Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Marlette Auto Wash, LLC claimed it had an easement through a parking lot owned by defendant Van Dyke SC Properties, LLC, for customers to access a car wash that plaintiff had purchased in 2007. Defendant counterclaimed, seeking to quiet title and obtain monetary damages for expenses relating to maintenance of the lot. The parties’ parcels were originally owned as a single unimproved tract of land; in 1988, land was to B & J Investment Company, which was owned in part by James Zyrowski, and split into two parcels. B & J opened a car wash on the corner parcel in 1989. Although the car wash was initially accessible from both the highway and the street, car wash customers generally used the parking lot of the adjoining parcel to get to and from the car wash. This adjoining parcel was sold to Marlette Development Corporation in 1988, which opened a shopping center in 1990. When Marlette Development’s deed was recorded, no easement was reserved for the benefit of the car wash property, and car wash customers continued to use the parking lot for access. In 2000, the village of Marlette closed the street entrance to the car wash. Car wash customers continued to use the parking lot for access without incident until Marlette Development sold its property to defendant in 2013. At this point, defendant’s sole owner, James Zyrowski informed plaintiff that unless it contributed money to maintain the parking lot, Zyrowski would close off access to the car wash through the parking lot. Plaintiff claimed a prescriptive easement for ingress and egress over defendant’s property on the basis of plaintiff’s open, notorious, adverse, and continuous use of that property for at least 15 years. The question presented for the Michigan Supreme Court was whether such use created a prescriptive easement that was appurtenant, without regard to whether the previous owner of the dominant estate took legal action to claim the easement. The answer to that inquiry is yes; the Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals erred by requiring plaintiff to establish privity of estate with the previous owner, regardless of whether plaintiff could establish that the elements of a prescriptive easement were satisfactorily met by that prior owner. Moreover, the Court of Appeals erred by holding that the previous owner of the dominant estate must have taken legal action to claim the prescriptive easement in order for plaintiff to prove that a prescriptive easement had vested during the preceding property owner’s tenure. “Title by adverse possession is gained when the period of limitations expires, not when legal action quieting title to the property is brought.” View "Marlette Auto Wash, LLC v. Van Dyke SC Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

In Docket No. 151800, Clam Lake Township and Haring Charter Township (the Townships) appealed the determination of the State Boundary Commission (the Commission) that an agreement entered into under the Intergovernmental Conditional Transfer of Property by Contract Act (Act 425 agreement) between the Townships was invalid. In Docket No. 153008, as the Commission proceedings in Docket No. 151800 were ongoing, TeriDee, LLC brought an action against the Townships, seeking a declaratory judgment that the Act 425 agreement was void as against public policy because it contracted away Haring’s zoning authority by obligating Haring’s zoning board to rezone pursuant to the agreement. The Act 425 agreement at issue here sought to transfer to Haring Charter Township an undeveloped parcel of roughly 241 acres of land in Clam Lake Township that was zoned for forest-recreational use. The agreement provided a description of the Townships’ desired economic development project, including numerous minimum requirements for rezoning the property. Approximately 141 acres of the land were owned by TeriDee LLC, the John F. Koetje Trust, and the Delia Koetje Trust (collectively, TeriDee), who wished to develop the land for commercial use. To achieve this goal, TeriDee petitioned the Commission to have the land annexed by the city of Cadillac. The Commission found TeriDee’s petition legally sufficient and concluded that the Townships’ Act 425 agreement was invalid because it was created solely as a means to bar the annexation and not as a means of promoting economic development. The Townships appealed the decision in the circuit court, and the court upheld the Commission’s determination, concluding that the Commission had the power to determine the validity of an Act 425 agreement. The Townships sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, which the Court of Appeals denied in an unpublished order. The Michigan Supreme Court held: (1) the State Boundary Commission did not have the authority to determine the validity of the Act 425 agreement and could only find whether an agreement was "in effect"; and (2) an Act 425 agreement can include requirements that a party enact particular zoning ordinances, and the Court of Appeals erred by concluding to the contrary. TeriDee's annexation petition was preempted. Both cases were remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Clam Lake Township v. Dept. of Licensing & Reg. Affairs" on Justia Law

On a snowy night, plaintiff Krystal Lowrey went with friends to defendant Woody’s Diner for drinks to celebrate St. Patrick’s Day. While exiting the diner, she fell on the stairs and injured herself. She brought this premises liability action, and the trial court granted summary disposition in defendant’s favor. The Court of Appeals subsequently reversed, concluding that defendant had failed to establish that it lacked notice of the hazardous condition alleged in the complaint, reasoning that defendant had not presented evidence of what a reasonable inspection would have entailed under the circumstances. After its review, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that in order to obtain summary judgment under MCR 2.116(C)(10), defendant was not required to present proof that it lacked notice of the hazardous condition, but needed only to show that plaintiff presented insufficient proof to establish the notice element of her claim. The Court concluded defendant met its burden because plaintiff failed to establish a question of fact as to whether defendant had notice of the hazardous condition. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals regarding defendant’s notice, reinstated the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on that issue, and vacated the remainder of the Court of Appeals’ opinion. View "Lowrey v. LMPS & LMPJ, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bank of America brought an action against First American Title Insurance Company, Westminster Abstract Company, and others, alleging breach of contract and negligent misrepresentation in connection with mortgages that plaintiff had partially financed on four properties whose value had been fraudulently inflated and whose purchasers were straw buyers who had been paid for their participation. Shortly after closing, all four borrowers defaulted. After discovering the underlying fraud in the four loans during the foreclosure proceedings, plaintiff sued, among others, First American, which had issued closing protection letters that promised to reimburse plaintiff for actual losses incurred in connection with the closings if the losses arose from fraud or dishonesty, and Westminster, alleging that it had violated the terms of the closing instructions. The other defendants either defaulted or were dismissed. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff’s claim against First American relating to the properties on which it had made full credit bids was barred by "New Freedom Mtg Corp v Globe Mtg Corp," (281 Mich App 63 (2008)). With respect to First American’s liability on the other two closings, the Court of Appeals concluded that the trial court properly granted summary disposition to First American and Westminster because plaintiff had failed to produce evidence that created a question of fact regarding whether Westminster knew of or participated in the underlying fraud in those closings. Finally, the Court of Appeals concluded that plaintiff had not established a link between Westminster’s alleged violations of the closing instructions and the claimed damages and, even if a link had been established, there were no damages because of plaintiff’s full credit bid at the foreclosure sale. The Supreme Court reversed, finding the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that plaintiff’s full credit bids barred its contract claims against the nonborrower third-party defendants. To the extent that New Freedom held that the full credit bid rule barred contract claims brought by a mortgagee against nonborrower third parties, it was overruled. Further, the closing instructions agreed to by plaintiff and Westminster constituted a contract upon which a breach of contract claim could be brought. Finally, the lower courts erred by relying on New Freedom to interpret the credit protection letters given that the terms of the letters in New Freedom differed materially from the ones at issue here. View "Bank of America, NA v. First American Title Ins. Co." on Justia Law

n consolidated appeals, the issue central to all that was presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether petitioners, who sold their principal residences in arm’s-length transactions, were entitled to refunds of the real estate transfer tax under the real estate transfer tax exemption set forth in MCL 207.526(u) when the state equalized value of the properties at the time of sale was less than it was at the time of their original purchases. The Court held that petitioners were entitled to refunds under the real estate transfer tax exemption in these circumstances. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the cases remanded to the Tax Tribunal for further proceedings, including reinstatement of its judgments in favor of petitioners. View "Gardner v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Michele Dupree sued Auto-Owners Insurance Company, seeking to recover, under her homeowners’ insurance policy, the full cost of repair or replacement for the personal property that was destroyed in a fire at her home. Because the parties did not agree on the extent of the personal property loss, the parties submitted separate appraisals to an umpire under the process set forth in the insurance policy. The umpire issued an appraisal award that set forth the full replacement cost, the applicable depreciation, and the actual cash value loss of the property. Defendant paid plaintiff the actual cash value of the property but refused to pay the full replacement cost on the ground that plaintiff had failed to submit proof, in accordance with the replacement-cost provision of her insurance policy, that she had actually replaced the damaged property. The court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment to plaintiff. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals, affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam. On appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was whether plaintiff’s appraisal award entitled her to only the actual cash value of her damaged personal property or whether defendant was liable for the full replacement cost of that property, i.e., actual cash value plus the applicable depreciation amount. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that plaintiff was not entitled to the full replacement cost of her property because she did not submit proof of actual loss in accordance with her policy. Defendant was liable for only the actual cash value of plaintiff’s damaged personal property. View "Dupree v. Auto-Owners Insurance Company" on Justia Law

Terri Sholberg died when the car she was driving hit a horse standing in the road. Diane Sholberg, as personal representative of her estate, sued Daniel Truman (the owner of the horse, which had escaped from its stall) and Robert and Marilyn Truman (the title owners of the farm that Daniel Truman operated). Other than being the title owners, defendants Robert and Marilyn Truman had nothing to do with the farm or the animals on it. The circuit court entered a default judgment against Daniel Truman, but granted summary judgment in defendants’ favor, concluding that they could not be held liable for a public nuisance because they were not in possession of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed with regard to the public nuisance claim, holding that defendants’ ownership of the property from which the alleged nuisance arose was sufficient to allow a nuisance action against them. Plaintiff applied for leave to appeal with respect to an issue concerning violations of the Equine Activity Liability Act, and defendants filed a separate application for leave to appeal on the nuisance claim. The Supreme Court denied plaintiff’s application, and granted defendant's application, reversing reversed in part the Court of Appeals' judgment with respect to the public nuisance claim: defendants merely owned the property. Defendants never possessed or exercised any control over the property and had not even visited it in more than a decade. There was no evidence that defendants knew or had reason to know that Daniel Truman’s animals had been escaping the property when the accident happened. Because defendants did not control or possess the property or the horse, there was no basis for imposing tort liability on them for a public nuisance. "Daniel Truman was the person best able to prevent any harm to others, and given that defendants had resigned all charge and control over the property to him, he was the person exclusively responsible for the alleged public nuisance he created on the property."View "Estate of Sholberg v. Truman" on Justia Law

The issue in this case involved two landowners’ facial challenge to the constitutionality of 18-59 of the Brighton Code of Ordinances (BCO), which created a rebuttable presumption that an unsafe structure could be demolished as a public nuisance if it was determined that the cost to repair the structure would exceed 100 percent of the structure’s true cash value as reflected in assessment tax rolls before the structure became unsafe. Specifically, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether this unreasonable-to-repair presumption violated substantive and procedural due process protections by permitting demolition without affording the owner of the structure an option to repair as a matter of right. As a preliminary matter, the Court clarified that the landowners’ substantive due process and procedural due process claims implicated two separate constitutional rights, and that each claim must be analyzed under separate constitutional tests. The Court of Appeals erred by improperly conflating these analyses and subsequently determining that BCO 18-59 facially violated plaintiffs’ general due process rights. When each due process protection was separately examined pursuant to the proper test, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance did not violate either protection on its face. View "Leon v. City of Brighton" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the execution of a lease of tangible personal property constitutes "use" for purposes of the Use Tax Act (UTA). Petitioner purchased an aircraft from one company and immediately executed a five-year lease to another company that already had possession of the aircraft. The Department of Treasury assessed a use tax against petitioner based on the lease transaction, and the Michigan Tax Tribunal ultimately upheld the assessment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that petitioner did not “use” the aircraft because it ceded total control of the aircraft to the lessee by virtue of the lease and the lessee had uninterrupted possession of the aircraft before and during the lease. The Supreme Court concluded that because the right to allow others to use one’s personal property is a right incident to ownership, and a lease is an instrument by which an owner exercises that right, it follows that the execution of a lease is an exercise of a right or power over tangible personal property incident to the ownership of the property. Therefore, that constitutes "use" for purposes of the UTA. Accordingly, petitioner "used" the aircraft in question for purposes of the UTA when it executed a lease of the aircraft in Michigan, regardless of whether it ever had actual possession of the aircraft. View "NACG Leasing v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Devon Bailey sued Steven Schaaf, T.J. Realty, Inc. (doing business as Hi-Tech Protection), Evergreen Regency Townhomes, Ltd., Radney Management & Investments, and others for injuries suffered while at a friend's apartment in a complex owned and operated by Radney. Hi-Tech security guards William Baker and Chris Campbell were on duty and patrolling the complex on the night Bailey was injured. A resident had informed Baker and Campbell that Schaaf was threatening people with a gun at an outdoor gathering. Bailey alleged that Baker and Campbell ignored the warning. Sometime later they heard two gunshots; Schaaf shot Bailey twice in the back, rendering Bailey a paraplegic. Bailey alleged that Baker and Campbell were agents of Hi-Tech, and that Hi-Tech was an agent of Radney and Evergreen. Bailey asserted multiple claims against all defendants under theories of premises liability, negligent hiring and supervising, ordinary negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of contract. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to defendants; Bailey appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part concluding in part that Evergreen and Radney owed Bailey a duty to call the police in response to an ongoing situation on the premises, extending the Supreme Court's decision in MacDonald v. PKT, Inc., (628 NW2d 33 (2001)) to the landlord-tenant context. In addition, the appellate court rejected Bailey's argument that he was a third-party beneficiary of the provision-of-security contract between Hi-Tech and Evergreen and that Hi-Tech did not owe Bailey a duty that was separate and distinct from Hi-Tech's duties under the Hi-Tech / Evergreen contract in effect at the time of Bailey's injuries. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals properly held that defendants were not entitled to summary judgment because, accepting Bailey's allegation as true, defendants had a duty to call the police. Bailey also alleged sufficient facts involving the existence of a contract for security services between the security company and the landlord, creating an agency relationship, and putting defendants on notice that their invitees and tenants faced a specific and imminent harm. The case was remanded to the appellate court for consideration of vicarious liability and negligence issues. View "Bailey v. Schaff" on Justia Law