Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Addison Township issued Jerry Barnhart a misdemeanor citation for operating a shooting range without a zoning compliance permit. The case proceeded to a bench trial. After the township presented its case, the court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict dismissing the case, ruling that defendant's activities were protected under MCL 691.1542a(2). The Circuit Court affirmed. In an unpublished opinion the Court of Appeals reversed dismissal of the citation and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of the panel’s interpretation of the term "sport shooting range" and for a determination whether defendant was in compliance with "generally accepted operation practices" as required by the statute. On remand, the township moved to enforce the ordinance, and defendant moved for a declaratory judgment and dismissal. The district court granted defendant's motion, concluding that defendant was operating a sport shooting range in compliance with generally accepted operation practices. The circuit court remanded the case to the district court to examine the provisions of the sport shooting ranges act (SSRA) as a whole and to consider whether MCL 691.1542a(2) applied to all local ordinances or only those attempting to regulate shooting ranges. On remand, the district court again ruled in favor of defendant. The circuit court reversed, holding that defendant’s activities were not protected under MCL 691.1542a. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found that in order for MCL 691.1542a(2) to apply to a shooting range, it must: (1) be a sport shooting range that also existed as a sport shooting range as of July 5, 1994; and (2) the sport shooting range must operate in compliance with the generally accepted operation practices. The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting MCL 691.1541(d) when it held that a shooting range owner could not have a commercial purpose in operating a sport shooting range. Defendant's shooting range was entitled to protection under MCL 691.1542a(2). The case was once again remanded for dismissal. View "Addison Township v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

Fradco, Inc., contested a final assessment issued by the Department of Treasury that disallowed a sales tax deduction following an audit. Through its resident agent, Fradco requested the department send all information regarding tax matters to the certified public accountant (CPA) that Fradco designated. The department mailed a copy of its preliminary decision and order of determination to Fradco's CPA. It sent the final assessment only to Fradco's place of business. Fradco's CPA inquired about the final assessment and was informed a month later that a final assessment had been issued, that no appeal had been taken, and that the matter was now subject to collection. The letter did not include a copy of the assessment. The department sought summary judgment in Fradco’s appeal, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal had not been filed within 35 days after the final assessment. The tribunal denied the motion, concluding that state law provided a parallel notice requirement whenever a taxpayer properly filed a request that notices be sent to a representative and that notice to Fradco alone had not been sufficient to start the 35-day period. Similarly, SMK, LLC, contested a final assessment issued by the Department of Treasury. SMK had hired a CPA and designated him to represent it for purposes of the sales tax audit, giving him limited authorization to inspect or receive confidential information, represent SMK, and receive mail from the department. The department faxed the CPA a notice stating that the audit package had been submitted. It sent a final assessment to SMK via certified mail, although SMK claimed that it did not receive the final assessment. The CPA made several inquiries to the department and received no answers from the department. Five days after the appeal period had allegedly run, the department sent SMK's CPA the final assessment and a letter stating that the deadline for appeal had passed. The Supreme Court granted the department leave to appeal and ordered that the Fradco and SMK appeals be heard together. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that if a taxpayer has appointed a representative, the Department of Treasury must issue notice to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s official representative before the taxpayer’s 35-day appeal period under MCL 205.22(1) begins to run. View "Fradco, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Defendant Ronald Earl was convicted by a jury of bank robbery and two counts of possession of less than 25 grams of a controlled substance. At the time defendant committed the offenses, MCL 780.905 required that all defendants convicted of a felony pay a $60 crime victim’s rights assessment. The statute was amended effective December 16, 2010, to raise the assessment for convicted felons to $130. At defendant’s sentencing in 2011, the court ordered defendant to pay the $130 crime victim’s rights assessment under MCL 780.905(1)(a). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the increased victim's rights fund assessment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Michigan v. Earl" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) petitioned for the interim suspension of Wayne Circuit Court Judge Wade H. McCree without pay. With respect to Count I, an appointed special master concluded that respondent should have disqualified himself from a felony nonsupport case as soon as he began a sexual relationship with the complaining witness in the case. With respect to Count II, the master found that respondent had lied to the prosecuting attorney’s office when he reported that the witness was stalking him and trying to extort money from him. With respect to Count III, the master concluded that respondent had improperly acted in another criminal case, one that involved the witness' uncle. With respect to Count IV, the master found that although many of the text messages that respondent exchanged with the witness while he was on the bench were inappropriate, they were used in a private context and did not rise to the level of judicial misconduct. Finally, the master found that the misrepresentations alleged in Count V did not warrant action by the JTC. The JTC recommended that respondent be removed from office, and conditionally suspended without pay for six years. The Supreme Court granted the petition. View "In re McCree" on Justia Law

John Ter Beek filed an action against the City of Wyoming, seeking to have a city zoning ordinance declared void and an injunction entered prohibiting its enforcement. Ter Beek was a qualifying patient and held a registry identification card under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA). He wanted to grow and use marijuana for medical purposes in his home and argued that section 4(a) of the MMMA, MCL 333.26424(a), preempted the ordinance. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Ter Beek argued that because the federal controlled substances act (CSA) prohibited the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana, the ordinance likewise prohibited the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana for medical use and therefore conflicted with and was preempted by the MMMA. The city argued instead that the CSA preempted the MMMA. The court granted the City's motion, agreeing that the CSA preempted the MMMA. Ter Beek appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the ordinance conflicted with sec. 4(a) of the MMMA and that the CSA did not preempt 4(a) because it was possible to comply with both statutes simultaneously and the state-law immunity for certain medical marijuana patients under 4(a) did not stand as an obstacle to the federal regulation of marijuana use. The City appealed. The Supreme Court concluded section 4(a) of the MMMA was not preempted by the federal controlled substances act, but 4(a) preempted the ordinance because the ordinance directly conflicted with the MMMA. View "Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the execution of a lease of tangible personal property constitutes "use" for purposes of the Use Tax Act (UTA). Petitioner purchased an aircraft from one company and immediately executed a five-year lease to another company that already had possession of the aircraft. The Department of Treasury assessed a use tax against petitioner based on the lease transaction, and the Michigan Tax Tribunal ultimately upheld the assessment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that petitioner did not “use” the aircraft because it ceded total control of the aircraft to the lessee by virtue of the lease and the lessee had uninterrupted possession of the aircraft before and during the lease. The Supreme Court concluded that because the right to allow others to use one’s personal property is a right incident to ownership, and a lease is an instrument by which an owner exercises that right, it follows that the execution of a lease is an exercise of a right or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership of the property. Therefore, that constitutes "use" for purposes of the UTA. Accordingly, petitioner "used" the aircraft in question for purposes of the UTA when it executed a lease of the aircraft in Michigan, regardless of whether it ever had actual possession of the aircraft. View "NACG Leasing v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Chandra Valencia Smith-Anthony was convicted by a jury of larceny from the person. While monitoring closed-circuit television monitors at a department store, the store's loss-prevention officer observed defendant acting suspiciously while shopping and proceeded to follow her. The officer saw defendant select a perfume box set from a display and later slip it into one of her bags. Defendant was stopped by the officer when she left the store with the item in her bag. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction, concluding that the prosecution had failed to establish the from-the-person element of larceny from a person because there was no evidence that defendant had committed the larceny within the officer's area of immediate presence or control as required by the statute. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals properly reversed defendant's conviction because there was insufficient evidence to support it. View "Michigan v. Smith-Anthony" on Justia Law

Stanley Duncan was charged with five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. His wife Vita Duncan was charged with two counts of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. A three-year-old victim was qualified to testify at the separate preliminary examinations held for each defendant. Both were bound over for a single jury trial. The victim was called to the stand, but became visibly agitated and unable to answer the court's questions regarding telling the truth and telling a lie. The court then ruled the victim was not competent to testify, suffering from "a then existing mental infirmity." The prosecution asked the court to declare the victim unavailable, but the court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's applications for leave for appeal. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution's motion for consideration: the child victim was unavailable within the meaning of Michigan's Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4), and the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded the child was not unavailable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Devon Bailey sued Steven Schaaf, T.J. Realty, Inc. (doing business as Hi-Tech Protection), Evergreen Regency Townhomes, Ltd., Radney Management & Investments, and others for injuries suffered while at a friend's apartment in a complex owned and operated by Radney. Hi-Tech security guards William Baker and Chris Campbell were on duty and patrolling the complex on the night Bailey was injured. A resident had informed Baker and Campbell that Schaaf was threatening people with a gun at an outdoor gathering. Bailey alleged that Baker and Campbell ignored the warning. Sometime later they heard two gunshots; Schaaf shot Bailey twice in the back, rendering Bailey a paraplegic. Bailey alleged that Baker and Campbell were agents of Hi-Tech, and that Hi-Tech was an agent of Radney and Evergreen. Bailey asserted multiple claims against all defendants under theories of premises liability, negligent hiring and supervising, ordinary negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of contract. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to defendants; Bailey appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part concluding in part that Evergreen and Radney owed Bailey a duty to call the police in response to an ongoing situation on the premises, extending the Supreme Court's decision in MacDonald v. PKT, Inc., (628 NW2d 33 (2001)) to the landlord-tenant context. In addition, the appellate court rejected Bailey's argument that he was a third-party beneficiary of the provision-of-security contract between Hi-Tech and Evergreen and that Hi-Tech did not owe Bailey a duty that was separate and distinct from Hi-Tech's duties under the Hi-Tech / Evergreen contract in effect at the time of Bailey's injuries. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because, accepting Bailey's allegation as true, defendants had a duty to call the police. Bailey also alleged sufficient facts involving the existence of a contract for security services between the security company and the landlord, creating an agency relationship, and putting defendants on notice that their invitees and tenants faced a specific and imminent harm. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of vicarious liability and negligence issues. View "Bailey v. Schaff" on Justia Law

Grange Insurance Company of Michigan sought a declaratory judgment regarding its responsibility under a no-fault insurance policy issued to Edward Lawrence to reimburse Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits it paid after the death of his daughter Josalyn Lawrence following an automobile accident. The accident occurred while Josalyn's mother, Laura Rosinski, was driving a vehicle insured by Farm Bureau. Lawrence and Rosinski were divorced at the time of the accident but shared joint legal custody of the child. Rosinski had primary physical custody. Farm Bureau sought partial reimbursement of the PIP benefits it paid, arguing that Grange was in the same order of priority because Josalyn was domiciled in both parents' homes under MCL 500.3114(1). Farm Bureau counterclaimed. The circuit court granted Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment; Grange appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Automobile Club Insurance Association (ACIA) also sought a declaratory judgment to recover PIP benefits from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company under similar circumstances as in "Lawrence." Sarah Campanelli, the daughter of Francis Campaneli and Tina Taylor, died following an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, Sarah's parents, Francis Campanelli and Tina Taylor, were divorced and shared joint legal custody of Sarah; Campanelli had physical custody. Soon after the divorce, the family court modified the divorce judgment, allowing Campanelli to move and to change Sarah's domicile to Tennessee. When the accident occurred eleven years later, Sarah was staying in Michigan to attend school after a summer visit with her mother. ACIA claimed that State Farm was the responsible insurer and that that Sarah was not domiciled in Michigan, therefore it was not responsible for Sarah's PIP benefits. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm; the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that there was a question of fact as to the child's domicile. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the "Grange" case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Grange; the Court reversed and remanded the "ACIA" case for entry of summary judgment in favor of ACIA. View "Grange Insurance Company of Michigan v. Lawrence" on Justia Law