Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
Detroit Edison Co. v. Dept. of Treasury
At issue in this case was whether and to what extent (if any) an electric utility was entitled to the industrial-processing tax exemption for tangible personal property located outside its generation plants. The Court of Appeals held that plaintiff was entitled to the full industrial-processing exemption for the property. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that the property subject to this suit was simultaneously used for exempt “industrial processing” activity under MCL 205.94o(7)(a) and nonexempt “distribution” and “shipping” activities under MCL 205.94o(6)(b). In these circumstances, the taxpayer was entitled to the industrial-processing exemption based on the “percentage of exempt use to total use determined by a reasonable formula or method approved by the department [of Treasury].” MCL 205.94o(2). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "Detroit Edison Co. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law
Gardner v. Dept. of Treasury
n consolidated appeals, the issue central to all that was presented for the Supreme Court's review was whether petitioners, who sold their principal residences in arm’s-length transactions, were entitled to refunds of the real estate transfer tax under the real estate transfer tax exemption set forth in MCL 207.526(u) when the state equalized value of the properties at the time of sale was less than it was at the time of their original purchases. The Court held that petitioners were entitled to refunds under the real estate transfer tax exemption in these circumstances. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the cases remanded to the Tax Tribunal for further proceedings, including reinstatement of its judgments in favor of petitioners. View "Gardner v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law
Beals v. Michigan
The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's consideration was whether defendant lifeguard's failure to intervene in the deceased's drowning was "the proximate cause" of his death. While governmental agencies and their employees are generally immune from tort liability under the governmental tort liability act (GTLA), MCL 691.1407(2)(c) provided an exception to this general rule when a governmental employee's conduct is both (1) grossly negligent and (2) "the proximate cause" of an injury, which the Michigan Supreme Court interpreted to mean the "most immediate, efficient, and direct cause". Plaintiff sued defendant, a governmental employee, arguing that governmental immunity did not apply because defendant's grossly negligent behavior while lifeguarding and resulting failure to rescue plaintiff's drowning son was the proximate cause of his death. Subsequently, defendant moved for summary judgment on immunity grounds, but the trial court denied defendant's motion. The Court of Appeals, in a split opinion, affirmed, concluding that a jury could reasonably find that defendant's failure to intervene constituted the proximate cause of the deceased's death. The Court of Appeals dissent instead concluded that defendant was immune from liability. After review, the Supreme Court held that the trial court erred by denying summary judgment to defendant, because the exception to governmental immunity articulated in MCL 691.1407(2) was inapplicable in this case. View "Beals v. Michigan" on Justia Law
Michigan Ass’n of Home Builders v. City of Troy
Plaintiffs, a group of associations representing builders, contractors, and plumbers, filed suit against the city of Troy, claiming that the City's building department fees violated section 22 of the Single State Construction Code Act (CCA), MCL 125.1522, as well as a provision of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, section 31. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the City, holding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the matter because plaintiffs had failed to exhaust the administrative procedure outlined in section 9b of the CCA, MCL 125.1509b. After review, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded: the plain language of MCL 125.1509b provided that the director may conduct performance evaluations of defendant’s “enforcing agency” and did not provide any administrative procedure relative to the entity responsible for establishing fees pursuant to MCL 125.1522(1). Because the administrative proceedings in section 9b did not purport to provide the director with the authority to evaluate defendant’s legislative body, the circuit court erred by granting summary disposition to the City on the basis of plaintiffs’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies. View "Michigan Ass'n of Home Builders v. City of Troy" on Justia Law
Hodge v. U.S. Security Associates, Inc.
Carnice Hodge brought an action to appeal the Unemployment Insurance Agency’s determination that she was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under a section under the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA) that disallows benefits for individuals discharged for work-related misconduct, after respondent U.S. Security Associates, Inc., terminated her employment as a security guard at Detroit Metropolitan Wayne County Airport. Hodge was fired for accessing publicly available flight departure information on a computer near her post at the request of a traveler in violation of respondent’s policy regarding the unauthorized use of client equipment. An administrative law judge affirmed the denial of benefits, as did the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC), but the Wayne Circuit Court reversed. The Court of Appeals granted the employer's application for leave to appeal and affirmed, holding that the circuit court had not erred by concluding as a matter of law that claimant’s behavior was a good-faith error in judgment rather than misconduct. After review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that the circuit and appellate courts applied an incorrect standard of review by substituting their own assessment of the seriousness of Hodge's conduct for the assessment of the MCAC. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals and reinstated the MCAC's judgment. View "Hodge v. U.S. Security Associates, Inc." on Justia Law
Speicher v. Columbia Township Bd. of Trustees
Defendants Columbia Township Board of Trustees and Columbia Township Planning Commission appealed the Court of Appeals’ decision holding that plaintiff Kenneth Speicher was entitled to an award of court costs and actual attorney fees based on his entitlement to declaratory relief under the Open Meetings Act (OMA). The Court of Appeals reached this decision only because it was compelled to do so by Court of Appeals precedent. If not for this binding precedent, the Court of Appeals would have denied plaintiff’s request for court costs and actual attorney fees on the ground that the plain language of MCL 15.271(4) does not permit such an award unless the plaintiff obtains injunctive relief. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that prior decisions of that court have strayed from the plain language of MCL 15.271(4). Therefore, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals opinion and order and reinstated the portion of its January 22, 2013 decision regarding court costs and actual attorney fees. View "Speicher v. Columbia Township Bd. of Trustees" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Government & Administrative Law
Hannay v. Dept. of Transp.
Heather Hannay brought an action against the Department of Transportation (MDOT), seeking damages for injuries she suffered when a salt truck driven by one of MDOT’s employees ran a stop sign and struck her car. After a bench trial, the court awarded Hannay $474,904 in noneconomic damages, $767,076 for work-loss benefits, and $153,872 in expenses for ordinary and necessary services. MDOT appealed, and Hannay cross-appealed. Harold Hunter, Jr., brought an action in the Genesee Circuit Court against David Sisco, Auto Club Insurance Association, and the city of Flint Transportation Department seeking damages for injuries suffered when a dump truck owned by Flint and driven by Sisco sideswiped Hunter’s vehicle. Flint moved for summary judgment. The court denied the motion. Flint appealed. The Court of Appeals in Hannay v. Dep’t of Transp concluded that economic damages are compensable under the motor vehicle exception, while the Court of Appeals in Hunter v. Sisco concluded that noneconomic damages are not compensable under this exception. Upon review of both cases, the Supreme Court concluded that “bodily injury” was a category of harm for which governmental immunity from tort liability was waived under MCL 691.1405 and for which damages that naturally flow were compensable. The Court therefore held that a plaintiff could bring a third-party tort action for economic damages, such as work-loss damages, and noneconomic damages, such as pain and suffering or emotional distress damages, against a governmental entity if the requirements of MCL 500.3135 have been met. In Hannay, the Court concluded that the work-loss damages in dispute were too speculative (plaintiff was in school to become a hygienist, not an actual hygienist at the time of the accident) to support the damages award as presented at trial. The Court affirmed the appellate court in Hannay with respect to the type of damages recoverable for bodily injury under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity, but reversed on plaintiff's claim for work-loss damages as a dental hygienist. In Hunter the Court reversed the appellate court with respect to the type of damages recoverable for bodily injury under the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity. Both cases were remanded for further proceedings in their respective trial courts. View "Hannay v. Dept. of Transp." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Injury Law
Wayne County Employees Retirement System v. Wayne Charter County
The Wayne County Employees Retirement System and the Wayne County Retirement Commission filed suit against Wayne Charter County and the Wayne County Board of Commissioners, alleging that a county ordinance defendants enacted in 2010 concerning the retirement system violated Const. 1963, art 9, sec. 24 and the Public Employment Retirement System Investment Act (PERSIA). The ordinance placed a $12 million limit on the balance of the retirement system’s reserve for inflation equity known as the Inflation Equity Fund (IEF), which was funded by investment earnings on pension assets. The ordinance also placed a $5 million limit on a discretionary distribution of money from the IEF known as the “13th check,” which had been made annually in varying amounts to eligible retirees and survivor beneficiaries to help fight the effects of inflation. The ordinance required any amount in the IEF exceeding the $12 million cap to be debited from the IEF and credited to the assets of the defined benefit plan, where it would be used to offset or reduce the annual required contribution (ARC) that the county was required to make to the defined benefit plan. The county filed a counterclaim alleging, among other things, that the retirement commission had violated its fiduciary duties by mismanaging the retirement system’s assets. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory objections to the ordinance, and plaintiffs appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the $32 million offset against the county’s ARC violated PERSIA for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion. The portion of the Court of Appeals opinion concluding that the intrasystem transfer of retirement system assets would violate PERSIA without the corresponding offset to the ARC was vacated, as were the portions of the opinion discussing the constitutional implications of the amended ordinance in relation to Const. 1963, art 9, sec. 24 and the determination that the transferred funds, once returned to the IEF, must be used only for the purposes of that fund. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wayne County Employees Retirement System v. Wayne Charter County" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Government & Administrative Law
International Business Machines Corp. v. Dept. of Treasury
International Business Machines Corporation (IBM) brought an action in the Court of Claims against the Department of Treasury to challenge the department's ruling that IBM was not entitled to apportion its business income tax base and modified gross receipts tax base using a three-factor apportionment formula provided in the Multistate Tax Compact (MCL 205.581 et seq.) and was instead required to apportion its income using the sales-factor formula in the Business Tax Act (MCL 208.1101 et seq.) when calculating its state taxes for 2008. IBM moved for summary judgment under MCR 2.116(C)(10), and the department moved for summary judgment under MCR 2.116(I)(2). After a hearing, the Court of Claims denied IBM's motion and granted the department's motion, holding that the BTA mandated the use of the sales-factor apportionment formula. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion per curiam. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that IBM was entitled to use the Compact's three-factor apportionment formula for its 2008 Michigan taxes and that the Court of Appeals erred by holding otherwise on the basis of its erroneous conclusion that the Legislature had repealed the Compact's election provision by implication when it enacted the BTA. Furthermore, the Court held that IBM could use the Compact's apportionment formula for that portion of its tax base subject to the modified gross receipts tax of the BTA.
View "International Business Machines Corp. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Tax Law
Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury
This case began as a dispute between the parties regarding whether plaintiff owed tax under the now-repealed Single Business Tax Act (SBTA) related to plaintiff's contributions to its Voluntary Employees' Beneficiary Association (VEBA) trust fund for 1997 through 2001. In this case, the issue for the Supreme Court to decide was what actions a taxpayer must take under MCL 205.30 of the Revenue Act to trigger the accrual of interest on a tax refund. The Court held that in order to trigger the accrual of interest, the plain language of the statute requires a taxpayer to: (1) pay the disputed tax; (2) make a “claim” or "petition" for a refund; and (3) "file" the claim or petition. "Although a "claim" or "petition" need not take any specific form, it must clearly demand, request, or assert a right to a refund of tax payments made to the Department of Treasury that the taxpayer asserts are not due. Additionally, in order to "file" the claim or petition, a taxpayer must submit the claim to the Treasury in a manner sufficient to provide the Treasury with adequate notice of the taxpayer’s claim."
View "Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law