Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In the first case, a young woman with severe headaches due to excess brain fluid had a shunt catheter implanted. She later returned to the emergency room with worsening symptoms, and a brain scan was performed. Dr. Swofford, a diagnostic radiologist, verified the scan results, but the emergency procedure to relieve her brain pressure failed, and she died. The plaintiff, representing the decedent's estate, sued Dr. Swofford and his practice for medical malpractice. The trial court ruled that the relevant specialty was diagnostic radiology, not neuroradiology, and thus excluded the plaintiff's neuroradiologist expert. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding neuroradiology to be the relevant specialty, allowing the expert to testify.In the second case, a plaintiff sued Dr. Colton for medical malpractice after multiple rhinoplasties resulted in a nasal deformity. Dr. Colton was certified in otolaryngology and facial plastic and reconstructive surgery. The plaintiff's expert, Dr. Armstrong, had the same certifications but spent most of his time on otolaryngology. The trial court found the expert's qualifications unclear and denied a motion to strike his testimony. The Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the relevant specialty was facial plastic and reconstructive surgery, and excluded the expert because he did not spend the majority of his time in that specialty.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed both cases. It held that the Woodard decision, which conflated "specialty" and "subspecialty," was incorrect. The Court clarified that "specialty" refers to general board certifications recognized by major certifying entities and does not require matching subspecialties. In Stokes, the Court affirmed that diagnostic radiology was the relevant specialty, allowing the neuroradiologist to testify. In Selliman, the Court remanded the case to determine whether facial plastic and reconstructive surgery is a subspecialty, requiring further fact-finding by the trial court. View "Estate Of Horn v. Swofford" on Justia Law

In 2005, the defendant's infant daughter, Nakita, died while under the defendant's care. The defendant claimed Nakita was choking, but after an autopsy, the medical examiner concluded that Nakita died from shaken baby syndrome (SBS). The defendant was convicted of first-degree felony murder in 2006 and sentenced to life in prison without parole. In 2017, the defendant filed a motion for relief from judgment, presenting new expert testimony that challenged the SBS diagnosis and suggested alternative causes of death, such as choking.The Wayne Circuit Court held an evidentiary hearing but ultimately denied the defendant's motion, ruling that the new expert testimony was inadmissible under Michigan Rule of Evidence (MRE) 702. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, agreeing that the biomechanical engineering evidence was inadmissible and that the new evidence did not make a different result probable on retrial.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and found that the trial court abused its discretion by excluding the expert testimony. The Court held that the biomechanical engineering evidence was relevant and reliable under MRE 702, as it was based on sufficient facts and reliable principles. The Court also determined that the new evidence, including the changed opinion of the original medical examiner and other expert testimony, made a different result probable on retrial. The Court concluded that the defendant had demonstrated "good cause" and "actual prejudice" as required by Michigan Court Rule (MCR) 6.508(D)(3) and satisfied all four prongs of the test established in People v. Cress.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' decisions and remanded the case for a new trial, allowing the new expert testimony to be considered. View "People Of Michigan v. Lemons" on Justia Law

Cleveland Stegall was employed at an FCA vehicle assembly plant through a staffing agency, Brightwing. In late 2015, FCA announced plans to eliminate Stegall’s shift by summer 2016. In April 2016, Stegall raised concerns about asbestos in the workplace to his FCA supervisors, who promised air quality tests but did not provide results. Stegall continued to request the results and threatened to file complaints with OSHA and Michigan OSHA. He was terminated on June 17, 2016, and subsequently filed a discrimination complaint with Michigan OSHA, alleging retaliation for his asbestos concerns.The Oakland Circuit Court granted summary disposition for both defendants, ruling that Stegall’s public-policy claim was preempted by the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) and that internal complaints could not support a public-policy claim. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the public-policy claim was preempted and could not be based on internal reporting. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that internal reporting could support a public-policy claim and remanded for further consideration of whether the claim was preempted by other laws.On remand, the Court of Appeals concluded that Stegall’s public-policy claim was preempted by OSHA and MiOSHA, as these statutes provided exclusive remedies for retaliation. The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the remedies under OSHA and MiOSHA were inadequate and thus not exclusive. Therefore, Stegall’s public-policy claim was not preempted. The case was remanded to the trial court to determine if there was a genuine issue of material fact regarding Stegall’s claim of wrongful termination in violation of public policy. View "Stegall V Resource Technology Corporation" on Justia Law

Stephanie Wilson was driving a 2006 Saturn Ion with Malcolm Smith as a passenger when they were pulled over by a police officer surveilling a house for narcotics activity. The officer observed what he believed to be a hand-to-hand drug transaction involving Smith. After stopping the vehicle for a traffic violation, the officer found five empty syringes but no drugs. Wilson denied the officer's claim that she admitted to driving Smith to purchase drugs. The vehicle was seized, and nearly four months later, forfeiture proceedings were initiated.The Wayne Circuit Court granted summary disposition in favor of Wilson, finding that the officer's observation of a hand-to-hand transaction did not necessarily involve drugs. The court did not specify the grounds for its ruling. The plaintiff's motions for reconsideration and relief from judgment were denied. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that Wilson used her vehicle to facilitate a drug purchase, making it subject to forfeiture.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and reversed the Court of Appeals' decision. The Supreme Court held that under MCL 333.7521(1)(d), a vehicle is subject to forfeiture only if it is used to transport illicit property for the purpose of its sale or receipt. The Court found that the elements of the statute were not concurrently fulfilled in this case. Specifically, while Wilson's vehicle was used to drive to a location where drugs were purchased, there was no evidence that the vehicle was used to transport drugs for the purpose of sale or receipt. Therefore, the vehicle was not subject to forfeiture under the statute. The Wayne Circuit Court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of Wilson was reinstated. View "In Re Forfeiture Of 2006 Saturn Ion" on Justia Law

Stephen M. Butka was accused of groping his two stepdaughters and masturbating in front of them when they were between 13 and 16 years old. He pleaded no contest to one count of third-degree child abuse in exchange for the dismissal of more severe charges. In 2006, he was sentenced to nine months in jail, two years of probation, and required to register as a sex offender. After successfully completing probation in 2008, Butka applied to have his conviction set aside in 2012, 2019, and 2021, but each application was denied, primarily due to the victims' objections.The Otsego Circuit Court denied Butka's applications, citing the ongoing emotional impact on the victims as inconsistent with the public welfare. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, relying on the precedent set in People v. Boulding, which required balancing the applicant's circumstances and behavior against the public welfare. The appellate court concluded that the victims' ongoing distress justified denying the application.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and clarified the interpretation of "public welfare" under MCL 780.621d(13). The Court held that the public welfare cannot be determined solely by the impact on the victims or a limited class of people. The Court found that the lower courts erred by focusing only on the victims' statements and not considering the broader public welfare. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and the trial court's decision, directing the trial court to grant Butka's application to set aside his conviction. View "People v. Butka" on Justia Law

The plaintiff, an employee of a subcontractor, was electrocuted while carrying a long-handled aluminum tool at a construction site. The tool either touched or came close to a high-voltage power line owned by the defendant utility company. The plaintiff sustained severe injuries, including amputations and a traumatic brain injury. He filed a lawsuit against the general contractor and the utility company, alleging negligence and premises liability.The Wayne Circuit Court denied the defendants' motions for summary disposition. The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the general contractor was not liable under the common work area doctrine and that the utility company did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to survive summary disposition. The court found genuine issues of material fact regarding three of the four elements of the common work area doctrine for the general contractor. Specifically, there were factual disputes about the height of the power lines and whether the general contractor took reasonable steps to guard against the danger. The court also found that multiple subcontractors were exposed to the risk, satisfying the requirement of a high degree of risk to a significant number of workers in a common work area.Regarding the utility company, the court found genuine issues of material fact about whether the power lines were properly maintained and whether the injury was foreseeable. The court concluded that the utility company had a duty to ensure the safety of the power lines, given the pre-injury communications and the known dangers of high-reaching conductive tools.The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "El-Jamaly V Kirco Manix Construction Llc" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted by a jury in the Allegan Circuit Court of multiple counts of criminal sexual conduct. During the trial, the presiding judge exchanged emails with the county prosecutor, expressing concerns about the police investigation. The defendant later discovered these communications and moved for a new trial, alleging judicial and prosecutorial misconduct, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The case was reassigned to a different judge, who granted the motion for a new trial due to the appearance of impropriety created by the emails. The prosecution appealed this decision.The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in granting a new trial. The appellate court concluded that the trial judge's ex parte communications were permissible for administrative purposes under the judicial conduct code and did not influence the jury's verdict. The defendant then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the trial judge's ex parte communications violated the Michigan Code of Judicial Conduct. The court found that these communications were not for administrative purposes and created an appearance of impropriety. However, the court concluded that the communications did not show actual bias or a high probability of bias that would violate the defendant's constitutional rights. The court also determined that the trial judge's failure to recuse herself did not result in a miscarriage of justice, as the jury was unaware of the communications and the trial prosecutor did not alter her strategy in response to them. Therefore, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision, holding that the trial court had no legal basis to grant a new trial. View "People of Michigan v. Loew" on Justia Law

Dwight T. Samuels and his identical twin brother, Duane, were involved in a fight at a restaurant, leading to multiple felony charges against both. The prosecution offered a package-deal plea, requiring both brothers to plead guilty to certain charges in exchange for the dismissal of others. Initially, Dwight objected to the plea but changed his mind after learning his brother wished to accept it. Both brothers pleaded guilty, and the trial court accepted their pleas without raising the issue of voluntariness. At sentencing, they moved to withdraw their pleas, arguing the package-deal format was coercive. The trial court denied the motions without an evidentiary hearing, finding the pleas voluntary.The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Dwight's application for leave to appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider whether an evidentiary hearing was required to determine the voluntariness of the plea. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the voluntariness of a plea induced by a promise of leniency to a relative is determined by whether the prosecution had probable cause to prosecute the third party.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that when a defendant's plea is made under a package-deal plea offer, and the record raises a question of fact about its voluntariness, a trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing. The court must consider the totality of the circumstances, guided by factors from In re Ibarra, to determine if the plea was voluntary. The Supreme Court found that the record raised a factual question about Dwight's plea and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to assess the voluntariness of his plea. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed. View "People Of Michigan v. Samuels" on Justia Law

Damon E. Warner was charged with first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct for allegedly assaulting his minor stepdaughter. During the investigation, Warner underwent three police interrogations, during which he initially denied the accusations but eventually signed a confession written by the police. A jury found him guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct but could not reach a verdict on the first-degree charge. Warner was sentenced to 10 to 30 years in prison. The first-degree charge was later dismissed without prejudice. Warner successfully appealed his conviction, and the Court of Appeals granted him a new trial.The Eaton Circuit Court allowed the prosecutor to reinstate the first-degree charge. Warner requested funds to hire an expert on false confessions and access to the victim’s medical and psychological records, but the trial court denied both motions. At the second trial, Warner was found guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to 20 to 40 years in prison. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, stating that although the trial court misinterpreted the precedent set by People v Kowalski, it did not abuse its discretion in denying Warner's request for an expert witness.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that it was fundamentally unfair to deny an indigent defendant funding for an expert on false confessions when the veracity of the confession was central to the trial. The Court found that Warner had demonstrated a reasonable probability that the expert would aid his defense and that the absence of such an expert resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Warner" on Justia Law

Daoud M. Janini and Feryal Janini filed a complaint against London Townhouses Condominium Association, alleging that the association failed to maintain the sidewalk by not removing snow and ice, leading to Daoud Janini's fall and subsequent brain injury. The plaintiffs owned a condominium unit in the complex, and the association was responsible for maintaining common areas, including the sidewalk where the incident occurred.The Wayne Circuit Court granted the defendant's motion for summary disposition in part, dismissing all claims except for the premises-liability claim. The defendant appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, holding that because the plaintiffs were co-owners of the land, they could not bring a premises-liability claim. The plaintiffs then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court.The Michigan Supreme Court held that a co-owner of a condominium unit is considered an invitee when entering the common elements of the condominium project. The court determined that the condominium association owes a duty of reasonable care to protect co-owners from dangerous conditions in these common areas. The court overruled the previous decision in Francescutti v. Fox Chase Condo Ass’n, which had precluded such claims. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Janini v. London Townhouses Condominium Association" on Justia Law