Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant James Buie was convicted in 2001 of sexually assaulting BS and two female minors: LS, age 13, and DS, age 9. The assaults occurred after BS, seeking to trade sex for cocaine, invited defendant into the apartment where she was babysitting LS and DS. In lieu of the desired bargain, Defendant held BS at gunpoint and raped her, LS, and DS. LS and DS were unable to identify the man who assaulted them, but at trial BS identified defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether witness testimony taken by two-way, interactive video was properly admitted during defendant’s trial. The Court's consideration implicated two issues: (1) whether Defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him was violated by the admission of video testimony; and (2) whether the admission of video testimony violated MCR 6.006(C). Because the Court concluded that Defendant waived his right of confrontation under the United States and Michigan Constitutions and that the court rule was not violated, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case back to the appellate court for consideration of Defendant’s remaining issues. View "Michigan v. Buie" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to revisit and reemphasize, several aspects of the test governing motions for a new trial, set forth in "Michigan v. Cress" (664 NW2d 174 (2003)). The Court began with "the unremarkable observation that when the Defendant possesses knowledge of evidence at the time of trial, that evidence cannot be characterized as 'newly discovered' under the first part of the 'Cress' test." In addition, the Court clarified that knowledge of evidence at the time of trial necessarily implicates the third part of the "Cress" test, which requires the Defendant to undertake "reasonable diligence" to discover and produce the evidence at trial. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Defendant carries the burden of making the requisite showing regarding each of the four parts of the "Cress" test. "Adherence to these principles-- each of which is discernable from our caselaw-- is necessary to maintain the balance between generally upholding the finality of criminal judgments, and unsettling such judgments in the unusual case in which justice under the law requires." In this case, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals "strayed" from these principles by overlooking that Defendant and defense counsel were both well aware at the time of trial alleged newly discovered evidence could have supported the defense and impermissibly relieved Defendant of her burden of showing that she could not, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of Defendant's remaining issues. View "Michigan v. Rao" on Justia Law

Defendant Glenn Williams appealed his conviction of armed robbery, arguing that because he was unsuccessful in feloniously taking or removing any actual property from the intended target of his robbery, there was not a sufficient factual basis to support his guilty plea to the charge of armed robbery. Upon review, the Supreme Court disagreed: "[w]hen the Legislature revised the robbery statute, MCL 750.530, to encompass a 'course of conduct' theory of robbery, it specifically included 'an attempt to commit the larceny' as sufficient to sustain a conviction for robbery itself. [The Court] conclude[d] that this amendment effectuated a substantive change in the law governing robbery in Michigan such that a completed larceny is no longer necessary to sustain a conviction for the crime of robbery or armed robbery." View "Michigan v. Williams" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal to resolve whether Michigan law recognizes the doctrine of "imperfect self-defense" as an independent theory that automatically mitigates criminal liability for a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter when a defendant acts as the initial aggressor and then claims that the victim’s response necessitated the use of force. The Court held that the doctrine does not exist in Michigan law as a freestanding defense mitigating murder to voluntary manslaughter, although the Court recognized that factual circumstances that have been characterized as imperfect self-defense may negate the malice element of second-degree murder. When analyzing the elements of manslaughter in light of defendant’s self-defense claim, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred in its ruling on the sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence to sustain Defendant Verdell Reese, III's manslaughter conviction. Therefore, the Court reversed in part the Court of Appeals’ judgment, affirmed the trial court’s verdict of manslaughter, and remanded this case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration of Defendant’s remaining issue on appeal. View "Michigan v. Reese" on Justia Law

This case arose from a physical struggle between Defendant Angel Moreno, Jr. and two Holland police officers when the officers sought to enter Defendant's home without a warrant. As a result, Defendant was charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer and causing injury under MCL 750.81d. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant was properly charged after trial. It was determined that the officers entered his home illegally. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that MCL 750.81d did not abrogate Defendant's common-law right to resist illegal police conduct. As such, the Court instructed the trial court to grant Defendant's motion to quash the charges against him on the basis that the officers' conduct was unlawful. View "Michigan v. Moreno" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Michigan and federal constitutions barred defendant's retrial. Defendant Lamar Evans was accused of burning a vacant house. There was no dispute that the trial court wrongly added an extraneous element to the statute under which Defendant was charged. Specifically, the trial court ruled that the prosecution was required to present proof that the burned house was not a dwelling, which was not a required element of MCL 750.73. As a result of the trial court's erroneous addition of this extraneous element to the charged offense, it granted Defendant's motion for a directed verdict and entered an order of acquittal, dismissing the case. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that when a trial court grants a defendant's motion for a directed verdict on the basis of an error of law that did not resolve any factual element of the charged offense, the trial court's ruling does not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy and retrial is therefore not barred. Accordingly, because the trial court's actions did not constitute an acquittal for the purposes of double jeopardy, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Evans" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the ineffective assistance of Defendant Richard Armstrong's trial counsel by failing to introduce evidence of cell phone records that would have undermined the complainant's credibility prejudiced Defendant, entitling him to a new trial. The Court of appeals held that Defendant failed to show any resulting prejudice. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and held that Defendant's counsel's performance was ineffective and prejudiced Defendant. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

At issue in this case is the scope of an employer's vicarious liability for quid pro quo sexual harassment. Specifically, the Supreme Court considered whether Wayne County and its sheriff's department could be held vicariously liable for a civil rights claim under state law based on the criminal act of a deputy sheriff committed during working hours but plainly beyond the scope of his employment. In 2001, Plaintiff Tara Hamed was arrested for unpaid child support. Because she had outstanding warrants for probation violations in Wayne County, she was transferred to the Wayne County jail. When she arrived, the deputy sheriff subjected her to sexually charged comments and offers for better treatment in exchange for sexual favors. Plaintiff resisted these advances, but she was transferred into an area of the jail not subject to surveillance cameras where she was sexually assaulted. The circuit court dismissed Plaintiff's harassment claim on the basis that Defendants were not vicariously liable for the criminal acts of sheriff's department employees. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Plaintiff had established a viable quid pro quo harassment claim. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that Defendants could not be held vicariously liable under the traditional principles of respondeat superior because Defendants had no prior knowledge of the deputy's sexually harassing conduct. The Court reversed the appellate court. View "Hamed v. Wayne County" on Justia Law

Defendant Donald Richardson and his wife had a "poor relationship" with some of their neighbors which resulted in several altercations. One such altercation escalated and Defendant was charged with two counts of assault with intent to commit murder, two counts of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder, two counts of felonious assault and one count of felony-firearm. At trial on these charges, Defendant asserted a theory of self-defense. At the close of trial, the court read a pattern jury instruction, which permitted consideration of whether Defendant had a duty to retreat. After a day of deliberations, the jury asked the judge to define "home." The court explained that an individual had no duty to retreat before using deadly force if in his own home or curtilage of that dwelling. Two days later, the jurors could not make a decision. The court reread the instruction that lies at the heart of this case, but did not reiterate the definition of curtilage. On appeal to the Supreme Court, Defendant argued that the court's use of the jury instruction, and its omission to reread the definition of curtilage (which is not part of the pattern jury instruction) was in error. Upon review of the trial record, the Supreme Court held that it was appropriate for the trial court to use the standard jury instruction in this case. Further, the Court found there was adequate evidence from which the jury could conclude that Defendant did not need to use deadly force to defend himself. Rather than grant leave to appeal, the Court affirmed Defendant's convictions for assault. View "Michigan v. Richardson" on Justia Law

Defendant Charles Fackelman was found guilty but mentally ill of home invasion, felonious assault, and felony-firearm charges that resulted from an altercation he had with a man Defendant believed caused the death of his teenage son in an episode of "road rage." Defendant perceived the man to have been unremorseful about his role in the tragedy and antagonistic toward Defendant and his family during subsequent legal proceedings. The issue at Defendant's trial was whether he was legally insane at the time of the incident. The prosecution's expert opined that he was not, while Defendant's expert opined that he was. These experts were the only doctors who testified at trial but were not the only expert opinions before the jury. The jury was repeatedly told about a third expert diagnosis whose report was reviewed by the other experts, but was "conspicuously absent" from trial. This third expert's report was never admitted into evidence for the jury's review. Upon review of the trial record and the briefs submitted by the parties, the Supreme Court concluded that use of the "tie breaking" diagnosis as substantive evidence of Defendant's sanity compromised his constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. The Court reversed the judgment of the lower courts, vacated Defendant's convictions, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Fackelman" on Justia Law