Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ingham, Jackson, and Calhoun County, Michigan (collectively, the Counties) filed an action alleging that they had a right to receive a decade’s worth of surplus contributions (surplus equity) made to the Michigan County Road Commission Self-Insurance Pool (the Pool). The Counties believed they were the successors in interest to their dissolved road commissions and, as such, were entitled to the surplus equity that the commissions might have received had they not been dissolved and withdrawn from the Pool. Jackson County made one other argument: because its road commission never formally withdrew from the Pool, the county said it had a right to receive surplus equity on the same terms as any current member. The Pool disagreed, contending the Counties had no right to surplus equity because the documents governing the Pool’s operations and its contracts with its various members provided the Pool with discretion in distributing surplus equity. This included, the Pool contended, the power to exclude former members should a distribution be made. The Court of Appeals sided with the Counties, holding that the Counties were the successors in interest to their dissolved road commissions and, as a matter of public policy, the Counties had a right to receive surplus equity for fiscal years in which their road commissions were members of the Pool. The Court of Appeals also determined that the dissolution of the Jackson County Road Commission did not disqualify Jackson County from membership in the Pool, and therefore, the county could receive surplus equity regardless of any public-policy considerations. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The Court agreed with the Pool that the Counties did not have a contractual right to receive surplus equity and that such an arrangement was not contrary to public policy. For Jackson County, the Court held that the dissolution of its county road commission did not transfer membership in the Pool from the road commission to the county itself, so the Pool could exclude Jackson County from post-dissolution distributions. View "County Of Ingham v. Michigan County Road Commission Self-Insurance Pool" on Justia Law

Plaintiff B. A. Tyler filed suit against David Findling; the Findling Law Firm, PLC; and Mekel Miller, alleging that David Findling published defamatory statements to attorney Anna Wright by telling her that plaintiff and plaintiff’s client (Samir Warda, for whose estate Findling had been appointed as a receiver) might have engaged in inappropriate or illegal activities. Findling made the allegedly defamatory statements to Wright, Warda’s attorney in a personal protection insurance (PIP) lawsuit, who recorded the conversation, in a room reserved for the plaintiffs’ side at the outset of a court-ordered mediation in the PIP matter. Wright subsequently shared this recording with plaintiff. Findling and his law firm (collectively, “defendants”) moved for summary judgment, and plaintiff responded with an affidavit by Wright. Defendants moved to strike Wright’s affidavit and to preclude her testimony at trial. The trial court granted the motion to strike under MCL 2.412(C), which governed the confidentiality of mediation communications, and granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff’s motion to file an amended complaint was also denied. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals vacated the trial court’s order granting defendants’ motion to strike Wright’s affidavit and find her testimony inadmissible, reversed the order granting defendants summary judgment, affirmed the order denying plaintiff’s motion to amend his complaint, and remanded for further proceedings. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in part, finding Findling's statements were indeed "mediation communications" under MCR 2.412(B)(2) and were therefore confidential under MCR 2.412(C). The Supreme Court also determined the appeals court erred in reversing the grant of summary judgment without which, plaintiff had no evidence to support the relevant defamation allegations. In all other respects, the appellate court's judgment was affirmed. View "Tyler v. Finding" on Justia Law

The Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA) brought actions against claimants Frank Lucente and Michael Herzog, respectively, to appeal the decisions of the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) that claimants were not required to pay restitution and fraud penalties under the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA) despite the fact that they had improperly received unemployment benefits after becoming employed full-time and providing inaccurate responses to certification questions concerning their new employment. The Michigan Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly held that MCL 421.62 authorized the UIA to issue original fraud and restitution determinations that were not subject to the constraints of MCL 421.32a. However, it erred by concluding that the UIA’s decision to issue “redeterminations” in these cases was of no substantive effect. "The UIA must issue an original determination alleging fraud, and its failure to do so was grounds for invalidating the 'redeterminations' in this case. On this issue, the payment of benefits cannot serve as an original 'determination' on the alleged fraud, and the UIA’s issuance of determinationless 'redeterminations' deprives claimants of their right to protest. When UIA-initiated review of a past-paid benefit results in a decision that the claimant received benefits during a period of ineligibility or disqualification and owes restitution as a result, the UIA must begin with an original 'determination' as described in MCL 421.62. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan Unemployment Ins. Agy. v. Lucente" on Justia Law

Kelly Bowman and her husband Vernon, brought a medical malpractice suit against St. John Hospital and Medical Center, Ascension Medical Group Michigan, and Tushar Parikh, M.D., alleging that Parikh erroneously advised Kelly Bowman that a growth in her breast was benign, on the basis of his interpretation of a 2013 mammogram. For the next two years, she felt the lump grow and sought follow-up care. In April 2015, she underwent a biopsy, which revealed “invasive ductal carcinoma with lobular features.” In May 2015, she was diagnosed with metastatic breast cancer and underwent a double mastectomy, which revealed that the cancer had spread to a lymph node. In August 2016, soon after learning that the cancer had spread to her bone marrow, she sought a second opinion from a specialist and learned that the 2013 mammogram might have been misread. Defendants moved for summary judgment, contending the Bowmans' complaint was untimely under the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court denied the motion, and defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed in a split decision. During the pendency of the proceedings, Kelly Bowman died, and her estate was substituted as plaintiff. The question for the Michigan Supreme Court's opinion was on whether Kelly Bowman "should have discovered the existence of [her claim] over six months before initiating proceedings. The Court answered, "no:" the record did not reveal Kelly Bowman should have known before June 2016 that her delayed diagnosis might have been caused by a misreading of the 2013 mammogram. "the available facts didn’t allow her to infer that causal relationship, and the defendants have not shown that Ms. Bowman wasn’t diligent. The present record does not allow us to conclude, as a matter of law, that Ms. Bowman sued over six months after she discovered or should have discovered the existence of her claim. And so we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings." View "Estate of Kelly Bowman v. St. John Hospital & Med. Ctr." on Justia Law

Gerald Magnant and John Davis were each charged with violating MCL 205.428(3) of the Michigan Tobacco Products Tax Act (the TPTA), for transporting 3,000 or more cigarettes without the transporter’s license required by MCL 205.423(1). Defendants were nonsupervisory employees of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community (KBIC). Michigan State Police pulled over a KBIC-owned pickup truck for speeding. Davis was driving, and consented to a search of a utility trailer, representing to the trooper that it contained “supplies” and “chips.” The trailer actually contained 56 cases holding over 600,000 “Seneca” cigarettes marked with KBIC stamps but not with the Michigan Department of Treasury tax stamps required by the TPTA. Magnant was a passenger, and admitted he helped load the trailer. The parties stipulated that Davis, Magnant, and the KBIC were not licensed to transport tobacco products under the TPTA. Defendants jointly moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the relevant statutes were unconstitutionally vague because they did not give individual employees, as opposed to businesses, adequate notice that they were subject to the TPTA licensing requirement for transporting cigarettes. A circuit court denied the motion, holding that the language of the TPTA provided adequate notice that an “individual” can be a “transporter” subject to the licensing requirement. The Michigan Supreme Court held that an individual acting as a “transporter” need not have specific awareness of the law that creates the licensing requirement; a conviction for violating MCL 205.428(3) must, at a minimum, be supported by a showing that the individual (1) knew he or she was transporting a regulated amount of cigarettes and (2) knew of facts that conferred “transporter” status upon him or her. In this case, however, the prosecution failed to present any evidence establishing or implying that defendants were aware of facts that conferred transporter status on them. Judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and defendants' joint motion to quash a bindover decision was granted. View "Michigan v. Magant" on Justia Law

In 2004, defendant Gregory Washington was convicted by jury of second-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In a 2006 unpublished opinion, an appellate court affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded the case for resentencing because the trial court had failed to articulate substantial and compelling reasons for its departure from the second-degree murder sentencing guidelines. Before defendant was resentenced, he petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court for review. While the Supreme Court was considering defendant’s application, the trial court resentenced defendant, and he petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of the new sentence. The Supreme Court ultimately denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal his original convictions. After the Court of Appeals also denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal, he filed his second petition to the Supreme Court, which was again denied. Defendant then moved the trial court for relief from judgment, which was denied. Defendant appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals; the Supreme Court denied appeal of the Court of Appeals’ denial. In June 2016, after exhausting all available postconviction relief, defendant filed a second motion for relief from judgment with the trial court, arguing that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to resentence him in 2006 because his application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court was pending at the time. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, vacated defendant’s sentence, and ordered resentencing. The prosecution appealed. The Court of Appeals, upheld the trial court’s ruling in a published per curiam opinion, holding that although defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment was barred by MCR 6.502(G), the trial court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the second sentence. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court indeed lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it resentenced defendant in 2006 while his application for leave to appeal was still pending with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also held the trial court did not err 10 years later in 2016 when it granted defendant relief on that ground, which was raised in defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment. The matter was remanded for the trial court for resentencing consistent with its 2016 order. View "Michigan v. Washington" on Justia Law

Taxpayers for Michigan Constitutional Government and several individuals brought an original action to the Court of Appeals against the state of Michigan; the Department of Technology, Management, and Budget; and the Office of the Auditor General to enforce section 30 of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, which prohibited the state from reducing its budget for total state spending paid to all units of local government, taken as a group, below that proportion in effect in fiscal year 1978–1979. Plaintiffs: (Count I) alleged the state violated section 30 by classifying as state spending paid to local government monies paid to school districts pursuant to Proposal A, Const 1963, art 9, section 11; (Count II) alleged the same assertion as to monies paid to public school academies (PSAs) pursuant to Proposal A and MCL 380.501(1); (Count III) alleged the state improperly classified as section 30 state spending those funds paid to maintain trunk-line roads; and (Count IV) sought a determination that state funds directed to local governments for new state mandates could not be counted toward the proportion of state funds required by section 30. The Court of Appeal dismissed Count III without prejudice upon stipulation of the parties; all parties moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. The appellate court granted the state defendants motion on Counts I and II; plaintiffs' motion was granted as to Count IV. Finally, the court granted plaintiffs mandamus relief and directed the state to comply with reporting requirements found in MCL 21.235(3) and MCL 21.241. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred when it held that PSAs were “school districts” as the term was used in the Headlee Amendment. Further, the Court held PSAs were themselves not a “political subdivision of the state” as voters would have understood the term when the Headlee Amendment was ratified. The Court thus reversed the conclusion reached in Part III(C) of the Court of Appeals opinion that PSAs were “school districts” and remanded to the Court of Appeals for its reconsideration of this issue. The Supreme Court vacated the panel’s grant of mandamus in Part III(E), and directed the Court of Appeals to provide further explanation of its decision to grant this extraordinary remedy. View "Taxpayers for Michigan Constitutional Govt. v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Defendant Lonnie Arnold was convicted by jury of aggravated indecent exposure and indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 25 to 70 years in prison for indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person; his sentence for aggravated indecent exposure was later set aside. At sentencing, Arnold argued that MCL 750.335a(2)(c) required a sentence of “1 day to life” as provided in the statute, but the trial court stated that it was prohibited from imposing a sentence with a minimum penalty of a term of years and a maximum penalty of life. The court’s minimum sentence of 25 years was calculated to fit within the sentencing guidelines range. Arnold appealed his sentence. The case eventually made its way to the Michigan Supreme Court, which held that the “1 day to life” sentence for indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person in MCL 750.335a(2)(c) was an alternative to the other sentences provided in MCL 750.335a and was not modifiable. The Supreme Court then remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to resolve the effect of the sentencing guidelines on the sentencing scheme for sexually delinquent persons in MCL 750.335a(2)(c). On remand, the Court of Appeals concluded the sentencing guidelines provided another sentencing alternative for persons convicted of indecent exposure as sexual delinquents. Accordingly, a sentencing court could sentence such defendants to either “1 day to life” or to a sentence premised on the guidelines. Because the trial court was not aware of this range of sentencing options, the Court of Appeals vacated Arnold’s sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Arnold again appealed the sentence to the Supreme Court. After re-review, the Supreme Court concluded the guidelines did not create an alternative sentence that could be imposed instead of the “1 day to life” sentence as the appellate court held. "This means that individuals convicted of an indecent-exposure offense under section 335a as sexually delinquent persons must be sentenced pursuant to the penalties prescribed in that statute as described in our earlier opinion. Because defendant did not receive such a sentence, he is entitled to resentencing." View "Michigan v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Defendant Erick Allen was convicted by jury of possessing less than 25 grams of cocaine, for which he was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to a prison term of 30 months to 15 years. Defendant was on parole at the time of the possession, but the Michigan Department of Corrections (the MDOC) did not file a parole detainer against him when he was arrested. Defendant was released from jail on July 13, 2017, on a personal recognizance bond. Defendant subsequently missed two court dates, and the district court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. He was arrested on August 17. The district court turned his personal recognizance bond into a cash/surety bond that Defendant was unable to post. On August 31, 2017, the district court changed his bond back to a personal recognizance bond so that defendant could participate in a drug treatment program. However, defendant brought drugs with him to the program, and he tested positive for cocaine on September 5, 2017. That same day, defendant was arrested, and the MDOC filed a parole detainer against defendant. After being bound over, defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine. Defendant remained in jail until his sentencing on March 1, 2018. At sentencing, defendant made no request to be given credit for time served. Although the court believed that defendant was not legally entitled to any jail credit because of his status as a parolee, in its discretion, the court gave defendant some credit for the time served prior to sentencing. Defendant spent approximately 195 days in jail prior to sentencing, 17 of which came before the MDOC filed a parole detainer against him. Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred by not granting any jail credit for the total time he spent in jail. The Michigan Supreme Court determined that under MCL 769.11b and Michigan v. Idziak, 773 NW2d 616 (2009), defendant was entitled to time-served credit. Because the trial court did not grant the credit to which defendant was entitled, defendant demonstrated plain error affecting his substantial rights. The Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the trial court's judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "Michigan v. Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Betts, Jr. entered a no-contest plea to violating the registration requirements of Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), as amended by 2011 PA 17 and 18 (the 2011 SORA), conditional on his ability to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the retroactive application of the 2011 SORA. Defendant pleaded guilty in 1993 to second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II). The trial court sentenced defendant to 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment. Two years later, SORA took effect. After defendant’s successful completion of parole, defendant failed to report his change of residence, his e-mail address, and his purchase of a vehicle within 3 days, contrary to MCL 28.725(1)(a), (f), and (g), as amended by 2011 PA 17. The prosecution charged defendant with violating SORA’s registration requirements. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the retroactive application of the 2011 SORA requirements violated the constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws. The trial court denied this motion. The Michigan Supreme Court held the retroactive application violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws. As applied to defendant Betts, because the crime subjecting him to registration occurred in 1993, the Supreme Court ordered that his instant conviction of failure to register as a sex offender be vacated. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Betts" on Justia Law