Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Stand Up for Democracy petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of State Canvassers to certify its referendum petition for inclusion on the November 2012 ballot. Intervening defendant Citizens for Fiscal Responsibility, challenged the certification of plaintiff’s referendum petition, alleging that it failed to comply with the type-size requirement of MCL 168.482(2) and that the doctrine of substantial compliance, whereby technical deficiencies are resolved in favor of certification, did not apply. The Court of Appeals agreed with both assertions, but concluded it was required to follow its decision in "Bloomfield Charter Township v Oakland County Clerk" and conclude that the petition substantially complied with MCL 168.482(2) and that certification was required. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, overturning "Bloomfield Charter" and dismissed the case: "because MCL 168.482(2) uses the mandatory term 'shall' and does not, by its plain terms, permit certification of deficient petitions with regard to form or content, a majority of [the] Court [held] that the doctrine of substantial compliance is inapplicable to referendum petitions submitted for certification." View "Stand Up for Democracy v. Mich. Sec'y of State" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) recommended that the Supreme Court remove Respondent 22nd District Court Judge Sylvia A. James from office for judicial misconduct. Judge James filed a petition asking the Court to reject that recommendation. The evidence established that respondent misappropriated public funds, some of which were intended for victims of crime in the city of Inkster. She inappropriately spent much of this money on self-promoting advertisements and travel expenses for herself and various other court employees. She treated these funds, as the master phrased it, as her own "publicly funded private foundation." In addition, she: (1) denied people access to the court by instituting and enforcing an improper business-attire policy; (2) employed a family member in violation of court policy; and (3) made numerous misrepresentations of fact under oath during the investigation and hearing of this matter. The Court concluded that cumulative effect of respondent's misconduct, coupled with its duration, nature, and pervasiveness meant that respondent was unfit for judicial office. "Although some of her misconduct, considered in isolation, does not justify such a severe sanction, taken as a whole her misconduct rises to a level that requires her removal from office." Therefore, the Court adopted the recommendations of the JTC, except with respect to costs respondent will be ordered to pay, as would be detailed later. View "In re Hon. Sylvia James" on Justia Law

This case involved the issue of the priority of competing liens between a court-appointed receiver and the holder of a first-recorded mortgage on real property located in DeWitt, Michigan. The receiver, Thomas Woods, sought to recover receivership expenses before the holder of the first-recorded mortgage, Dart Bank, satisfied its mortgage interest. In affirming the circuit court's order placing a first-priority lien on the property in the amount of the receiver's expenses, the Court of Appeals relied, in part, on the Supreme Court's decisions in "Bailey v Bailey" and "Fisk v Fisk" and its own decision in "Attica Hydraulic Exchange v Seslar," to hold that because Dart did not object to and benefited from the receivership, it "may be held responsible for the receivership expenses." The Supreme Court granted Dart's application for leave to appeal to determine whether the common-law rule that receivership expenses are entitled to first priority is controlling, notwithstanding that the holder of a prior recorded mortgage is statutorily entitled to priority under MCL 600.3236, and whether a mortgagee must explicitly consent to the receivership before the mortgagee may be required to pay the associated costs. Upon review, the Supreme Court declined to extend the common-law rule to the facts of this case. Rather, the Court held that MCL 600.3236 controlled and, by its plain language, requires that any liens preexisting the mortgage that is the subject of the foreclosure remain in the same order of priority as they existed at the time of the mortgage's execution. The Court also held that a mortgagee that forecloses consistently with MCL 600.3236 may waive its statutory right of priority and, if that occurs, the receiver may be entitled to compensation before the mortgagee, but only if the mortgagee's waiver is explicitly and unequivocally given. Because the Court of Appeals in this case failed to recognize the applicability of MCL 600.3236 and erroneously extended the holdings in "Bailey" and "Fisk" to support its conclusion that even in the absence of affirmative consent, Dart could nevertheless be required to pay the receiver's costs and fees, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's judgment and remanded the case to the circuit court for entry of an order releasing the escrow funds in favor of Dart. View "Price v. Kosmalski" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a municipality such as a township could be held responsible under MCL 324.3109(2) of the Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Act (NREPA)1 for raw sewage discharged into state waters by private citizens within the township's borders. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that under NREPA, a municipality can be held responsible for, and required to prevent, the discharge when the raw sewage originates within its borders, even when the raw sewage is discharged by a private party and not directly discharged by the municipality itself. The Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals because it interpreted MCL 324.3109(2) in a manner that precluded a municipality from being held responsible for such a discharge. The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address remaining arguments made on appeal. View "Dept. of Env. Quality v. Worth Twnsp." on Justia Law

In combined cases, the Supreme Court examined the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to decide whether several issues relating to the Act's notice provision mandate notice be sent to the appropriate tribe or to the Secretary of the Interior. Because the question of whether notice violations occurred in these cases began with determining whether the tribal-notice requirement was triggered, the Court first considered what indicia of Indian heritage sufficed to trigger the notice requirement. Further, the Court then considered whether a parent could waive the rights granted by ICWA to an Indian child's tribe and determine the appropriate recordkeeping requirements necessary to document the trial court's efforts to comply with ICWA's notice provision. "While it is impossible to articulate a precise rule that will encompass every possible factual situation, in light of the interests protected by ICWA, the potentially high costs of erroneously concluding that notice need not be sent, and the relatively low burden of erring in favor of requiring notice, we think the standard for triggering the notice requirement of 25 USC 1912(a) must be a cautionary one." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that: (1) sufficiently reliable information of virtually any criteria on which tribal membership might be based suffices to trigger the notice requirement; (2) a parent of an Indian child cannot waive the separate and independent ICWA rights of an Indian child's tribe and that the trial court must maintain a documentary record; and (3) the proper remedy for an ICWA-notice violation is to conditionally reverse the trial court and remand for resolution of the ICWA-notice issue. View "In re J.L. Gordon, Minor" on Justia Law

The Judicial Tenure Commission (JTC) recommended that the Supreme Court remove Respondent 12th District Court Judge James Justin from office for numerous instances of documented judicial misconduct. Respondent's multiple acts of misconduct evidenced that he failed to follow the law, "apparently believing that it simply did not apply to him." Among the instances cited, Respondent fixed traffic citations issued to himself and his spouse, dismissed cases without hearings, failed to follow plea agreements, and made false statements under oath during the JTC hearing. Upon review, the Supreme Court ordered Respondent's removal from office, and that he pay costs, fees and expenses incurred by the JTC in prosecuting its complaint.View "In re Honorable James Justin" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Beverly Duffy was injured while riding an off-road vehicle on a trail owned by the State and maintained by the Department of Natural Resources (DNR). Plaintiff sued both entities, and throughout the litigation brought various theories in an attempt to avoid the grant of governmental immunity to Defendants under the Governmental Tort Liability Act (GTLA). In the lower courts, Plaintiff argued that Defendant ad a duty to keep the trail in reasonable repair under the "highway exception" to governmental immunity because the trial falls within the statutory definition of "highway." On appeal to the Supreme Court, Plaintiff argued that the Court should rule that the trail is either a "forest road" or "road" under the GTLA and that the trail falls under the "highway exception." The Court noted that the issue that belies this case is one of first impression. Upon review of state case law and the case record from the lower courts, the Supreme Court concluded that the trail is not a "highway" under Michigan law. Instead, the Court classified it as a "trailway": "all roads, forest roads, trails, trailways and highways in this case lead to the conclusion that Plaintiff's claim is barred by governmental immunity." The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals' decision that dismissed Plaintiff's case. View "Duffy v. Dept. of Natural Resources" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is the scope of an employer's vicarious liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether Wayne County and its sheriff's department could be held vicariously liable for a civil rights claim under state law based on the criminal act of a deputy sheriff committed during working hours but plainly beyond the scope of his employment. In 2001, Plaintiff Tara Hamed was arrested for unpaid child support. Because she had outstanding warrants for probation violations in Wayne County, she was transferred to the Wayne County jail. When she arrived, the deputy sheriff subjected her to sexually charged comments and offers for better treatment in exchange for sexual favors. Plaintiff resisted these advances, but she was transferred into an area of the jail not subject to surveillance cameras where she was sexually assaulted. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's harassment claim on the basis that Defendants were not vicariously liable for the criminal acts of sheriff's department employees. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had established a viable quid pro quo harassment claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Defendants could not be held vicariously liable under the traditional principles of respondeat superior because Defendants had no prior knowledge of the deputy's sexually harassing conduct. The Court reversed the appellate court. View "Hamed v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the "community caretaking" exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained before entering a residence applied to a first-responder answering a 911 call. Defendant Mark Slaughter resided in a townhouse. His neighbor saw water running down her basement wall and over her electrical box. After a few failed attempts to reach Defendant, the neighbor called 911. The city dispatched several firefighters to the townhouse. After consulting with the neighbor, the firefighters entered Defendant's residence. When the firefighter went to the basement to shut off the water, he observed in plain view, grow lights and several dozen marijuana plants. The firefighter reported what he saw to the local police. Defendant was charged with manufacturing with the intent to deliver the marijuana. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the plants, grow lights, and everything else police officers confiscated, arguing that the firefighter's entry into his townhouse violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The circuit court granted the motion, holding that the firefighter did not attempt to verify the existence of running water in the wall prior to entering Defendant's home. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision, the majority holding that a "community caretaking" exception to the Fourth Amendment could apply to searches by firefighters only when they were investigating a possible fire hazard. Upon review, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts' decisions, holding that the community caretaking exception applies to firefighters "no less than to police officers" when they are responding to emergencies that threaten life or property. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the firefighter's actions in this case were reasonable, thus satisfying the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. The Court remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

The Michigan Campaign Finance Act (MCFA) prohibits a "public body" from using public resources to make a "contribution or expenditure" for political purposes. At issue in this case what whether a public school district's administration of a payroll deduction plan that collects and remits political contributions from its employees to the Michigan Education Association's political action committee violates the MCFA. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that through the administration of a payroll deduction plan that remits funds to a partisan political action committee, a school district makes both a "contribution" and “expenditure" under the terms of the MCFA. View "Michigan Edu. Ass'n v. Michigan Sec'y of State" on Justia Law