Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Fraser Township filed a complaint against Harvey and Ruth Ann Haney, seeking a permanent injunction to enforce its zoning ordinance and to prevent defendants from raising on their commercially zoned property, hogs or other animals that would violate the zoning ordinance, to remove an allegedly nonconforming fence, and to plow and coat the ground with nontoxic material. Defendants brought a hog onto their property as early as 2006, and defendants maintained hogs on their property through the time this lawsuit was filed in 2016. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred by the six-year statutory period of limitations in MCL 600.5813. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that because the case was an action in rem, the statute of limitations did not apply. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the statute of limitations applied. Finding that the appellate court erred in concluding the statute of limitations applied, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Township of Fraser v. Haney" on Justia Law

The League of Women Voters, Progress Michigan, the Coalition to Close Lansing Loopholes, and Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections brought an action in the Court of Claims against the Michigan Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of 2018 PA 608, which changed the procedures by which the people of Michigan could circulate petitions to invoke the referendum, initiative, and constitutional-amendment processes set forth in Michigan’s Constitution and statutory election laws. The Court of Claims struck down the geographical limitation in MCL 168.471 as well as the checkbox requirement of MCL 168.482(7); however, it ruled that the affidavit requirement, MCL 168.482a, was constitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the Court of Claims’ decision, striking as unconstitutional the geographic limitation in MCL 168.471 and the requirement in MCL 168.482(4) that petitions include language identifying the signer’s congressional district. The Court of Appeals also reversed the Court of Claims as to the checkbox and affidavit requirements, holding that the checkbox requirement in MCL 168.482 was constitutional but the affidavit requirement in MCL 168.482a overly burdened the free-speech rights of the petitions’ sponsors. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal, arguing that the checkbox requirement, MCL 168.482(7), was unconstitutional. The Department of the Attorney General sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ holdings as to the 15% geographic requirement, MCL 168.471, and the affidavit requirement, MCL 168.482a. Defendant Secretary of State sought leave to appeal in order to request that, regardless of the outcome, the decision be applied only prospectively. The Michigan Supreme Court held the 15% cap on signatures from any one congressional district and the pre-circulation affidavit requirement for paid circulators violated the Michigan Constitution. The checkbox requirement, however, passed constitutional muster. "In light of the chaos and injustice that would ensue were the opinion to be applied retroactively," the decision was given prospective effect only. View "League Of Women Voters Of Michigan, et al. v. Secretary Of State" on Justia Law

This action involved a request for documents under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU), submitted a FOIA request to defendant, the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), seeking disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether a federal regulation with a nondisclosure component, 8 CFR 236.6 (2021), could be the basis for exempting public records from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d). The Supreme Court held that it could not, "for the simple reason that a regulation is not a statute." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary, and the Court overruled Soave v. Dep’t of Ed, and Mich Council of Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, as to their erroneous interpretations of MCL 15.243(1)(d). The case was remanded back to the Calhoun Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union Of Michigan v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Ingham County, Jackson County, and Calhoun County (collectively, the Counties) filed suit alleging that they had a right to receive a decade’s worth of surplus contributions (surplus equity) made to the Michigan County Road Commission Self- Insurance Pool (the Pool). The parties filed cross-motions for summary disposition, and the trial court granted summary disposition to the Pool and rejected the Counties’ claims. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Counties were successors in interest to their dissolved road commissions. Additionally, the Court of Appeals held that because Jackson County had not signed a withdrawal agreement with the Pool, Jackson County had not withdrawn from the Pool and was entitled, as a successor in interest, to receive equity distributions from prior-year contributions made by its former road commission. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address whether the Pool was permitted to decline to issue refunds of surplus premiums to the Counties of contributions from previous years even if the Counties were successors in interest to their former road commissions. The Court of Appeals concluded that the Pool’s withdrawal policy was clear: a withdrawing member forfeited any and all rights to dividends, credits, and/or interest that was or would become payable after the effective date of the member’s withdrawal from the Pool. However, the Court of Appeals reasoned that Jackson County had not withdrawn from the Pool because the Jackson County Road Commission had never executed the Pool’s withdrawal agreement. The appellate court determined that excluding the Counties from sharing in distributions of surplus equity was unenforceable as against public policy, citing MCL 124.5(6) of the intergovernmental contracts act. The Court further stated that when a road commission withdraws from the Pool because it was dissolved, excluding a county from any surplus distribution would penalize the county for exercising its right to dissolve its road commission. The Supreme Court reversed, agreeing with the Pool that the Counties did not have a contractual right to receive surplus equity and that such an arrangement was not contrary to public policy. And for Jackson County, the Supreme Court held that the dissolution of its county road commission did not transfer membership in the Pool from the road commission to the county itself, so the Pool could exclude Jackson County from postdissolution distributions. View "County of Ingham v. Michigan County Road Commission Self-Insurance Pool" on Justia Law

The Detroit News, Inc., Detroit Free Press, Inc., and others filed suit against the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission, alleging that the commission violated the Michigan Const. 1963, art 4, section 6 by withholding certain data and supporting materials used to develop its proposed redistricting plans and by conducting business during a closed meeting. Plaintiffs sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that Article 4, section 6 required the commission to disclose all supporting materials that it uses to develop its plans; (2) a writ of mandamus compelling the release of supporting materials withheld; (3) a declaratory judgment that Article 4, section 6 required the commission to conduct all of its business in open meetings; and (4) a writ of mandamus requiring the release of the recording of a closed-session meeting and requiring that all future business meetings be open to the public. "From the titles of the memoranda discussed at that meeting, it is beyond dispute that the meeting involved the development of the redistricting maps. Such work is unquestionably within the Commission’s core 'business,' and it therefore needed to be conducted in the open." with respect to disclosure of 10 memoranda that the Commission claimed were privileged attorney-client communications, the Supreme Court concluded that, in light of the constitutional text requiring disclosure of materials that support development of redistricting plans, seven of the memoranda had to be published as “supporting materials” under Const 1963, art 4, section 6(9). "The other three are not 'supporting materials' and therefore need not be disclosed." View "The Detroit News, Inc. v. Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission" on Justia Law

Ingham, Jackson, and Calhoun County, Michigan (collectively, the Counties) filed an action alleging that they had a right to receive a decade’s worth of surplus contributions (surplus equity) made to the Michigan County Road Commission Self-Insurance Pool (the Pool). The Counties believed they were the successors in interest to their dissolved road commissions and, as such, were entitled to the surplus equity that the commissions might have received had they not been dissolved and withdrawn from the Pool. Jackson County made one other argument: because its road commission never formally withdrew from the Pool, the county said it had a right to receive surplus equity on the same terms as any current member. The Pool disagreed, contending the Counties had no right to surplus equity because the documents governing the Pool’s operations and its contracts with its various members provided the Pool with discretion in distributing surplus equity. This included, the Pool contended, the power to exclude former members should a distribution be made. The Court of Appeals sided with the Counties, holding that the Counties were the successors in interest to their dissolved road commissions and, as a matter of public policy, the Counties had a right to receive surplus equity for fiscal years in which their road commissions were members of the Pool. The Court of Appeals also determined that the dissolution of the Jackson County Road Commission did not disqualify Jackson County from membership in the Pool, and therefore, the county could receive surplus equity regardless of any public-policy considerations. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed. The Court agreed with the Pool that the Counties did not have a contractual right to receive surplus equity and that such an arrangement was not contrary to public policy. For Jackson County, the Court held that the dissolution of its county road commission did not transfer membership in the Pool from the road commission to the county itself, so the Pool could exclude Jackson County from post-dissolution distributions. View "County Of Ingham v. Michigan County Road Commission Self-Insurance Pool" on Justia Law

The Unemployment Insurance Agency (UIA) brought actions against claimants Frank Lucente and Michael Herzog, respectively, to appeal the decisions of the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (MCAC) that claimants were not required to pay restitution and fraud penalties under the Michigan Employment Security Act (MESA) despite the fact that they had improperly received unemployment benefits after becoming employed full-time and providing inaccurate responses to certification questions concerning their new employment. The Michigan Supreme Court found the Court of Appeals correctly held that MCL 421.62 authorized the UIA to issue original fraud and restitution determinations that were not subject to the constraints of MCL 421.32a. However, it erred by concluding that the UIA’s decision to issue “redeterminations” in these cases was of no substantive effect. "The UIA must issue an original determination alleging fraud, and its failure to do so was grounds for invalidating the 'redeterminations' in this case. On this issue, the payment of benefits cannot serve as an original 'determination' on the alleged fraud, and the UIA’s issuance of determinationless 'redeterminations' deprives claimants of their right to protest. When UIA-initiated review of a past-paid benefit results in a decision that the claimant received benefits during a period of ineligibility or disqualification and owes restitution as a result, the UIA must begin with an original 'determination' as described in MCL 421.62. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan Unemployment Ins. Agy. v. Lucente" on Justia Law

Taxpayers for Michigan Constitutional Government and several individuals brought an original action to the Court of Appeals against the state of Michigan; the Department of Technology, Management, and Budget; and the Office of the Auditor General to enforce section 30 of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, which prohibited the state from reducing its budget for total state spending paid to all units of local government, taken as a group, below that proportion in effect in fiscal year 1978–1979. Plaintiffs: (Count I) alleged the state violated section 30 by classifying as state spending paid to local government monies paid to school districts pursuant to Proposal A, Const 1963, art 9, section 11; (Count II) alleged the same assertion as to monies paid to public school academies (PSAs) pursuant to Proposal A and MCL 380.501(1); (Count III) alleged the state improperly classified as section 30 state spending those funds paid to maintain trunk-line roads; and (Count IV) sought a determination that state funds directed to local governments for new state mandates could not be counted toward the proportion of state funds required by section 30. The Court of Appeal dismissed Count III without prejudice upon stipulation of the parties; all parties moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. The appellate court granted the state defendants motion on Counts I and II; plaintiffs' motion was granted as to Count IV. Finally, the court granted plaintiffs mandamus relief and directed the state to comply with reporting requirements found in MCL 21.235(3) and MCL 21.241. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred when it held that PSAs were “school districts” as the term was used in the Headlee Amendment. Further, the Court held PSAs were themselves not a “political subdivision of the state” as voters would have understood the term when the Headlee Amendment was ratified. The Court thus reversed the conclusion reached in Part III(C) of the Court of Appeals opinion that PSAs were “school districts” and remanded to the Court of Appeals for its reconsideration of this issue. The Supreme Court vacated the panel’s grant of mandamus in Part III(E), and directed the Court of Appeals to provide further explanation of its decision to grant this extraordinary remedy. View "Taxpayers for Michigan Constitutional Govt. v. Michigan" on Justia Law

In 2016, plaintiff Jennifer Buhl and her husband went to a party store in Oak Park, Michigan. As she was walking, plaintiff saw a raised crack in the sidewalk outside the store and tried to step over it. Because plaintiff did not notice that the sidewalk was uneven on the other side of the crack, she fell and fractured her left ankle. The specific question this case raised for the Michigan Supreme Court’s review was whether an amendment to the governmental tort liability act (GTLA) that went into effect after plaintiff’s claim accrued but before plaintiff filed her complaint could be retroactively applied. The Supreme Court held that the amended provision did not apply retroactively. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Buhl v. City of Oak Park" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from a dispute over the unemployment-insurance tax rate applicable to Great Oaks Country Club, Inc (Great Oaks). The Department of Talent and Economic Development/Unemployment Insurance Agency (the Agency) determined that Great Oaks was not entitled to the new-employer tax rate under the Michigan Employment Security Act (the MESA), specifically MCL 421.13m(2)(a)(i)(A) and (B). An ALJ determined that because Great Oaks had eight quarters of no employment or payroll before January 1, 2014, it was entitled to the new-employer tax rate. The ALJ further ruled that the phrase “beginning January 1, 2014” in MCL 421.13m(2)(a)(i)(A) and (B) was the date by when a client employer must have accrued eight quarters of not reporting employees or payroll. The Agency appealed the ALJ’s decision to the Michigan Compensation Appellate Commission (the MCAC), and the MCAC affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Court of Appeals adopted the interpretation of Section 13m offered by the Agency, which maintained that a client employer must have switched to client-level reporting before January 1, 2014, to be assessed the new-employer tax rate (the conversion-date interpretation). The Michigan Supreme Court disagreed, holding that in this context, Section 13m was best understood according to the interpretation offered by Great Oaks: that a client employer must have accrued the relevant number of calendar quarters in which it reported “no employees or no payroll” by January 1, 2014, to be assessed the new-employer tax rate (the accrual-date interpretation). And because Great Oaks reported no employees or payroll for eight consecutive calendar quarters before January 1, 2014, the Supreme Court held that Great Oaks was entitled to be assessed the new-employer tax rate under Section 13m of the MESA. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ decision was reversed and the matter remanded to the Agency for further proceedings. View "Dept. of Talent & Econ. Dev. v. Great Oaks Country Club" on Justia Law