Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Theodore Wafer was convicted by jury of second-degree murder, statutory involuntary manslaughter, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), for the killing of Renisha McBride. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 15 to 30 years for second-degree murder and 7 to 15 years for manslaughter, to be served consecutively to the two-year term of imprisonment for felony-firearm. McBride crashed her vehicle into a parked car around 1:00 a.m. in November 2013. Around 4:00 a.m., McBride arrived at defendant’s home, and defendant heard someone banging on his door. Defendant retrieved his shotgun, believing that someone was trying to break into his house. He opened the door a few inches and fired his gun when he saw a person approaching the door, shooting McBride in the face and killing her. Defendant appealed his convictions, alleging, among other things, that the multiple punishments for second-degree murder and statutory involuntary manslaughter violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. In an unpublished opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s convictions for these two offenses did not violate double-jeopardy protections because each offense contained different elements. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding conviction of both second-degree murder and statutory involuntary manslaughter for the death of a single victim violated the multiple-punishments strand of state and federal double-jeopardy jurisprudence. View "Michigan v. Wafer" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Leffew and his wife, Micheline, were convicted by jury of first-degree home invasion and third-degree home invasion, respectively. In September 2017, the Leffews moved to Michigan where they stayed with Jeremiah’s biological mother, Donna Knezevich, and her partner of more than 25 years, Lisa Seibert. A few months before Micheline’s and Jeremiah’s arrival, Seibert and Knezevich had opened their relationship to include Michael Porter. On November 14, 2017, Seibert would later describe an argument as a “little squabble” that got “pretty heated:” Police arrived, and Seibert, on Knezevich’s insistence, left the family home and stayed with Porter. A few days later, though, tempers cooled and Knezevich sought to reconcile. She called Seibert, who was still staying at Porter’s home, and proposed marriage. Seibert accepted and asked Knezevich to pick her up. Knezevich, happy to oblige, went to Porter’s house, accompanied by Jeremiah and Micheline. The parties' accounts of what happened next diverge; but the Leffews were convicted: Micheline of third-degree home invasion based on her commission of a misdemeanor (malicious destruction of a building) while breaking into the home and Jeremiah of first-degree home invasion based on entering the home without permission and committing an assault against Porter; Jeremiah was also convicted of felonious assault. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded Defendants were prejudiced and received ineffective assistance of counsel when their attorneys failed to request a jury instruction on the defense of others. Defendants were entitled to a new trial. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Leffew" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Propp was convicted by jury of first-degree premeditated murder. The victim, defendant’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child, was found dead in her own bed. Defendant, who had spent the night with the victim, gave the police several conflicting accounts of what had happened in the preceding hours; however, it was undisputed that the victim had died by neck compression. Before trial, defendant moved for funds to retain an expert in the area of erotic asphyxiation, claiming that the testimony was necessary to support his claim that the victim’s death was accidental. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the record did not support that theory. The prosecution then moved to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim as well as prior acts against his ex-wife; the majority of the evidence came in the form of statements the victim had made to friends and family members concerning her relationship with defendant. Defendant objected, arguing that the other-acts evidence was either inadmissible hearsay, or more prejudicial than probative. The court granted the prosecution’s motion in its entirety, and the jury ultimately found defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. In affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for funds to retain an expert, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because defendant sought appointment of an expert to assert the “affirmative defense” that the victim had died accidentally, he was required, but had failed, to demonstrate a substantial basis for the defense. Defendant appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding: (1) the defense of accident to first-degree premeditated murder was not an affirmative defense; and (2) the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to consider MRE 802 when determining that the challenged other-acts evidence was admissible. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ holding regarding the other-acts evidence had to be reversed and the case remanded for the Court of Appeals to determine whether the rules of evidence would otherwise bar the admission of the other-acts evidence. View "Michigan v. Propp" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Propp was convicted by jury of first-degree premeditated murder. The victim, defendant’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child, was found dead in her own bed. Defendant, who had spent the night with the victim, gave the police several conflicting accounts of what had happened in the preceding hours; however, it was undisputed that the victim had died by neck compression. Before trial, defendant moved for funds to retain an expert in the area of erotic asphyxiation, claiming that the testimony was necessary to support his claim that the victim’s death was accidental. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the record did not support that theory. The prosecution then moved to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim as well as prior acts against his ex-wife; the majority of the evidence came in the form of statements the victim had made to friends and family members concerning her relationship with defendant. Defendant objected, arguing that the other-acts evidence was either inadmissible hearsay or more prejudicial than probative. The court granted the prosecution’s motion in its entirety, and the jury ultimately found defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court o Appeals erred by holding that defendant was required to make the additional showing necessary for affirmative defenses in order to be entitled to expert assistance and by holding that rules of evidence other than MRE 403 do not apply to other-acts evidence admitted under MCL 768.27b. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part, reversed the judgment in part, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Propp" on Justia Law

Nicholas Reynolds pleaded no contest to two counts of child sexually abusive activity (CSAA); one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III); and one count of assault by strangulation. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 160 to 240 months for the CSAA convictions, 108 to 180 months for the CSC-III conviction, and 72 to 120 months for the assault-by-strangulation conviction. The court ordered that these sentences run concurrently with each other but consecutively to defendant’s sentence for an Illinois child-pornography conviction for which he was on parole when he committed the crimes at issue here. Defendant moved the circuit court to correct an invalid sentence, arguing that his minimum sentencing guidelines range should have also been scored using his convictions for CSAA. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant then sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, but his application was denied. He then sought leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s sentences. Defendant contended the Court of Appeals erred by holding that he was not entitled to a remand for resentencing because CSAA and CSC-III were both Class B offenses, and defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSIR) should have scored the guidelines for both offenses under MCL 771.14(2)(e). The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with defendant, reversed in part, and remanded to the circuit court for resentencing on defendant’s CSAA convictions. View "Michigan v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Gerald Magnant and John Davis were each charged with violating MCL 205.428(3) of the Michigan Tobacco Products Tax Act (the TPTA), for transporting 3,000 or more cigarettes without the transporter’s license required by MCL 205.423(1). Defendants were nonsupervisory employees of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community (KBIC). Michigan State Police pulled over a KBIC-owned pickup truck for speeding. Davis was driving, and consented to a search of a utility trailer, representing to the trooper that it contained “supplies” and “chips.” The trailer actually contained 56 cases holding over 600,000 “Seneca” cigarettes marked with KBIC stamps but not with the Michigan Department of Treasury tax stamps required by the TPTA. Magnant was a passenger, and admitted he helped load the trailer. The parties stipulated that Davis, Magnant, and the KBIC were not licensed to transport tobacco products under the TPTA. Defendants jointly moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the relevant statutes were unconstitutionally vague because they did not give individual employees, as opposed to businesses, adequate notice that they were subject to the TPTA licensing requirement for transporting cigarettes. A circuit court denied the motion, holding that the language of the TPTA provided adequate notice that an “individual” can be a “transporter” subject to the licensing requirement. The Michigan Supreme Court held that an individual acting as a “transporter” need not have specific awareness of the law that creates the licensing requirement; a conviction for violating MCL 205.428(3) must, at a minimum, be supported by a showing that the individual (1) knew he or she was transporting a regulated amount of cigarettes and (2) knew of facts that conferred “transporter” status upon him or her. In this case, however, the prosecution failed to present any evidence establishing or implying that defendants were aware of facts that conferred transporter status on them. Judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and defendants' joint motion to quash a bindover decision was granted. View "Michigan v. Magant" on Justia Law

In 2004, defendant Gregory Washington was convicted by jury of second-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In a 2006 unpublished opinion, an appellate court affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded the case for resentencing because the trial court had failed to articulate substantial and compelling reasons for its departure from the second-degree murder sentencing guidelines. Before defendant was resentenced, he petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court for review. While the Supreme Court was considering defendant’s application, the trial court resentenced defendant, and he petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of the new sentence. The Supreme Court ultimately denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal his original convictions. After the Court of Appeals also denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal, he filed his second petition to the Supreme Court, which was again denied. Defendant then moved the trial court for relief from judgment, which was denied. Defendant appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals; the Supreme Court denied appeal of the Court of Appeals’ denial. In June 2016, after exhausting all available postconviction relief, defendant filed a second motion for relief from judgment with the trial court, arguing that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to resentence him in 2006 because his application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court was pending at the time. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, vacated defendant’s sentence, and ordered resentencing. The prosecution appealed. The Court of Appeals, upheld the trial court’s ruling in a published per curiam opinion, holding that although defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment was barred by MCR 6.502(G), the trial court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the second sentence. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court indeed lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it resentenced defendant in 2006 while his application for leave to appeal was still pending with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also held the trial court did not err 10 years later in 2016 when it granted defendant relief on that ground, which was raised in defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment. The matter was remanded for the trial court for resentencing consistent with its 2016 order. View "Michigan v. Washington" on Justia Law

Defendant Lonnie Arnold was convicted by jury of aggravated indecent exposure and indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person. He was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to 25 to 70 years in prison for indecent exposure by a sexually delinquent person; his sentence for aggravated indecent exposure was later set aside. At sentencing, Arnold argued that MCL 750.335a(2)(c) required a sentence of “1 day to life” as provided in the statute, but the trial court stated that it was prohibited from imposing a sentence with a minimum penalty of a term of years and a maximum penalty of life. The court’s minimum sentence of 25 years was calculated to fit within the sentencing guidelines range. Arnold appealed his sentence. The case eventually made its way to the Michigan Supreme Court, which held that the “1 day to life” sentence for indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person in MCL 750.335a(2)(c) was an alternative to the other sentences provided in MCL 750.335a and was not modifiable. The Supreme Court then remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to resolve the effect of the sentencing guidelines on the sentencing scheme for sexually delinquent persons in MCL 750.335a(2)(c). On remand, the Court of Appeals concluded the sentencing guidelines provided another sentencing alternative for persons convicted of indecent exposure as sexual delinquents. Accordingly, a sentencing court could sentence such defendants to either “1 day to life” or to a sentence premised on the guidelines. Because the trial court was not aware of this range of sentencing options, the Court of Appeals vacated Arnold’s sentence and remanded to the trial court for resentencing. Arnold again appealed the sentence to the Supreme Court. After re-review, the Supreme Court concluded the guidelines did not create an alternative sentence that could be imposed instead of the “1 day to life” sentence as the appellate court held. "This means that individuals convicted of an indecent-exposure offense under section 335a as sexually delinquent persons must be sentenced pursuant to the penalties prescribed in that statute as described in our earlier opinion. Because defendant did not receive such a sentence, he is entitled to resentencing." View "Michigan v. Arnold" on Justia Law

Defendant Erick Allen was convicted by jury of possessing less than 25 grams of cocaine, for which he was sentenced as a fourth-offense habitual offender to a prison term of 30 months to 15 years. Defendant was on parole at the time of the possession, but the Michigan Department of Corrections (the MDOC) did not file a parole detainer against him when he was arrested. Defendant was released from jail on July 13, 2017, on a personal recognizance bond. Defendant subsequently missed two court dates, and the district court issued a bench warrant for his arrest. He was arrested on August 17. The district court turned his personal recognizance bond into a cash/surety bond that Defendant was unable to post. On August 31, 2017, the district court changed his bond back to a personal recognizance bond so that defendant could participate in a drug treatment program. However, defendant brought drugs with him to the program, and he tested positive for cocaine on September 5, 2017. That same day, defendant was arrested, and the MDOC filed a parole detainer against defendant. After being bound over, defendant was convicted by a jury of possession of cocaine. Defendant remained in jail until his sentencing on March 1, 2018. At sentencing, defendant made no request to be given credit for time served. Although the court believed that defendant was not legally entitled to any jail credit because of his status as a parolee, in its discretion, the court gave defendant some credit for the time served prior to sentencing. Defendant spent approximately 195 days in jail prior to sentencing, 17 of which came before the MDOC filed a parole detainer against him. Defendant appealed in the Court of Appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred by not granting any jail credit for the total time he spent in jail. The Michigan Supreme Court determined that under MCL 769.11b and Michigan v. Idziak, 773 NW2d 616 (2009), defendant was entitled to time-served credit. Because the trial court did not grant the credit to which defendant was entitled, defendant demonstrated plain error affecting his substantial rights. The Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the trial court's judgment was reversed, and the matter remanded for resentencing. View "Michigan v. Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Betts, Jr. entered a no-contest plea to violating the registration requirements of Michigan’s Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA), as amended by 2011 PA 17 and 18 (the 2011 SORA), conditional on his ability to challenge on appeal the constitutionality of the retroactive application of the 2011 SORA. Defendant pleaded guilty in 1993 to second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II). The trial court sentenced defendant to 5 to 15 years’ imprisonment. Two years later, SORA took effect. After defendant’s successful completion of parole, defendant failed to report his change of residence, his e-mail address, and his purchase of a vehicle within 3 days, contrary to MCL 28.725(1)(a), (f), and (g), as amended by 2011 PA 17. The prosecution charged defendant with violating SORA’s registration requirements. Defendant moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that the retroactive application of the 2011 SORA requirements violated the constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws. The trial court denied this motion. The Michigan Supreme Court held the retroactive application violated state and federal constitutional prohibitions on ex post facto laws. As applied to defendant Betts, because the crime subjecting him to registration occurred in 1993, the Supreme Court ordered that his instant conviction of failure to register as a sex offender be vacated. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Betts" on Justia Law