Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

David Maples sought compensation under the Michigan Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA) after his conviction of delivery of cocaine was vacated and the related criminal charges were dismissed. The Court of Claims granted summary judgment for the state, concluding that the testimony of a previously-unavailable witness was not new evidence and, alternatively that it was Maples’s trial counsel’s deficient performance and the speedy-trial violation that had resulted in the vacation of Maples’s conviction, not the proffered testimony. The Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the testimony was not new evidence because it had been offered at the entrapment hearing, and that it was not new evidence because Maples had not offered any proof regarding how the witness would testify. Maples sought leave to appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the lower courts, finding there was an adequate offer of proof the witness' proposed testimony, and that the testimony was new under the WICA because it was not presented at a proceeding that adjudicated guilt. View "Maples v. Michigan" on Justia Law

In 1992, plaintiff Desmond Ricks saw a man shoot and kill Gerry Bennett in Detroit. Ricks was on parole then; he began serving concurrent sentences for armed robbery and assault with intent to rob while armed in 1987 and was paroled in 1991. When he witnessed Bennett’s murder, Ricks still had 4 years and 118 days remaining on his armed-robbery and assault sentences. As he fled from the gunman, Ricks dropped his winter coat. It would later be discovered by the police, who used it to connect him to Bennett’s killing. Ricks was convicted of Bennett’s murder, based in large part on ballistics evidence fabricated by a Detroit police officer. The Michigan Innocence Clinic discovered that a Detroit Police Department officer had fabricated the ballistics evidence used to convict Ricks. A circuit court issued an order vacating his murder and felony-firearm convictions and sentences; Ricks was released from prison the same day, and the charges were dismissed. Ricks filed a Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA) complaint with the Michigan Court of Claims seeking compensation for the almost 25 years he was wrongfully imprisoned from October 13, 1992 to May 26, 2017. This case was about one of the exceptions enumerated in the Act: MCL 691.1755(4), which barred compensation for any time served under a consecutive sentence for another conviction. The question presented was whether this exception applied when a wrongful conviction alone triggered a parole revocation, which required the WICA claimant’s parole-revoked sentence to be served before the sentence for the wrongful conviction would begin to run. The Supreme Court held that it did not, because the time served under the parole-revoked sentence was not served under a consecutive sentence for another conviction. The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Court of Claims for further proceedings. View "Ricks v. Michigan" on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address the trial court’s resolution of a pair of Batson challenges, each concerning the others’ use of peremptory challenges to remove prospective jurors on the basis of race. Jacques Kabongo was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon. Two police officers testified that they had seen defendant cover a holstered handgun with his shirt and that defendant’s license to carry a concealed weapon had expired. Defendant appealed by right, arguing, among other things, that the trial court had erred by overruling his objections to the prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges to excuse Prospective Jurors 2(a), 3(a), and 14(a), all of whom were Black, and by disallowing defendant’s use of a peremptory challenge to excuse Prospective Juror 5(a), who was white. The Court of Appeals affirmed. With regard to the State’s challenge of the three Black jurors, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court did not clearly err by finding the prosecution’s race-neutral explanation was not a pretext for improper purposeful discrimination. With regard to Kabongo’s Batson challenge, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court clearly erred by determining that defense counsel’s race-neutral explanation was a pretext to discrimination, “While defense counsel’s comments may have suggested that he was previously engaged in purposeful discrimination against white prospective jurors during voir dire and that defense counsel perhaps even intimated an intent to continue to do so, the record does not reflect that defense counsel actually engaged in purposeful discrimination against this particular prospective white juror. This prospective juror had extensive familial ties to law enforcement, and the sole evidence against defendant was to be the testimony of law enforcement officers.” The Supreme Court held the trial court’s erroneous denial of defendant’s peremptory challenges was not a structural error that required automatic reversal of his convictions under Michigan law. Applying harmless-error review, the Court found no harm resulted from the trial court’s denial of defendant’s peremptory challenges, and affirmed the denial of his request for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Kabongo" on Justia Law

Victoria Pagano was charged with operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated with a child as a passenger, and having an open container in a vehicle. An anonymous caller phoned 911, alleging defendant was driving while intoxicated. Central dispatch informed a police officer of the call, and within 30 minutes, the officer observed defendant’s vehicle but did not see defendant commit any traffic violations. Although it appeared that a copy of the 911 call might have been preserved, a recording was not introduced into evidence, and the caller was not identified. According to the officer’s testimony, the anonymous caller informed dispatch that defendant was out of the vehicle, yelling at children, and appeared to be obnoxious. The caller believed defendant’s alleged intoxication was the cause of her behavior with the children, and provided the vehicle’s license plate number; the direction in which the vehicle was traveling; and the vehicle’s make, model, and color. The officer pulled defendant over strictly on the basis of the information relayed in the 911 call. Defendant was arrested and subsequently charged. Defendant moved for dismissal of the charges, arguing that the investigatory stop was unlawful and that, as a result, any evidence obtained pursuant to the stop should have been suppressed. The district court granted the motion, holding that there was no probable cause to stop defendant’s vehicle because the 911 call was not reliable. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the trial court. View "Michigan v. Pagano" on Justia Law

At issue before the Michigan Supreme Court in this case was whether defendant, Troy Antonio Brown, was entitled to a new trial because the detective who conducted defendant’s police interview testified falsely against him. The Court concluded: (1) the detective’s testimony against defendant was false; (2) the prosecutor failed to correct the false testimony; and (3) there was a reasonable likelihood that the uncorrected false testimony affected the judgment of the jury. Therefore, judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed, defendant’s conviction was vacated, and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Brown" on Justia Law

Keith Wood was convicted by jury of jury tampering, for having distributed a pamphlet promoting the concept of jury nullification outside the courthouse at which the pretrial hearing of a man named Andrew Yoder was scheduled to begin. The pamphlet asserted that jurors could vote their conscience, that jurors could not be forced to obey a juror oath, and that a juror had the right to hang a jury if he or she did not agree with other jurors. Defendant handed the pamphlet to two women who told him that they had been summoned to the court for jury selection. The case against Yoder never went to trial because Yoder entered into a plea agreement. After being charged in district court with obstruction of justice, and jury tampering, defendant moved to dismiss both charges, arguing with regard to the jury-tampering charge that the term “juror” in MCL 750.120a(1) did not include people who were summoned for jury duty but never selected or sworn. The district court dismissed the obstruction charge, but denied the motion to dismiss the tampering charge. The circuit court and Court of Appeals affirmed the district court. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding that individuals who were merely summoned for jury duty and have not yet participated in a case were not jurors for purposes of MCL 750.120a(1). Therefore, defendant did not attempt to influence the decision of any “juror” as that term was used in MCL 750.120a(1). View "Michigan v. Wood" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Davontae Sanford filed suit against the state of Michigan, seeking compensation under the Wrongful Imprisonment Compensation Act (WICA). Another man confessed to the crimes committed in 2007 to which plaintiff had pled guilty when he was 15 years old: four counts of second-degree murder and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. In 2008, plaintiff was sentenced to concurrent terms of 37 to 90 years in prison for the murder convictions, plus a consecutive two-year term for the felony-firearm conviction, with credit for the 198 days he spent in the Wayne County Juvenile Detention Facility. After an investigation into the other man’s confession and with the stipulation of the prosecutor, the circuit court vacated plaintiff’s convictions and sentences on June 6, 2016, and plaintiff was released from the Michigan Department of Corrections June 8, 2016. Defendant admitted that plaintiff was entitled to $408,356.16 in compensation for the 8 years and 61 days he spent in a state correctional facility pursuant to the WICA’s damages formula set forth in MCL 691.1755(2)(a), but defendant disputed whether plaintiff was entitled to $27,124.02 in compensation for the 198 days he spent in local detention. The Court of Claims held that the time plaintiff spent in local detention was not compensable under the WICA, and it awarded plaintiff $408,356.16. Plaintiff appealed as of right, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court concurred with the appellate court that the WICA did not authorize compensation for the time plaintiff spent in detention before he was wrongfully convicted of a crime, and affirmed that court's judgment. View "Sanford. v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellee Derek Smith was convicted by jury on two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm (AWIGBH); three counts of assault with a dangerous weapon (felonious assault); one count of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony; one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm; and two counts of misdemeanor assault and battery. Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals, which affirmed his convictions but remanded to the trial court for resentencing on the basis that two offense variables had been incorrectly scored. Upon reconsideration, the Court of Appeals found no merit to defendant's argument the trial court erred by having imposed the felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively with the AWIGBH sentences when the jury had not explicitly found that he possessed a firearm during the commission of the AWIGBH offenses. The appellate court ultimately ordered resentencing, finding the felony-firearm sentence could not be imposed to run consecutively with the AWIGBH sentences. The Court of Appeals remanded the case to the trial court for it to determine whether felonious assault or felon-in-possession was the predicate felony for the felony-firearm conviction and to amend Smith’s judgment of sentence so that the felony-firearm sentence was consecutive only with the predicate offense. The prosecutor appealed that decision to the Michigan Supreme Court. Finding no reversible error, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, finding the Court of Appeals appropriately remanded the case to the trial court to impose the two-year felony-firearm sentence to run consecutively with a single felony sentence. View "Michigan v. Smith" on Justia Law

While conducting a probation compliance check on defendant John D. Vanderpool’s house, a probation agent found heroin. Defendant admitted that the heroin belonged to him. A few weeks later, defendant was arrested and was again found in possession of heroin. He was charged with two counts of possession with intent to deliver heroin and with violating probation. Defendant moved to suppress evidence from the compliance check, arguing that the search was illegal because he was not on probation at the time of the search, but the circuit court denied the motion. Defendant pleaded no contest to having violated probation and to having possessed less than 25 grams of a controlled substance, second offense. Defendant appealed, arguing that because he was not on probation when his home was searched, the search was unlawful. The Michigan Supreme Court agree: while the circuit court attempted to extend defendant’s probation before the compliance check, because the term of probation had already expired, the court did not have the authority to extend it. Consequently, the warrantless search of defendant’s home was not justified. View "Michigan v. Vanderpool" on Justia Law

Arthur Jemison was convicted by jury of first-degree sexual assault, comitted in 1996. The victim underwent a forensic examination in 1996, and evidence was collected for a rape kit at that time. But the rape kit was not analyzed until 2015. In 2015, samples from the kit were sent to a laboratory in Utah for testing and analysis. A forensic analyst at the lab concluded that a vaginal swab from the kit contained the DNA of at least one male donor. The Utah lab forwarded its report to the Michigan State Police (MSP) Forensic Science Division, where the sample was compared to DNA stored in a database. The MSP determined that there was an association between Jemison’s DNA and the DNA of the male donor identified by the lab as a contributor to the vaginal swab. Before trial, the prosecution moved to allow the analyst to testify via two-way, interactive video. Jemison objected, but the court granted the motion. At trial, Jemison renewed his objection before a new judge, but the trial court allowed the video testimony over the objection. Jemison appealed his conviction, arguing, in part, that his right of confrontation under the federal and state Constitutions was denied when the trial court allowed the lab analyst to testify via two-way, interactive video. In an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded Jemison’s right of confrontation was adequately protected when the analyst testified via video because the video testimony allowed Jemison and the jury to observe the witness’s responses and reactions in real time and Jemison was able to cross-examine the witness. Although the Court of Appeals held that the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed the video testimony over Jemison’s objection in violation of MCR 6.006(C), it concluded that the error was harmless. The Michigan Supreme Court found the appellate court relied only on precedent that predated the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 (2004), "which transformed the Court's approach to confrontation rights." The Michigan Court found Crawford, in overruling the then-prevailing case law, shifted from a "reliability focus to a bright-line rule requiring a face-to-face encounter for testimonial evidence." Here, the Court ruled admitting the prosecution witness’s video testimony over the defendant’s objection violated defendant’s state and federal constitutional rights to confrontation. It therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that Court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Jemison" on Justia Law