Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Charles Fackelman was found guilty but mentally ill of home invasion, felonious assault, and felony-firearm charges that resulted from an altercation he had with a man Defendant believed caused the death of his teenage son in an episode of "road rage." Defendant perceived the man to have been unremorseful about his role in the tragedy and antagonistic toward Defendant and his family during subsequent legal proceedings. The issue at Defendant's trial was whether he was legally insane at the time of the incident. The prosecution's expert opined that he was not, while Defendant's expert opined that he was. These experts were the only doctors who testified at trial but were not the only expert opinions before the jury. The jury was repeatedly told about a third expert diagnosis whose report was reviewed by the other experts, but was "conspicuously absent" from trial. This third expert's report was never admitted into evidence for the jury's review. Upon review of the trial record and the briefs submitted by the parties, the Supreme Court concluded that use of the "tie breaking" diagnosis as substantive evidence of Defendant's sanity compromised his constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The Court reversed the judgment of the lower courts, vacated Defendant's convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Fackelman" on Justia Law

Three issues before the Supreme Court in this case arose from events that occurred in November 2007 while Defendant Johnny Bonilla-Machado was serving time at a correctional facility in Ionia. Defendant was there for unarmed robbery and attempted carjacking. While in his cell, Defendant assaulted two corrections officers by overflowing his toilet and splashing the water on the corrections officers as they made their respective rounds. Defendant was charged with two counts of assaulting a prison employee and found guilty by a jury on both counts. Defendant did not testify at his trial. The maximum sentence for assaulting a prison employee was five years. The trial court could enhance the sentence for subsequent felony convictions by not more than one-and-one-half times the statutory maximum. The trial court indicated that it was "bound" to enhance the sentences, and sentenced Defendant as a second-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 30 to 90 months for each conviction. Defendant objected to the enhanced maximum sentences. The first issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant was coerced by the trial court and his trial counsel to forgo his right to testify. Second, the Court considered whether an offense that was statutorily designated as a "crime against public safety" may also be considered as a "crime against a person" to establish a continuing pattern of criminal behavior for purposes of scoring the offense variable (OV). Finally, the Court considered whether Defendant was entitled to resentencing as a matter of law in light of the trial court's erroneous statement that it was "bound" to enhance Defendant's maximum sentences. Upon review, the Court concluded that there was no evidence that Defendant was coerced to forgo his right to testify. The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that scoring the assaults of the prison employees were "crimes against public safety," and held that Defendant should be resentenced as to this issue. Finally, the Court concluded that the trial court's "mandated" sentence enhancement comment was in error, but was handled by the Court of Appeals, now making the matter moot. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to recalculate Defendant's sentence. View "Michigan v. Bonilla-Machado" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant Edward Kowalski's convictions of accosting a minor to commit an immoral act and using a computer as means to accomplish that act should have been overturned because of an error in jury instructions. The Court of Appeals ruled that the convictions should be overturned. The instructions given at trial did not properly instruct the jury on the actus reus of the applicable statute, and as such were given in error. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that regardless of whether Defendant waived review of the jury instructions, they were not an "outcome-determinative" error. Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the jury's verdict. The Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated Defendant's convictions. View "Michigan v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a trial court properly assessed fifteen points for an "offense variable" (OV) to Defendant Cecil Huston sentence when he engaged in "predatory conduct to exploit […] a vulnerable victim." Defendant was charged with armed robbery and carjacking when he and another robbed a female victim in a shopping mall parking lot. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding, The Supreme Court held that in order to assess 15 points for the OV, Defendant's pre-offense conduct only had to be directed at "a victim"--not a specific victim-- and the victim did not have to be inherently vulnerable. Instead, a defendant's "predatory conduct" alone can create or enhance a victim's "vulnerability." In this case, Defendant engaged in "predatory conduct" to "exploit a vulnerable victim" because Defendant and his accomplice lain in wait, armed with two BB guns and a knife, and hid from the victim who was by herself at night in an otherwise empty parking lot. Because the trial court properly assessed fifteen points for the OV, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment and sentence. View "Michigan v. Huston " on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether homeless sex offenders are obligated to comply with the registration requirement of the state Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). Specifically, the issue centered on whether homeless offenders have a "residence" or "domicile" as defined by SORA. In 1984, Defendant Randal Dowdy pled guilty to kidnapping and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. He remained incarcerated until 2002. As a consequence of his sex crime conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender. Defendant registered his address as that of a homeless shelter. When the shelter discovered that he was a sex offender, he was kicked out pursuant to the shelter's policies barring sex offenders from receiving its services. In 2006 when police attempted to verify where Defendant had lived, they discovered that Defendant had not maintained his SORA registration since leaving prison. The circuit court dismissed charges against Defendant pertaining to his failure to register, holding that Defendant's homelessness rendered it impossible for him to comply with SORA. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that homelessness was not a bar to compliance with SORA because homelessness "does not preclude an offender from entering a police station and reporting to a law enforcement agency regarding the offender's residence or domicile." The Court reversed the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Dowdy" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a limitations period applied to an action for breach of a construction contract. The Court of Appeals held that the limitations period applied in this case, and that the statute's six-year limit expired before Plaintiff Miller-Davis Company filed its complaint. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court that had awarded Plaintiff damages. Plaintiff argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that a different statute of limitations for breach of contract controlled, and the period prescribed by that statute was the applicable statute for this action. Upon review of the two statutes of limitations, the Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiff. The limitation in both statutes is six years, however, the period runs from "the date the claim first accrued." The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment because there was a question about the date Plaintiff's action accrued. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the "community caretaking" exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained before entering a residence applied to a first-responder answering a 911 call. Defendant Mark Slaughter resided in a townhouse. His neighbor saw water running down her basement wall and over her electrical box. After a few failed attempts to reach Defendant, the neighbor called 911. The city dispatched several firefighters to the townhouse. After consulting with the neighbor, the firefighters entered Defendant's residence. When the firefighter went to the basement to shut off the water, he observed in plain view, grow lights and several dozen marijuana plants. The firefighter reported what he saw to the local police. Defendant was charged with manufacturing with the intent to deliver the marijuana. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the plants, grow lights, and everything else police officers confiscated, arguing that the firefighter's entry into his townhouse violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The circuit court granted the motion, holding that the firefighter did not attempt to verify the existence of running water in the wall prior to entering Defendant's home. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision, the majority holding that a "community caretaking" exception to the Fourth Amendment could apply to searches by firefighters only when they were investigating a possible fire hazard. Upon review, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts' decisions, holding that the community caretaking exception applies to firefighters "no less than to police officers" when they are responding to emergencies that threaten life or property. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the firefighter's actions in this case were reasonable, thus satisfying the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. The Court remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that Defendants Richco Construction, Inc. (Richco) and Ronald Richards, Jr. were personally notified of the default judgment against them and denied their motion to set aside that judgment. The suit arose from a contractual relationship between Plaintiff Lawrence M. Clarke, Inc. (Clarke) and Defendant. Clarke worked on a residential subdivision in 2003, and hired Richco as a subcontractor to work on the sewer system. Richco's work did not satisfy the local governing municipality, and after efforts to repair were unfruitful, Clarke contracted with another party to finish the work. Clark filed a breach of contract and fraud complaint against Richco. The process server attempted to serve Richco at its business address on file with the state, but Richco had vacated the premises and left no forwarding address. Clarke continued in its efforts to locate Richco and refiled its complaint. The trial court permitted alternative service through mailing notice to last-known addresses and a classified advertisement in the local paper. With no response, Clarke moved for a default judgment that the court granted. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Richco was personally notified, and that Richco was entitled to relief from the default judgment. The Court reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Lawrence M. Clarke, Inc. v. Richco Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

The Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA) prohibits a "public body" from using public resources to make a "contribution or expenditure" for political purposes. At issue in this case what whether a public school district's administration of a payroll deduction plan that collects and remits political contributions from its employees to the Michigan Education Association's political action committee violates the MCFA. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that through the administration of a payroll deduction plan that remits funds to a partisan political action committee, a school district makes both a "contribution" and “expenditure" under the terms of the MCFA. View "Michigan Edu. Ass'n v. Michigan Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

In 2005, Defendant Kent Lee and his wife babysat their neighbor's two boys. Defendant prepared the children for bedtime by bathing them. The younger boy, a three-year-old, was uncooperative when Defendant tried to diaper and dress him. According to Defendant, he used his finger to "flick" the child's penis in an effort to get his attention. When the child did not respond, Defendant flicked him again. The child cried after the second flick. Defendant was subsequently charged with second-degree criminal sexual conduct and second-degree child abuse. At his sentencing hearing, the prosecution requested that Defendant be required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender’s Registration Act's (SORA) catch-all provision. The judge did not require the registration, finding that the crime was not a "sex act." Approximately twenty months after the sentencing, the prosecution moved for an entry of order requiring Defendant to register under SORA. Defendant objected, but the trial court reversed itself, and required the registration. Defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it required Defendant to register 20 months after he was sentenced. The Court reversed the appellate court and vacated the trial court's decisions. View "Michigan v. Lee" on Justia Law