Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Brian Beck, Audrey Mahoney, David and Felice Oppenheim, Patty Brown, and others brought an action in the Oakland Circuit Court against Park West Galleries, Inc., and others, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract and fraud. Defendant Park West Galleries, Inc. (Park West) sold art on various cruise ships traversing international waters. Plaintiffs purchased art from Park West on multiple occasions over the course of several years while on different cruise ships in different locations. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether an arbitration clause included in invoices for plaintiffs’ artwork purchases applied to disputes arising from plaintiffs’ previous artwork purchases when the invoices for the previous purchases did not refer to arbitration. The Court agreed with plaintiffs that the arbitration clause contained in the later invoices could not be applied to disputes arising from prior sales with invoices that did not contain the clause. Each transaction involved a separate and distinct contract, and the facts did not reasonably support a conclusion that the parties intended for the arbitration clause to retroactively apply to the previous contracts. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed that part of the Court of Appeals judgment that extended the arbitration clause to the parties’ prior transactions that did not refer to arbitration. The case was remanded back to the Court of Appeals for consideration of the issues raised in plaintiffs’ appeal that the Court did not address to the extent those issues relate to claims that are not subject to arbitration. In all other respects, leave to appeal was denied because the Court was not persuaded that it needed to review the remaining questions presented. View "Beck v. Park West Galleries, Inc." on Justia Law

Alan Jesperson was injured in a motor vehicle accident when his motorcycle was struck from behind by a vehicle owned by Mary Basha and driven by Matthew Badelalla while Badelalla was making deliveries for Jet’s Pizza. Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA) was notified of Jesperson’s injuries and that it was the highest-priority no-fault insurer. It began making payments to Jesperson shortly after it received that notice. Jesperson brought an action against Basha, Badelalla, and Jet’s seeking damages for the injuries he had sustained. He later moved to amend his complaint to add a claim against ACIA after it stopped paying him no-fault benefits. The trial court entered a default judgment against Badelalla and Basha, entered an order allowing Jesperson to amend the complaint, and entered an order severing Jesperson’s claims for trial. A jury returned a verdict of no cause of action with regard to Jesperson’s claims against Jet’s. Before trial on the remaining claim, ACIA moved for summary judgment, arguing that Jesperson’s claim against it was barred by the statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(1). The court agreed that the statute of limitations barred Jesperson’s claim and granted ACIA’s motion for summary disposition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the exception in MCL 500.3145(1) to the one-year limitations period when the insurer has previously made a payment applied only if the insurer has made a payment within one year after the date of the accident. Jesperson appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court found that the insurer's payment of no-fault benefits more than a year after the date of the accident satisfied the second exception to the one-year statute of limitations in MCL 500.3145(1). The Court vacated the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the insurer and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Jesperson v. Auto Club Insurance Association" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice case, the issue on appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court was whether the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding plaintiff’s expert medical testimony under MRE 702. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants after excluding the opinion testimony of plaintiff’s expert, concluding that it was inadmissible because it was not reliable and did not meet the requirements of MCL 600.2955. The Court of Appeals, in a split opinion, reversed the circuit court and remanded, concluding that the circuit court incorrectly applied MRE 702 and abused its discretion by excluding the expert's testimony. The expert admitted that his opinion was based on his own personal beliefs. The Supreme Court found there was no evidence that the expert's opinion was generally accepted within the relevant expert community, there was no peer-reviewed medical literature supporting his opinion, plaintiff failed to provide any other support for the expert's opinion, and defendant submitted contradictory, peer-reviewed medical literature. As such, the Court concluded the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert's testimony. The Court of Appeals clearly erred by concluding otherwise. View "Ehler v. Mirsa" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review in this matter focused on the application of Michigan's Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA) to an employee who alleged that she was terminated because she reported a coworker’s plan to violate the law. Because "a violation or a suspected violation" refers to an existing violation of a law, the plain language of MCL 15.362 contemplated an act or conduct that has actually occurred or was ongoing. "MCL 15.362 contains no language encompassing future, planned, or anticipated acts amounting to a violation or a suspected violation of a law." Because plaintiff in this case merely reported another’s intent to violate a law in the future, plaintiff had no recourse under the WPA. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remanded this case to that court for further proceedings. View "Pace v. Edel-Harrison" on Justia Law

During an attempted apprehension of an armed-robbery suspect, defendant-police officer Jake Liss shot a fellow officer, plaintiff Michael Lego. Lego and his spouse Pamela filed suit against defendant, asserting gross negligence. The trial court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The issue this case presented on appeal to the Supreme Court centered on the scope of the immunity provision of the firefighter’s rule for governmental entities and employees, MCL 600.2966. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals majority that the applicability of MCL 600.2966 could not be decided at this time as a matter of law under the facts presented in this case. "The majority essentially determined that the defendant might not be entitled to immunity if his actions were especially egregious; in other words, if the defendant were grossly negligent, he would not be entitled to immunity because the injury resulting from his actions would not 'arise[] from the normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks of [Michael Lego’s] profession.'" The Court felt this interpretation of the language “normal, inherent, and foreseeable risks” contravened MCL 600.2966, especially when it was read in conjunction with the general firefighter’s rule, MCL 600.2967. The Court therefore held that the Court of Appeals erred by holding that defendant would not be entitled to immunity if he acted with gross negligence. Accordingly, defendant was entitled to immunity as a matter of law. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed in part; the case was remanded to the Circuit Court for entry of an order granting summary judgment to defendant. View "Lego v. Liss" on Justia Law

Defendants, an unlicensed residential builder; his businesses; and Denaglen Corp., a check-cashing service, appealed the Court of Appeals' decision to affirm the grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs, homeowners who contracted to have their home restored following a flood. On appeal, this case raised four issues: (1) whether MCL 339.2412(1), which prohibited an unlicensed builder from "bring[ing] or maintain[ing] an action . . . for the collection of compensation," prevents an unlicensed builder from defending on the merits against claims asserted against him by a homeowner; (2) whether MCL 339.2412(1) provided a homeowner with an independent cause of action for damages arising from the statute's violation; (3) whether a contract for the services of an unlicensed builder was void ab initio or whether it may have some form of continuing legal existence; and (4) whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to set aside the default of defendant Denaglen Corp., the check-cashing service. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. The Court found that the appellate court erred in granting summary judgment to the plaintiffs. While the Court of Appeals correctly held that MCL 339.2412(1) did not prevent an unlicensed builder from defending against a lawsuit on its merits and did not afford a homeowner an independent cause of action to seek damages for its violation. However, contracts between an innocent homeowner and an unlicensed residential builder were voidable by the homeowner and thereby effective in conveying rights and authorities to both parties and third parties. The Court of Appeals therefore erred when it declared the contract at issue void ab initio, "although that court's error was wholly understandable given the confusing state of applicable law." Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant defendant Denaglen relief from its default. However, because the proper amount of damages remained in dispute, Denaglen was free to attempt to challenge the extent of its liability. View "Epps v. 4 Quarters Restoration, LLC" on Justia Law

Defendant Feronda Smith was charged with, among other things, armed robbery and first-degree felony murder after the police found known drug dealer Larry Pass, Jr., dead in Pass’s own home. At trial, two prosecution witnesses claimed to have been present when defendant allegedly shot Pass. The first witness was codefendant Tarence Lard, who testified for the prosecution as part of a plea agreement for his part in the crime. The second witness was Mark Yancy, who maintained his innocence with respect to the shooting but admitted collecting Pass’s drugs, helping dispose of the murder weapon, and using cocaine with defendant and Lard after the shooting. Yancy and Lard contradicted one another in important ways, although both testified that Yancy and defendant had had a violent dispute over money in the weeks leading up to the murder. No other evidence connected defendant to the crime or confirmed that he had ever been at the scene, and no murder weapon was ever recovered. Yancy was a paid informant, and had been compensated for his assistance in a FBI inquiry into Pass' murder. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether the prosecution breached a duty to correct the substantially misleading, if not false, testimony of Yancy's about his formal and compensated cooperation in the government’s investigation. "Given the overall weakness of the evidence against the defendant and the significance of the witness’s testimony," the Supreme Court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the prosecution’s exploitation of the substantially misleading testimony affected the verdict. Therefore the Court reversed and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Jackson was convicted by a jury on six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing a young member of the church where he served as pastor. At trial, the complainant’s aunt testified that she had approached the complainant to discuss the possible abuse in light of her own experiences and after talking with another woman who had also worked with defendant and had subsequently left the church. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that this testimony indicated that defendant had engaged in sexual relationships with the complainant’s aunt and her acquaintance, and was inadmissible evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b). The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion, ruling that admissibility of the testimony was not governed by MRE 404(b) because the testimony was not evidence that defendant had engaged in prior sexual conduct with underage parishioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although the testimony was evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b), it fell within an exception to that rule for res gestae evidence and thus could be admitted without reference to or compliance with the rule. Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the testimony was other-acts evidence as contemplated by MRE 404(b), and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. However, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals majority that the trial court’s failure to subject the testimony to scrutiny under MRE 404(b) was nonetheless correct because the testimony fell within a "res gestae exception" to that rule. Because the testimony at issue constituted evidence of "other acts" as contemplated by MRE 404(b), its admission was governed by that rule and its procedural requirements. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ determination that the defendant’s convictions should be affirmed, as defendant has failed to show entitlement to relief on the basis of this error. The Court therefore affirmed defendant’s convictions, but vacated that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority reasoning that the testimony at issue could be admitted without reference to or compliance with MRE 404(b) by virtue of a res gestae exception" to that rule. View "Michigan v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Jackson was convicted by a jury on six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing a young member of the church where he served as pastor. At trial, the complainant’s aunt testified that she had approached the complainant to discuss the possible abuse in light of her own experiences and after talking with another woman who had also worked with defendant and had subsequently left the church. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that this testimony indicated that defendant had engaged in sexual relationships with the complainant’s aunt and her acquaintance, and was inadmissible evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b). The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion, ruling that admissibility of the testimony was not governed by MRE 404(b) because the testimony was not evidence that defendant had engaged in prior sexual conduct with underage parishioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although the testimony was evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b), it fell within an exception to that rule for res gestae evidence and thus could be admitted without reference to or compliance with the rule. Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the testimony was other-acts evidence as contemplated by MRE 404(b), and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. However, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals majority that the trial court’s failure to subject the testimony to scrutiny under MRE 404(b) was nonetheless correct because the testimony fell within a "res gestae exception" to that rule. Because the testimony at issue constituted evidence of "other acts" as contemplated by MRE 404(b), its admission was governed by that rule and its procedural requirements. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ determination that the defendant’s convictions should be affirmed, as defendant has failed to show entitlement to relief on the basis of this error. The Court therefore affirmed defendant’s convictions, but vacated that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority reasoning that the testimony at issue could be admitted without reference to or compliance with MRE 404(b) by virtue of a res gestae exception" to that rule. View "Michigan v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Rahim Omarkhan Lockridge was convicted by jury of involuntary manslaughter for the death of his wife.His minimum sentence range calculated under the sentencing guidelines was 43 to 86 months. The trial court concluded that there were factors not accounted for in scoring the guidelines, including a probation violation, killing his wife in front of their three children, leaving the children at home with their mother dead on the floor, and prior domestic violence. Citing these as reasons to depart from the minimum sentence range, the court sentenced defendant to a term of 8 years (96 months) to 15 years (the statutory maximum sentence). Defendant appealed, challenging both the scoring of the guidelines and the trial court’s decision to exceed the guidelines minimum sentence range. While his case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court decided "Alleyne v United States," (133 S Ct 2151 (2013)), which extended the rule of "Apprendi v New Jersey," (530 US 466 (2000)), and held that a fact that increases either end of a defendant’s sentencing range must have been admitted by the defendant or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. After allowing defendant to file a supplemental brief challenging the guidelines scoring on "Alleyne" grounds, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s sentence in three separate opinions and rejected the Alleyne challenge. The Michigan Supreme Court granted defendant's application to address the constitutional question presented by his Alleyne challenge. The Court found that in this case, defendant’s guidelines minimum sentence range was irrelevant to the upward departure sentence he ultimately received. Accordingly, the Court held that he could not show the prejudice necessary to establish plain error under "Michigan v. Carines," (597 NW2d 130 (1999)), and affirmed his sentence. View "Michigan v. Lockridge" on Justia Law