Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Jeffery Douglas of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (victim under the age of 13) and second-degree criminal sexual conduct (victim under the age of 13). The charges arose from statements by his daughter, KD, that defendant had made her touch his penis on one occasion and perform fellatio on him on a separate occasion. Defendant appealed, challenging the admission of certain testimony and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals held that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel during both the pretrial and trial proceedings and that the cumulative effect of the trial errors denied him a fair trial. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant's convictions and sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for reinstatement of a plea offer made by the prosecution before trial. The Court of Appeals ordered that if defendant refused to accept the plea offer, he was entitled to a new trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that a new trial was warranted in light of the errors by both the court and defense counsel at trial. The Court held, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the prosecution’s prior plea offer must be reinstated, as the Supreme Court saw no reversible error in the trial court’s determination to the contrary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Douglas" on Justia Law

Levon Bynum was charged with first-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to murder, carrying a concealed weapon, and felony-firearm following a shooting that had occurred outside a party store in Battle Creek. Bynum and some of the others present were alleged to be members of the Boardman Boys gang, whose territory bordered the party store. Bynum claimed that he acted in self-defense. An officer in the Battle Creek Police Department's Gang Suppression Unit, was proffered at trial as an expert witness on gangs, gang membership, and gang culture with a particular expertise about Battle Creek gangs. The court allowed the officer's testimony and his PowerPoint presentation, concluding that the evidence was relevant to prove Bynum's motive for shooting the victims. Defense counsel did not specifically object to any of this testimony after the initial, general objection to the testimony, and the jury found Bynum guilty as charged. Bynum's appellate defense counsel subsequently moved for a new trial, arguing the ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the officer's testimony as improper propensity evidence. The court rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because it was satisfied that trial counsel's objections had preserved the claimed error in the testimony. The court also held that the expert witness testimony was appropriate. Bynum appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed Bynum's convictions in an unpublished opinion per curiam. The Supreme Court held that if the prosecution presents fact evidence to show that the crime at issue is gang-related, expert testimony about gangs, gang membership, and gang culture may be admitted as relevant under MRE 402 and of "assist[ance] [to] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" under MRE 702. In applying MRE 402 and MRE 702 to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court appropriately exercised its role as gatekeeper in determining that expert testimony about gangs and gang culture would assist the jury in understanding the evidence. The Court also held that MRE 404(a) precludes testimony that is specifically used to show that, on a particular occasion, a gang member acted in conformity with character traits commonly associated with gang members. The expert witness in this case exceeded these limitations when he provided his opinion that defendant committed the crimes at issue because he acted in conformity with his gang membership. The Court therefore affirmed the result of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Bynum " on Justia Law

The issue these cases presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether "Miller v Alabama," (132 S Ct 2455 (2012)), should have been applied retroactively (pursuant to either the federal or state test for retroactivity) to cases in which the defendant's sentence became final for purposes of direct appellate review before Miller was decided; and (2) whether the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, section 16 categorically barred the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender. Defendant Raymond Carp was 15 years old when he participated in the 2006 bludgeoning and stabbing of Mary Ann McNeely. He was charged with first-degree murder and tried as an adult. A jury convicted Carp of this offense, and in accordance with the law at the time he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Because Carp did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court, his conviction and sentence became final for the purposes of direct appellate review in June, 2009. Defendant Cortez Davis was 16 years old at the time of his offense. Along with a cohort, while brandishing firearms, Davis accosted two individuals in Detroit for the purpose of robbery. Two witnesses testified that when one of the victims attempted to flee, Davis and his cohort fired five or six shots, killing the victim. Davis was charged with felony first-degree murder and convicted by a jury. At sentencing, the trial court initially ruled that Michigan's statutory sentencing scheme for first-degree murder could not constitutionally be applied to juvenile homicide offenders because it was “cruel and unusual” to impose a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile who was “capable of rehabilitation.” Davis was ultimately sentenced to 10 to 40 years in prison. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing pursuant to Michigan's statutory sentencing scheme, and at resentencing, the trial court imposed the required sentence of life without parole. The conviction and sentence became final for the purposes of direct appellate review in 2000. Unlike Carp and Davis, whose sentences became final for purposes of direct review before Miller was decided, at least 10 defendants were convicted and sentenced before Miller, but their cases were on direct appeal at the time Miller was decided. Dakotah Eliason was one of those defendants. At age 14, Eliason, without provocation and after hours of deliberation, fired a single deadly shot into the head of his stepgrandfather as he slept in his home. Eliason was charged with first-degree murder, convicted by a jury, and sentenced in October 2010 to life without parole. While Eliason's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, Miller was decided. In assessing the effect of Miller on Michigan's sentencing scheme for juvenile first-degree-murder offenders, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court must as a result of Miller perform an individualized sentencing analysis based upon the factors identified in the Miller case. Eliason appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge the sentencing procedures and options defined by the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court should have the further option of imposing a sentence of a term of years. Eliason additionally argued that Const 1963, art 1, sec. 16 categorically barred the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile. After considering these matters, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the rule announced in Miller did not satisfy either the federal test for retroactivity set forth in "Teague v Lane," (489 US 288 (1989)), or Michigan's separate and independent test for retroactivity set forth in "Michigan v Sexton," (580 NW2d 404 (1998)), and "Michigan v Maxson," (759 NW2d 817 (2008)). Furthermore, the Court held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor Const 1963, art 1, section 16 categorically barred the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender. View "Michigan v. Carp" on Justia Law

Matthew McKinley was convicted by a jury of larceny over $20,000, malicious destruction of property over $20,000, and inducing a minor to commit a felony in connection with a series of thefts of commercial air conditioning units. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, to concurrent terms of 12 to 25 years in prison on each count and reserved a decision regarding restitution. Following a hearing, and over defense counsel’s objection to the amount of restitution assessed, the court entered an amended judgment of sentence to reflect the imposition of $158,180.44 in restitution. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant’s conviction for larceny over $20,000, but otherwise affirmed his convictions and sentences in an unpublished opinion. The panel rejected defendant’s argument that Michigan’s restitution scheme was unconstitutional because it permitted trial courts to impose restitution on the basis of facts not proved to the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court limited to the issues on appeal to whether an order of restitution was equivalent to a criminal penalty and whether Michigan’s statutory restitution scheme was unconstitutional insofar as it permitted the trial court to order restitution based on conduct for which a defendant was not charged that had not been submitted to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that a trial court’s restitution award that is based solely on conduct for which the defendant was not charged may not be sustained. View "Michigan v. McKinley" on Justia Law

This case began as a dispute between the parties regarding whether plaintiff owed tax under the now-repealed Single Business Tax Act (SBTA) related to plaintiff's contributions to its Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association (VEBA) trust fund for 1997 through 2001. In this case, the issue for the Supreme Court to decide was what actions a taxpayer must take under MCL 205.30 of the Revenue Act to trigger the accrual of interest on a tax refund. The Court held that in order to trigger the accrual of interest, the plain language of the statute requires a taxpayer to: (1) pay the disputed tax; (2) make a “claim” or "petition" for a refund; and (3) "file" the claim or petition. "Although a "claim" or "petition" need not take any specific form, it must clearly demand, request, or assert a right to a refund of tax payments made to the Department of Treasury that the taxpayer asserts are not due. Additionally, in order to "file" the claim or petition, a taxpayer must submit the claim to the Treasury in a manner sufficient to provide the Treasury with adequate notice of the taxpayer’s claim." View "Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

This appeal involved Empire Fire and Marine Insurance Company's obligations under an "Insurance for Non-Trucking Use" policy issued to Drielick Trucking. The policy contained a business-use exclusion, which included two clauses that Empire argued precluded coverage in this case. The Court of Appeals agreed that the first clause precluded coverage when the covered vehicle was not carrying property at the time of the accident, was in this case. Thus, the Court of Appeals expressly declined to address the second clause relating to leased covered vehicles. The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in its interpretation of the first clause. The case to the trial court for further fact-finding to determine whether Drielick Trucking and Great Lakes Carriers Corporation (GLC) entered into a leasing agreement for the use of Drielick Trucking’s semi-tractors as was contemplated under the policy's clause related to a leased covered vehicle. View "Estate of Eugene Hunt v. Drielick" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether a trial court's failure to provide the appellant-surety notice within seven days of defendant's failure to appear barred forfeiture of the bail bond posted by the surety. Relying on "In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond (Michigan v Moore)" (740 NW2d 734 (2007)), the Court of Appeals held that a court’s failure to comply with the seven-day notice provision of MCL 765.28(1) did not bar forfeiture of a bail bond posted by a surety. Because the Supreme Court concluded that Moore was wrongly decided, it held that a court’s failure to comply with the seven-day notice provision of MCL 765.28(1) did bar forfeiture of a bail bond posted by a surety: "[w]hen a statute provides that a public officer 'shall' undertake some action within a specified period of time, and that period of time is provided to safeguard another’s rights or the public interest, as with the statute at issue here, it is mandatory that such action be undertaken within the specified period of time, and noncompliant public officers are prohibited from proceeding as if they had complied with the statute." View "In re Forfeiture of Bail Bond (Michigan v. Gaston)" on Justia Law

Petitioner-mother and respondent were married in 2003 and had one child, AJR, during their marriage. They divorced in 2009. The divorce judgment gave the parties joint legal custody of the child, gave physical custody to the mother, placed support obligations on respondent, and gave respondent reasonable visitation. Mother married petitioner-stepfather in 2010, and they lived together with AJR as a family. In May 2012, petitioners filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights so that the stepfather could adopt AJR under MCL 710.51(6). Petitioners alleged that respondent had failed to provide support or comply with a support order and had failed to visit or contact AJR for more than two years. The trial court granted the petition and terminated respondent’s parental rights. Respondent appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that respondent’s parental rights had been improperly terminated given that respondent and the mother had joint legal custody of AJR and MCL 710.51(6) only allowed a court to terminate the rights of a parent who does not have legal custody. The panel held that the statute required the petitioning parent be the parent having sole legal custody. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals. "Petitioner-mother has always been free to seek modification of the custody arrangement under MCL 722.27. If on remand petitioner-mother secures sole legal custody of the child, then petitioners may proceed with stepparent adoption under MCL 710.51(6)." View "In re ARJ" on Justia Law

George Tanner was charged with open murder and mutilation of a dead body. After his arrest, he was taken to jail and read his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to counsel and questioning ceased. The next day, while speaking with a jail psychologist, defendant stated that he wanted to “get something off of his chest.” The psychologist informed jail staff of defendant’s request. The jail administrator then spoke with defendant. Defendant told the administrator that he wanted to speak with someone about his case and asked if the administrator could obtain an attorney for him. The administrator stated that he could not provide an attorney for defendant, but could contact the police officers who were handling the case. The administrator then contacted both the police and the prosecutor. The prosecutor apparently informed the court of defendant’s request for an attorney, and the court sent an attorney to the jail. After the attorney and the police officers arrived at the jail, the jail administrator took the police officers to speak with defendant and asked the attorney to wait in the jail lobby while the officers determined defendant’s intentions. Defendant was again read his Miranda rights, which he waived without again requesting an attorney and without being made aware of the attorney’s presence at the jail. Defendant then made incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the murder. Defense counsel moved to suppress the statements, and the court granted the motion. The prosecution sought leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the application. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the rule announced in "Michigan v Bender," (551 NW2d 71 (1996)), should have been maintained. Bender required police officers to promptly inform a suspect facing custodial interrogation that an attorney is available when that attorney attempts to contact the suspect. If the officers failed to do so, any statements made by the suspect, including voluntary statements given by the suspect with full knowledge of his Miranda rights, are rendered inadmissible. The Supreme Court respectfully concluded Bender was wrongly decided and that it should have been overruled. The Court reversed the trial court’s suppression of certain incriminating statements made by defendant, which was justified solely on the grounds of Bender, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Tanner" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal complaint against Wayne Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, alleging 10 counts of judicial misconduct that arose out of criminal cases over which he had presided. After hearing argument on objections to the master’s report, a majority of the JTC concluded that the evidence established judicial misconduct in eight of the ten allegations and recommended that respondent be suspended for 90 days without pay. After review of the entire record and due consideration of the parties’ arguments, the Supreme Court agreed with the JTC’s conclusion that respondent committed judicial misconduct, but the Court was not persuaded that the recommended sanction was appropriate in this case. Instead, the Court held that a 60-day suspension without pay was proportionate to the body of judicial misconduct established by the record. View "In re Hon. Bruce Morrow" on Justia Law