Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the execution of a lease of tangible personal property constitutes "use" for purposes of the Use Tax Act (UTA). Petitioner purchased an aircraft from one company and immediately executed a five-year lease to another company that already had possession of the aircraft. The Department of Treasury assessed a use tax against petitioner based on the lease transaction, and the Michigan Tax Tribunal ultimately upheld the assessment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that petitioner did not “use” the aircraft because it ceded total control of the aircraft to the lessee by virtue of the lease and the lessee had uninterrupted possession of the aircraft before and during the lease. The Supreme Court concluded that because the right to allow others to use one’s personal property is a right incident to ownership, and a lease is an instrument by which an owner exercises that right, it follows that the execution of a lease is an exercise of a right or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership of the property. Therefore, that constitutes "use" for purposes of the UTA. Accordingly, petitioner "used" the aircraft in question for purposes of the UTA when it executed a lease of the aircraft in Michigan, regardless of whether it ever had actual possession of the aircraft. View "NACG Leasing v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Chandra Valencia Smith-Anthony was convicted by a jury of larceny from the person. While monitoring closed-circuit television monitors at a department store, the store's loss-prevention officer observed defendant acting suspiciously while shopping and proceeded to follow her. The officer saw defendant select a perfume box set from a display and later slip it into one of her bags. Defendant was stopped by the officer when she left the store with the item in her bag. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction, concluding that the prosecution had failed to establish the from-the-person element of larceny from a person because there was no evidence that defendant had committed the larceny within the officer's area of immediate presence or control as required by the statute. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals properly reversed defendant's conviction because there was insufficient evidence to support it. View "Michigan v. Smith-Anthony" on Justia Law

Stanley Duncan was charged with five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. His wife Vita Duncan was charged with two counts of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. A three-year-old victim was qualified to testify at the separate preliminary examinations held for each defendant. Both were bound over for a single jury trial. The victim was called to the stand, but became visibly agitated and unable to answer the court's questions regarding telling the truth and telling a lie. The court then ruled the victim was not competent to testify, suffering from "a then existing mental infirmity." The prosecution asked the court to declare the victim unavailable, but the court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's applications for leave for appeal. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution's motion for consideration: the child victim was unavailable within the meaning of Michigan's Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4), and the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded the child was not unavailable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Devon Bailey sued Steven Schaaf, T.J. Realty, Inc. (doing business as Hi-Tech Protection), Evergreen Regency Townhomes, Ltd., Radney Management & Investments, and others for injuries suffered while at a friend's apartment in a complex owned and operated by Radney. Hi-Tech security guards William Baker and Chris Campbell were on duty and patrolling the complex on the night Bailey was injured. A resident had informed Baker and Campbell that Schaaf was threatening people with a gun at an outdoor gathering. Bailey alleged that Baker and Campbell ignored the warning. Sometime later they heard two gunshots; Schaaf shot Bailey twice in the back, rendering Bailey a paraplegic. Bailey alleged that Baker and Campbell were agents of Hi-Tech, and that Hi-Tech was an agent of Radney and Evergreen. Bailey asserted multiple claims against all defendants under theories of premises liability, negligent hiring and supervising, ordinary negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of contract. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to defendants; Bailey appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part concluding in part that Evergreen and Radney owed Bailey a duty to call the police in response to an ongoing situation on the premises, extending the Supreme Court's decision in MacDonald v. PKT, Inc., (628 NW2d 33 (2001)) to the landlord-tenant context. In addition, the appellate court rejected Bailey's argument that he was a third-party beneficiary of the provision-of-security contract between Hi-Tech and Evergreen and that Hi-Tech did not owe Bailey a duty that was separate and distinct from Hi-Tech's duties under the Hi-Tech / Evergreen contract in effect at the time of Bailey's injuries. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because, accepting Bailey's allegation as true, defendants had a duty to call the police. Bailey also alleged sufficient facts involving the existence of a contract for security services between the security company and the landlord, creating an agency relationship, and putting defendants on notice that their invitees and tenants faced a specific and imminent harm. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of vicarious liability and negligence issues. View "Bailey v. Schaff" on Justia Law

Grange Insurance Company of Michigan sought a declaratory judgment regarding its responsibility under a no-fault insurance policy issued to Edward Lawrence to reimburse Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits it paid after the death of his daughter Josalyn Lawrence following an automobile accident. The accident occurred while Josalyn's mother, Laura Rosinski, was driving a vehicle insured by Farm Bureau. Lawrence and Rosinski were divorced at the time of the accident but shared joint legal custody of the child. Rosinski had primary physical custody. Farm Bureau sought partial reimbursement of the PIP benefits it paid, arguing that Grange was in the same order of priority because Josalyn was domiciled in both parents' homes under MCL 500.3114(1). Farm Bureau counterclaimed. The circuit court granted Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment; Grange appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Automobile Club Insurance Association (ACIA) also sought a declaratory judgment to recover PIP benefits from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company under similar circumstances as in "Lawrence." Sarah Campanelli, the daughter of Francis Campaneli and Tina Taylor, died following an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, Sarah's parents, Francis Campanelli and Tina Taylor, were divorced and shared joint legal custody of Sarah; Campanelli had physical custody. Soon after the divorce, the family court modified the divorce judgment, allowing Campanelli to move and to change Sarah's domicile to Tennessee. When the accident occurred eleven years later, Sarah was staying in Michigan to attend school after a summer visit with her mother. ACIA claimed that State Farm was the responsible insurer and that that Sarah was not domiciled in Michigan, therefore it was not responsible for Sarah's PIP benefits. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm; the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that there was a question of fact as to the child's domicile. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the "Grange" case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Grange; the Court reversed and remanded the "ACIA" case for entry of summary judgment in favor of ACIA. View "Grange Insurance Company of Michigan v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Defendant Donald Michael Hardy was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of carjacking. His sentence was 12 to 50 years' imprisonment. Hardy filed a motion for resentencing, challenging the OV scoring and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the circuit court denied. Hardy then appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the sentence. Defendant Devon DeCarlos Glenn, Jr. was convicted after pleading guilty to armed robbery and felonious assault. He was sentenced to 15 to 30 years' imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction and 18 to 48 months' imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction. The Court of Appeals vacated Glenn's sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that although Glenn's conduct used more violence than was strictly necessary to complete an armed robbery, it was not egregious enough in relation to the other conduct listed in the sentencing guidelines to justify the score the circuit court gave him. Both defendants appealed their sentences to the Supreme Court; after review, the Supreme Court found no error in the circuit court's scoring of Hardy's sentence. However, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in Glenn's case and remanded for recalculation of his sentence. View "Michigan v. Glenn" on Justia Law

Brent Harris sued Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA), seeking to recover a duplicate payment for medical expenses incurred as the result of a motorcycle-motor vehicle accident, which had been paid directly to providers by his health insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM). Harris claimed ACIA was required to pay him directly the same amounts paid by BCBSM to any healthcare provider for the medical expenses. ACIA filed a third-party complaint against BCBSM and Harris filed an amended complaint naming BCBSM as a defendant. The circuit court granted summary judgment to BCBSM and ACIA, concluding that because ACIA's policy was uncoordinated, ACIA was the primary insurer, and that the BCBSM certificate coordinated benefits with the no-fault policy. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, concluding that the BCBSM certificate did not coordinate with ACIA's no-fault policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and reinstated the trial court's judgment: In this case, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Harris was entitled to double recovery; Harris was not obligated to pay his medical expenses because, as a matter of law, ACIA was liable for Harris's PIP benefits. ACIA was liable regardless of when the expenses were incurred and BCBSM's certificate that stated it would not cover those services for which Harris legally did not have to pay precluded Harris from receiving double recovery for those medical expenses. View "Harris v. Auto Club Insurance Association" on Justia Law

Nancy Mick, as personal representative of the estate of Stephen Bradley, sought to have the Kent County Sheriff's Department held in contempt of court. She obtained an order from the probate court to take Stephen Bradley into custody for a psychiatric evaluation. The sheriff's department did not arrive, and Mr. Bradley shot and killed himself. Mick originally filed a wrongful-death action against the sheriff's department, but the department was granted governmental immunity from suit. Mick then filed her contempt action, arguing the estate of Mr. Bradley suffered damages as a result of the sheriff department's failure to show. The department again moved for dismissal on immunity grounds, but the probate court denied that motion. The department then appealed the probate court's decision at circuit court, which reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, finding that the governmental tort liability act (GTLA) did not apply in this case. The department appealed to the Supreme Court. Upon review, the Supreme Court the department was entitled to dismissal on an immunity basis, and reversed the Court of Appeals. View "In re Bradley Estate" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Hurticene Hardaway sued Wayne County in circuit court seeking a declaratory judgment, and claiming breach of contract and promissory estoppel in relation to the denial of certain lifetime benefits granted to certain former County employees. Plaintiff worked in the County's office of corporation counsel. The trial court concluded that due to language in the Wayne County Commission Resolution 94-903, plaintiff did not qualify for the benefits. The trial court ultimately granted the County's motion for summary judgment, but the Court of Appeals reversed, finding that the language in question was ambiguous. In its review of the resolution in question, the Supreme Court concluded its language was not ambiguous, therefore affirming the trial court's interpretation and judgment. View "Hardaway v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to redact the majority of the detectives' out-of-court statements from the interrogation of Defendant John Musser where they commented on his credibility. Most of the statements made had no probative value, and their admission undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict because the jury may have relied on those statements in reaching its verdict. The Court felt the limiting jury instruction did not cure this error. Accordingly, the Court vacated defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Musser" on Justia Law