Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A city adopted an ordinance regulating recreational marijuana establishments, limiting the number of retail licenses available and establishing a competitive process for selecting license recipients. The city manager was granted the authority to implement and administer the application process, including ranking applicants according to specific criteria. Twenty-one applications were submitted for two licenses; the city manager convened a workgroup of city officials to assist in reviewing applications and ultimately selected two applicants other than the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were placed on a waitlist in case the selected applicants failed subsequent requirements.Plaintiffs Quality Roots, Inc., and Exclusive Capital Partners LLC filed complaints in the Oakland Circuit Court, challenging the city’s license issuance and alleging violations of the Michigan Regulation and Taxation of Marihuana Act (MRTMA) and the Open Meetings Act (OMA). The city moved for summary disposition, which the trial court granted, rejecting claims of OMA violations and other alleged statutory breaches. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed summary disposition regarding the MRTMA claims but reversed as to the OMA claims, finding the city manager a “governing body” under the OMA and remanding for a remedy regarding the OMA violation. The Court of Appeals reasoned that the city commission had delegated its authority to the city manager, making him subject to OMA requirements.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the appeal and held that the city manager was not required to comply with the OMA during the marijuana retail license selection process. The court found that the city manager acted under independent ordinance-based authority, not as a public body or by delegated authority from the city commission, and thus was not subject to OMA requirements. The Supreme Court reversed the relevant part of the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded for entry of summary disposition in favor of the city. View "Exclusive Capital Partners LLC v. City Of Royal Oak" on Justia Law

A Michigan State Police trooper stopped a vehicle for speeding, driven by the defendant, with a passenger under the age of 21. The trooper smelled marijuana but did not see any in plain view, nor did the occupants appear intoxicated or in possession. After both initially denied possessing marijuana, the passenger admitted to having a small amount (“shake”), which under Michigan law is a civil infraction for those under 21. The trooper then searched the vehicle and found a concealed firearm, which the defendant admitted was his.At the preliminary examination, the defendant argued that the vehicle search violated the Fourth Amendment. The 63rd District Court bound him over on the concealed weapon charge. In Kent Circuit Court, the defendant moved to suppress the firearm, but the motion was denied. The Michigan Court of Appeals, after remand from the Michigan Supreme Court, affirmed the circuit court’s denial, holding the search did not violate the Fourth Amendment.The Supreme Court of Michigan reviewed the case and held that the warrantless search was unlawful under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The Court found that the trooper had probable cause only to believe a civil infraction (possession of a small amount of marijuana by a minor) had occurred, not a crime. The Court clarified that probable cause to believe only a civil infraction has been committed does not justify a warrantless search under the automobile exception. The presence of marijuana odor, without more, does not establish probable cause to believe a criminal amount is present. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "People of Michigan v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty to attempted unarmed robbery in Michigan in 2021, following a prior conviction for attempted rape in Illinois in 1983. As part of the 2022 sentence, the Berrien Circuit Court imposed lifetime registration as a Tier III sex offender under Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), based on the statute’s “recapture” provision. This provision requires individuals with pre-SORA sexual offense convictions to register if they are later convicted of any felony after July 1, 2011. The defendant had not committed another sexual offense in the intervening decades, and his recent conviction involved theft and a disputed assault in a Walmart store.After sentencing, the defendant challenged the registration requirement, arguing it was unconstitutional and not applicable because he was an out-of-state resident. The Berrien Circuit Court denied his motion to correct an invalid sentence. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the registration requirement constitutional but held that the defendant, as a nonresident, did not have to register unless he moved to or worked in Michigan.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case, focusing on whether SORA’s recapture provision constituted cruel or unusual punishment when imposed for nonsexual offenses. The Court held that imposing SORA registration on individuals convicted of nonsexual offenses who had a pre-SORA sexual offense conviction was unconstitutional under the Michigan Constitution. The Court found the registration requirement grossly disproportionate, ineffective for rehabilitation, and harsher than penalties imposed for similar offenses elsewhere. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court to remove the registration requirement from the defendant’s sentence. View "People of Michigan v. Ellis" on Justia Law

A woman serving as her mother’s patient advocate removed her mother from an assisted living facility, subsequently killed her mother, and then died by suicide. The mother’s estate, represented by one of her other daughters, brought a wrongful death lawsuit against the daughter’s estate and obtained a judgment. When the daughter’s estate proved insolvent, attention turned to a revocable trust the daughter had created, which was the designated beneficiary of her 401(k) account and life insurance policy. The trustee of the daughter’s trust sought a declaratory ruling on whether these proceeds could be used to satisfy the judgment for the mother’s estate.In the St. Clair Probate Court, the judge determined that the life insurance proceeds were subject to creditor claims under Michigan’s Estates and Protected Individuals Code, but that the 401(k) proceeds were exempt. Both sides appealed. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the probate court’s decision as to the life insurance but reversed as to the 401(k), holding that neither the statutory exemptions for retirement accounts nor life insurance applied, and thus both sources could be reached by the mother’s estate.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case. It held that assets of a revocable trust—such as life insurance and 401(k) proceeds payable to the trust after the settlor’s death—are generally subject to creditor claims if the trust was revocable at the settlor’s death, unless a statutory exception applies. However, the Court found that 401(k) proceeds are exempt from creditor claims under MCL 700.7605(2), and that life insurance proceeds are exempt under MCL 700.7605(4) because, if not paid to the settlor’s estate, they are protected by Michigan’s Insurance Code. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings, holding the proceeds were exempt from creditor claims. View "In Re Fowler Estate" on Justia Law

A resident of an apartment complex for elderly and disabled individuals was injured when she stepped into an uncovered and unmarked trench near the trash-disposal area in the parking lot before sunrise. The apartment complex was managed by a company that had contracted with one entity to replace concrete (which created the trench) and another company to fill the trench, which was not completed until after the resident’s injury. The resident alleged that the management company breached its statutory duty under Michigan law to keep common areas fit for their intended use, and that the contractor who created the trench was negligent for failing to correct or adequately warn of the hazard. The contractor responsible for filling the trench was dismissed from the case and not part of the appeal.The Montcalm Circuit Court granted summary disposition to both the property management company and the concrete contractor. The court found that the trash-disposal area remained reasonably accessible and thus fit for its intended use, so the statutory covenant was not breached. The court further ruled that the resident’s claim against the contractor sounded in premises liability, and the contractor owed no duty because the hazard was open and obvious. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that neither defendant was liable: the trench posed only a “mere inconvenience,” and the contractor had not breached any duty under ordinary negligence principles.The Supreme Court of Michigan, reviewing the case, held that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the contractor breached its common-law duty to refrain from unreasonably endangering others, and whether the management company violated its statutory duty under MCL 554.139(1)(a) to keep common areas fit for their intended use. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ decision and remanded for further proceedings. The holding clarified that summary disposition was not appropriate because reasonable persons could differ on whether the uncovered, unmarked trench rendered the area unfit for elderly and disabled tenants and created an unreasonable risk of harm. View "Bowerman v. Red Oak Management Co. Inc." on Justia Law

A defendant was charged with multiple counts related to child abuse and torture after her six-year-old son was found with bruises, swelling, and scarring on his body during a police welfare check. Medical professionals observed signs consistent with nonaccidental injuries. The defendant admitted to tying her son’s wrists with a belt for hours at a time and acknowledged that her partner had also tied him up. At trial, the child testified that he was restrained with zip ties in the defendant’s presence. An expert in child abuse pediatrics diagnosed the child with “medical torture,” a clinical term describing exposure to repeated physical assaults and psychological maltreatment. The expert clarified that her diagnosis was medical, not legal, and that she could not speak to the legal definition of “torture.”The Wayne Circuit Court conducted a jury trial, resulting in the defendant’s conviction for torture, second-degree child abuse, second-degree child abuse in the presence of another child, and third-degree child abuse. The jury acquitted her of one count involving another child. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but vacated the sentences due to a scoring error and remanded for resentencing. The appellate court rejected the argument that the expert’s testimony about “medical torture” was improper, finding it distinguished from testimony that would address legal responsibility or intent.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed whether the expert’s testimony diagnosing “medical torture” impermissibly invaded the jury’s role. The Court held that the testimony was inadmissible because it was unhelpful to the jury, lacked a reliable foundation, and encroached on the jury’s determination of guilt. However, the Court concluded the error did not affect the outcome of the proceedings, given the substantial evidence properly admitted. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "People of Michigan v. Alexander" on Justia Law

The defendant was arrested in connection with a fatal shooting and, following his arrest, was given Miranda warnings. Police initially did not interrogate him because they believed he was intoxicated. The next day, during a videorecorded interrogation, the defendant waived his rights but later invoked his right to counsel, stating he needed appointed counsel. Police then left, purportedly to locate an attorney, but after more than two hours returned and informed the defendant that no attorney was available and he did not have the money to hire one. The defendant expressed confusion and asked clarifying questions. Police indicated that unless the defendant agreed to speak without an attorney, they could not discuss the case further. The defendant ultimately agreed to speak without counsel, was given Miranda warnings again, and made incriminating statements.The Wayne Circuit Court, after reviewing the interrogation video, granted the defendant’s motion to suppress the statements. The court found that police communications had frustrated the required Miranda advice by suggesting that the defendant’s right to counsel depended on his ability to pay, thereby undermining his rights. The trial court also found that police had reinitiated interrogation after the defendant invoked his right to counsel.The Michigan Court of Appeals reversed the suppression order, holding that the defendant’s waiver was voluntary, knowing, and intelligent, and that police had not violated his constitutional rights. The defendant sought further review.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the defendant’s Fifth Amendment rights under Miranda were violated. The Court found that police undermined the required advice of rights by suggesting that the right to counsel depended on the defendant’s ability to pay and that the prosecution failed to show the defendant reinitiated the interrogation. The Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded for further proceedings, ordering suppression of the defendant’s post-invocation statements. View "People Of Michigan v. Fenderson" on Justia Law

The case involved a defendant who, at age 18, ingested a large amount of LSD with a friend, AC, at her home. After taking the drug, the defendant removed his pants and underwear, made statements suggesting sexual intent, and groped AC. AC resisted and escaped, seeking help from her mother. The defendant then exhibited erratic behavior, fled into the night naked from the waist down, and was later found by police, who described him as hallucinating and confused. He was taken to a hospital, where, about an hour after being found, he was read his Miranda rights by a sheriff’s deputy. The defendant then made an incriminating statement, “I am a rapist and I am fucked,” during the ensuing interrogation.The Grand Traverse Circuit Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the statement, concluding he had made a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of assault with intent to commit criminal sexual conduct involving penetration. His motions for a new trial or an evidentiary hearing on ineffective assistance of counsel were denied. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, finding any error in admitting the statement harmless because the victim’s testimony was sufficient for conviction.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that the defendant’s Miranda waiver was not knowing and intelligent, considering the totality of the circumstances, including his age, lack of law enforcement experience, exhaustion, and ongoing effects of LSD. The Court further held that the erroneous admission of the defendant’s statement was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as it was highly prejudicial evidence of intent. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings. View "People Of Michigan v. Soriano" on Justia Law

A commercial truck driver was injured in an accident while operating a tractor-trailer in Missouri. The tractor was registered in Michigan and titled to a limited liability company (LLC) solely owned by the plaintiff, while the trailer was owned by a different LLC. Under a lease agreement, the plaintiff’s LLC leased the tractor to the other LLC, and the plaintiff exclusively operated the tractor. Insurance coverage for the tractor was provided by a policy that excluded personal protection insurance (PIP) when the vehicle was used to transport cargo, and the other LLC’s insurance did not cover PIP for the tractor. The plaintiff, who lived with his parents in Michigan, was not a named insured on his father’s auto policy, nor was the tractor listed as a covered vehicle.After the accident, the plaintiff sued several insurers, arguing that one of them should provide PIP benefits under Michigan’s no-fault act. The Wayne Circuit Court denied summary disposition to one insurer and dismissed others from the case. On appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed, finding insufficient evidence to classify the plaintiff as the tractor’s owner or registrant. It ruled that the plaintiff’s claim for PIP benefits was not barred and that his father’s insurer was the highest priority insurer.The Michigan Supreme Court, in reviewing the case, held that the plaintiff was an “owner” of the tractor under MCL 500.3101(3)(l)(i) because he had the right to use the vehicle in a manner consistent with ownership for more than 30 days. The Court found that his exclusive, regular use and control of the tractor, as the sole member and agent of the LLC, satisfied the statutory definition of ownership. Because he failed to maintain the required insurance, the plaintiff was excluded from recovering PIP benefits under MCL 500.3113. The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court. View "Abdulla v. Progressive Southeastern Insurance Company" on Justia Law

The case arose from a dispute over property ownership following the death of a homeowner who did not leave a will. The defendant, who had lived in the home with his children and grandmother, refused to leave after her death despite an eviction order. When sheriff’s deputies arrived to enforce the eviction, the defendant resisted leaving and was arrested. As a result, he was charged with trespassing and two counts of resisting or obstructing a police officer. The defendant maintained throughout that he believed he had a right to remain in the home and thus was not trespassing.After a jury trial in Emmet Circuit Court, the defendant was convicted on all counts. He moved for a new trial, arguing that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated when his counsel conceded guilt on the trespassing charge during closing argument without consulting him or securing his consent. At the evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that the defendant had consistently maintained his innocence before trial and was not informed of the plan to concede guilt. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the defendant failed to cooperate with counsel and did not object to the concession. The Court of Appeals affirmed, finding that counsel acted within his discretion given the lack of communication.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that under McCoy v. Louisiana, a criminal defendant has the right to decide the objective of the defense, including maintaining innocence. The Court found that defense counsel’s unilateral concession of guilt, despite the defendant’s insistence on innocence and without consultation, violated this right. The Court clarified that a defendant is not required to contemporaneously object to preserve this claim. The structural error required automatic reversal. The judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, the convictions vacated, and the case remanded for a new trial on all charges. View "People Of Michigan v. Klungle" on Justia Law