups filed unfair labor practice complaints against Macomb County and the Macomb County Road Commission over a change in the method for calculating pension benefits. The groups argued the County lowered benefits without bargaining on the issue as required by Michigan labor law. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that disputes over terms or conditions of employment covered by a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) are subject to arbitration through a grievance process. When the CBA grants the retirement commission discretion to use actuarial tables to establish pension benefits, the decision to change a long-standing method of calculating those benefits does not (by itself) constitute the clear and unmistakable evidence needed to overcome the CBA's coverage, nor does it create a new condition of employment that would trigger the need to bargain. As a result, none of the unfair labor practices alleged in this case could be sustained, and the remedy for this dispute should have gone through the grievance process called for in the CBA. View "Macomb County v. AFSCME Council 25 Locals 411 & 893 " on Justia Law

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Hillsdale County Senior Services, Inc. (HCSS) filed an action against Hillsdale County, seeking mandamus to enforce the terms of a property-tax ballot proposition that provided for the levy of an additional 0.5 mill property tax in Hillsdale County to fund HCSS. The Hillsdale County voters approved the proposition in 2008 to raise funds for the provision of services to older persons by HCSS. Defendant entered into a contract with HCSS from January 1, 2009 through December 31, 2010, but did not levy and spend the full, voter-approved, 0.5 mill. The circuit court granted plaintiffs' writ for mandamus and ordered defendant to levy the entire 0.5 mill for the length of time approved by the voters. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the order, concluding that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case because the Tax Tribunal had exclusive and original jurisdiction over the matter. HCSS appealed, and the Supreme Court, after its review, agreed that the circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly the Court of Appeals was affirmed. View "Hillsdale County Senior Services Center v. Hillsdale County" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Kenneth Admire was seriously injured when the motorcycle he was riding collided with a car being operated by an insured of Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Following the accident, Kenneth required wheelchair-accessible transportation. Through his guardian Russ Admire, brought an action against Auto-Owners Insurance Company, seeking payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act. Auto-Owners had agreed to pay the full cost of purchasing a van modified to accommodate Kenneth’s wheelchair. Kenneth’s guardian gave Auto-Owners notice of his intent to purchase a new van. In response, Auto-Owners stated that it was not obligated to pay the base purchase price of a new van, but that it would pay for the necessary modifications if Kenneth’s guardian purchased a new vehicle for him. Kenneth’s guardian purchased the new van for Kenneth, and after the cost of the modifications was reimbursed and the trade-in value was applied, Kenneth was left with $18,388.50 in out-of-pocket expenses for the modified van. Kenneth brought suit seeking reimbursement for the out-of-pocket expenses. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Kenneth, but the Supreme Court reversed: Auto-Owners met its statutory obligation to pay for the transportation expenses recoverable under the statute, by paying for the van’s modifications and reimbursing him for mileage to and from his medical appointments. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the base price of the van was compensable. View "Admire v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. " on Justia Law