Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

MSSC, Inc., sued Airboss Flexible Products Co., alleging anticipatory breach of contract and seeking to enforce a purchase order between the parties after Airboss threatened to stop filling orders unless MSSC agreed to a price increase. Airboss supplied products to MSSC, and MSSC used those products to manufacture parts for their customers. The parties’ purchase order for the Airboss products was identified as a “blanket” order that listed the parts to be supplied but did not include specific quantities. Instead, the purchase order indicated that quantities would be based on the needs of an MSSC customer. MSSC was obligated to create and send “releases” per the terms and conditions, but neither the purchase order nor the terms and conditions obligated MSSC to send any number of firm orders to Airboss—either as a raw number or as a percentage of MSSC’s total need. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction in favor of MSSC, finding that the contract was a requirements contract and was likely enforceable. Airboss moved for summary judgment, arguing that the purchase order failed to satisfy the statute of frauds of the Uniform Commercial Code, MCL 440.1101 et seq. In response, MSSC moved for summary judgment, arguing that the blanket purchase order was a requirements contract that satisfied the statute of frauds. The trial court granted MSSC’s motion, concluding that because the purchase order was identified as a “blanket” order, it contained a “quantity term” that satisfied the statute of frauds. Airboss appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. Contrary to the lower courts, the Michigan Supreme Court found the parties entered into a release-by-release contract, which allowed Airboss to stop selling parts to MSSC. View "MSSC, Inc v. Airboss Flexible Products Co." on Justia Law

Drago and Blaga Kostadinovski brought a medical malpractice action against Steven Harrington, M.D. and Advanced Cardiothoracic Surgeons, PLLC, asserting six specific theories with respect to how the doctor breached the standard of care throughout the course of Drago’s mitral-valve-repair surgery in December 2011, during which Drago suffered a stroke. Plaintiffs timely served defendants with a notice of intent (NOI) to file suit, timely served the complaint, and timely served the affidavit of merit. Following the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs’ experts were unable to validate or support the six theories asserted by plaintiffs in the NOI, affidavit of merit, and complaint. Plaintiffs agreed to the dismissal of their existing, unsupported negligence allegations and complaint but moved to amend the complaint to assert a new theory. The court denied the motion to amend the complaint, reasoning that amendment would be futile given that the existing NOI would be rendered obsolete because it did not include the new theory. Plaintiffs appealed and defendants cross-appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded to the trial court for it to apply MCL 600.2301 in considering whether plaintiffs should be allowed to amend the NOI. In a footnote to the opinion, the Court of Appeals rejected plaintiffs’ argument that MCL 600.2912b simply required the service of an NOI before suit was filed and that once a compliant and timely NOI is served, as judged at the time suit is filed and by the language in the original complaint, the requirements of the statute have been satisfied. On remand, the trial court denied plaintiffs’ motion to amend, concluding that amendment would be futile and that amending the complaint would contravene MCL 600.2912b. Plaintiffs appealed. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded MCL 600.2912b did not apply where a plaintiff seeks to amend their complaint against an already-named defendant after suit has already commenced. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Kostadinovski v. Harrington" on Justia Law

Soaring Pine Capital Real Estate and Debt Fund II, LLC, filed suit against Park Street Group Realty Services, LLC; Park Street Group, LLC; and Dean Groulx, alleging multiple counts of breach of contract and fraud. Soaring Pine lent Park Street $1 million to “flip” tax-foreclosed homes in Detroit. The mortgage note had a stated interest rate of 20%, but there were fees and charges associated with the loan that, if considered interest, pushed the effective interest rate above 25%. The mortgage note also contained a "usury savings clause" stating that the note should not be construed to impose an illegal interest rate. After paying more than $140,000 in interest on the loan, Park Street discontinued further payments, arguing Soaring Pine violated the criminal usury statute, MCL 438.41, by knowingly charging an interest rate exceeding 25% and therefore was barred by the wrongful-conduct rule from recovering on the loan. Soaring Pine countered that the fees and charges associated with the loan were not interest and that the note had a usury savings clause that prevented it from charging a usurious rate. Soaring Pine further argued that, assuming it had engaged in criminal usury, it could still recover the loan principal and would only be precluded from collecting the interest. The trial court agreed with Park Street that the purported fees and expenses tied to the loan were really disguised interest, and there was no question of fact that Soaring Pine charged a criminally usurious interest rate. However, the court agreed with Soaring Pine that the usury savings clause was enforceable and that the appropriate remedy was to relieve Park Street of its obligation to pay the interest on the loan but not its obligation to repay the principal. The Michigan Supreme Court held that in determining whether a loan agreement imposes interest that exceeds the legal rate, a usury savings clause is ineffective if the loan agreement otherwise requires a borrower to pay an illegal interest rate. Seeking to collect an unlawful interest rate in a lawsuit, standing alone, was insufficient to trigger criminal liability under Michigan’s criminal usury statute. The appropriate remedy for a lender’s abusive lawsuit is success for the borrower in that lawsuit and appropriate civil sanctions, not a criminal conviction for usury. The Court reversed the appellate and trial courts to the extent they were inconsistent with the Supreme Court's holdings, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Soaring Pine Capital Real Estate v. Park Street Group Realty" on Justia Law

Adora Wilmore-Moody, individually and as next friend of her minor son, brought an action against Mohammed Zakir and Everest National Insurance Company, alleging that Zakir had negligently rear-ended her vehicle, and sought personal protection insurance benefits from Everest for the injuries she and her son incurred as a result of the collision. Everest did not pay the benefits but instead rescinded plaintiff’s policy on the ground that plaintiff had failed to disclose that she had a teenaged granddaughter living with her when she applied for the insurance policy. Everest then brought a counterclaim seeking declaratory relief and moved for summary judgment of plaintiff’s claim against it under MCR 2.116(C)(10), arguing that it was entitled to rescind plaintiff’s policy because she had made a material misrepresentation in her insurance application. The trial court granted Everest’s motion. After this ruling, Zakir also moved for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiff was barred from recovering third-party noneconomic damages from him under the Michigan no-fault act because once Everett rescinded plaintiff’s insurance policy, she did not have the security required by statute at the time the injury occurred. The trial court granted Zakir summary judgment too. The Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of summary judgment to Everest, reversed as to Zakir, and remanded the case for further proceedings. Zakir appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: an insurer’s decision to rescind a policy post-accident does not trigger the exclusion in MCL 500.3135(2)(c). "Rescission is an equitable remedy in contract, exercised at the discretion of the insurer, and does not alter the reality that, at the time the injury occurred, the injured motorist held the required security. Rescission by the insurer post-accident is not a defense that can be used by a third-party tortfeasor to avoid liability for noneconomic damages." View "Wilmore-Moody v. Zakir" on Justia Law

Elia Companies, LLC, filed suit against the University of Michigan Regents, alleging breach of contract; violations of Michigan’s anti-lockout statute; breach of covenant for quiet possession; constructive eviction; conversion; and unjust enrichment. In 2013, plaintiff entered into a 10-year lease with defendant to obtain space at the Michigan Union for establishing a coffee shop. In March 2017, defendant disclosed its plans to renovate the Union. Plaintiff’s complaint alleged that the parties’ lease required that they negotiate a relocation of the leased premises. However, defendant terminated the lease on April 20, 2018, based on plaintiff’s alleged default and ordered plaintiff to vacate the premises. Plaintiff filed this action in August 2018, and defendant, over plaintiff’s objection, filed a notice of transfer removing the case to the Court of Claims pursuant to MCL 600.6404(3) and MCL 600.6419(1) of the Court of Claims Act (the COCA). Defendant moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s action had to be dismissed because plaintiff failed to comply with the notice and verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 of the COCA. The Court of Claims agreed and dismissed plaintiff’s case. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part. The panel affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff’s ancillary claims on governmental-tort-immunity grounds but reversed the dismissal of plaintiff’s contract claim. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred when it excused plaintiff’s failure to timely comply with MCL 600.6431. “All parties with claims against the state, except those exempted in MCL 600.6431 itself, must comply with the requirements of MCL 600.6431.” Judgment was reversed and the matter remanded to the Court of Claims for reinstatement of summary judgment granted in defendant’s favor. View "Elia Companies, LLC v. University Of Michigan Regents" on Justia Law

In 2019, Susan Christie filed suit against Wayne State University, asserting age and disability discrimination under the Elliott-Larsen Civil Rights Act (the ELCRA); and the Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act (the PWDCRA). Christie took a medical leave of absence in February 2017 and returned to work on May 1, 2017. Plaintiff alleged that after her return to work, her supervisors questioned her about her age, asked her when she intended to retire, and had conversations with others in her presence regarding the ages of employees. Plaintiff received a negative job-performance review on September 22, 2017, allegedly the first negative review she had ever received, and defendant terminated her from her job on November 27, 2017. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that MCL 600.6431(1) of the Court of Claims Act (the COCA), required plaintiff to file either a verified complaint with the Court of Claims or notice of intent to file suit with the Court of Claims within one year of the accrual of her claim; defendant maintained plaintiff’s claim was barred by governmental immunity because she failed to do either. The court denied the motion, concluding that MCL 600.6431(1) did not preclude plaintiff from filing her claim in the circuit court because the COCA notice requirements only applied to claims litigated in the Court of Claims. Defendant appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals. While the Court of Appeals ultimately concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal as a matter of right, it treated the appeal as though leave had been granted and affirmed the trial court’s order in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding the trial court erred by denying defendant’s motion for summary judgment. View "Christie v. Wayne State University" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Mack Stirling lived in Leelanau County, Michigan since 1990. Petitioner’s wife, Dixie, owned two rental properties in Utah. The Stirlings filed joint tax returns for the pertinent tax years of 2016 to 2019. Neither Mack nor Dixie ever resided at the Utah properties. Instead, Dixie rented the properties to tenants who used the properties as their primary residences. Dixie claimed an applicable Utah tax exemption during the relevant tax years. Plaintiff applied for a principal residence exemption (PRE) on his Michigan home. Leelanau County denied the application because it concluded the Utah exemption rendered the Stirlings ineligible for the PRE. The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed: the Utah tax exemption at issue, which was available to landowners who rented their property to tenants, was not substantially similar to Michigan’s PRE, which was available only for a landowner’s principal residence. Accordingly, Plaintiff was eligible to claim the Michigan PRE. View "Stirling v. County of Leelanau" on Justia Law

Defendant Roberto Dupree and two accomplices robbed a store in Clinton Township, Michigan in late 2012. Only one of the three robbers was armed.The issue in this case was the proper scoring of Offense Variables 1 and 2, which concerned the possession or use of a weapon during the commission of a crime. Because there was no contention that defendant possessed a weapon during the offense at issue, and because no other offender was assessed points for either offense variable, both offense variables should have been scored at zero points. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in this regard and remanded for resentencing. View "Michigan v. Dupree" on Justia Law

Defendant Theresa Gafken was convicted by jury of second-degree murder. Defendant drove her vehicle at speeds exceeding 100 miles per hour while fleeing the police; she ran a red light and collided with other vehicles, killing one person and severely injuring several others. Before trial, defendant moved to be allowed to testify that she intended to pull over when the police officer activated his overhead lights and that she did not do so because the passenger sitting behind her, Michael Scandalito, thrust a gun into her ribs and threatened to kill her if she stopped the car. In addition, defendant wanted to testify that Scandalito was on parole and being sought for a parole violation and that he had committed aggravated assault against his mother while using drugs. The prosecution opposed the motion, arguing that defendant should not be allowed to introduce the evidence because it amounted to a duress defense, which was not allowed. The trial court granted in part and denied in part the motion, concluding that the evidence was not admissible with regard to the second-degree-murder charge but was admissible with regard to the operating a vehicle while intoxicated (OWI) charges. Following that ruling, the prosecution dismissed the two OWI charges, after which defendant moved to allow a duress defense. The court denied the motion, and the jury ultimately convicted defendant of second-degree murder. Defendant appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded the trial court’s order preventing defendant from raising a duress defense to a second-degree murder charge that relied on a depraved-heart theory of malice was error, and it was not harmless. "The denial of the defense, coupled with the trial court’s exclusion of any evidence that Scandalito threatened defendant, effectively left defendant with no defense at all." The Court of Appeals judgment affirming the trial court was reversed, defendant's conviction vacated, and the case remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Gafken" on Justia Law

Kino Christian, Joshun Edwards, and C’Quan Hinton were convicted by jury of murder in 2007 and sentenced to life in prison. Defendants’ direct appeals were unsuccessful. In 2014, Edwards’s family filed a request under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act for documents related to the case. Among the documents provided in response to the request was a transcript of the first interview with the prosecution’s main witness, Jarylle Murphy, which the prosecution had not provided to defendants. Defendants moved for relief from judgment under MCR 6.508, arguing in part that because there were inconsistencies in the interview transcript that could have been used to impeach Murphy’s testimony at trial, the prosecution’s suppression of the transcript violated their constitutional right to exculpatory evidence under Brady v. Maryland, 373 US 83 (1963). The court denied the motions, ruling that although the prosecution had failed to disclose favorable evidence to defendants before trial, the evidence was not material and, therefore, reversal was not required. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding the interview transcript that the prosecution suppressed was both favorable and material to the defense. Having established both good cause for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal and actual prejudice for purposes of MCR 6.508, defendants were entitled to a new trial. View "Michigan v. Hinton" on Justia Law