Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

At issue in this case was whether and to what extent (if any) an electric utility was entitled to the industrial-processing tax exemption for tangible personal property located outside its generation plants. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was entitled to the full industrial-processing exemption for the property. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the property subject to this suit was simultaneously used for exempt “industrial processing” activity under MCL 205.94o(7)(a) and nonexempt “distribution” and “shipping” activities under MCL 205.94o(6)(b). In these circumstances, the taxpayer was entitled to the industrial-processing exemption based on the “percentage of exempt use to total use determined by a reasonable formula or method approved by the department [of Treasury].” MCL 205.94o(2). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "Detroit Edison Co. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

In 2007, plaintiff Lisa Tyra received a kidney transplant at defendant William Beaumont Hospital, with a kidney made available by defendant Organ Procurement Agency of Michigan. Plaintiff allegedly suffered complications because the kidney did not constitute a proper match, and she filed suit asserting defendants should have identified this fact before the surgery. When plaintiff filed her complaint, the 182-day notice period set forth in MCL 600.2912b(1) had not yet expired. Organ Procurement moved for summary disposition on the basis that plaintiff’s complaint was filed prematurely, and the period of limitations had since expired. The hospital and Dr. Steven Cohn, the transplant surgeon, joined the motion and the trial court later granted the motion. The trial court reasoned that, under "Burton v Reed City Hosp Corp," (691 NW2d 424 (2005)), the prematurely filed complaint failed to toll the running of the period of limitations and plaintiff could not cure the error by refiling the complaint. The legal issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the controlling caselaw authority governing this case, "Zwiers v Growney," (778 NW2d 81 (2009)), was overruled by the Michigan Supreme Court in "Driver v Naini," (802 NW2d 311 (2011)). The Court of Appeals held that Zwiers was not overruled in Driver. Because the Supreme Court concluded to the contrary, it reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part in both "Tyra v Organ Procurement Agency of Mich," (850 NW2d 667 (2013)), and "Furr v McLeod," (848 NW2d 465 (2014)). In "Tyra," the Court reinstated the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition, and in "Furr," the Court remanded the case back to the trial court for entry of an order granting defendants’ motion for summary disposition. View "Tyra v. Organ Procurement Agency of Michigan" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Miller was convicted by a jury of operating while intoxicated (OWI), and operating while intoxicated causing serious impairment of another person’s body function (OWI-injury), for an accident that resulted when he grabbed the steering wheel of the car that his girlfriend was driving. The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of five years’ probation, with the first nine months to be served in jail. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction for OWI-injury but vacated defendant’s OWI conviction on the ground that it violated defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy by convicting defendant of both OWI and OWI-injury. "When read as a whole, MCL 257.625 expresses a clear legislative intent not to allow conviction of and punishment for multiple offenses arising from the same incident except where explicitly authorized by the statute, and MCL 257.625(1) and MCL 257.625(5) do not specifically authorize multiple punishments." The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals correctly vacated defendant’s conviction, but for the wrong reason. View "Michigan v. Miller" on Justia Law

n consolidated appeals, the issue central to all that was presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether petitioners, who sold their principal residences in arm’s-length transactions, were entitled to refunds of the real estate transfer tax under the real estate transfer tax exemption set forth in MCL 207.526(u) when the state equalized value of the properties at the time of sale was less than it was at the time of their original purchases. The Court held that petitioners were entitled to refunds under the real estate transfer tax exemption in these circumstances. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the cases remanded to the Tax Tribunal for further proceedings, including reinstatement of its judgments in favor of petitioners. View "Gardner v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Defendant Leo Ackley was convicted by jury of first-degree felony murder and first-degree child abuse after his live-in girlfriend's three-year-old child died under his care. At trial, the prosecution called five medical experts who testified that the child had died as the result of a head injury that was caused intentionally, while defense counsel called no experts, despite having been provided court funding for expert assistance and the name of a well-known forensic pathologist who could support the defense theory that the injuries had resulted from an accidental fall. Defendant appealed, arguing he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for his lawyer's failure to challenge the government's experts. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that defense counsel’s failure to attempt to engage a single expert witness to rebut the prosecution’s expert testimony, or to attempt to consult an expert with the scientific training to support the defendant’s theory of the case, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and created a reasonable probability that this error affected the outcome of the defendant’s trial. Defendant's convictions were vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Ackley" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether defendant lifeguard's failure to intervene in the deceased's drowning was "the proximate cause" of his death. While governmental agencies and their employees are generally immune from tort liability under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1407(2)(c) provided an exception to this general rule when a governmental employee's conduct is both (1) grossly negligent and (2) "the proximate cause" of an injury, which the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted to mean the "most immediate, efficient, and direct cause". Plaintiff sued defendant, a governmental employee, arguing that governmental immunity did not apply because defendant's grossly negligent behavior while lifeguarding and resulting failure to rescue plaintiff's drowning son was the proximate cause of his death. Subsequently, defendant moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds, but the trial court denied defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals, in a split opinion, affirmed, concluding that a jury could reasonably find that defendant's failure to intervene constituted the proximate cause of the deceased's death. The Court of Appeals dissent instead concluded that defendant was immune from liability. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by denying summary judgment to defendant, because the exception to governmental immunity articulated in MCL 691.1407(2) was inapplicable in this case. View "Beals v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Aroma Wines & Equipment, Inc. was a wholesale wine importer and distributor. Defendant Columbian Distribution Services, Inc. operated warehouses in Michigan. In 2006, Aroma agreed to rent some of Columbian’s climate-controlled warehouse space to store its stock of wine. According to the parties’ agreement, Columbian was required to maintain the wine within a temperature range of 50 to 65 degrees Fahrenheit. While the agreement required Columbian to provide Aroma with notice before Columbian could transport Aroma’s wine to a different warehouse complex, Columbian reserved the right under the agreement to move the wine without notice “within and between any one or more of the warehouse buildings which comprise the warehouse complex” identified in the agreement. Aroma’s sales declined sharply during 2008, and Aroma began falling behind on its monthly payments to Columbian. In January 2009, Columbian notified Aroma that it was asserting a lien on Aroma’s wine and that Aroma could not pick up any more wine or ship any more orders until past due invoices were paid. In March 2009, Columbian released to Aroma a small portion of its wine in exchange for a $1,000 payment on Aroma’s account. Notwithstanding this payment, Columbian asserted that Aroma had accrued a past-due balance of more than $20,000 on the account. At some point during this dispute, and contrary to the terms of the contract, Columbian removed the wine from its climate-controlled space and transported it to an uncontrolled environment. Aroma alleged that Columbian moved its wine to rent the space to higher-paying customers. Columbian conceded that it moved the wine but claimed that the move was temporary, that its purpose was to renovate the climate-controlled space, and that none of the wine was exposed to extreme temperature conditions. Aroma claimed that the time the wine spent in the uncontrolled space destroyed the wine’s salability. Aroma sued, alleging: (1) breach of contract; (2) violation of the Uniform Commercial Code; (3) common-law conversion; and (4) statutory conversion under MCL 600.2919a(1)(a). Columbian moved for a directed verdict on the statutory conversion claim, arguing that Aroma had failed to provide any evidence to support its assertion that Columbian converted Aroma’s wine to its own use. The motion on this count was granted, and Aroma appealed. After review, the Supreme Court limited review of the case to the trial court's decision on the statutory conversion claim, and reversed. The Court found that plaintiff proffered evidence at trial that would have allowed the jury to conclude that defendant used the wine for some purpose personal to defendant’s interests. As a result, the circuit court erred by granting defendant’s motion for directed verdict on this claim. View "Aroma Wines & Equipment, Inc. v. Columbia Distribution Svcs., Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Cynthia Mazur, wife of David Mazur, was both a registered qualifying patient and a registered primary caregiver for two medical marijuana patients. David grew marijuana in their marital home. Officers of the Holly Police Department, acting on a tip, searched the residence for marijuana. Marijuana plants, dried marijuana, and pipes with marijuana residue were found. In executing the search, an officer questioned defendant, who used the first-person plural pronoun "we" when describing the marijuana operation. Although the use of this pronoun led the officers to conclude that defendant was a participant in her husband's marijuana operation, defendant contended her involvement was limited to writing the date of harvest for marijuana plants on several sticky notes. Both defendant and David were charged with marijuana-related offenses. The issue defendant's appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review required an examination of immunity under the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA); specifically whether the application of the MMMA's immunity provisions applied to individuals who were neither registered qualifying patients nor primary caregivers. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant claiming that he or she is solely in the presence or vicinity of the medical use of marijuana is not entitled to immunity under MCL 333.26424(i) when the medical use of marijuana was not in accordance with the act. Nor is a defendant entitled to immunity under MCL 333.26424(i) when the defendant's conduct goes beyond assisting with the use or administration of marijuana. However, the Court held that "marihuana paraphernalia," as that phrase was defined in MCL 333.26424(g), included items that were both specifically designed or actually employed for the medical use of marijuana. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Mazur" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, a group of associations representing builders, contractors, and plumbers, filed suit against the city of Troy, claiming that the City's building department fees violated section 22 of the Single State Construction Code Act (CCA), MCL 125.1522, as well as a provision of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, section 31. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because plaintiffs had failed to exhaust the administrative procedure outlined in section 9b of the CCA, MCL 125.1509b. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the plain language of MCL 125.1509b provided that the director may conduct performance evaluations of defendant’s “enforcing agency” and did not provide any administrative procedure relative to the entity responsible for establishing fees pursuant to MCL 125.1522(1). Because the administrative proceedings in section 9b did not purport to provide the director with the authority to evaluate defendant’s legislative body, the circuit court erred by granting summary disposition to the City on the basis of plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. View "Michigan Ass'n of Home Builders v. City of Troy" on Justia Law

In Case Number 149772, Michelle Fairley brought an action against the Michigan Department of Corrections after an MDOC employee driving an MDOC vehicle struck her car, seriously injuring her. Counsel filed a notice of intent to file a claim against MDOC in the Court of Claims, but Fairley herself did not sign the notice, as required by MCL 600.6431(1). MDOC moved for summary judgment on grounds that the notice was defective, and the Court of Claims denied the motion. In Case Number 149940, Lori Stone brought an action against the Michigan State Police, when she was seriously injured when her stopped vehicle was struck by two patrol cars. Stone also filed a notice of intent to file a claim against the MSP in the Court of Claims; the notice did not indicate that it had been verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths, as required by MCL 600.6431(1). MSP moved for summary judgment on grounds that the notice was defective, but the Court of Claims granted this motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute did not require evidence of the oath or affirmation on the face of the notice. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases to determine whether a claimant's failure to comply with the notice verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 provided a complete defense to an action against the state or one of its departments. The Court concluded that a notice lacking any indication that it was signed and verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths is defective and, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, was a complete defense that could be raised at any time by a defendant entitled to governmental immunity. Accordingly, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in both Stone v Michigan State Police and Fairley v Department of Corrections and remanded the cases to the Court of Claims for reinstatement of the order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the former and for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the latter. View "Fairley v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law