Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Dwight T. Samuels and his identical twin brother, Duane, were involved in a fight at a restaurant, leading to multiple felony charges against both. The prosecution offered a package-deal plea, requiring both brothers to plead guilty to certain charges in exchange for the dismissal of others. Initially, Dwight objected to the plea but changed his mind after learning his brother wished to accept it. Both brothers pleaded guilty, and the trial court accepted their pleas without raising the issue of voluntariness. At sentencing, they moved to withdraw their pleas, arguing the package-deal format was coercive. The trial court denied the motions without an evidentiary hearing, finding the pleas voluntary.The Michigan Court of Appeals denied Dwight's application for leave to appeal. The Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to consider whether an evidentiary hearing was required to determine the voluntariness of the plea. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, holding that the voluntariness of a plea induced by a promise of leniency to a relative is determined by whether the prosecution had probable cause to prosecute the third party.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that when a defendant's plea is made under a package-deal plea offer, and the record raises a question of fact about its voluntariness, a trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing. The court must consider the totality of the circumstances, guided by factors from In re Ibarra, to determine if the plea was voluntary. The Supreme Court found that the record raised a factual question about Dwight's plea and remanded the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to assess the voluntariness of his plea. The Court of Appeals' judgment was reversed. View "People Of Michigan v. Samuels" on Justia Law

Damon E. Warner was charged with first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct for allegedly assaulting his minor stepdaughter. During the investigation, Warner underwent three police interrogations, during which he initially denied the accusations but eventually signed a confession written by the police. A jury found him guilty of second-degree criminal sexual conduct but could not reach a verdict on the first-degree charge. Warner was sentenced to 10 to 30 years in prison. The first-degree charge was later dismissed without prejudice. Warner successfully appealed his conviction, and the Court of Appeals granted him a new trial.The Eaton Circuit Court allowed the prosecutor to reinstate the first-degree charge. Warner requested funds to hire an expert on false confessions and access to the victim’s medical and psychological records, but the trial court denied both motions. At the second trial, Warner was found guilty of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and sentenced to 20 to 40 years in prison. The Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision, stating that although the trial court misinterpreted the precedent set by People v Kowalski, it did not abuse its discretion in denying Warner's request for an expert witness.The Michigan Supreme Court reviewed the case and held that it was fundamentally unfair to deny an indigent defendant funding for an expert on false confessions when the veracity of the confession was central to the trial. The Court found that Warner had demonstrated a reasonable probability that the expert would aid his defense and that the absence of such an expert resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "People v. Warner" on Justia Law

In 1993, William E. Neilly was convicted of first-degree felony murder, felon in possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and conspiracy to commit armed robbery. He was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. However, subsequent rulings by the United States Supreme Court deemed mandatory life without parole sentences for defendants who committed crimes when under the age of 18 years old as unconstitutional. As a result, Neilly was resentenced to 35 to 60 years in prison. The trial court also ordered Neilly to pay $14,895.78 in restitution to the victim’s family for funeral expenses.Neilly appealed the restitution order, arguing that it violated the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. He contended that the trial court ordered restitution under the current restitution statutes rather than the former restitution statutes in effect when he was originally sentenced in 1993. The Court of Appeals rejected Neilly’s argument, reasoning that restitution is a civil remedy and not punishment, and its imposition did not result in an increase in punishment in violation of the Ex Post Facto Clauses.The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decision. The court held that restitution imposed under the current statutes is a civil remedy, not a criminal punishment. Therefore, applying the restitution statutes to defendants whose criminal acts predate the enactment of the restitution statutes does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. The court concluded that the trial court’s restitution order was affirmed. View "People v. Neilly" on Justia Law

John M. Burkman and Jacob A. Wohl were charged with bribing or intimidating voters, conspiracy to bribe or intimidate voters, and two counts of using a computer to commit a crime. The charges stemmed from a robocall they designed and financed in 2020, which targeted voters in Michigan areas with significant Black populations. The robocall claimed that voting by mail would result in the voter’s personal information becoming part of a public database used by the police to track down old warrants, by credit card companies to collect debt, and potentially by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to track people for mandatory vaccines. The district court found probable cause to believe that the defendants had committed the charged offenses and bound them over for trial. The defendants moved to quash the bindovers, arguing that the robocall was not a “menace” or “other corrupt means or device” under the relevant statute and that the statute was unconstitutional. The circuit court denied the motions.The Michigan Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in determining that the defendants’ conduct fell within the term “menace” as used in the relevant statute. However, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the defendants’ conduct fell within the statutory catchall term “other corrupt means or device.” The Supreme Court also held that the defendants’ conduct was not excluded from constitutional free-speech protections under the true-threat exception, but erred by holding that the defendants’ conduct was excluded from constitutional free-speech protections under the speech-integral-to-criminal-conduct exception. The Supreme Court adopted a limiting construction of the statute’s catchall provision and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "People v. Burkman" on Justia Law

In 2012, Ronald Scott was arrested and charged with various crimes. After a jury trial, he was convicted of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and acquitted of other charges. Before trial, the prosecution sought to admit certain other-acts evidence, which the trial court ruled inadmissible. The prosecution appealed this decision, and the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. Scott's trial began while his application for leave to appeal was still pending, and the other-acts evidence was admitted at trial. Scott was convicted and sentenced, and he appealed his convictions and sentences.The Court of Appeals vacated Scott's convictions and sentences, ruling that the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to conduct the trial under a precedent case, People v Washington. The Supreme Court later vacated this decision and remanded the case for reconsideration. On remand, the Court of Appeals held that resentencing a defendant whose application for leave was pending was not a structural error but a procedural error. The Court of Appeals then affirmed Scott's convictions but remanded the case for resentencing. Scott sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court.The Supreme Court held that a trial court's failure to adhere to court rules staying a proceeding while an interlocutory appeal is pending is a procedural error, and any such error can be remedied through subsequent appellate review after a final judgment is entered. Interlocutory appeals do not divest a trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction over a case. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to assess whether the prosecution presented evidence at Scott's trial that violated the rules of evidence and, if so, whether Scott is entitled to a new trial. View "People Of Michigan v. Scott" on Justia Law

Joshua L-J Stewart was convicted by jury on three counts of armed robbery; assault with intent to commit murder; receiving and concealing stolen property valued between $1,000 and $20,000; and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant allegedly aided and abetted two other individuals in two armed robberies by serving as the getaway driver. Two of the victims were shot by the perpetrators during the robberies, and one of the victims died as a result of his injuries. Defendant was arrested and questioned after he drove one of the perpetrators to the hospital in the vehicle used in the robberies. Before trial, defendant moved to suppress statements he made during his police interview, arguing that the statements were involuntary because of coercive interview techniques and promises of leniency by the interrogating officers. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence given in the police interview. The totality of the circumstances of defendant’s interrogation, including his age, the timing of the interview, the officers’ references to leniency, the officers’ use of falsehoods, and the officers’ overall tone and use of language, created an environment in which defendant’s free will was overborne and the statements he gave were involuntary. "The use of these statements at trial violated defendant’s constitutional rights, and he was entitled to a new trial." View "Michigan v. Stewart" on Justia Law

Defendant Dametrius Posey and a codefendant were tried jointly before a jury on multiple counts of assault with intent to murder; assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder; carrying a weapon with unlawful intent; being a felon in possession of a firearm; and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony. While the appeal was pending, defendant and the prosecution moved jointly to remand for resentencing because of several errors during the sentencing hearing. The Court of Appeals granted the motion and remanded for resentencing. The trial court ultimately imposed the same minimum sentence as defendant’s original sentence, 264 months, which was within the revised guidelines range. The Court of Appeals then affirmed defendant’s convictions and sentence. The Michigan Supreme Court found this case "unique: Unlike in prior cases, the witness who identified defendant at trial did not identify defendant before trial; the witness’s first recorded identification of defendant as an assailant occurred at trial. In fact, the witness identified different individuals as possible assailants before trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that the reliability criteria could not be applied given that there was no improper law-enforcement activity and no pretrial identification of defendant obtained through an unnecessarily suggestive pretrial process." The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court on that point and vacated that portion of its opinion. However, the Court nonetheless affirmed defendant’s convictions because he has not shown plain error affecting his substantial rights. The Court opined on defendant's request for review of his sentence: challenges to within-guidelines sentences may be reviewed for reasonableness. The case was remanded to the appellate court for such reasonableness review. "n all other respects, leave to appeal is denied because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this Court." View "Michigan v. Posey" on Justia Law

Frank King was charged as a fourth-offense habitual offender with breaking and entering. Before trial, defendant moved to proceed in propria persona and to terminate his relationship with his appointed counsel. The trial court granted defendant’s motion but kept appointed counsel to serve as defendant’s advisory counsel. On the first day of trial, defendant pleaded no contest in exchange for an agreement pursuant to Michigan v. Cobbs, 443 Mich 276 (1993), capping his minimum sentence at 72 months, to be served concurrently with a sentence defendant was already serving in an unrelated case. Defendant’s advisory counsel apparently handled details of the plea negotiations, and advisory counsel indicated during sentencing that he had worked out the Cobbs agreement with the prosecution. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the Cobbs agreement, but he later filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals. Defendant argued that his conviction should have been reversed because he was denied the right to counsel at critical stages of the proceeding because his waiver of counsel was invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished per curiam opinion. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded defendant’s waiver of his right to counsel was indeed invalid, and he was deprived of counsel during critical stages of the proceedings, requiring automatic reversal. View "Michigan v. King" on Justia Law

Defendant Menayetta Yeager was convicted by jury of first-degree murder, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony in connection with the shooting death of her boyfriend, Jonte Brooks. In 2017, Brooks punched defendant in the face with a gun when defendant informed him, while they were sitting in defendant’s minivan, that she no longer wanted to be in a relationship with him. Brooks then pulled defendant out of the van by her hair and repeatedly hit her, after which he got back into defendant’s van and used it to chase after her, attempting to run her over before eventually driving away. A neighbor, who witnessed some of the encounter, went over to defendant and agreed to take her to try to retrieve her van. While defendant was talking on her cellphone with Brooks to make those arrangements, Brooks repeatedly threatened to kill both defendant and the neighbor. Ultimately, Brooks pulled into a gas station behind the neighbor’s vehicle, defendant got out of the neighbor’s vehicle during the continued argument with Brooks, and defendant pulled out a gun and shot at Brooks multiple times. Brooks ultimately died from a bullet wound to his chest. After appealing her conviction, the Court of Appeals remanded to the trial court for a Ginther hearing to determine whether trial counsel’s failure to request an instruction on voluntary manslaughter as a lesser included offense to murder constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. On remand, trial counsel testified that he did not request a voluntary manslaughter instruction because he believed that instruction to be mutually exclusive of the self-defense theory asserted at trial. The court then concluded that trial counsel erred by not requesting the voluntary manslaughter instruction because, had the instruction been requested, a reasonable juror could have found defendant was guilty of voluntary manslaughter rather than first-degree murder. For that reason, the trial court granted a new trial. After remand, the prosecution cross-appealed the trial court order, arguing that trial counsel was not ineffective, and that even if he was, defendant had not been prejudiced. Finding no reversible error in the appellate court's judgment, the Michigan Supreme Court affirmed the grant of a new trial. View "Michigan v. Yeager" on Justia Law

The Macomb County Prosecutor sought to appeal the Parole Board’s grant of parole to Richard McBrayer, a prisoner under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. The Parole Board intervened. In 1994, McBrayer pleaded guilty of two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct involving his stepdaughter when she was 12 to 14 years old. He was sentenced to concurrent terms of 20 to 40 years in prison; the minimum sentences represented the top of the then-controlling judicial sentencing guidelines range. McBrayer became eligible for parole in January 2010 after accumulating disciplinary credits through the years. In 2011, 2015, and 2018, the Parole Board granted McBrayer parole, but the board’s grant of parole was overturned each time after the victim, or the prosecutor, appealed. In 2020, the board again considered McBrayer for, and granted him, parole. McBrayer’s parole-guidelines score of +11, indicated a high probability of parole, and the board found facts to support the grant. The prosecutor again appealed the board’s decision. After reviewing the evidence in the record, the court reversed the board’s grant of parole, reasoning that there had been no improvement in McBrayer’s circumstances from the time he was last considered for parole. In a split unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s ruling, reasoning that there were substantial and compelling reasons to depart from the parole guidelines—namely, the heinous nature of the crimes, the impact of the crimes on the victim, skepticism about McBrayer’s rehabilitation, and concerns with the efficacy of his parole plans. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals majority applied the wrong analysis and ignored the discretion that the Legislature has assigned to the Parole Board. Applying the proper analysis, the Supreme Court concluded the Parole Board did not abuse its discretion. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstated the Parole Board’s grant of parole. View "In re Parole of Richard Allen McBrayer" on Justia Law