Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Andrie Inc. brought an action in the Court of Claims, seeking a refund of use taxes it had paid under protest for the years 1999 through 2006 after an audit by the Department of Treasury determined that Andrie had understated the taxes it owed for that period under the Use Tax Act (UTA). In order to be entitled to the exemption from the use tax, a taxpayer must show that the sales tax was both due and paid on the sale of that tangible personal property. Because Andrie did not submit any evidence that sales tax had been paid, Andrie was not entitled to the use tax exemption. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed to the extent it held that the use tax could never be levied on property if the purchase of that property was subject to sales tax. View "Andrie, Inc. v. Dept. of Tresasury" on Justia Law

In December 2009, defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony, and two counts of unlawful imprisonment. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree home invasion. Because first-degree home invasion was the only felony that defendant was charged with that could have supported the conviction for first-degree felony murder, the initial jury verdict was, plainly, inconsistent. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court erred by denying defendant's constitutional right to represent himself. The Court of Appeals remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial, and the Supreme Court denied the prosecution's application for leave to appeal. The prosecution then filed an amended information setting forth the charges on retrial. The defendant was re-charged with each of the charges of which he was initially convicted. Defendant moved to dismiss the first-degree felony-murder charge, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented a second prosecution on that charge because he stood acquitted of the only predicate felony, which was one of the elements of felony murder. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, agreeing that a second jury could not reconsider the home-invasion element of felony murder given the preclusive effect of his acquittal of home invasion. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecution's interlocutory application for leave to appeal and reversed the trial court's order in an unpublished opinion per curiam, holding that because the jury's verdict was inconsistent, that inconsistency negated the application of the collateral-estoppel doctrine in the second prosecution. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant whose conviction for felony murder was reversed on appeal could be retried for that charge when he was also acquitted of the only felony that supported it. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the collateral-estoppel strand of Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence prevented the prosecution from re-charging the defendant with felony murder. Because the defendant’s acquittal of the only supporting felony triggered collateral estoppel, the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a second felony-murder prosecution of defendant. View "Michigan v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was stopped by the police for a traffic violation. As defendant exited the vehicle, officers observed defendant drop a silver automatic handgun into the map pocket of the car door and quickly close the door. Defendant was 21 years old at the time and had no prior criminal history. After establishing that defendant did not possess a permit to carry a concealed weapon, he was arrested and subsequently charged with the crime of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW). The prosecutor permitted defendant to plead guilty to the reduced charge of attempted CCW and recommended a probationary sentence. At sentencing, defense counsel urged the court to delay sentencing for one year, at which time defendant would be "very close to graduating from college" and the prosecutor's office might change its mind and either dismiss the case entirely or permit defendant to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. The prosecutor objected to a delayed sentence and asked that defendant be sentenced to probation. The trial court expressed concern that defendant would "end up with a felony," thus limiting his employment opportunities. Expressing its unhappiness with the prosecutor's position, the court stated that it would consider "the delayed sentence with one day over a year; then [the court] would have lost jurisdiction." The next time the parties returned to court, defense counsel requested that sentencing be delayed for one year to give defendant the opportunity to show that he deserved "significant leniency" from the court. The prosecutor continued to object to delayed sentencing, stating that the prosecutor's office did not intend to reduce the criminal charge any further. The trial court stated that it found it "disturb[ing]" that the prosecutor opposed defendant's proposed sentence. The trial court announced that it would exercise its discretion and delayed the imposition of defendant's sentence for one year. On appeal, the prosecutor argued the trial court had no legal authority to dismiss the case over the prosecution's objections, because MCL 771.1 did not permit dismissal of the case. The Court of Appeals found no merit to the prosecutor's appeal. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether MCL 771.1(2) divested sentencing judge of jurisdiction if a defendant is not sentenced within one year after the imposition of a delayed sentence. The Supreme Court held that it did not. "The one-year limitation designates the maximum amount of time that sentencing may be delayed in order to provide defendant the chance to establish his worthiness of leniency. After one year, sentencing may no longer be delayed for that purpose, and the judge is required to sentence defendant as provided by law." The appellate court's decision was overruled and the case remanded to the trial court for defendant's sentencing. View "Michigan v. Smith" on Justia Law

George Badeen (a licensed collection agency manager) and Midwest Recovery and Adjustment, Inc. (a licensed collection agency that Badeen owned and operated) brought a class action against PAR, Inc.; Remarketing Solutions; CenterOne Financial Services, LLC; and numerous other lenders and forwarding companies doing business in Michigan. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant "forwarding companies" acted as collection agencies under Michigan law but did so without a license, in violation of MCL 339.904(1), and that defendant lenders, who hired the forwarding companies, violated Michigan law by hiring unlicensed collection agencies, in violation of MCL 445.252(s). Plaintiffs further alleged that the violations injured them by impeding their business while not complying with Michigan law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the forwarding companies did not satisfy the definition of "collection agency" because the phrase "soliciting a claim for collection" in that statute referred to asking the debtor to pay the debt, which the forwarding companies did not do. The court granted defendants’ motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the forwarding companies indeed did fall within the statutory definition of collection agencies. Accordingly, the Court vacated Part III(B) of the Court of Appeals' judgment, and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Badeen v. PAR, Inc." on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court, three actions: two class actions and a qui tam action brought in the name of the state of Michigan involving allegations that multiple pharmacies systematically violated MCL 333.17755(2) by improperly retaining savings that should have been passed on to customers when dispensing generic drugs in the place of their brand-name equivalents. Furthermore, plaintiffs argued that violations of section 17755(2) necessarily resulted in violations of the Health Care False Claim Act (HCFCA) and the Medicaid False Claim Act (MFCA) when pharmacists submitted reimbursement claims to the state for Medicaid payments that they were not entitled to receive. "The inferences and assumptions required to implicate defendants [were] simply too tenuous for plaintiffs' claims to survive summary judgment. Moreover, plaintiffs' overbroad approach of identifying all transactions in which a generic drug was dispensed fail[ed] to hone in on the only relevant transactions - those in which a generic drug was dispensed in place of a brand-name drug." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ construction of MCL 333.17755(2) and its holding that plaintiffs' pleadings were sufficient to survive summary judgment, vacated the remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment, and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Michigan ex rel Gurganus v. CVS Caremark Corp." on Justia Law

Terri Sholberg died when the car she was driving hit a horse standing in the road. Diane Sholberg, as personal representative of her estate, sued Daniel Truman (the owner of the horse, which had escaped from its stall) and Robert and Marilyn Truman (the title owners of the farm that Daniel Truman operated). Other than being the title owners, defendants Robert and Marilyn Truman had nothing to do with the farm or the animals on it. The circuit court entered a default judgment against Daniel Truman, but granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor, concluding that they could not be held liable for a public nuisance because they were not in possession of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed with regard to the public nuisance claim, holding that defendants’ ownership of the property from which the alleged nuisance arose was sufficient to allow a nuisance action against them. Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal with respect to an issue concerning violations of the Equine Activity Liability Act, and defendants filed a separate application for leave to appeal on the nuisance claim. The Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s application, and granted defendant's application, reversing reversed in part the Court of Appeals' judgment with respect to the public nuisance claim: defendants merely owned the property. Defendants never possessed or exercised any control over the property and had not even visited it in more than a decade. There was no evidence that defendants knew or had reason to know that Daniel Truman’s animals had been escaping the property when the accident happened. Because defendants did not control or possess the property or the horse, there was no basis for imposing tort liability on them for a public nuisance. "Daniel Truman was the person best able to prevent any harm to others, and given that defendants had resigned all charge and control over the property to him, he was the person exclusively responsible for the alleged public nuisance he created on the property."View "Estate of Sholberg v. Truman" on Justia Law

Chrysler Group, LLC and plaintiff LaFontaine Saline Inc. (LaFontaine), an authorized Chrysler automobile dealer, entered into a Dealer Agreement in 2007, granting LaFontaine the non-exclusive right to sell Dodge vehicles from its location in Saline, Michigan, and defined LaFontaine’s Sales Locality as "the area designated in writing to [LaFontaine] by [Chrysler] from time to time as the territory of [LaFontaine’s] responsibility for the sale of [Chrysler, Jeep, and Dodge] vehicles, vehicle parts and accessories . . . ." This case centered on whether the 2010 amendment of the Motor Vehicle Dealer Act (MVDA) (expanding the relevant market area) from a six-mile radius to a nine-mile radius, applied retroactively. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it did not. The Court therefore vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for reinstatement of summary judgment in favor of Chrysler. View "LaFontaine Saline, Inc. v. Chrysler Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Matthew Makowski filed an action in the Court of Claims against the Governor and the Secretary of State, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to reverse then-Governor Jennifer Granholm's decision to revoke her commutation of plaintiff's nonparolable life sentence that had been imposed for his first-degree murder and armed robbery convictions. The Governor had signed the commutation, it was signed by the Secretary of State and affixed with the Great Seal. Four days later, the Governor decided to revoke the order, and all copies of the commutation certificate were destroyed. Plaintiff alleged that the commutation was final when it was signed, sealed, and delivered to the Department of Corrections, and argued the Governor lacked the authority to revoke a completed commutation. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the governor's exercise of discretion over commutation decisions. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Governor's exercise of the commutation power presented a nonjusticiable political question. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Constitution did not give the Governor the power to revoke a validly granted commutation: "[b]ecause the Governor signed plaintiff's commutation and delivered it to the Secretary of State, where it was signed and affixed with the Great Seal, plaintiff was granted an irrevocable commutation of his sentence." View "Makowski v. Granholm" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of Michigan’s one-parent doctrine. The one-parent doctrine essentially imposes joint and several liability on both parents, potentially divesting either of custody, on the basis of the unfitness of one. "Merely describing the doctrine foreshadows its constitutional weakness." Upon petition by the Department of Human Services (DHS), the trial court adjudicated respondent-mother, Tammy Sanders, as unfit but dismissed the allegations of abuse and neglect against respondent-appellant-father, Lance Laird. Laird moved for his children to be placed with him. Although Laird was never adjudicated as unfit, the trial court denied Laird’s motion, limited his contact with his children, and ordered him to comply with a service plan. The trial court relied on the one-parent doctrine and the Court of Appeals’ decision in "In re CR," (646 NW2d 506 (2002)), from which that doctrine derives. Laird argued that the one-parent doctrine violated his fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of his children because it permits the court to enter dispositional orders affecting that right without first determining that he was an unfit parent. The Supreme Court agreed: because application of the one-parent doctrine impermissibly infringed the fundamental rights of unadjudicated parents without providing adequate process, the Court held that it was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. View "In re Sanders" on Justia Law

Defendant Chad Garrison, stole four snowmobiles and two trailers from vacation homes in Cheboygan County. He pleaded guilty to one count of larceny of property valued at $1,000 or more, but less than $20,000, as a second-offense habitual offender. While the case was pending, the three victims of defendant’s theft traveled back and forth from their primary residences in order to secure their stolen property and attend a restitution hearing. At the hearing, the victims testified that they had incurred travel expenses related to these trips in the cumulative amount of $1,125. The sentencing court included $977 of this amount in its restitution order over defense counsel’s objection. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the restitution issue. The Court determined that neither the Crime Victim's Rights Act nor MCL 769.1a authorized courts to include victims’ travel expenses in a restitution award. The Court concluded that the sentencing court abused its discretion by doing so in this case. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, concluding that the statutes do authorize such payments because they require courts to order full restitution, i.e., restitution that is complete and maximal. Therefore, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue and remanded this case to the Cheboygan Circuit Court for reinstatement of the original restitution order. View "Michigan v. Garrison" on Justia Law