Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff TOMRA of North America, Inc., brought two separate actions in the Court of Claims against the Michigan Department of Treasury, seeking a refund for use tax and sales tax that plaintiff had paid on the basis that plaintiff’s sales of container-recycling machines and repair parts were exempt from taxation under the General Sales Tax Act, and the Use Tax Act. Plaintiff moved for summary judgment, seeking a ruling on the question whether plaintiff’s container-recycling machines and repair parts performed, or were used in, an industrial-processing activity. The Court of Claims denied plaintiff’s motion and instead granted summary disposition in favor of defendant, holding that plaintiff’s container-recycling machines and repair parts were not used in an industrial-processing activity and that plaintiff therefore was not entitled to exemption from sales and use tax for the sale and lease of the machines and their repair parts. The Court of Claims found that the tasks that plaintiff’s machines performed occurred before the industrial process began, reasoning that the activities listed in MCL 205.54t(3) and MCL 205.94o(3) were only industrial-processing activities when they occurred between the start and end of the industrial process as defined by MCL 205.54t(7)(a) and MCL 205.94o(7)(a), respectively. Plaintiff appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed, declining to interpret MCL 205.54t(7)(a) and MCL 205.94o(7)(a) as placing a temporal limitation on the activities listed in MCL 205.54t(3) and MCL 205.94o(3), respectively. To this, the Michigan Supreme Court concurred and affirmed the Court of Appeals. The matter was remanded to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "TOMRA of North America, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Honigman Miller Schwartz and Cohn LLP filed a petition in the Tax Tribunal, challenging the income tax assessments issued by the city of Detroit for the tax years 2010 through 2014. The firm argued that under MCL 141.623 of the Uniform City Income Tax Ordinance (UCITO), payment for services performed by attorneys working in the city on behalf of clients located outside the city constituted out-of-city revenue for the purpose of calculating income taxes, not in-city revenue as asserted by the City. The tribunal granted partial summary judgment in favor of the City, reasoning that the relevant consideration for calculating gross revenue under MCL 141.623 was where the work was performed, not where the client received the services. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that under MCL 141.623, the relevant consideration for determining the percentage of gross revenue from services rendered in the city was where the service itself was delivered to the client, not where the attorney performed the service. In reaching that result, the Court attributed different meanings to the term “rendered” in MCL 141.623 and the term “performed” in MCL 141.622, reasoning that because the Legislature used different words within the same act, it intended the terms to have distinct meanings. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed: when calculating the percentage of gross revenue from services rendered in the city, the focus was on where the service was performed, not on where it was delivered. View "Honigman Miller Schwartz & Cohn, LLP v. City of Detroit" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Xun Wang was convicted of two counts of Medicaid fraud, and one count of unauthorized practice of a health profession. Defendant earned a medical degree in her native China, and earned a Ph.D. in basic medical science in the United States. Notwithstanding her education in the United States and abroad, defendant was never licensed to practice in a health profession in the United States. The Michigan Department of the Attorney General’s Health Care Fraud Division discovered that a high volume of narcotics prescriptions were being written at the clinic for which she worked part time. In 2014, the department conducted an investigation, during which Drew Macon and Lorrie Bates, special agents with the department, separately went to the clinic while posing as patients with Medicaid benefits. Defendant saw both agents when they posed as patients, identified herself as clinic-owner Dr. Murtaza Hussain’s assistant, and took written notes of their medical histories. Defendant also performed physical examinations, answered their questions, and wrote prescriptions for both agents on a prescription pad that Hussain had previously signed, including a prescription for Ambien, a Schedule 4 controlled substance. The patients’ notes were entered into the clinic’s computer system and were electronically signed by Hussain; the notes indicated that both defendant and Hussain had seen the agents. The Medicaid processing system reflected that claims were submitted for both agents’ treatment and were paid to Hussain for a total of $260. The trial court sentenced her to concurrent terms of 365 days in jail for each conviction, which was suspended upon the successful completion of five years’ probation and the payment of $106,454 in fines and costs. The Michigan Supreme Court found after review that while the lower courts did nor err in determining there was sufficient evidence to convict defendant on unauthorized practice of a health profession, the evidence did not establish she was aware or should have been aware that the patients at issue were Medicaid beneficiaries and their treatment was substantially certain to cause the payment of a Medicaid benefit under the applicable statute. Therefore, defendant's convictions of Medicaid fraud were reversed. The matter was remanded back to the trial court for reconsideration of the fines assessed. View "Michigan v. Wang" on Justia Law

Kelly Warren pleaded guilty to two separate charges of operating a vehicle while intoxicated, third offense (OWI-3rd) in exchange for the dismissal of other criminal charges against him and of the sentence enhancement to which he was subject as a fourth-offense habitual offender. At the plea hearing, the trial court, noted on the record that each charge carried with it a maximum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, but the court did not inform defendant that it had the discretionary authority to sentence him to consecutive sentences under MCL 768.7b(2)(a) because he had committed the second OWI-3rd charge while the first OWI-3rd charge was pending. The trial court ultimately sentenced defendant to consecutive prison terms of 2 to 5 years, which subjected defendant to a maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment. Defendant moved to withdraw his plea on the basis of the court’s failure to advise him of the possibility of consecutive sentencing. The trial court denied the motion, and the Court of Appeals denied defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court then remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted with directions to compare Michigan v. Johnson, 413 Mich 487 (1982) with Michigan v. Blanton, 317 Mich App 107 (2016), On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentences, the majority concluding that Michigan caselaw, including Johnson and Blanton, was not dispositive of the issue and that neither the Michigan Court Rules nor due process required the court to inform defendant that it had the discretion to impose consecutive sentences. Defendant again petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding MCR 6.302(B)(2) required a trial court to advise a defendant of its discretionary consecutive-sentencing authority and potential consequences. As a result, the trial court here erred when it denied defendant’s motion to withdraw his plea because the court failed to apprise him of both this authority and its potential consequences. View "Michigan v. Warren" on Justia Law

Deborah Foster sought to enforce a consent judgment of divorce (the consent judgment) between herself and ex-husband Ray Foster. The consent judgment provided that Ray would pay Deborah 50% of his military disposable retired pay accrued during the marriage or, if he waived a portion of his military retirement benefits in order to receive military disability benefits, he would continue to pay Deborah an amount equal to what she would have received had Ray not elected to receive such supplemental disability benefits. Because Ray was injured during combat, he was eligible for combat-related special compensation (CRSC), and Ray applied for CRSC around the time of his retirement. Deborah filed for divorce in November 2007, and the consent judgment was entered in December 2008. Deborah was receiving slightly more than $800 per month under the consent judgment until February 2010. When Ray began receiving CRSC, his disposable retirement benefit amount had been reduced, and Deborah's monthly payment was reduced to a little more than $200 per month. Ray failed to pay Deborah the difference between the reduced amount of retirement pay she was receiving and the amount that she had received shortly after entry of the consent judgment. Ray was ultimately held in contempt of court; he appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court erred by not finding Deborah's attempts to enforce the consent judgment preempted by federal law. The Court of Appeals concluded there was no preemption and affirmed the trial court’s contempt order. Defendant sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. The Supreme Court vacated the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for reconsideration in light of Howell v. Howell, 137 S Ct 1400 (2017). On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed the trial court’s finding of contempt, concluding that Howell did not overrule the Court of Appeals’ decision in Megee v. Carmine, 290 Mich App 551 (2010). Ray appealed again. The Supreme Court found federal law indeed preempted state law, such that the consent judgment was unenforceable to the extent it required Ray to reimburse Deborah for the reduction in the amount payable to her due to his election to receive CRSC. "Although the Court of Appeals indicated its agreement with plaintiff’s assertion that defendant was engaging in an improper collateral attack against the consent judgment, the panel did not discuss the effect of federal preemption on the trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction or defendant’s ability to challenge the terms of the consent judgment outside of direct appeal." The matter was remanded for the Court of Appeals to address the effect of the Supreme Court's holding on Ray's ability to challenge the terms of the consent judgment. View "Foster v. Foster" on Justia Law

Christie DeRuiter, a registered qualifying medical marijuana patient and a registered primary caregiver to qualifying patients, brought an action in the Kent Circuit Court against Byron Township, alleging that the township’s zoning ordinance—which required that a primary caregiver obtain a permit before cultivating medical marijuana and that the caregiver cultivate the marijuana within a dwelling or garage in a residentially zoned area within the township as part of a regulated home occupation at a full-time residence—directly conflicted with and was therefore preempted by the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (the MMMA). DeRuiter cultivated marijuana in an enclosed, locked facility at a commercially zoned property she rented in the township; she did not obtain a permit from the township before cultivating the medical marijuana as a primary caregiver. At the township’s direction, DeRuiter’s landlord ordered her to stop cultivating medical marijuana at the property or face legal action. The Michigan Supreme Court found that under the conflict-preemption doctrine, the MMMA did not nullify a municipality’s inherent authority to regulate land use under the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (MZEA) as long as: (1) the municipality does not prohibit or penalize the cultivation of medical marijuana; and (2) the municipality does not impose regulations that are unreasonable and inconsistent with regulations established by state law. The township’s ordinance requiring primary caregivers to obtain a permit and pay a fee before using a building or structure within the township to cultivate medical marijuana also did not directly conflict with the MMMA because the ordinance did not effectively prohibit the medical use of marijuana. The Court of Appeals erred by affirming the trial court’s grant of summary disposition in favor of DeRuiter. The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "DeRuiter v. Township of Byron" on Justia Law

The Association of Businesses Advocating Tariff Equity (ABATE) (Docket Nos. 158305 and 158306) and Energy Michigan, Inc. (Docket Nos. 158307 and 158308) each appealed an order of the Michigan Public Service Commission (MPSC) implementing MCL 460.6w. The MPSC order imposed a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers. The local clearing requirement represented the amount of capacity resources that were required to be in the local resource zone in which the electric supplier’s demand was served. ABATE and Energy Michigan challenged the MPSC’s interpretation of MCL 460.6w, and Energy Michigan further asserted that the MPSC order improperly imposed new rules that were not promulgated in compliance with the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and reversed the MPSC’s decision, holding that no provision of MCL 460.6w clearly and unmistakably authorized the MPSC to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers and that the MPSC could impose a local clearing requirement only exactly as MISO does—on a zonal basis. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals concluded that the MPSC was not permitted to impose a local clearing requirement on any provider individually. Because the Court of Appeals held that MCL 460.6w did not provide the MPSC with the authority to impose a local clearing requirement on individual alternative electric suppliers, the Court of Appeals did not reach the APA argument. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding that despite the identical language describing the MPSC’s authority for determining both elements of its capacity obligation, the Court of Appeals concluded that there was a difference based on its review of the entire statute. The Court surmised that conclusion was unfounded; in fact, a contextual review of the statute supported the opposite conclusion. The Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals misread MCL 460.6w when it read into the statutory text a requirement that the MPSC impose Michigan’s local clearing requirement using the same methodology the Mid-continent Independent System Operator did. The Court of Appeals further misunderstood the differences between the wholesale and retail capacity markets when it held that the MPSC could not impose a local clearing requirement on alternative electric suppliers individually. View "In re Reliability Plans of Electric Utilities for 2017-2021" on Justia Law

Tiffany Reichard was bound over to Circuit Court on a charge of open murder under a felony-murder theory for having aided and abetted her boyfriend in an armed robbery during which he stabbed a man to death. Defendant moved to present evidence that her boyfriend had physically abused her and that she had participated in the armed robbery under duress. The court granted the motion. The prosecution filed an interlocutory application for leave to appeal, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that duress could not be used as a defense to first-degree felony murder when the claim of duress involves the defendant’s participation in the underlying felony. The Michigan Supreme Court held that duress could be asserted as an affirmative defense to murder if it was a defense to the underlying felony. "That Michigan has a separate malice requirement for felony murder does not alter our conclusion." The Court therefore reversed the appellate court and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings: the trial court had to provide a duress instruction to the jury if such instruction was requested by defendant, and if a rational view of the evidence supported the conclusion that defendant aided her boyfriend with robbery out of duress. View "Michigan v. Reichard" on Justia Law

Travis Sammons was convicted by jury of conspiracy to commit murder in connection with the shooting death of Humberto Casas. DyJuan Jones and Rosei Watkins witnessed the shooting, which occurred on a street around 1 p.m. Jones was riding in the backseat of a car being driven by his mother when he heard the shots, and Watkins was driving with her grandson in her own car. About 10 to 20 minutes later, the police pulled over defendant and Dominque Ramsey in a silver Jeep. Both men were taken to the Saginaw Police Department, where they were detained. A photo of the Jeep was taken and shown to Watkins, who identified it as the Jeep from the shooting. Several hours later, Jones and his mother went to the police station, where Michigan State Police Detective Sergeant David Rivard organized a showup identification of defendant and Ramsey. According to Jones, he could identify neither man as having been involved in the shooting, while Rivard claimed that Jones identified defendant as the shooter but did not identify Ramsey. No one witnessed the conversation between Jones and Rivard, the conversation was not recorded in any way, and Jones did not sign any kind of statement or report indicating that he had made an identification. At the preliminary examination, Jones repeatedly denied having identified the shooter. Defendant objected to Rivard’s testimony about the showup identification and filed a motion to suppress this evidence. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress and, after a trial, the jury found both men guilty of conspiracy. Both men filed motions for a directed verdict or a new trial. The circuit court denied defendant’s motion but granted Ramsey’s, ruling that there was insufficient evidence to sustain his conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the showup identification procedure employed in this case was suggestive because it indicated to the witness that the police suspected defendant. "The suggestiveness was unnecessary because there was no reason, except perhaps police convenience, to use a suggestive procedure, and the showup was not reliable under Neil v Biggers, 409 US 188 (1972). This error was not harmless because the prosecution’s case was significantly less persuasive without the showup." Accordingly, the Court of Appeals judgment was reversed. View "Michigan v. Sammons" on Justia Law

Nadeem Rajput was convicted of second-degree murder. Defendant was driving his vehicle with another man, known only as Haus, as a passenger. The victim was driving a red Malibu with her boyfriend, Dewayne Clay, as a passenger. When the Malibu approached defendant’s vehicle, two individuals in the Malibu fired gunshots at defendant and Haus. No one was injured. Defendant and Haus returned to defendant’s house but soon after went in search of the Malibu. When they found the Malibu, the victim was the sole occupant. Defendant and Haus chased the Malibu, eventually trapping it, and then approached the Malibu on foot. An argument ensued, and multiple gunshots were fired, resulting in the victim’s death. Defendant was charged with first-degree premeditated murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant argued that Haus had shot the victim but that Haus had done so in self-defense when the victim reached for a gun in her vehicle. Defendant requested that a self-defense instruction be read to the jury, but the court denied the request, citing Michigan v Droste, 160 Mich 66 (1910), for the proposition that a defendant who claims that another person committed the homicide was not entitled to a self-defense instruction. Defendant also tried to admit testimony to support his self-defense theory. The trial court refused to admit the testimony, finding it irrelevant. The jury acquitted defendant of first-degree murder and felony-firearm but convicted defendant of second-degree murder. At sentencing, the court noted defendant’s guidelines minimum sentence range of 225 to 375 months’ imprisonment but departed upward, sentencing defendant to 46 to 95 years’ imprisonment. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s rulings on the self-defense instruction and the proffered testimony. Although it disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning, the appellate court held that defendant was not entitled to a self-defense instruction because he and Haus were the initial aggressors and could have fled. The Court of Appeals also held the proffered testimony was irrelevant. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding that defendant was not entitled to his requested self-defense instruction and that the testimony was irrelevant, “If supported by the evidence, defendant’s theory of the case must be given.” The matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Rajput" on Justia Law