Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This action involved a request for documents under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU), submitted a FOIA request to defendant, the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), seeking disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether a federal regulation with a nondisclosure component, 8 CFR 236.6 (2021), could be the basis for exempting public records from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d). The Supreme Court held that it could not, "for the simple reason that a regulation is not a statute." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary, and the Court overruled Soave v. Dep’t of Ed, and Mich Council of Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, as to their erroneous interpretations of MCL 15.243(1)(d). The case was remanded back to the Calhoun Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union Of Michigan v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Fraser Township filed a complaint against Harvey and Ruth Ann Haney, seeking a permanent injunction to enforce its zoning ordinance and to prevent defendants from raising on their commercially zoned property hogs or other animals that would violate the zoning ordinance, to remove an allegedly nonconforming fence, and to plow and coat the ground with nontoxic material. Defendants brought a hog onto their property as early as 2006, and defendants maintained hogs on their property through the time this lawsuit was filed in 2016. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Fraser's claim was time-barred by the six-year statutory period of limitations in MCL 600.5813. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that because the case was an action in rem, the statute of limitations did not apply. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that because defendants had kept hogs on the property since 2006 and plaintiff did not bring suit until 2016, plaintiff’s case was time-barred. Fraser appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for it to address whether defendants waived an affirmative defense under Baker v Marshall, 323 Mich App 590 (2018). On remand, the Court of Appeals distinguished Baker and explained that defendants did not waive the statute-of-limitations defense. Fraser again sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted the request, holding that MCL 600.5813 did not bar plaintiff’s suit, which was an action for injunctive relief to address violations of the zoning ordinance that occurred within the six-year limitations period. "[W]hether the zoning violation accrued continuously or each day, it accrued within the limitations period, and plaintiff’s action was timely because its complaint was initiated within six years of defendants’ most recent offenses. The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that plaintiff’s action would be timely only under the continuing-wrongs doctrine, which has been abrogated in Michigan." View "Township of Fraser v. Haney" on Justia Law

The League of Women Voters, Progress Michigan, the Coalition to Close Lansing Loopholes, and Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections challenged the constitutionality of 2018 PA 608, which changed the procedures by which the people of Michigan could circulate petitions to invoke the referendum, initiative, and constitutional-amendment processes set forth in Michigan’s Constitution and statutory election laws. Specifically, 2018 PA 608 amended MCL 168.471 to state that no more than 15% of the signatures used to determine the validity of a petition could be from any one congressional district; it amended MCL 168.482 by adding Subsection (7), which required petitions to include checkboxes that would indicate whether the circulator of the petition was a paid signature gatherer or a volunteer; and it added MCL 168.482a, which provided that signature gatherers who were being paid had to, before circulating any petition, file a signed affidavit to that effect with the Secretary of State. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the Court of Claims’ decision, striking as unconstitutional the geographic limitation in MCL 168.471 and the requirement in MCL 168.482(4) that petitions include language identifying the signer’s congressional district. The Court of Appeals also reversed the Court of Claims as to the checkbox and affidavit requirements, holding that the checkbox requirement in MCL 168.482 was constitutional but the affidavit requirement in MCL 168.482a overly burdened the free-speech rights of the petitions’ sponsors. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal, arguing that the checkbox requirement, MCL 168.482(7), was unconstitutional. The Michigan Supreme Court held the 15% cap on signatures from any one congressional district and the precirculation affidavit requirement for paid circulators violated the Michigan Constitution. The checkbox requirement, however, passed constitutional muster. "In light of the chaos and injustice that would ensue were the opinion to be applied retroactively, the decision was given prospective effect only." Any signature gathered after January 24, 2022, must be on a petition that conforms to the requirements of MCL 168.482(7). View "League Of Women Voters Of Michigan v. Michigan Secretary Of State" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Leffew and his wife, Micheline, were convicted by jury of first-degree home invasion and third-degree home invasion, respectively. In September 2017, the Leffews moved to Michigan where they stayed with Jeremiah’s biological mother, Donna Knezevich, and her partner of more than 25 years, Lisa Seibert. A few months before Micheline’s and Jeremiah’s arrival, Seibert and Knezevich had opened their relationship to include Michael Porter. On November 14, 2017, Seibert would later describe an argument as a “little squabble” that got “pretty heated:” Police arrived, and Seibert, on Knezevich’s insistence, left the family home and stayed with Porter. A few days later, though, tempers cooled and Knezevich sought to reconcile. She called Seibert, who was still staying at Porter’s home, and proposed marriage. Seibert accepted and asked Knezevich to pick her up. Knezevich, happy to oblige, went to Porter’s house, accompanied by Jeremiah and Micheline. The parties' accounts of what happened next diverge; but the Leffews were convicted: Micheline of third-degree home invasion based on her commission of a misdemeanor (malicious destruction of a building) while breaking into the home and Jeremiah of first-degree home invasion based on entering the home without permission and committing an assault against Porter; Jeremiah was also convicted of felonious assault. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded Defendants were prejudiced and received ineffective assistance of counsel when their attorneys failed to request a jury instruction on the defense of others. Defendants were entitled to a new trial. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Leffew" on Justia Law

Ingham County, Jackson County, and Calhoun County (collectively, the Counties) filed suit alleging that they had a right to receive a decade’s worth of surplus contributions (surplus equity) made to the Michigan County Road Commission Self- Insurance Pool (the Pool). The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition, and the trial court granted summary disposition to the Pool and rejected the Counties’ claims. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Counties were successors in interest to their dissolved road commissions. Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that because Jackson County had not signed a withdrawal agreement with the Pool, Jackson County had not withdrawn from the Pool and was entitled, as a successor in interest, to receive equity distributions from prior-year contributions made by its former road commission. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address whether the Pool was permitted to decline to issue refunds of surplus premiums to the Counties of contributions from previous years even if the Counties were successors in interest to their former road commissions. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Pool’s withdrawal policy was clear: a withdrawing member forfeited any and all rights to dividends, credits, and/or interest that was or would become payable after the effective date of the member’s withdrawal from the Pool. However, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Jackson County had not withdrawn from the Pool because the Jackson County Road Commission had never executed the Pool’s withdrawal agreement. The appellate court determined that excluding the Counties from sharing in distributions of surplus equity was unenforceable as against public policy, citing MCL 124.5(6) of the intergovernmental contracts act. The Court further stated that when a road commission withdraws from the Pool because it was dissolved, excluding a county from any surplus distribution would penalize the county for exercising its right to dissolve its road commission. The Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the Pool that the Counties did not have a contractual right to receive surplus equity and that such an arrangement was not contrary to public policy. And for Jackson County, the Supreme Court held that the dissolution of its county road commission did not transfer membership in the Pool from the road commission to the county itself, so the Pool could exclude Jackson County from postdissolution distributions. View "County of Ingham v. Michigan County Road Commission Self-Insurance Pool" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Propp was convicted by jury of first-degree premeditated murder. The victim, defendant’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child, was found dead in her own bed. Defendant, who had spent the night with the victim, gave the police several conflicting accounts of what had happened in the preceding hours; however, it was undisputed that the victim had died by neck compression. Before trial, defendant moved for funds to retain an expert in the area of erotic asphyxiation, claiming that the testimony was necessary to support his claim that the victim’s death was accidental. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the record did not support that theory. The prosecution then moved to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim as well as prior acts against his ex-wife; the majority of the evidence came in the form of statements the victim had made to friends and family members concerning her relationship with defendant. Defendant objected, arguing that the other-acts evidence was either inadmissible hearsay, or more prejudicial than probative. The court granted the prosecution’s motion in its entirety, and the jury ultimately found defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. In affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for funds to retain an expert, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because defendant sought appointment of an expert to assert the “affirmative defense” that the victim had died accidentally, he was required, but had failed, to demonstrate a substantial basis for the defense. Defendant appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding: (1) the defense of accident to first-degree premeditated murder was not an affirmative defense; and (2) the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to consider MRE 802 when determining that the challenged other-acts evidence was admissible. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ holding regarding the other-acts evidence had to be reversed and the case remanded for the Court of Appeals to determine whether the rules of evidence would otherwise bar the admission of the other-acts evidence. View "Michigan v. Propp" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) filed a formal three-count complaint against Third Circuit Court Judge Bruce Morrow, arising from comments he made to two female prosecutors during a murder trial. The JTC unanimously recommended that respondent be sanctioned with a public censure and a 12-month suspension without pay. Respondent petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court, requesting that the Court reject or modify the JTC’s recommendation. The Supreme Court found the JTC correctly found that respondent committed misconduct in office, and that public censure and suspension were appropriate. However, the Court determined a 6-month rather than the JTC’s recommended 12-month suspension was proportionate. View "In Re Morrow " on Justia Law

Nicholas Reynolds pleaded no contest to two counts of child sexually abusive activity (CSAA); one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III); and one count of assault by strangulation. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 160 to 240 months for the CSAA convictions, 108 to 180 months for the CSC-III conviction, and 72 to 120 months for the assault-by-strangulation conviction. The court ordered that these sentences run concurrently with each other but consecutively to defendant’s sentence for an Illinois child-pornography conviction for which he was on parole when he committed the crimes at issue here. Defendant moved the circuit court to correct an invalid sentence, arguing that his minimum sentencing guidelines range should have also been scored using his convictions for CSAA. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant then sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, but his application was denied. He then sought leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s sentences. Defendant contended the Court of Appeals erred by holding that he was not entitled to a remand for resentencing because CSAA and CSC-III were both Class B offenses, and defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSIR) should have scored the guidelines for both offenses under MCL 771.14(2)(e). The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with defendant, reversed in part, and remanded to the circuit court for resentencing on defendant’s CSAA convictions. View "Michigan v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Propp was convicted by jury of first-degree premeditated murder. The victim, defendant’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child, was found dead in her own bed. Defendant, who had spent the night with the victim, gave the police several conflicting accounts of what had happened in the preceding hours; however, it was undisputed that the victim had died by neck compression. Before trial, defendant moved for funds to retain an expert in the area of erotic asphyxiation, claiming that the testimony was necessary to support his claim that the victim’s death was accidental. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the record did not support that theory. The prosecution then moved to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim as well as prior acts against his ex-wife; the majority of the evidence came in the form of statements the victim had made to friends and family members concerning her relationship with defendant. Defendant objected, arguing that the other-acts evidence was either inadmissible hearsay or more prejudicial than probative. The court granted the prosecution’s motion in its entirety, and the jury ultimately found defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court o Appeals erred by holding that defendant was required to make the additional showing necessary for affirmative defenses in order to be entitled to expert assistance and by holding that rules of evidence other than MRE 403 do not apply to other-acts evidence admitted under MCL 768.27b. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part, reversed the judgment in part, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Propp" on Justia Law

The Detroit News, Inc., Detroit Free Press, Inc., and others filed suit against the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission, alleging that the commission violated the Michigan Const. 1963, art 4, section 6 by withholding certain data and supporting materials used to develop its proposed redistricting plans and by conducting business during a closed meeting. Plaintiffs sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that Article 4, section 6 required the commission to disclose all supporting materials that it uses to develop its plans; (2) a writ of mandamus compelling the release of supporting materials withheld; (3) a declaratory judgment that Article 4, section 6 required the commission to conduct all of its business in open meetings; and (4) a writ of mandamus requiring the release of the recording of a closed-session meeting and requiring that all future business meetings be open to the public. "From the titles of the memoranda discussed at that meeting, it is beyond dispute that the meeting involved the development of the redistricting maps. Such work is unquestionably within the Commission’s core 'business,' and it therefore needed to be conducted in the open." with respect to disclosure of 10 memoranda that the Commission claimed were privileged attorney-client communications, the Supreme Court concluded that, in light of the constitutional text requiring disclosure of materials that support development of redistricting plans, seven of the memoranda had to be published as “supporting materials” under Const 1963, art 4, section 6(9). "The other three are not 'supporting materials' and therefore need not be disclosed." View "The Detroit News, Inc. v. Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission" on Justia Law