Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A patient died from a bilateral pulmonary embolism after being seen at a hospital for chest pain, and his estate, through its personal representative, brought a medical malpractice action against several doctors and the hospital. The alleged malpractice occurred on July 16, 2020. The personal representative received authority to act for the estate on June 7, 2021, sent a notice of intent to sue to defendants on February 10, 2023, and filed the complaint on August 14, 2023.The Genesee Circuit Court, applying Michigan Supreme Court precedent from Waltz v Wyse, granted summary disposition for defendants, holding the suit time-barred because the statutory extension for personal representatives in wrongful death actions (under MCL 600.5852) was not subject to tolling during the notice-of-intent period. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, stating it was bound by Waltz. The Michigan Supreme Court initially denied a bypass application but later ordered oral argument on whether Waltz was correctly decided and whether it should be retained under stare decisis.The Michigan Supreme Court overruled Waltz, holding that MCL 600.5852 does incorporate a limitations period and is subject to tolling under MCL 600.5856, which includes tolling for the 182-day notice-of-intent period required in medical malpractice actions. The Court concluded that the Legislature intended for personal representatives to benefit from this tolling and that there was no statutory or policy basis to exclude wrongful death actions from such tolling. The Court also determined that stare decisis did not justify retaining Waltz. As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Estate Of Ernest v. Brown" on Justia Law

In 1976, the defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder for aiding and abetting an armed robbery in which another individual committed a fatal shooting at a grocery store. The defendant was not present during the actual shooting but had provided information about the store’s occupants to the principal. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. The trial court’s instructions to the jury did not require a finding of malice as later defined by Michigan law.On direct appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the conviction due to improper jury instructions regarding the mens rea for felony murder. However, the Michigan Supreme Court reinstated the conviction after its decision in People v Aaron, which redefined malice for felony murder but applied only to trials in progress or later. The case returned to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the conviction, and the Michigan Supreme Court denied further review.In 2020, the defendant filed for post-judgment relief, arguing that his sentence was unconstitutional because the jury did not make a finding of malice as required by Aaron, and that mandatory life without parole was cruel or unusual punishment. The trial court denied his motion, stating it was bound by precedent, and the Court of Appeals denied leave to appeal.The Michigan Supreme Court held that mandatory life without parole for pre-Aaron felony murder constitutes cruel or unusual punishment under the Michigan Constitution if the jury was not instructed on malice as defined by Aaron, unless the prosecution can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found malice based on the trial evidence. If the prosecution fails to meet this burden, the no-parole aspect of the sentence must be struck, making the defendant eligible for parole. The trial court’s order was vacated in part, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "People Of Michigan v. Langston" on Justia Law

The plaintiff was injured in a car accident allegedly caused by the defendant. At the time, the plaintiff had no-fault insurance but had opted out of personal protection insurance (PIP) coverage because he was covered by Medicare Parts A and B, which is permitted under Michigan law. Instead of seeking PIP benefits for medical expenses, the plaintiff filed a tort suit against the defendant to recover his medical costs. Although several of the plaintiff’s medical providers accepted Medicare, none billed Medicare or charged Medicare rates, and the plaintiff did not submit claims to Medicare, instead seeking the full billed amounts as damages.In the Wayne Circuit Court, the defendant moved for partial summary disposition, arguing that the plaintiff should have mitigated his damages by using Medicare and that his recovery should be subject to statutory reimbursement limits based on Medicare fee schedules. The trial court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff did not have a duty to mitigate by seeking Medicare payments and that the reimbursement limitations did not apply to third-party tort claims. On interlocutory appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that the plaintiff did have a duty to mitigate damages by seeking Medicare payments and that reimbursement limitations applied to his claim.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the common-law duty to mitigate damages applies to a tort claim brought under MCL 500.3135(3)(c), so plaintiffs with Medicare coverage must seek payment from Medicare for treatment received from Medicare-participating providers. However, the Court also held that the reimbursement limitations in MCL 500.3157, which cap payments at Medicare rates, do not apply to tort claims under that statutory section. The Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Canty v. Mason" on Justia Law

A man was stopped by police while driving a car matching the description of a vehicle seen leaving the scene of a shooting. Police found a loaded handgun in the glovebox. During questioning, the driver admitted to being at the scene and driving the car, but when asked for a DNA sample to compare with the handgun, he refused and ended the interview. At trial, the prosecutor argued that the defendant’s decision to stop cooperating was evidence of a “guilty conscience,” displaying a board with that phrase to the jury and contrasting his actions with those of other occupants who continued their interviews.After closing arguments, the Macomb Circuit Court judge raised concerns that the prosecutor’s comments improperly used the defendant’s invocation of his right to silence against him. Defense counsel moved for a mistrial, which the court granted. The defendant argued that a retrial would violate double jeopardy, but the trial court denied this, finding no evidence that the prosecutor specifically intended to provoke a mistrial. At the second trial, the prosecution shifted its theory, and the defendant was convicted. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that retrial was not barred under the standard from Oregon v Kennedy, 456 US 667 (1982), because the prosecutor’s misconduct was not intended to goad the defense into requesting a mistrial but was instead reckless or negligent.On further appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the Kennedy standard does not properly protect the double-jeopardy rights guaranteed by the Michigan Constitution. The Court rejected Kennedy and adopted the broader standard from Pool v Superior Court, 139 Ariz 98 (1984), holding that retrial is barred if a mistrial is granted due to intentional, prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct pursued for an improper purpose with indifference to the risk of mistrial, and the resulting prejudice cannot be cured short of a mistrial. The Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded for application of the new standard. View "People Of Michigan v. Jennings" on Justia Law

A minor was injured in a car accident while traveling from her father's home to school. Her parents had divorced and, according to a 2011 custody order, shared joint physical custody with an equal division of parenting time. However, in practice, the minor spent about 75% of her time at her mother’s home and 25% at her father’s. At the time of the accident, she was staying at her father's house. Multiple insurance companies insured her parents, and disputes arose regarding which insurer was responsible for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits and the applicable liability coverage under her father’s insurance policy.The Oakland Circuit Court denied Esurance’s motion for summary disposition, which argued that the minor was domiciled with her mother and that Auto-Owners, her mother’s insurer, should be the highest priority insurer. The court instead granted Auto-Owners’ request for judgment, finding the minor was domiciled with her father based on the custody order and the Michigan Supreme Court’s prior decision in Grange Insurance Company of Michigan v Lawrence, which treated custody orders as determinative of domicile. The trial court also ruled that she was a resident of her father’s home for purposes of a step-down provision in his Esurance policy, limiting liability coverage. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the minor was domiciled and resident at her father's home at the time of the accident.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and overruled the Grange domicile rule. The Court held that a custody order does not conclusively determine a child’s domicile for purposes of the no-fault act. Instead, the custody order serves as a starting point, but courts must review all facts and circumstances—including traditional domicile factors—to determine domicile. The Court vacated the Court of Appeals judgment regarding domicile and residency and remanded the case to the trial court. View "Frownfelter v. Esurance Property And Casualty Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A city adopted an ordinance regulating recreational marijuana establishments, limiting the number of retail licenses available and establishing a competitive process for selecting license recipients. The city manager was granted the authority to implement and administer the application process, including ranking applicants according to specific criteria. Twenty-one applications were submitted for two licenses; the city manager convened a workgroup of city officials to assist in reviewing applications and ultimately selected two applicants other than the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were placed on a waitlist in case the selected applicants failed subsequent requirements.Plaintiffs Quality Roots, Inc., and Exclusive Capital Partners LLC filed complaints in the Oakland Circuit Court, challenging the city’s license issuance and alleging violations of the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA) and the Open Meetings Act (OMA). The city moved for summary disposition, which the trial court granted, rejecting claims of OMA violations and other alleged statutory breaches. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition regarding the MRTMA claims but reversed as to the OMA claims, finding the city manager a “governing body” under the OMA and remanding for a remedy regarding the OMA violation. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the city commission had delegated its authority to the city manager, making him subject to OMA requirements.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and held that the city manager was not required to comply with the OMA during the marijuana retail license selection process. The court found that the city manager acted under independent ordinance-based authority, not as a public body or by delegated authority from the city commission, and thus was not subject to OMA requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the relevant part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of the city. View "Exclusive Capital Partners LLC v. City Of Royal Oak" on Justia Law

A Michigan State Police trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding, driven by the defendant, with a passenger under the age of 21. The trooper smelled marijuana but did not see any in plain view, nor did the occupants appear intoxicated or in possession. After both initially denied possessing marijuana, the passenger admitted to having a small amount (“shake”), which under Michigan law is a civil infraction for those under 21. The trooper then searched the vehicle and found a concealed firearm, which the defendant admitted was his.At the preliminary examination, the defendant argued that the vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment. The 63rd District Court bound him over on the concealed weapon charge. In Kent Circuit Court, the defendant moved to suppress the firearm, but the motion was denied. The Michigan Court of Appeals, after remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, affirmed the circuit court’s denial, holding the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.The Supreme Court of Michigan reviewed the case and held that the warrantless search was unlawful under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The Court found that the trooper had probable cause only to believe a civil infraction (possession of a small amount of marijuana by a minor) had occurred, not a crime. The Court clarified that probable cause to believe only a civil infraction has been committed does not justify a warrantless search under the automobile exception. The presence of marijuana odor, without more, does not establish probable cause to believe a criminal amount is present. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "People of Michigan v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unarmed robbery in Michigan in 2021, following a prior conviction for attempted rape in Illinois in 1983. As part of the 2022 sentence, the Berrien Circuit Court imposed lifetime registration as a Tier III sex offender under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), based on the statute’s “recapture” provision. This provision requires individuals with pre-SORA sexual offense convictions to register if they are later convicted of any felony after July 1, 2011. The defendant had not committed another sexual offense in the intervening decades, and his recent conviction involved theft and a disputed assault in a Walmart store.After sentencing, the defendant challenged the registration requirement, arguing it was unconstitutional and not applicable because he was an out-of-state resident. The Berrien Circuit Court denied his motion to correct an invalid sentence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the registration requirement constitutional but held that the defendant, as a nonresident, did not have to register unless he moved to or worked in Michigan.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether SORA’s recapture provision constituted cruel or unusual punishment when imposed for nonsexual offenses. The Court held that imposing SORA registration on individuals convicted of nonsexual offenses who had a pre-SORA sexual offense conviction was unconstitutional under the Michigan Constitution. The Court found the registration requirement grossly disproportionate, ineffective for rehabilitation, and harsher than penalties imposed for similar offenses elsewhere. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court to remove the registration requirement from the defendant’s sentence. View "People of Michigan v. Ellis" on Justia Law

A woman serving as her mother’s patient advocate removed her mother from an assisted living facility, subsequently killed her mother, and then died by suicide. The mother’s estate, represented by one of her other daughters, brought a wrongful death lawsuit against the daughter’s estate and obtained a judgment. When the daughter’s estate proved insolvent, attention turned to a revocable trust the daughter had created, which was the designated beneficiary of her 401(k) account and life insurance policy. The trustee of the daughter’s trust sought a declaratory ruling on whether these proceeds could be used to satisfy the judgment for the mother’s estate.In the St. Clair Probate Court, the judge determined that the life insurance proceeds were subject to creditor claims under Michigan’s Estates and Protected Individuals Code, but that the 401(k) proceeds were exempt. Both sides appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s decision as to the life insurance but reversed as to the 401(k), holding that neither the statutory exemptions for retirement accounts nor life insurance applied, and thus both sources could be reached by the mother’s estate.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that assets of a revocable trust—such as life insurance and 401(k) proceeds payable to the trust after the settlor’s death—are generally subject to creditor claims if the trust was revocable at the settlor’s death, unless a statutory exception applies. However, the Court found that 401(k) proceeds are exempt from creditor claims under MCL 700.7605(2), and that life insurance proceeds are exempt under MCL 700.7605(4) because, if not paid to the settlor’s estate, they are protected by Michigan’s Insurance Code. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, holding the proceeds were exempt from creditor claims. View "In Re Fowler Estate" on Justia Law

A resident of an apartment complex for elderly and disabled individuals was injured when she stepped into an uncovered and unmarked trench near the trash-disposal area in the parking lot before sunrise. The apartment complex was managed by a company that had contracted with one entity to replace concrete (which created the trench) and another company to fill the trench, which was not completed until after the resident’s injury. The resident alleged that the management company breached its statutory duty under Michigan law to keep common areas fit for their intended use, and that the contractor who created the trench was negligent for failing to correct or adequately warn of the hazard. The contractor responsible for filling the trench was dismissed from the case and not part of the appeal.The Montcalm Circuit Court granted summary disposition to both the property management company and the concrete contractor. The court found that the trash-disposal area remained reasonably accessible and thus fit for its intended use, so the statutory covenant was not breached. The court further ruled that the resident’s claim against the contractor sounded in premises liability, and the contractor owed no duty because the hazard was open and obvious. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that neither defendant was liable: the trench posed only a “mere inconvenience,” and the contractor had not breached any duty under ordinary negligence principles.The Supreme Court of Michigan, reviewing the case, held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the contractor breached its common-law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others, and whether the management company violated its statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep common areas fit for their intended use. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. The holding clarified that summary disposition was not appropriate because reasonable persons could differ on whether the uncovered, unmarked trench rendered the area unfit for elderly and disabled tenants and created an unreasonable risk of harm. View "Bowerman v. Red Oak Management Co. Inc." on Justia Law