Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a homeowner, or another person rightfully possessing a home, commits criminal larceny by removing fixtures from the home after it has been foreclosed on and sold at a sheriff’s sale, but before the statutory redemption period has expired. Defendant Timothy March was arrested and charged with such a crime. He argued in an attempt to quash the information against him that the fixtures were not the proper subject of the crime of larceny, and that he could not have wrongfully taken property of another because he retained legal title and the right of possession throughout the redemption period, during which time the removal of the fixtures had occurred. The prosecution conceded that defendant had the right to possess the house during the redemption period, so the charges were eventually dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that the “owner” of property included not only the titleholder of that property, but also “any other person whose consent was necessary before the property could be taken.” Therefore, the sheriff's sale purchaser "owned" the fixtures because his consent was necessary before they could be taken by defendant. This "consent" ground, as deduced by the Court of Appeals in its analysis of Michigan caselaw and the applicable statutes, was incorrect, according to the Supreme Court. "The right to consent could not serve as a proxy for the right to possession, because neither of the sources of legal authority on which the court relied gives rise to the right to possession. MCL 600.3278 does not endow the purchaser with a possessory right, nor does the equitable title held by [the sheriff's sale purchaser]." View "Michigan v. March" on Justia Law

In three consolidated cases, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the question of whether defendants’ false statements made while serving as law enforcement officers during an internal affairs investigation could be used against them in criminal proceedings. This case arose out of a "disturbing" encounter between Dajuan Hodges-Lamar and defendants, who at the time were police officers for the city of Detroit. While on duty in November 2009, defendant Hughes approached Hodges-Lamar while he was seated in a car at a gas station. Hughes initially appeared to question Hodges-Lamar, but quickly proceeded to assault him while defendants Harris and Little, who were also on duty, stood by and did nothing to stop the assault. Hodges-Lamar filed a complaint with the Detroit Police Department, which spurred an internal investigation by the Detroit Police Department’s Office of the Chief Investigator (OCI). All three defendants were called to testify at a Garrity hearing. The OCI presented defendants with an advice-of-rights form drafted by the Detroit Police Department. All three defendants made false statements at the Garrity hearing. Defendants Harris and Little denied that Hughes had any physical contact with Hodges-Lamar. Hughes admitted that he removed Hodges-Lamar from Hodges-Lamar’s car during questioning, but Hughes maintained that he did not use any unnecessary force against Hodges-Lamar. A video recording of the incident surfaced after defendants had made their statements, wholly at odds with the statements provided by defendants. Hughes was charged with common-law felony misconduct in office, misdemeanor assault and battery, and obstruction of justice. Defendants Harris and Little were each charged with one count of common-law obstruction of justice. Defendants brought motions in district court to dismiss the obstruction-of-justice charges. The district court concluded that defendants’ statements were protected by the disclosures by law enforcement officers act (DLEOA), even if the information provided was false or misleading. The court determined that without defendants’ statements the obstruction-of-justice charges could not be sustained and dismissed those charges. The prosecution appealed in the circuit court, which concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion by dismissing the obstruction-of-justice charges. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court found no error in the district court's dismissal, and reinstated that court's judgment. View "Michigan v. Hughes" on Justia Law

As a result of a 2007 misdemeanor conviction of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, defendant was required to register on the Michigan Sex Offender Registry semiannually for 25 years. Defendant failed to properly register and in February 2010 pleaded guilty of SORA-1, a felony, and was sentenced to 5 years’ probation, with the first 4 months served in jail. In 2012, defendant listed a vacant house as his residence for SORA purposes, and he was arrested for failing to comply with SORA. In June 2013, a jury convicted defendant of SORA-2. Although MCL 28.729(1)(b) provided for a maximum sentence of 7 years, the trial court sentenced defendant under MCL 769.10(1)(a) as a second-offense habitual offender to 2 to 10.5 years’ imprisonment. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review was whether defendant as a SORA second offender could be subject to a sentence enhancement under the Habitual Offender Act (HOA). The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sentence imposed for defendant’s SORA-2 conviction could be enhanced under the habitual-offender statutes because the Legislature created separate offenses for subsequent violations of SORA. View "Michigan v. Allen" on Justia Law

In 1993, plaintiff Dean Altobelli began working as an attorney for Miller, Canfield, Paddock and Stone, P.L.C. (“the Firm”). Upon joining the Firm, plaintiff signed the “Miller Canfield Operating Agreement” (“Operating Agreement”), a document governing the Firm’s internal affairs. By January 2006, plaintiff had become a senior principal at the Firm. However, in late May or early June 2010, plaintiff decided he wanted to pursue a new opportunity as an assistant coach for the University of Alabama football team. Plaintiff proposed a 7- to 12-month leave of absence from the Firm to defendant Michael Hartmann, the Firm’s CEO, and defendant Michael Coakley, who was the head of the Firm’s litigation group but was not a managing director. Plaintiff suggested that the Firm permit him to maintain his ownership interest and return to the Firm as a senior principal any time before June 1, 2011. Plaintiff avers that Hartmann initially promised plaintiff that he could spend as much time at the University of Alabama as he wanted and still receive certain allocated income from his clients. Hartmann disputed this, claiming that plaintiff voluntarily withdrew from the partnership. Plaintiff claimed he was improperly terminated, and that the Firm shorted plaintiff's income as a result. Plaintiff's attempt to resolve the matter through the direct settlement and mediation process, as outlined in the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement, was unsuccessful. In November 2011, plaintiff filed a demand for arbitration as provided for in the arbitration clause. Despite having made the demand for arbitration, he filed suit alleging that the seven individuals named as defendants were responsible for engaging in tortious conduct with regard to plaintiff's request for a leave of absence and retention of his equity ownership in the Firm. Defendants moved for summary judgment and a motion to compel arbitration as required by the arbitration clause. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment too. The circuit court denied defendants’ motions and granted plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, finding as a matter of law that plaintiff did not voluntarily withdraw from the Firm. Rather, the circuit court concluded that defendants had improperly terminated plaintiff's ownership interest without authority. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed the part of the Court of Appeals’ opinion regarding the motion to compel arbitration and instead held that this case was subject to binding arbitration under the arbitration clause of the Operating Agreement. Accordingly, the lower courts should not have reached the merits of plaintiff’s motion for partial summary disposition, as the motion addressed substantive contractual matters that should have been resolved by the arbitrator. The case was remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Altobelli v. Hartmann" on Justia Law

Linda Hodge filed suit against State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company for first-party no-fault benefits related to injuries she sustained when she was struck by a car insured by State Farm. Hodge’s complaint indicated that the amount in controversy was $25,000, which was within the district court’s jurisdiction. During discovery, State Farm came to believe that Hodge would present at trial proof of damages in excess of the district court’s $25,000 jurisdictional limit. The trial court denied State Farm’s motion in limine to prevent Hodge from presenting evidence of claims exceeding $25,000, and to prevent the jury from awarding damages in excess of $25,000. At trial, Hodge did present proof of injuries exceeding $25,000, and the jury returned a verdict of $85,957. The district court reduced the verdict to the jurisdictional limit of $25,000, and it awarded $1,769 in no-fault interest. State Farm appealed, claiming that the amount in controversy exceeded the district court’s jurisdictional limit and that capping Hodge’s damages at $25,000 could not cure the defect. The circuit court agreed and reversed the district court’s order of judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s decision that the district court was divested of jurisdiction when pretrial discovery, counsel’s arguments, and the evidence presented at trial pointed to damages in excess of $25,000. The Supreme Court held "what the jurisprudence of this state has long established:" in its subject-matter jurisdiction inquiry, a district court determines the amount in controversy using the prayer for relief set forth in the plaintiff’s pleadings, calculated exclusive of fees, costs, and interest. Hodge’s complaint prayed for money damages “not in excess of $25,000,” the jurisdictional limit of the district court. Even though her proofs exceeded that amount, the prayer for relief controlled when determining the amount in controversy, and the limit of awardable damages. Because there were no allegations, and therefore no findings, of bad faith in the pleadings, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff’s claim. View "Hodge v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co." on Justia Law

In September 2008, plaintiff Dustin Rock fractured his right ankle while changing the brake pads on a truck. Defendant K. Thomas Crocker, D.O., a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, conducted surgery and provided postsurgical care. In October 2008, defendant allegedly told plaintiff that he could start bearing weight on his leg, though plaintiff did not start doing so at the time. In November 2008, another doctor, Dr. David Viviano, performed a second surgery on plaintiff’s ankle, purportedly because the surgery performed by defendant had failed to unite all the pieces of the fracture. At the time of the surgery performed by defendant, Viviano was a board-certified orthopedic surgeon. In June 2010, plaintiff filed this lawsuit, alleging that defendant had committed 10 specific negligent acts during the first surgery and over the course of postsurgical care. The issues this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review involved: (1) the admissibility of allegations of breaches of the standard of care that did not cause the plaintiff’s injury; and (2) the time at which a standard-of-care expert witness must meet the board-certification requirement in MCL 600.2169(1)(a). First, the Supreme Court vacated that portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment ruling on the admissibility of the allegations in this case and remanded for the circuit court to determine whether the disputed evidence was admissible under MRE 404(b). Second, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that a proposed expert’s board-certification qualification was based on the expert’s board-certification status at the time of the alleged malpractice rather than at the time of the testimony. View "Rock v. Crocker" on Justia Law

In 2008, Feridon Pirgu sustained closed head injuries after he was struck by a car driven by an insured of defendant, United Services Automobile Association. Plaintiff, Feridon’s wife Lindita, was appointed as his guardian and conservator. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff sought various personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits for Feridon. Because Feridon was uninsured, the claim was initially assigned to the Michigan Assigned Claims Facility, which then assigned the claim to Citizens Insurance Company. Following a priority dispute between Citizens and defendant, defendant was determined to have first priority for payment of PIP benefits. Defendant began adjusting the claim in 2010, and immediately discontinued payment of the benefits. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's was whether the framework for calculating a reasonable attorney fee set forth in "Smith v Khouri" applied to attorney fee determinations under MCL 500.3148(1) of the no-fault insurance act. The Court of Appeals’ majority affirmed the trial court’s calculation of the attorney fee award, concluding that the Smith framework did not apply to attorney fee determinations under section 3148(1). The Supreme Court disagreed with this conclusion and instead held that the Smith framework applied to attorney fee determinations under section 3148(1). Therefore, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacated the fee award, and remanded to the trial court for reconsideration of its attorney fee award. View "Pirgu v. Unived Services Automobile Ass'n." on Justia Law

Defendant Antonio Gloster was convicted by jury of aiding and abetting armed robbery. Defendant had driven four men to a market in Hamtramck. While defendant stayed in the car, two of the men assaulted a woman and attempted to steal her necklace. Defendant then picked the men up and drove away. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a sentencing court could assess a defendant 15 points for “predatory conduct” under Offense Variable (OV) 10 (exploitation of a vulnerable victim), solely on the basis of the predatory conduct of a defendant’s co-offenders. The Supreme Court concluded that it could not. "In direct contrast to other OVs, MCL 777.40 contains no language directing a court to assess a defendant the same number of points as his co-offenders in multiple-offender situations. We decline to import such language into OV 10, as it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that this Court will not read words into a statute that the Legislature has excluded." View "Michigan v. Gloster" on Justia Law

Defendant city of Lansing enacted an ordinance requiring contractors working on city construction contracts to pay employees a prevailing wage. Plaintiff Associated Builders and Contractors, a trade association, filed suit against Lansing, arguing that the ordinance was unconstitutional because municipalities did not have the authority to adopt laws regulating the wages paid by third parties, even where the relevant work is done on municipal contracts paid for with municipal funds. The Court of Appeals majority disagreed, and ruled that subsequent changes to state law had caused the controlling caselaw precedent, Attorney General ex rel Lennane v Detroit, to be “superseded.” The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the Court of Appeals erred by exceeding its powers for refusing to follow a decision from the Michigan Supreme Court that both applied and had not been overruled. Even so, the Supreme Court took the opportunity to overrule Lennane because subsequent constitutional changes "undercut its viability." The Court therefore vacated the Court of Appeals’ decision but affirmed the result. View "Associated Builders & Contractors v. City of Lansing" on Justia Law

In 2009 and 2010, the south wing of the Detroit Public Library was renovated. Defendant KEO & Associates, Inc. (KEO) was the principal contractor for this project. Defendant Westfield Insurance Company supplied KEO with a payment bond worth $1.3 million, as required by the public works bond act (PWBA). KEO was identified as the principal contractor and Westfield as the surety on the bond. KEO subcontracted with defendant Electrical Technology Systems, Inc. (ETS) to provide labor and materials for electrical work. The agreement between KEO and ETS included a pay-if-paid clause, obliging KEO to pay ETS only after KEO had been paid for the relevant portion of work performed. ETS in turn subcontracted with Wyandotte Electric Supply Company for materials and supplies, making Wyandotte a sub-subcontractor from KEO’s perspective. ETS and Wyandotte first formed a relationship in 2003, when they entered into an “open account” agreement that governed ETS’s purchases from Wyandotte. Over the course of the project, ETS paid Wyandotte only sporadically and the unpaid balance grew. Initially, Wyandotte supplied materials on credit and credited ETS’s payments to the oldest outstanding balance, but eventually Wyandotte began to ship materials only for cash on delivery. Wyandotte sent certified letters to KEO and Westfield asking for a copy of the payment bond related to the library renovation project. The letter, on Wyandotte’s letterhead, referred to the “Detroit Public Library South Wing with [ETS.]” According to Wyandotte, KEO provided a copy of the payment bond the next day. Wyandotte also sent KEO a 30-day “Notice of Furnishing” in accordance with MCL 129.207, explaining that it was one of ETS’s suppliers. Wyandotte also sent copies of the letter to Westfield, the library, and ETS. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's revie centered on whether actual notice was required for a sub-subcontractor to recover on a payment bond when that sub-subcontractor complied with the notice requirements set forth in MCL 129.207. Furthermore, this case raised the question of whether a PWBA claimant could recover a time-price differential and attorney fees that were provided for by the claimant’s contract with a subcontractor, but were unknown to the principal contractor holding the payment bond as well as the principal’s surety. The Supreme Court concluded that the PWBA contained no actual notice requirement for claimants that comply with the statute, that the trial court properly awarded a time-price differential and attorney fees on past-due invoices to Wyandotte, and that the trial court erred in awarding postjudgment interest under MCL 600.6013(7). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Court of Appeals with regard to the first two issues and reversed with regard to the third. View "Wyandotte Electric Supply Co. v. Electrical Technology Systems, Inc." on Justia Law