Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Grange Insurance Company of Michigan sought a declaratory judgment regarding its responsibility under a no-fault insurance policy issued to Edward Lawrence to reimburse Farm Bureau General Insurance Company of Michigan for personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits it paid after the death of his daughter Josalyn Lawrence following an automobile accident. The accident occurred while Josalyn's mother, Laura Rosinski, was driving a vehicle insured by Farm Bureau. Lawrence and Rosinski were divorced at the time of the accident but shared joint legal custody of the child. Rosinski had primary physical custody. Farm Bureau sought partial reimbursement of the PIP benefits it paid, arguing that Grange was in the same order of priority because Josalyn was domiciled in both parents' homes under MCL 500.3114(1). Farm Bureau counterclaimed. The circuit court granted Farm Bureau's motion for summary judgment; Grange appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Automobile Club Insurance Association (ACIA) also sought a declaratory judgment to recover PIP benefits from State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company under similar circumstances as in "Lawrence." Sarah Campanelli, the daughter of Francis Campaneli and Tina Taylor, died following an automobile accident. At the time of the accident, Sarah's parents, Francis Campanelli and Tina Taylor, were divorced and shared joint legal custody of Sarah; Campanelli had physical custody. Soon after the divorce, the family court modified the divorce judgment, allowing Campanelli to move and to change Sarah's domicile to Tennessee. When the accident occurred eleven years later, Sarah was staying in Michigan to attend school after a summer visit with her mother. ACIA claimed that State Farm was the responsible insurer and that that Sarah was not domiciled in Michigan, therefore it was not responsible for Sarah's PIP benefits. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of State Farm; the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that there was a question of fact as to the child's domicile. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded the "Grange" case for entry of summary judgment in favor of Grange; the Court reversed and remanded the "ACIA" case for entry of summary judgment in favor of ACIA. View "Grange Insurance Company of Michigan v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Brent Harris sued Auto Club Insurance Association (ACIA), seeking to recover a duplicate payment for medical expenses incurred as the result of a motorcycle-motor vehicle accident, which had been paid directly to providers by his health insurer, Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan (BCBSM). Harris claimed ACIA was required to pay him directly the same amounts paid by BCBSM to any healthcare provider for the medical expenses. ACIA filed a third-party complaint against BCBSM and Harris filed an amended complaint naming BCBSM as a defendant. The circuit court granted summary judgment to BCBSM and ACIA, concluding that because ACIA's policy was uncoordinated, ACIA was the primary insurer, and that the BCBSM certificate coordinated benefits with the no-fault policy. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, concluding that the BCBSM certificate did not coordinate with ACIA's no-fault policy. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed in part and reinstated the trial court's judgment: In this case, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that Harris was entitled to double recovery; Harris was not obligated to pay his medical expenses because, as a matter of law, ACIA was liable for Harris's PIP benefits. ACIA was liable regardless of when the expenses were incurred and BCBSM's certificate that stated it would not cover those services for which Harris legally did not have to pay precluded Harris from receiving double recovery for those medical expenses. View "Harris v. Auto Club Insurance Association" on Justia Law

Petitioner Robert Smitter applied for workers' compensation benefits after being injured on the job working as a firefighter for Thornapple Township. At the time of his injury, Petitioner also worked for General Motors. He earned eleven percent of his income from the township and 89 from GM. The township did not reduce its workers’ compensation obligation by coordinating Petitioner's benefits with his disability benefits under MCL 418.354(1)(b). The township sought reimbursement from the Second Injury Fund under the dual-employment provisions for the entirety of Petitioner's wage-loss benefits. The fund agreed to pay the amount it would have owed if the township had coordinated Petitioner's benefits. The township filed an application for a hearing with the Worker’s Compensation Board of Magistrates, seeking reimbursement from the fund for the uncoordinated amount. The magistrate ordered the fund to reimburse the township for 89 percent of Petitioner's uncoordinated benefits. The Workers’ Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) affirmed. The Court of Appeals denied the fund’s application for leave to appeal. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that when the injury employment provided less than 80 percent of the employee’s wages, the fund is required to reimburse its portion of the coordinated amount of benefits. Because the Township did not coordinate in this case, the appellate court erred in its analysis. Accordingly the appellate court was reversed and the case remanded to the magistrate for further proceedings. View "Smitter v. Thornapple Township" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kenneth Admire was seriously injured when the motorcycle he was riding collided with a car being operated by an insured of Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Following the accident, Kenneth required wheelchair-accessible transportation. Through his guardian Russ Admire, brought an action against Auto-Owners Insurance Company, seeking payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act. Auto-Owners had agreed to pay the full cost of purchasing a van modified to accommodate Kenneth’s wheelchair. Kenneth’s guardian gave Auto-Owners notice of his intent to purchase a new van. In response, Auto-Owners stated that it was not obligated to pay the base purchase price of a new van, but that it would pay for the necessary modifications if Kenneth’s guardian purchased a new vehicle for him. Kenneth’s guardian purchased the new van for Kenneth, and after the cost of the modifications was reimbursed and the trade-in value was applied, Kenneth was left with $18,388.50 in out-of-pocket expenses for the modified van. Kenneth brought suit seeking reimbursement for the out-of-pocket expenses. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Kenneth, but the Supreme Court reversed: Auto-Owners met its statutory obligation to pay for the transportation expenses recoverable under the statute, by paying for the van’s modifications and reimbursing him for mileage to and from his medical appointments. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the base price of the van was compensable. View "Admire v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

Defendant-Appellee McKinley Hyten obtained a provisional driver's license in April 2004. In January 2007, Defendant's driver's license was suspended because of multiple moving violations and two minor traffic accidents. In light of what she perceived as assurances from her probation officer, Defendant anticipated that her license would be restored at a district court hearing scheduled for later that year. Defendant's mother Anne Johnson gave Defendant a vehicle, and given the anticipated restoration of the driver's license, sought to obtain automobile insurance for Defendant. Johnson telephoned an independent insurance agent who, after being told that the license had been suspended, informed Johnson that Defendant could not be insured until her license had been restored. Nonetheless, an application for insurance from Titan Insurance Company was filled out on Defendant's behalf, postdated to August 24, 2007. August 22, 2007, Defendant signed the application for insurance. At an August 24, 2007, hearing, Defendant's driver's license was not restored. Plaintiff-Appellee Titan Insurance Company was not informed of this fact. Subsequently, in February 2008, Defendant was driving the insured vehicle and collided with the vehicle of Howard and Martha Holmes, causing injuries to both. Titan then learned Defendant did not have a valid driver's license when the policy was issued. In anticipation that the Holmeses would be filing claims against Defendant for their injuries, Titan filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, asserting that once an insurable event occurred and a third party (the Holmeses) possessed a claim against the insured arising out of that event, the insurer was not entitled to reform the policy to avoid paying the third party. Titan appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: in accordance with the Supreme Court's precedent in "Keys v Pace,"(99 NW2d 547 (1959)), the Court found "nothing in the law to warrant the establishment of an 'easily ascertainable' rule." The Court overruled "State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Kurylowicz," (242 NW2d 530 (1976)) and its progeny, and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Titan Ins. Co. v. Hyten" on Justia Law

This case involved a policy for uninsured-motorist (UM) coverage issued by Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company which contained a 30-day notice provision regarding hit-and-run motor vehicle claims. Upon review, the Court held that an unambiguous notice-of-claim provision setting forth a specified period within which notice must be provided is enforceable without a showing that the failure to comply with the provision prejudiced the insurer. Therefore, State Farm properly denied the claim for UM benefits sought in the instant case because it did not receive timely notice, a condition precedent to the policy's enforcement. In this case, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the trial court for entry of summary disposition in favor of State Farm.View "DeFrain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted leave in two cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (PIP benefits) under the no-fault act, notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP benefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she "had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code (including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, the "joyriding" statutes) has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Furthermore, the Court held that the use of the phrase "a person" in MCL 500.3113(a) "clearly and plainly" includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precludes that person from receiving PIP benefits. View "Progressive Marathon Ins. Co. v. Spectrum Health Hospitals" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted leave in two cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (PIP benefits) under the no-fault act, notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP benefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she "had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code (including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, the "joyriding" statutes) has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Furthermore, the Court held that the use of the phrase "a person" in MCL 500.3113(a) "clearly and plainly" includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precludes that person from receiving PIP benefits. View "Spectrum Health Hospitals v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Michigan" on Justia Law

The issues before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the services provided by plaintiff's wife constituted services "for an injured person's care," whether the Court of Appeals properly remanded this case to the circuit court for findings of fact regarding the extent to which expenses for services for plaintiff's care were actually incurred, and whether the circuit court erred by awarding an hourly rate that corporate agencies charge for rendering services, rather than an hourly rate that individual caregivers receive for those services. Upon review, the Court held that "allowable expenses" must be "for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation." Because the Michigan no-fault act does not create different standards depending on who provides the services, this requirement applies equally to services that a family member provides and services that an unrelated caregiver provides. For this case, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that plaintiff may recover "allowable expenses" to the extent that they encompass services that are reasonably necessary for plaintiff's care when the care is "related to [plaintiff's] injuries." However, because the circuit court erred by awarding damages for allowable expenses without requiring proof that the underlying charges were actually incurred, the Court agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the circuit court for a determination whether charges for allowable expenses were actually incurred. In determining the hourly rate for attendant care services, the circuit court "clearly erred" by ruling that plaintiff was entitled to an hourly rate of $40 for attendant care services because that rate was entirely inconsistent with the evidence of an individual's rate of compensation, including the compensation that plaintiff's wife, actually received as an employee hired to care for plaintiff. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Douglas v. Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

In July 2004, while walking through a gas station parking lot, plaintiff was struck by a motor vehicle driven by defendant, who was insured by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company. At the time, plaintiff lived with Harrietta Johnson, her ex-mother-in-law. Neither woman owned a vehicle, and neither was insured. Plaintiff filed a third-party tort claim against defendant, seeking damages for replacement services pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c). The trial court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor, concluding that plaintiff could not recover damages for replacement services pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c).The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether, in a third-party tort action, damages for replacement services are recoverable pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c). Because "replacement services" is not among the categories listed in MCL 500.3135(3)(c), damages for replacement services are not recoverable in such an action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary disposition in defendant's favor on plaintiff's economic damages claim for replacement services expenses. View "Johnson v. Recca" on Justia Law