Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Three issues before the Supreme Court in this case arose from events that occurred in November 2007 while Defendant Johnny Bonilla-Machado was serving time at a correctional facility in Ionia. Defendant was there for unarmed robbery and attempted carjacking. While in his cell, Defendant assaulted two corrections officers by overflowing his toilet and splashing the water on the corrections officers as they made their respective rounds. Defendant was charged with two counts of assaulting a prison employee and found guilty by a jury on both counts. Defendant did not testify at his trial. The maximum sentence for assaulting a prison employee was five years. The trial court could enhance the sentence for subsequent felony convictions by not more than one-and-one-half times the statutory maximum. The trial court indicated that it was "bound" to enhance the sentences, and sentenced Defendant as a second-offense habitual offender to concurrent terms of 30 to 90 months for each conviction. Defendant objected to the enhanced maximum sentences. The first issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant was coerced by the trial court and his trial counsel to forgo his right to testify. Second, the Court considered whether an offense that was statutorily designated as a "crime against public safety" may also be considered as a "crime against a person" to establish a continuing pattern of criminal behavior for purposes of scoring the offense variable (OV). Finally, the Court considered whether Defendant was entitled to resentencing as a matter of law in light of the trial court's erroneous statement that it was "bound" to enhance Defendant's maximum sentences. Upon review, the Court concluded that there was no evidence that Defendant was coerced to forgo his right to testify. The Court of Appeals erroneously concluded that scoring the assaults of the prison employees were "crimes against public safety," and held that Defendant should be resentenced as to this issue. Finally, the Court concluded that the trial court's "mandated" sentence enhancement comment was in error, but was handled by the Court of Appeals, now making the matter moot. The Court remanded the case back to the trial court to recalculate Defendant's sentence. View "Michigan v. Bonilla-Machado" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant Edward Kowalski's convictions of accosting a minor to commit an immoral act and using a computer as means to accomplish that act should have been overturned because of an error in jury instructions. The Court of Appeals ruled that the convictions should be overturned. The instructions given at trial did not properly instruct the jury on the actus reus of the applicable statute, and as such were given in error. Upon review of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court concluded that regardless of whether Defendant waived review of the jury instructions, they were not an "outcome-determinative" error. Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to support the jury's verdict. The Court reversed the appellate court and reinstated Defendant's convictions. View "Michigan v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a trial court properly assessed fifteen points for an "offense variable" (OV) to Defendant Cecil Huston sentence when he engaged in "predatory conduct to exploit […] a vulnerable victim." Defendant was charged with armed robbery and carjacking when he and another robbed a female victim in a shopping mall parking lot. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' holding, The Supreme Court held that in order to assess 15 points for the OV, Defendant's pre-offense conduct only had to be directed at "a victim"--not a specific victim-- and the victim did not have to be inherently vulnerable. Instead, a defendant's "predatory conduct" alone can create or enhance a victim's "vulnerability." In this case, Defendant engaged in "predatory conduct" to "exploit a vulnerable victim" because Defendant and his accomplice lain in wait, armed with two BB guns and a knife, and hid from the victim who was by herself at night in an otherwise empty parking lot. Because the trial court properly assessed fifteen points for the OV, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate court's decision and reinstated the trial court's judgment and sentence. View "Michigan v. Huston " on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether homeless sex offenders are obligated to comply with the registration requirement of the state Sex Offenders Registration Act (SORA). Specifically, the issue centered on whether homeless offenders have a "residence" or "domicile" as defined by SORA. In 1984, Defendant Randal Dowdy pled guilty to kidnapping and first-degree criminal sexual conduct. He remained incarcerated until 2002. As a consequence of his sex crime conviction, he was required to register as a sex offender. Defendant registered his address as that of a homeless shelter. When the shelter discovered that he was a sex offender, he was kicked out pursuant to the shelter's policies barring sex offenders from receiving its services. In 2006 when police attempted to verify where Defendant had lived, they discovered that Defendant had not maintained his SORA registration since leaving prison. The circuit court dismissed charges against Defendant pertaining to his failure to register, holding that Defendant's homelessness rendered it impossible for him to comply with SORA. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that homelessness was not a bar to compliance with SORA because homelessness "does not preclude an offender from entering a police station and reporting to a law enforcement agency regarding the offender's residence or domicile." The Court reversed the lower courts and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Dowdy" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court was asked to determine whether the "community caretaking" exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement that a warrant be obtained before entering a residence applied to a first-responder answering a 911 call. Defendant Mark Slaughter resided in a townhouse. His neighbor saw water running down her basement wall and over her electrical box. After a few failed attempts to reach Defendant, the neighbor called 911. The city dispatched several firefighters to the townhouse. After consulting with the neighbor, the firefighters entered Defendant's residence. When the firefighter went to the basement to shut off the water, he observed in plain view, grow lights and several dozen marijuana plants. The firefighter reported what he saw to the local police. Defendant was charged with manufacturing with the intent to deliver the marijuana. He filed a pretrial motion to suppress evidence of the plants, grow lights, and everything else police officers confiscated, arguing that the firefighter's entry into his townhouse violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The circuit court granted the motion, holding that the firefighter did not attempt to verify the existence of running water in the wall prior to entering Defendant's home. The Court of Appeals affirmed in a split decision, the majority holding that a "community caretaking" exception to the Fourth Amendment could apply to searches by firefighters only when they were investigating a possible fire hazard. Upon review, the Supreme Court overturned the lower courts' decisions, holding that the community caretaking exception applies to firefighters "no less than to police officers" when they are responding to emergencies that threaten life or property. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the firefighter's actions in this case were reasonable, thus satisfying the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement. The Court remanded the case back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Slaughter" on Justia Law

In 2005, Defendant Kent Lee and his wife babysat their neighbor's two boys. Defendant prepared the children for bedtime by bathing them. The younger boy, a three-year-old, was uncooperative when Defendant tried to diaper and dress him. According to Defendant, he used his finger to "flick" the child's penis in an effort to get his attention. When the child did not respond, Defendant flicked him again. The child cried after the second flick. Defendant was subsequently charged with second-degree criminal sexual conduct and second-degree child abuse. At his sentencing hearing, the prosecution requested that Defendant be required to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender’s Registration Act's (SORA) catch-all provision. The judge did not require the registration, finding that the crime was not a "sex act." Approximately twenty months after the sentencing, the prosecution moved for an entry of order requiring Defendant to register under SORA. Defendant objected, but the trial court reversed itself, and required the registration. Defendant appealed. The appellate court affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the trial court erred when it required Defendant to register 20 months after he was sentenced. The Court reversed the appellate court and vacated the trial court's decisions. View "Michigan v. Lee" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Defendant-Appellant Drew Peltola on drug possession charges. The trial court considered Defendant's prior criminal history ("prior record variables" or PRVs), and calculated his sentence to be in the five to twenty-three month range, with a statutory minimum at twenty years. Because defendant had a prior conviction for a controlled substance, the trial court applied a sentence enhancement. As a result, the court doubled both the minimum and maximum sentences for each conviction and sentenced defendant within the enhanced guidelines range to concurrent terms of 4 to 40 years' imprisonment. Defendant unsuccessfully appealed the trial court's scoring of his PRVs. The question before the Supreme Court involved whether the trial court miscalculated Defendant's sentence based on its scoring of the PRVs. Upon consideration of the trial record and the applicable legal authority, the Supreme Court found that the trial court's enhancing of Defendant's sentence range was authorized by Michigan law. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court's decision and Defendant's sentence. View "Michigan v. Peltola" on Justia Law

In âPeople v. Helzer,â the Michigan Supreme Court held that when a criminal defendant is charged with being a sexually delinquent person in relation to an underlying sexual offense, separate juries must determine the defendantâs guilt of the sexual delinquency charge and the underlying charge. In this case, Defendant Anthony Breidenbach was convicted by a single jury of "indecent exposure as a sexually delinquent person.â The trial court granted Defendantâs motion for a new trial after the Court of Appeals vacated his conviction on the ground that the first trial violated his rights under the Supreme Courtâs two-jury directive. The prosecutor appealed, arguing that the Helzer case was wrongly decided. The Supreme Court overturned its holding in Helzer. The sexual delinquency statute at issue this case and in the Helzer case, neither explicitly nor implicitly requires separate juries. Because the Helzer rule lacks support in the language of the statute itself, determinations whether separate juries are needed should be made on a case-by-case basis in accordance with state law. The Court granted the prosecutorâs request to for permission to appeal the lower courtâs ruling, and it vacated the trial courtâs granting to Defendant a new trial, reinstating his conviction.