Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Michigan and federal constitutions barred defendant's retrial. Defendant Lamar Evans was accused of burning a vacant house. There was no dispute that the trial court wrongly added an extraneous element to the statute under which Defendant was charged. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the prosecution was required to present proof that the burned house was not a dwelling, which was not a required element of MCL 750.73. As a result of the trial court's erroneous addition of this extraneous element to the charged offense, it granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict and entered an order of acquittal, dismissing the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when a trial court grants a defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the basis of an error of law that did not resolve any factual element of the charged offense, the trial court's ruling does not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy and retrial is therefore not barred. Accordingly, because the trial court's actions did not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Evans" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) recommended that the Supreme Court remove Respondent 12th District Court Judge James Justin from office for numerous instances of documented judicial misconduct. Respondent's multiple acts of misconduct evidenced that he failed to follow the law, "apparently believing that it simply did not apply to him." Among the instances cited, Respondent fixed traffic citations issued to himself and his spouse, dismissed cases without hearings, failed to follow plea agreements, and made false statements under oath during the JTC hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court ordered Respondent's removal from office, and that he pay costs, fees and expenses incurred by the JTC in prosecuting its complaint.View "In re Honorable James Justin" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned whether insurer Defendant-Appellant Allstate Insurance Company was liable to Plaintiff Mona Lisa Frazier for personal protection benefits under the state no-fault act. Plaintiff was injured when she slipped and fell on a patch of ice while closing the passenger door of her car. She placed a few items inside, and fell when she closed the door. The Court concluded Plaintiff was not entitled to benefits under the no-fault act because her injury did not arise out of the use of a parked vehicle under MCL 500.3106(1). "Before her injury, plaintiff had been standing with both feet planted firmly on the ground outside of the vehicle; she was entirely in control of her body’s movement, and she was in no way reliant upon the vehicle itself. Therefore, she was not in the process of 'alighting from' the vehicle." Because of these circumstances, Defendant did not owe benefits to Plaintiff, and its refusal to pay them was not unreasonable. The Court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Frazier v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the ineffective assistance of Defendant Richard Armstrong's trial counsel by failing to introduce evidence of cell phone records that would have undermined the complainant's credibility prejudiced Defendant, entitling him to a new trial. The Court of appeals held that Defendant failed to show any resulting prejudice. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and held that Defendant's counsel's performance was ineffective and prejudiced Defendant. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

In this medical malpractice action, the issue before the Supreme Court pertained to whether Plaintiffs Willie and Beverly Driver were entitled to amend their original notice of intent (NOI) when adding a nonparty defendant to their pending litigation in order that the NOI related back to the original filing for purposes of tolling the statute of limitations. Upon review of the NOI at issue and the Court's decision in "Bush v. Shabahang," the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff is not entitled to amend an original NOI to add nonparty defendants so that the amended NOI relates back to the original filing. The Court affirmed the result reached by the Court of Appeals on this issue, and reversed the case in all other aspects. View "Driver v. Naini " on Justia Law

Edris Ligons underwent a colonoscopy. Four days later, she developed vomiting, diarrhea, chills and fever. She was admitted to the emergency room at Defendant Crittenton Hospital. Ms. Ligons refused to be admitted to the hospital. The hospital discharged her after giving her antibiotics, treating her for dehydration and giving her instructions to follow up with her treating physician the next day. Tests and exploratory surgery would reveal that Ms. Ligons suffered from a perforated colon, inflamed pelvic mass and an abscess. She had advanced liver failure brought in part by 30 years of alcoholism. Removal of the colon was impossible due to Ms. Ligons' preexisting conditions. Ms. Ligons never recovered from the surgery and died in early 2002. Plaintiff was the personal representative of Ms. Ligons' estate. He delivered a notice of intent (NOI) to sue to the Hospital and the doctors involved ("Defendants"). Plaintiff delivered a supplemental NOI providing more detail regarding proximate cause. Plaintiff then filed suit accompanied by two affidavits of merit (AOM). Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the NOIs and AOM did not comply with the governing statutes. The trial court denied Defendant's motions, and the Court of Appeals found that the AOMs were insufficient. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the AOMs at issue in this case were filed after both the limitations and saving periods had expired. The Court held in such cases, dismissal with prejudice must follow because "allowing amendment of the deficient AOM would directly conflict with the statutory scheme governing medical malpractice actions, the clear language of the court rules and precedent of this Court." The Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals which dismissed Plaintiff's case with prejudice. View "Ligons v. Crittenton Hospital" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Beverly Duffy was injured while riding an off-road vehicle on a trail owned by the State and maintained by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Plaintiff sued both entities, and throughout the litigation brought various theories in an attempt to avoid the grant of governmental immunity to Defendants under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). In the lower courts, Plaintiff argued that Defendant ad a duty to keep the trail in reasonable repair under the "highway exception" to governmental immunity because the trial falls within the statutory definition of "highway." On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that the Court should rule that the trail is either a "forest road" or "road" under the GTLA and that the trail falls under the "highway exception." The Court noted that the issue that belies this case is one of first impression. Upon review of state case law and the case record from the lower courts, the Supreme Court concluded that the trail is not a "highway" under Michigan law. Instead, the Court classified it as a "trailway": "all roads, forest roads, trails, trailways and highways in this case lead to the conclusion that Plaintiff's claim is barred by governmental immunity." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that dismissed Plaintiff's case. View "Duffy v. Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is the scope of an employer's vicarious liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether Wayne County and its sheriff's department could be held vicariously liable for a civil rights claim under state law based on the criminal act of a deputy sheriff committed during working hours but plainly beyond the scope of his employment. In 2001, Plaintiff Tara Hamed was arrested for unpaid child support. Because she had outstanding warrants for probation violations in Wayne County, she was transferred to the Wayne County jail. When she arrived, the deputy sheriff subjected her to sexually charged comments and offers for better treatment in exchange for sexual favors. Plaintiff resisted these advances, but she was transferred into an area of the jail not subject to surveillance cameras where she was sexually assaulted. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's harassment claim on the basis that Defendants were not vicariously liable for the criminal acts of sheriff's department employees. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had established a viable quid pro quo harassment claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Defendants could not be held vicariously liable under the traditional principles of respondeat superior because Defendants had no prior knowledge of the deputy's sexually harassing conduct. The Court reversed the appellate court. View "Hamed v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kevin Krohn suffered a severe spinal fracture that left him a paraplegic. Plaintiff brought suit under the state no-fault act seeking personal protection insurance benefits from Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company to cover costs incurred for a surgical procedure performed in Portugal. The procedure was experimental and was not considered a generally accepted treatment for Plaintiff's injury. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the experimental procedure was a reasonably necessary service for Plaintiff's care, recovery or rehabilitation under state law. Upon review of the record below, the Court concluded that if a medical treatment is experimental and not generally accepted within the medical community, an insured seeking reimbursement for the treatment must present objective and verifiable medical evidence to establish that the treatment was efficacious. In this case, the Court found the procedure was an "understandable" personal decision that offered Plaintiff only a medically unproved "possibility" for an efficacious result. The Court held the procedure was not an allowable expense for insurance reimbursement. The Court affirmed the appellate court that ruled in favor of Defendant. View "Krohn v. Home-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Defendant Donald Richardson and his wife had a "poor relationship" with some of their neighbors which resulted in several altercations. One such altercation escalated and Defendant was charged with two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, two counts of felonious assault and one count of felony-firearm. At trial on these charges, Defendant asserted a theory of self-defense. At the close of trial, the court read a pattern jury instruction, which permitted consideration of whether Defendant had a duty to retreat. After a day of deliberations, the jury asked the judge to define "home." The court explained that an individual had no duty to retreat before using deadly force if in his own home or curtilage of that dwelling. Two days later, the jurors could not make a decision. The court reread the instruction that lies at the heart of this case, but did not reiterate the definition of curtilage. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the court's use of the jury instruction, and its omission to reread the definition of curtilage (which is not part of the pattern jury instruction) was in error. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court held that it was appropriate for the trial court to use the standard jury instruction in this case. Further, the Court found there was adequate evidence from which the jury could conclude that Defendant did not need to use deadly force to defend himself. Rather than grant leave to appeal, the Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for assault. View "Michigan v. Richardson" on Justia Law