Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This appeal involved Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company's obligations under an "Insurance for Non-Trucking Use" policy issued to Drielick Trucking. The policy contained a business-use exclusion, which included two clauses that Empire argued precluded coverage in this case. The Court of Appeals agreed that the first clause precluded coverage when the covered vehicle was not carrying property at the time of the accident, was in this case. Thus, the Court of Appeals expressly declined to address the second clause relating to leased covered vehicles. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the first clause. The case to the trial court for further fact-finding to determine whether Drielick Trucking and Great Lakes Carriers Corporation (GLC) entered into a leasing agreement for the use of Drielick Trucking’s semi-tractors as was contemplated under the policy's clause related to a leased covered vehicle. View "Estate of Eugene Hunt v. Drielick" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether a trial court's failure to provide the appellant-surety notice within seven days of defendant's failure to appear barred forfeiture of the bail bond posted by the surety. Relying on "In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond (Michigan v Moore)" (740 NW2d 734 (2007)), the Court of Appeals held that a court’s failure to comply with the seven-day notice provision of MCL 765.28(1) did not bar forfeiture of a bail bond posted by a surety. Because the Supreme Court concluded that Moore was wrongly decided, it held that a court’s failure to comply with the seven-day notice provision of MCL 765.28(1) did bar forfeiture of a bail bond posted by a surety: "[w]hen a statute provides that a public officer 'shall' undertake some action within a specified period of time, and that period of time is provided to safeguard another’s rights or the public interest, as with the statute at issue here, it is mandatory that such action be undertaken within the specified period of time, and noncompliant public officers are prohibited from proceeding as if they had complied with the statute." View "In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond (Michigan v. Gaston)" on Justia Law

Petitioner-mother and respondent were married in 2003 and had one child, AJR, during their marriage. They divorced in 2009. The divorce judgment gave the parties joint legal custody of the child, gave physical custody to the mother, placed support obligations on respondent, and gave respondent reasonable visitation. Mother married petitioner-stepfather in 2010, and they lived together with AJR as a family. In May 2012, petitioners filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights so that the stepfather could adopt AJR under MCL 710.51(6). Petitioners alleged that respondent had failed to provide support or comply with a support order and had failed to visit or contact AJR for more than two years. The trial court granted the petition and terminated respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that respondent’s parental rights had been improperly terminated given that respondent and the mother had joint legal custody of AJR and MCL 710.51(6) only allowed a court to terminate the rights of a parent who does not have legal custody. The panel held that the statute required the petitioning parent be the parent having sole legal custody. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. "Petitioner-mother has always been free to seek modification of the custody arrangement under MCL 722.27. If on remand petitioner-mother secures sole legal custody of the child, then petitioners may proceed with stepparent adoption under MCL 710.51(6)." View "In re ARJ" on Justia Law

George Tanner was charged with open murder and mutilation of a dead body. After his arrest, he was taken to jail and read his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to counsel and questioning ceased. The next day, while speaking with a jail psychologist, defendant stated that he wanted to “get something off of his chest.” The psychologist informed jail staff of defendant’s request. The jail administrator then spoke with defendant. Defendant told the administrator that he wanted to speak with someone about his case and asked if the administrator could obtain an attorney for him. The administrator stated that he could not provide an attorney for defendant, but could contact the police officers who were handling the case. The administrator then contacted both the police and the prosecutor. The prosecutor apparently informed the court of defendant’s request for an attorney, and the court sent an attorney to the jail. After the attorney and the police officers arrived at the jail, the jail administrator took the police officers to speak with defendant and asked the attorney to wait in the jail lobby while the officers determined defendant’s intentions. Defendant was again read his Miranda rights, which he waived without again requesting an attorney and without being made aware of the attorney’s presence at the jail. Defendant then made incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the murder. Defense counsel moved to suppress the statements, and the court granted the motion. The prosecution sought leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the application. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the rule announced in "Michigan v Bender," (551 NW2d 71 (1996)), should have been maintained. Bender required police officers to promptly inform a suspect facing custodial interrogation that an attorney is available when that attorney attempts to contact the suspect. If the officers failed to do so, any statements made by the suspect, including voluntary statements given by the suspect with full knowledge of his Miranda rights, are rendered inadmissible. The Supreme Court respectfully concluded Bender was wrongly decided and that it should have been overruled. The Court reversed the trial court’s suppression of certain incriminating statements made by defendant, which was justified solely on the grounds of Bender, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Tanner" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal complaint against Wayne Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, alleging 10 counts of judicial misconduct that arose out of criminal cases over which he had presided. After hearing argument on objections to the master’s report, a majority of the JTC concluded that the evidence established judicial misconduct in eight of the ten allegations and recommended that respondent be suspended for 90 days without pay. After review of the entire record and due consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court agreed with the JTC’s conclusion that respondent committed judicial misconduct, but the Court was not persuaded that the recommended sanction was appropriate in this case. Instead, the Court held that a 60-day suspension without pay was proportionate to the body of judicial misconduct established by the record. View "In re Hon. Bruce Morrow" on Justia Law

Andrie Inc. brought an action in the Court of Claims, seeking a refund of use taxes it had paid under protest for the years 1999 through 2006 after an audit by the Department of Treasury determined that Andrie had understated the taxes it owed for that period under the Use Tax Act (UTA). In order to be entitled to the exemption from the use tax, a taxpayer must show that the sales tax was both due and paid on the sale of that tangible personal property. Because Andrie did not submit any evidence that sales tax had been paid, Andrie was not entitled to the use tax exemption. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed to the extent it held that the use tax could never be levied on property if the purchase of that property was subject to sales tax. View "Andrie, Inc. v. Dept. of Tresasury" on Justia Law

In December 2009, defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony, and two counts of unlawful imprisonment. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree home invasion. Because first-degree home invasion was the only felony that defendant was charged with that could have supported the conviction for first-degree felony murder, the initial jury verdict was, plainly, inconsistent. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court erred by denying defendant's constitutional right to represent himself. The Court of Appeals remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial, and the Supreme Court denied the prosecution's application for leave to appeal. The prosecution then filed an amended information setting forth the charges on retrial. The defendant was re-charged with each of the charges of which he was initially convicted. Defendant moved to dismiss the first-degree felony-murder charge, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented a second prosecution on that charge because he stood acquitted of the only predicate felony, which was one of the elements of felony murder. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, agreeing that a second jury could not reconsider the home-invasion element of felony murder given the preclusive effect of his acquittal of home invasion. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecution's interlocutory application for leave to appeal and reversed the trial court's order in an unpublished opinion per curiam, holding that because the jury's verdict was inconsistent, that inconsistency negated the application of the collateral-estoppel doctrine in the second prosecution. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant whose conviction for felony murder was reversed on appeal could be retried for that charge when he was also acquitted of the only felony that supported it. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the collateral-estoppel strand of Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence prevented the prosecution from re-charging the defendant with felony murder. Because the defendant’s acquittal of the only supporting felony triggered collateral estoppel, the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a second felony-murder prosecution of defendant. View "Michigan v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was stopped by the police for a traffic violation. As defendant exited the vehicle, officers observed defendant drop a silver automatic handgun into the map pocket of the car door and quickly close the door. Defendant was 21 years old at the time and had no prior criminal history. After establishing that defendant did not possess a permit to carry a concealed weapon, he was arrested and subsequently charged with the crime of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW). The prosecutor permitted defendant to plead guilty to the reduced charge of attempted CCW and recommended a probationary sentence. At sentencing, defense counsel urged the court to delay sentencing for one year, at which time defendant would be "very close to graduating from college" and the prosecutor's office might change its mind and either dismiss the case entirely or permit defendant to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. The prosecutor objected to a delayed sentence and asked that defendant be sentenced to probation. The trial court expressed concern that defendant would "end up with a felony," thus limiting his employment opportunities. Expressing its unhappiness with the prosecutor's position, the court stated that it would consider "the delayed sentence with one day over a year; then [the court] would have lost jurisdiction." The next time the parties returned to court, defense counsel requested that sentencing be delayed for one year to give defendant the opportunity to show that he deserved "significant leniency" from the court. The prosecutor continued to object to delayed sentencing, stating that the prosecutor's office did not intend to reduce the criminal charge any further. The trial court stated that it found it "disturb[ing]" that the prosecutor opposed defendant's proposed sentence. The trial court announced that it would exercise its discretion and delayed the imposition of defendant's sentence for one year. On appeal, the prosecutor argued the trial court had no legal authority to dismiss the case over the prosecution's objections, because MCL 771.1 did not permit dismissal of the case. The Court of Appeals found no merit to the prosecutor's appeal. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether MCL 771.1(2) divested sentencing judge of jurisdiction if a defendant is not sentenced within one year after the imposition of a delayed sentence. The Supreme Court held that it did not. "The one-year limitation designates the maximum amount of time that sentencing may be delayed in order to provide defendant the chance to establish his worthiness of leniency. After one year, sentencing may no longer be delayed for that purpose, and the judge is required to sentence defendant as provided by law." The appellate court's decision was overruled and the case remanded to the trial court for defendant's sentencing. View "Michigan v. Smith" on Justia Law

George Badeen (a licensed collection agency manager) and Midwest Recovery and Adjustment, Inc. (a licensed collection agency that Badeen owned and operated) brought a class action against PAR, Inc.; Remarketing Solutions; CenterOne Financial Services, LLC; and numerous other lenders and forwarding companies doing business in Michigan. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant "forwarding companies" acted as collection agencies under Michigan law but did so without a license, in violation of MCL 339.904(1), and that defendant lenders, who hired the forwarding companies, violated Michigan law by hiring unlicensed collection agencies, in violation of MCL 445.252(s). Plaintiffs further alleged that the violations injured them by impeding their business while not complying with Michigan law. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the forwarding companies did not satisfy the definition of "collection agency" because the phrase "soliciting a claim for collection" in that statute referred to asking the debtor to pay the debt, which the forwarding companies did not do. The court granted defendants’ motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the forwarding companies indeed did fall within the statutory definition of collection agencies. Accordingly, the Court vacated Part III(B) of the Court of Appeals' judgment, and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Badeen v. PAR, Inc." on Justia Law

Before the Supreme Court, three actions: two class actions and a qui tam action brought in the name of the state of Michigan involving allegations that multiple pharmacies systematically violated MCL 333.17755(2) by improperly retaining savings that should have been passed on to customers when dispensing generic drugs in the place of their brand-name equivalents. Furthermore, plaintiffs argued that violations of section 17755(2) necessarily resulted in violations of the Health Care False Claim Act (HCFCA) and the Medicaid False Claim Act (MFCA) when pharmacists submitted reimbursement claims to the state for Medicaid payments that they were not entitled to receive. "The inferences and assumptions required to implicate defendants [were] simply too tenuous for plaintiffs' claims to survive summary judgment. Moreover, plaintiffs' overbroad approach of identifying all transactions in which a generic drug was dispensed fail[ed] to hone in on the only relevant transactions - those in which a generic drug was dispensed in place of a brand-name drug." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ construction of MCL 333.17755(2) and its holding that plaintiffs' pleadings were sufficient to survive summary judgment, vacated the remainder of the Court of Appeals' judgment, and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Michigan ex rel Gurganus v. CVS Caremark Corp." on Justia Law