Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Fraser Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, P.C. provided legal services to the defendants, a group of trusts, in connection with the financing and purchase of four hydroelectric dams. Dissatisfied with the representation they received, defendants refused to pay the full sum of fees billed by Fraser Trebilcock. To recover these unpaid fees, Fraser Trebilcock brought the underlying suit against defendants for breach of contract. Pursuant to MCR 2.403, the matter was submitted for a case evaluation, which resulted in an evaluation of $60,000 in favor of Fraser Trebilcock. Fraser Trebilcock accepted the evaluation, but defendants rejected it. The case proceeded to trial, resulting in a verdict for Fraser Trebilcock and a judgment totaling $73,501.90. Throughout the litigation of this breach-of-contract action, Fraser Trebilcock appeared through Michael Perry (a shareholder of the firm) and other lawyers affiliated with the firm. At no point did Fraser Trebilcock retain outside counsel, and there was no indication that the firm entered into a retainer agreement with its member lawyers or received or paid a bill for their services in connection with the litigation. After receiving the verdict, the parties filed posttrial motions: defendants moved for a new trial, and Fraser Trebilcock moved for case-evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O), seeking to recover, inter alia, a “reasonable attorney fee” under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b) for the legal services performed by its member lawyers. The trial court denied the defendants’ motion for a new trial, and granted Fraser Trebilcock’s motion for case-evaluation sanctions, ruling in particular that Fraser Trebilcock could recover an attorney fee as part of its sanctions. The issue on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether the plaintiff law firm could recover, as case-evaluation sanctions under MCR 2.403(O)(6)(b), a “reasonable attorney fee” for the legal services performed by its own member lawyers in connection with its suit to recover unpaid fees from defendants. Contrary to the determinations of the trial court and the Court of Appeals majority, the Supreme Court concluded it could not. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals was reversed in part, the trial court's award of fees was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Frazier Trebilcock Davis & Dunlap, P.C. v. Boyce Trust 2350" on Justia Law

John Krusac, as personal representative of the estate of Dorothy Krusac, brought a medical malpractice action against Covenant Medical Center, Inc., alleging that Dorothy Krusac died as a result of injuries she sustained when she rolled off an operating table following a cardiac catheterization procedure. During discovery, it became known that one of the medical staff present during the procedure had filled out an incident report shortly after the event and submitted it to her supervisor. Plaintiff filed a motion in limine on the eve of trial, asking the court to conduct an in camera inspection of the incident report and provide plaintiff with the facts contained in it. On plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration, however, the court reviewed the report in camera and subsequently ordered defendant to provide plaintiff with a portion of the incident report that contained only objective facts in light of "Harrison v Munson Healthcare, Inc," (304 Mich App 1 (2014)), which held that the peer-review privilege did not apply to objective facts contained in an incident report. Defendant sought leave to appeal the order in the Court of Appeals and moved to stay the proceedings, both of which motions the Court of Appeals denied. After its review, the Supreme Court held that the applicable statutory authority that governed this case did not contain an exception to the peer review privilege for objective facts. As a result, that portion of "Harrison" was wrongly decided. Here, the trial court erred by relying on Harrison to order production of the objective-facts portion of the incident report. Therefore, the Supreme Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Krusac v. Covenant Medical Center, Inc." on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address the constitutionality of 2012 PA 300, which modified the retirement benefits of current public school employees. Plaintiffs, which were various labor organizations representing such employees, raised three constitutional challenges: (1) whether the act violated the prohibitions of uncompensated takings in the Michigan and United States Constitutions, Const 1963, art 10, section 2 and US Const, Ams V and XIV; (2) whether the act impaired the obligation of contracts in violation of the Michigan and United States Constitutions, Const 1963, art 1, sect. 10 and US Const, art I, sect. 10, cl 1; and (3) whether the act violated the guarantee of due process in the Michigan and United States Constitutions, Const 1963, art 1, sect. 17 and US Const, Am XIV, sect. 1. After considering each of these challenges, the Michigan Court held that the act did not violate any provision of either the Michigan or the United States Constitution. View "AFT Michigan v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Carnice Hodge brought an action to appeal the Unemployment Insurance Agency’s determination that she was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under a section under the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA) that disallows benefits for individuals discharged for work-related misconduct, after respondent U.S. Security Associates, Inc., terminated her employment as a security guard at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport. Hodge was fired for accessing publicly available flight departure information on a computer near her post at the request of a traveler in violation of respondent’s policy regarding the unauthorized use of client equipment. An administrative law judge affirmed the denial of benefits, as did the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC), but the Wayne Circuit Court reversed. The Court of Appeals granted the employer's application for leave to appeal and affirmed, holding that the circuit court had not erred by concluding as a matter of law that claimant’s behavior was a good-faith error in judgment rather than misconduct. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the circuit and appellate courts applied an incorrect standard of review by substituting their own assessment of the seriousness of Hodge's conduct for the assessment of the MCAC. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the MCAC's judgment. View "Hodge v. U.S. Security Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants Columbia Township Board of Trustees and Columbia Township Planning Commission appealed the Court of Appeals’ decision holding that plaintiff Kenneth Speicher was entitled to an award of court costs and actual attorney fees based on his entitlement to declaratory relief under the Open Meetings Act (OMA). The Court of Appeals reached this decision only because it was compelled to do so by Court of Appeals precedent. If not for this binding precedent, the Court of Appeals would have denied plaintiff’s request for court costs and actual attorney fees on the ground that the plain language of MCL 15.271(4) does not permit such an award unless the plaintiff obtains injunctive relief. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that prior decisions of that court have strayed from the plain language of MCL 15.271(4). Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals opinion and order and reinstated the portion of its January 22, 2013 decision regarding court costs and actual attorney fees. View "Speicher v. Columbia Township Bd. of Trustees" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were taxpayers and school districts seeking a declaratory judgment that the amount of funding appropriated by the Legislature to fund new and increased recordkeeping requirements was materially deficient. Consistent with the Supreme Court's construction of the "Headlee Amendment" and its court rules, the Court required that plaintiffs bringing an action charging inadequate funding of a legislative mandate under the Headlee Amendment must allege and prove not only that the funding was insufficient, but the type and extent of the harm. In this opinion, the Court made clear that this burden included the requirement that the plaintiff show the specific amount of underfunding where the Legislature has made at least some appropriation of funds. The special master in this case applied this burden of proof and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims when plaintiffs stated at trial that they would not provide proofs establishing the specific amount of underfunding. The Court of Appeals reversed, requiring plaintiffs only to provide evidence that the methodology used by the Legislature to determine the amount of the appropriation was materially flawed, and remanded the case to the special master for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals’ standard was inconsistent with its requirement that a plaintiff alleging inadequate funding must show the type and extent of the funding shortfall. Plaintiffs were properly instructed regarding the burden of proof by the special master before trial and failed to offer proofs concerning the specific amount of the alleged shortfall. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered a judgment in favor of defendants. View "Adair v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Heather Hannay brought an action against the Department of Transportation (MDOT), seeking damages for injuries she suffered when a salt truck driven by one of MDOT’s employees ran a stop sign and struck her car. After a bench trial, the court awarded Hannay $474,904 in noneconomic damages, $767,076 for work-loss benefits, and $153,872 in expenses for ordinary and necessary services. MDOT appealed, and Hannay cross-appealed. Harold Hunter, Jr., brought an action in the Genesee Circuit Court against David Sisco, Auto Club Insurance Association, and the city of Flint Transportation Department seeking damages for injuries suffered when a dump truck owned by Flint and driven by Sisco sideswiped Hunter’s vehicle. Flint moved for summary judgment. The court denied the motion. Flint appealed. The Court of Appeals in Hannay v. Dep’t of Transp concluded that economic damages are compensable under the motor vehicle exception, while the Court of Appeals in Hunter v. Sisco concluded that noneconomic damages are not compensable under this exception. Upon review of both cases, the Supreme Court concluded that “bodily injury” was a category of harm for which governmental immunity from tort liability was waived under MCL 691.1405 and for which damages that naturally flow were compensable. The Court therefore held that a plaintiff could bring a third-party tort action for economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages, against a governmental entity if the requirements of MCL 500.3135 have been met. In Hannay, the Court concluded that the work-loss damages in dispute were too speculative (plaintiff was in school to become a hygienist, not an actual hygienist at the time of the accident) to support the damages award as presented at trial. The Court affirmed the appellate court in Hannay with respect to the type of damages recoverable for bodily injury under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, but reversed on plaintiff's claim for work-loss damages as a dental hygienist. In Hunter the Court reversed the appellate court with respect to the type of damages recoverable for bodily injury under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity. Both cases were remanded for further proceedings in their respective trial courts. View "Hannay v. Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law

The Wayne County Employees Retirement System and the Wayne County Retirement Commission filed suit against Wayne Charter County and the Wayne County Board of Commissioners, alleging that a county ordinance defendants enacted in 2010 concerning the retirement system violated Const. 1963, art 9, sec. 24 and the Public Employment Retirement System Investment Act (PERSIA). The ordinance placed a $12 million limit on the balance of the retirement system’s reserve for inflation equity known as the Inflation Equity Fund (IEF), which was funded by investment earnings on pension assets. The ordinance also placed a $5 million limit on a discretionary distribution of money from the IEF known as the “13th check,” which had been made annually in varying amounts to eligible retirees and survivor beneficiaries to help fight the effects of inflation. The ordinance required any amount in the IEF exceeding the $12 million cap to be debited from the IEF and credited to the assets of the defined benefit plan, where it would be used to offset or reduce the annual required contribution (ARC) that the county was required to make to the defined benefit plan. The county filed a counterclaim alleging, among other things, that the retirement commission had violated its fiduciary duties by mismanaging the retirement system’s assets. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory objections to the ordinance, and plaintiffs appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the $32 million offset against the county’s ARC violated PERSIA for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion. The portion of the Court of Appeals opinion concluding that the intrasystem transfer of retirement system assets would violate PERSIA without the corresponding offset to the ARC was vacated, as were the portions of the opinion discussing the constitutional implications of the amended ordinance in relation to Const. 1963, art 9, sec. 24 and the determination that the transferred funds, once returned to the IEF, must be used only for the purposes of that fund. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wayne County Employees Retirement System v. Wayne Charter County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated a FOIA request, and ultimately this FOIA lawsuit, to receive materials related to pending criminal proceedings that were in defendants’ possession, including video surveillance recordings created by private businesses. Defendants asserted that the surveillance recordings were not public records within the meaning of FOIA and, as a result, did not need to be disclosed. The parties did not dispute that video recordings were “writings” within the meaning of FOIA. Nor did they dispute that these particular video surveillance recordings were “in the possession of” and “retained by” defendants, both of which are public bodies. What was in dispute was whether the recordings were in the possession of or retained by defendants “in the performance of an official function, from the time [they were] created.” "What ultimately determines whether records in the possession of a public body are public records within the meaning of FOIA is whether the public body prepared, owned, used, possessed, or retained them in the performance of an official function. To this point, the Supreme Court agreed with the dissenting Court of Appeals judge that the recordings at issue in this case were public records because they were in the possession of or retained by defendants “in the performance of an official function, from the time [they were] created.” The Supreme Court reversed the appellate and trial courts' decisions inconsistent with its holding in this case, and remanded the case for entry of an order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Amberg v. City of Dearborn" on Justia Law

Defendant Deandre Woolfolk was convicted by a jury for first-degree murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony for his part in a fatal shooting that took place two hours before his 18th birthday. He was sentenced for life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the possession charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because he was not yet 18 when the crime was committed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing. The State appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that for the purposes of "Miller," defendant remained under the age of 18 at the time he committed murder, and therefore was entitled to be treated in accordance with the Miller rule. View "Michigan v. Woolfolk" on Justia Law