Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Donald Michael Hardy was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of carjacking. His sentence was 12 to 50 years' imprisonment. Hardy filed a motion for resentencing, challenging the OV scoring and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the circuit court denied. Hardy then appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the sentence. Defendant Devon DeCarlos Glenn, Jr. was convicted after pleading guilty to armed robbery and felonious assault. He was sentenced to 15 to 30 years' imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction and 18 to 48 months' imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction. The Court of Appeals vacated Glenn's sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that although Glenn's conduct used more violence than was strictly necessary to complete an armed robbery, it was not egregious enough in relation to the other conduct listed in the sentencing guidelines to justify the score the circuit court gave him. Both defendants appealed their sentences to the Supreme Court; after review, the Supreme Court found no error in the circuit court's scoring of Hardy's sentence. However, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in Glenn's case and remanded for recalculation of his sentence. View "Michigan v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Brent Harris sued Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA), seeking to recover a duplicate payment for medical expenses incurred as the result of a motorcycle-motor vehicle accident, which had been paid directly to providers by his health insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM). Harris claimed ACIA was required to pay him directly the same amounts paid by BCBSM to any healthcare provider for the medical expenses. ACIA filed a third-party complaint against BCBSM and Harris filed an amended complaint naming BCBSM as a defendant. The circuit court granted summary judgment to BCBSM and ACIA, concluding that because ACIA's policy was uncoordinated, ACIA was the primary insurer, and that the BCBSM certificate coordinated benefits with the no-fault policy. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, concluding that the BCBSM certificate did not coordinate with ACIA's no-fault policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and reinstated the trial court's judgment: In this case, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Harris was entitled to double recovery; Harris was not obligated to pay his medical expenses because, as a matter of law, ACIA was liable for Harris's PIP benefits. ACIA was liable regardless of when the expenses were incurred and BCBSM's certificate that stated it would not cover those services for which Harris legally did not have to pay precluded Harris from receiving double recovery for those medical expenses. View "Harris v. Auto Club Insurance Association" on Justia Law

Nancy Mick, as personal representative of the estate of Stephen Bradley, sought to have the Kent County Sheriff's Department held in contempt of court. She obtained an order from the probate court to take Stephen Bradley into custody for a psychiatric evaluation. The sheriff's department did not arrive, and Mr. Bradley shot and killed himself. Mick originally filed a wrongful-death action against the sheriff's department, but the department was granted governmental immunity from suit. Mick then filed her contempt action, arguing the estate of Mr. Bradley suffered damages as a result of the sheriff department's failure to show. The department again moved for dismissal on immunity grounds, but the probate court denied that motion. The department then appealed the probate court's decision at circuit court, which reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, finding that the governmental tort liability act (GTLA) did not apply in this case. The department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court the department was entitled to dismissal on an immunity basis, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Bradley Estate" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Hurticene Hardaway sued Wayne County in circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment, and claiming breach of contract and promissory estoppel in relation to the denial of certain lifetime benefits granted to certain former County employees. Plaintiff worked in the County's office of corporation counsel. The trial court concluded that due to language in the Wayne County Commission Resolution 94-903, plaintiff did not qualify for the benefits. The trial court ultimately granted the County's motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the language in question was ambiguous. In its review of the resolution in question, the Supreme Court concluded its language was not ambiguous, therefore affirming the trial court's interpretation and judgment. View "Hardaway v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to redact the majority of the detectives' out-of-court statements from the interrogation of Defendant John Musser where they commented on his credibility. Most of the statements made had no probative value, and their admission undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict because the jury may have relied on those statements in reaching its verdict. The Court felt the limiting jury instruction did not cure this error. Accordingly, the Court vacated defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Musser" on Justia Law

Defendant Samuel Elliott was convicted of armed robbery for holding up a gas station. He had been on parole for a prior conviction, and was arrested the day after the alleged robbery for a parole violation. Defendant's brother called police to inform them of Defendant's misdeed. Police interrogated Defendant until he invoked his right to counsel. While in jail, Defendant confessed his crime to a parole officer when she asked about the gas station robbery and the ramifications of having violated parole. The parole officer did not inform Defendant of his Miranda rights before questioning him. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements made to the parole officer at trial. The appellate court reversed, finding the statements should have been suppressed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in its conclusion that because Defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation by the parole officer, even if she was a law enforcement officer, neither Defendant's right to be given a series of warnings before custodial interrogation nor his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation was violated. View "Michigan v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Defendant Rayfield Clary was convicted by jury of assault with intent to commit murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant's first trial ended in mistrial; after his second, he appealed the outcome. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, concluding that defendant had been improperly impeached with his silence. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the prosecution’s references at trial to defendant’s postarrest, post-Miranda silence with the police were improper. View "Michigan v. Clary" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court combined several taxpayers' appeals for the purpose of this opinion. In each, taxpayers owned two (or more) separate S-corporations, and attributed profits and losses from each businesses to their Michigan tax returns, arguing that the multiple businesses were unitary corporations. In each case, plaintiffs owned a Michigan company and a foreign company, but combined the profits and losses from both for credits on their Michigan returns. The Department of the Treasury disallowed the unitary classification. The Supreme Court held that under Michigan tax law, individual taxpayers may combine the profits and losses from unitary flow-through businesses and then apportion that income on the basis of those businesses’ combined apportionment factors. View "Malpass v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Thomas Petipren sued the police chief of Port Sanilac Rodney Jaskowski and the Village itself alleging Jaskowski assaulted and wrongfully arrested him for resisting, obstructing and disorderly conduct. Jaskowski filed a separate suit against Petipren alleging assault and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Petipren's band had been scheduled to perform at a fundraiser hosted by the Village. Attendees complained about the before Petipren's took the stage. A decision was made to stop the music; Petipren, claimed he was unaware of the decision to stop the performances, and was warming up on his drum set when Jaskowski approached him. Jaskowski arrested Petipren. The parties' respective versions of the facts surrounding the arrest were completely different. Petipren alleged that he did not resist arrest, but that Jaskowski barged through the drum set and then pushed him off his seat and into a pole before pushing him off the stage and onto the grass where he was handcuffed. Jaskowski alleged that Petipren refused to stop playing, swore at him, struck him in the jaw, and then resisted arrest. Jaskowski moved for summary judgment on Petipren's claims on the grounds of governmental immunity. The trial court denied that motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower courts and reversed and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of Jaskowski. View "Petipren v. Jaskowski" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Smitter applied for workers' compensation benefits after being injured on the job working as a firefighter for Thornapple Township. At the time of his injury, Petitioner also worked for General Motors. He earned eleven percent of his income from the township and 89 from GM. The township did not reduce its workers’ compensation obligation by coordinating Petitioner's benefits with his disability benefits under MCL 418.354(1)(b). The township sought reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund under the dual-employment provisions for the entirety of Petitioner's wage-loss benefits. The fund agreed to pay the amount it would have owed if the township had coordinated Petitioner's benefits. The township filed an application for a hearing with the Worker’s Compensation Board of Magistrates, seeking reimbursement from the fund for the uncoordinated amount. The magistrate ordered the fund to reimburse the township for 89 percent of Petitioner's uncoordinated benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied the fund’s application for leave to appeal. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that when the injury employment provided less than 80 percent of the employee’s wages, the fund is required to reimburse its portion of the coordinated amount of benefits. Because the Township did not coordinate in this case, the appellate court erred in its analysis. Accordingly the appellate court was reversed and the case remanded to the magistrate for further proceedings. View "Smitter v. Thornapple Township" on Justia Law