Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

James Township, Michigan filed a nuisance action against Daniel Rice , alleging Rice violated the township’s blight ordinance as well as the Michigan Residential Code by having junk cars, unpermitted construction, and fences of an improper height on his property. Rice moved to dismiss the portions of the citation related to the improper height of his fence and the unpermitted construction, arguing that, under the Right to Farm Act (RTFA), the township was prohibited from enforcing against farms or farm operations local ordinances governing those structures. The township opposed the motion, arguing that the property was not protected by the RTFA because it had not previously been used for farming. Following a hearing, the district court, found that Rice’s use of the property constituted a “farm” or “farm operation” for purposes of the RTFA and that the RTFA was an affirmative defense to those portions of the civil citation. The district court dismissed the specified portions of the citation and denied the parties’ individual requests for costs and fees. Rice moved for reconsideration, arguing that, under MCL 286.473b, he was entitled to costs and expenses, as well as reasonable and actual attorney fees; the district court denied the motion. The district court later dismissed the remaining portions of the citation and dismissed the action with prejudice. Rice appealed and the circuit court affirmed the district court’s order. The Court of Appeals denied Rice’s application for leave to appeal the circuit court’s order. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s legal conclusions, holding that an award of costs , expenses, and fees was not mandatory under MCL 286.473b, but the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for articulation of the district court’s reasons for the discretionary denial. The Michigan Supreme Court found no such discretion under the RTFA, and Rice was entitled to his fees. The appellate court’s judgment was reversed. View "Township of James v. Rice" on Justia Law

Meemic Insurance Company filed a subrogation claim against Angela Jones, seeking to recover from Jones money it had paid to CitiMortgage, Inc., the mortgagee of a residential house owned by Jones and insured by Meemic, after fire damaged the property. In September 2015, Jones was living at the house when it was damaged by a fire. Meemic paid her $2,500 in partial payment of the claim for insurance benefits. During Meemic’s ensuing investigation, Jones admitted that at the time she secured the policy in 2014, she did not reside at the house but, instead, rented it to a third party. Meemic claimed that Jones’s failure to disclose in the initial policy that her home was being rented to others constituted a material misrepresentation. On the basis of the misrepresentation, Meemic rescinded and voided the insurance policy from its inception and returned Jones’s policy payments. After rescinding the policy, Meemic paid $53,356.49 to CitiMortgage under the lienholder contract of the policy. Jones filed an action against Meemic, claiming breach of contract and sought to recover under the insurance policy. Meemic moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had properly rescinded the policy given Jones’s misrepresentation in the initial policy. The motion was ultimately granted, and Jones' complaint was dismissed with prejudice. In 2018, Meemic filed the underlying action against Jones seeking to recover the $2,500 advance payment made to Jones and the $53,356.49 it had paid to CitiMortgage under the lienholder contract. Jones moved for summary judgment, arguing that she was relieved from any obligations under the insurance policy because Meemic had rescinded the insurance policy; Meemic opposed the motion and filed a countermotion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Meemic, and Meemic appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court held: an insurer who rescinds a homeowner’s insurance policy that contains a mortgage clause may seek subrogation from the insured under its rescinded policy for the amount paid to the mortgagee under the lienholder contract. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed because it erred by concluding that Meemic’s rescission of the risk contract precluded it from denying payment to Jones and then asserting rights under the subrogation provision of the lienholder contract. View "Meemic Insurance Co. v. Jones" on Justia Law

John Moss was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III) after he pleaded no contest to the charge. The charge stemmed from allegations made by defendant’s adoptive sister. In exchange for his plea, the trial court dismissed the other charges that had been brought against defendant, including another count of CSC-III, and a fourth-offense habitual-offender enhancement. Defendant and the complainant did not have a birth parent in common, but they were both adopted by the same woman. After sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his plea, arguing for the first time that he was not related to the complainant by either blood or affinity. The trial court denied the motion, determining that, although the adoptive siblings were not related by blood, they were related by affinity. Defendant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals; the Court denied the application in an unpublished order. Defendant then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address whether a family relation that arises from a legal adoption was either effectively a blood relation, or a relation by affinity, as those terms were used in MCL 750.520b through MCL 750.520e. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion, reasoning that defendant and the complainant were effectively related by blood. With that finding, the appeals court considered it unnecessary to address whether defendant and the complainant were related by affinity, but it did so anyway because of the remand order and concluded that they were not related by affinity. Defendant again sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that defendant and the complainant, were adoptive siblings, and were not related by blood for purposes of the statute. "[T]he Court of Appeals erred by concluding otherwise." Because the order directing oral argument on the application only asked the parties to address whether defendant and the complainant were related by blood, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that defendant and the complainant were not related by affinity was left undisturbed. Because an adequate factual basis for defendant’s plea did not exist in light of the Courts’ legal rulings, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Moss" on Justia Law

When a party files an action for divorce and the other spouse subsequently dies before the divorce is finalized, there is a rebuttable presumption that the surviving spouse was not willfully absent from the decedent spouse under MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i). Carla Von Greiff petitioned under MCL 700.2801(2)(e) of the Estates and Protected Individuals Code (EPIC) seeking a declaration that Anne Jones-Von Greiff was not the surviving spouse of Carla’s father, Hermann Von Greiff. Anne filed for divorce from Hermann on June 1, 2017. Before the probate court entered the judgment of divorce, Hermann died on June 17, 2018. In her petition, Carla asserted that Anne had been willfully absent from Hermann for a year or more before his death and that, therefore, Anne was not entitled to inherit as Hermann’s surviving spouse under EPIC. The probate court ruled that Anne was not a surviving spouse because she had been intentionally, physically, and emotionally absent from Hermann for more than a year before his death. Anne appealed, and the Court of Appeals determined Anne was not willfully absent under MCL 700.2801(2)(e)(i) because she did not intend to abandon or desert Hermann but was exercising her legal right to seek a divorce and to enforce her rights as a divorcing spouse during the year preceding his death. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court on different grounds: if there were spousal communications, whether direct or indirect, during the divorce proceedings that were consistent and made in connection with the legal termination of the marriage, then the surviving spouse was not willfully absent and was entitled to the benefits of a surviving spouse under the statute. In this case, Carla did not sustain her burden to show that Anne was willfully absent given that Anne was pursuing the entry of a divorce judgment via communications with the decedent through her attorney. View "In Re Von Greiff Estate " on Justia Law

Mecosta County Medical Center, d/b/a Spectrum Health Big Rapids (and others) sued Metropolitan Group Property and Casualty Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company at the Kent Circuit Court, seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits related to a single-car crash involving Jacob Myers. Myers co-owned the vehicle involved in the crash with his girlfriend; his girlfriend’s grandmother had purchased a no-fault insurance policy on the vehicle through Metropolitan Group. Myers assigned plaintiffs his right to collect PIP benefits in the amount of his treatment bills. After the assignment, Myers sued Metropolitan Group and State Farm at the Wayne Circuit Court for PIP benefits related to other costs arising from the crash. Plaintiffs sued defendants at the Kent Court to recover on the assigned claim. Defendants moved for summary judgment against Myers at the Wayne Court. State Farm argued that because Myers did not live with the State Farm policyholders he was not covered by their policy. Metropolitan Group asserted that Myers was not entitled to coverage because he did not personally maintain coverage on the vehicle. The Wayne Court granted both motions and dismissed Myers’s PIP claim with prejudice. Myers did not appeal. While defendants’ motions were pending with the Wayne Court, Metropolitan Group also moved for summary judgment at the Kent Court on the same basis as its motion in the Wayne Court. However, the Wayne Court granted defendants’ motions before the Kent Court considered Metropolitan Group’s motion. After the Wayne Court granted summary judgment for defendants, defendants filed additional motions for summary judgment at the Kent Court, arguing plaintiffs’ claims were barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because the Wayne Court had concluded that Myers was ineligible for PIP benefits. The Kent Court granted the motion, holding that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed in a split, unpublished opinion. The appellate majority held that an assignee was not bound by a judgment against an assignor in an action commenced after the assignment occurred. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, finding that plaintiffs were not in privity with Myers with respect to the judgment entered subsequently to the assignment, and therefore, plaintiffs could not be bound by that judgment under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. View "Mecosta County Medical Center v. Metropolitan Group Property, et al." on Justia Law

Comerica, Inc. sought to redeem certain tax credits over the Michigan Department of Treasury’s objection. The credits were earned under the Single Business Tax Act by a Comerica affiliate. That subsidiary assigned the credits to another subsidiary, a Michigan bank. Later, Comerica created a third subsidiary, a Texas bank, and merged the Michigan bank into the Texas bank. Comerica then claimed the tax credits, on behalf of the Texas bank, in its Michigan tax filings. The Department of Treasury disallowed the tax credits, concluding that the Texas bank did not receive the Michigan bank’s credits through the merger because the Michigan bank lacked the legal authority to transfer the credits. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the tax credits could lawfully pass to the Texas bank. View "Comerica Inc. v. Department Of Treasury" on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew Campbell was a lifelong Michigan resident. For many years, petitioner claimed and enjoyed a principal residence exemption (PRE) on his Michigan residence. In late 2016, petitioner purchased a second home in Surprise, Arizona. Respondent Michigan Department of Treasury (Treasury), reviewed and denied petitioner’s PRE claim for his Michigan property for the 2017 tax year. In the ensuing dispute, the issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review was whether a property owner was entitled to claim a PRE under Michigan tax law when the owner received a similar tax benefit for a home in another state. To this the Supreme Court concluded that petitioner was not entitled to the PRE. Specifically, under MCL 211.7cc(3)(a), a property owner “is not entitled to [the PRE] in any calendar year in which . . . [t]hat person has claimed a substantially similar exemption, deduction, or credit, regardless of amount, on property in another state.” Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Department of Treasury’s October 2, 2018 decision and order of determination denying petitioner’s PRE for the 2017 tax year. View "Campbell v. Department Of Treasury" on Justia Law

Consumers Energy Company filed an action against Brian and Erin Storm, and Lake Michigan Credit Union, seeking to condemn a portion of the Storms’ property for a power-line easement. The Storms challenged the necessity of the easement under the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA). The trial court concluded that Consumers had failed to establish the public necessity of the easement on the Storms’ property and entered an order dismissing Consumers’ action and awarding attorney fees to the Storms. Consumers appealed that order as of right to the Court of Appeals. The Storms moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that under MCL 213.56(6), Consumers could only appeal the trial court’s public-necessity determination by leave granted. The Court of Appeals initially denied the motion by order, but the order was entered without prejudice to further consideration of the jurisdictional issue by the case -call panel. The Court of Appeals case-call panel issued an opinion in which it agreed with the Storms that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction; the Court of Appeals therefore dismissed the portion of Consumers’ appeal challenging the trial court’s determination of public necessity. Despite dismissing the public-necessity portion of Consumers’ appeal, the Court of Appeals addressed Consumers’ challenge to the trial court’s award of attorney fees and vacated the attorney-fee award. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals should have considered the condemning agency’s appeal as of right and reached the ultimate question of whether the trial court erred by holding that there was no public necessity for the proposed acquisition. “Therefore, it is not yet apparent that the proposed acquisition was improper such that the property owners would be entitled to reimbursement so as to avoid being ‘forced to suffer because of an action that they did not initiate and that endangered, through condemnation proceedings, their right to private property.’” Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the analysis construing MCL 213.66(2) in Part III of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Consumers Energy Company v. Storm" on Justia Law

Defendant Hamin Dixon pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a cell phone. Defendant was serving a sentence at a state correctional facility when prison staff found him in a bathroom stall near a cell phone. A cell phone charger was later found during a search of defendant’s shared prison cell. Defendant was charged with possession of a cell phone in a prison and pleaded guilty to attempted possession in exchange for dismissal of the possession charge and withdrawal of the prosecution’s request for habitual-offender sentencing. The court sentenced defendant to 11 to 30 months in prison and assessed 25 points under Offense Variable (OV) 19, MCL 777.49(a). Defendant later moved to correct an invalid sentence, arguing that the court should have assessed zero points under OV 19 because there was no evidence that his conduct had threatened the security of the prison. The court denied the motion, concluding that there was no set of circumstances under which possession of a cell phone would not threaten the security of a prison. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the sentencing court found no facts beyond constructive possession, there was no evidence that defendant’s conduct threatened the security of the prison, so OV 19 was improperly scored. View "Michigan v. Dixon" on Justia Law

Leslie Murphy, a former shareholder of Covisint Corporation, brought an action against Samuel Inman, III and other former Covisint directors, alleging they breached their statutory and common-law fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff when Covisint entered into a cash-out merger agreement with OpenText Corporation in 2017. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff lacked standing because his claim was derivative in nature and he did not satisfy the requirements for bringing a derivative shareholder action under MCL 450.1493a. Plaintiff responded that he was permitted to bring a direct shareholder action under MCL 450.1541a, and that defendants owed common-law fiduciary duties to plaintiff as a shareholder. The trial court granted defendants’ motion, ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a direct shareholder action because he could not demonstrate an injury to himself without showing injury to the corporation, nor could he show harm separate and distinct from that of other Covisint shareholders. The court also rejected plaintiff’s common-law theory because it arose out of the same alleged injury as his statutory claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that a shareholder who alleges the directors of the target corporation breached their fiduciary duties owed to the shareholder in handling a cash-out merger could bring that claim as a direct shareholder action. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that plaintiff’s claim was derivative. View "Murphy v. Inman" on Justia Law