Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In "Michigan v. Fobb," the Court of Appeals held that an extortion conviction under the "against his will" prong of MCL 750.213 could only be maintained when the act defendant sought to compel entailed "serious consequences" to the victim. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case required the Court to revisit the Fobb decision. Defendant James Early Harris, Jr. was convicted by a jury of extortion, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer, and three counts of carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant agreed to pay Willie Neal $400 to fix the transmission on defendant's truck. Neal began working on the truck in the driveway that defendant shared with a neighbor, but stopped when it began to rain. Upset by Neal’s refusal to work in the rain, defendant went into his house and returned with a gun. Defendant told Neal that he would "silence him" unless Neal resumed working on the truck or returned a portion of defendant’s down payment for the work. Neal refused, and defendant returned home. When police officers arrived, they found defendant in the driveway carrying a rifle. Relying on Fobb, defendant argued that he could not be convicted of extortion because the act defendant sought to compel (continued work on the truck) was not of serious consequences to the mechanic. But the plain language of the extortion statute, MCL 750.213, defined extortion in terms of whether the defendant maliciously threatened a person with harm in order to "compel the person so threatened to do . . . any act against his will." The Supreme Court concluded defendant's conduct satisfied the requirements set forth in MCL 750.213, and affirmed his conviction of extortion. Furthermore, the Court overruled the Court of Appeals decisions in "Michigan v. Fobb" and "Michigan v. Hubbard" to the extent that those decisions required that the act or omission compelled by the defendant be of serious consequence to the victim. View "Michigan v. Harris" on Justia Law

Defendant Ronald Earl was convicted by a jury of bank robbery and two counts of possession of less than 25 grams of a controlled substance. At the time defendant committed the offenses, MCL 780.905 required that all defendants convicted of a felony pay a $60 crime victim’s rights assessment. The statute was amended effective December 16, 2010, to raise the assessment for convicted felons to $130. At defendant’s sentencing in 2011, the court ordered defendant to pay the $130 crime victim’s rights assessment under MCL 780.905(1)(a). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the increased victim's rights fund assessment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Michigan v. Earl" on Justia Law

Chandra Valencia Smith-Anthony was convicted by a jury of larceny from the person. While monitoring closed-circuit television monitors at a department store, the store's loss-prevention officer observed defendant acting suspiciously while shopping and proceeded to follow her. The officer saw defendant select a perfume box set from a display and later slip it into one of her bags. Defendant was stopped by the officer when she left the store with the item in her bag. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction, concluding that the prosecution had failed to establish the from-the-person element of larceny from a person because there was no evidence that defendant had committed the larceny within the officer's area of immediate presence or control as required by the statute. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals properly reversed defendant's conviction because there was insufficient evidence to support it. View "Michigan v. Smith-Anthony" on Justia Law

Stanley Duncan was charged with five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. His wife Vita Duncan was charged with two counts of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. A three-year-old victim was qualified to testify at the separate preliminary examinations held for each defendant. Both were bound over for a single jury trial. The victim was called to the stand, but became visibly agitated and unable to answer the court's questions regarding telling the truth and telling a lie. The court then ruled the victim was not competent to testify, suffering from "a then existing mental infirmity." The prosecution asked the court to declare the victim unavailable, but the court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's applications for leave for appeal. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution's motion for consideration: the child victim was unavailable within the meaning of Michigan's Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4), and the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded the child was not unavailable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Defendant Donald Michael Hardy was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of carjacking. His sentence was 12 to 50 years' imprisonment. Hardy filed a motion for resentencing, challenging the OV scoring and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the circuit court denied. Hardy then appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the sentence. Defendant Devon DeCarlos Glenn, Jr. was convicted after pleading guilty to armed robbery and felonious assault. He was sentenced to 15 to 30 years' imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction and 18 to 48 months' imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction. The Court of Appeals vacated Glenn's sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that although Glenn's conduct used more violence than was strictly necessary to complete an armed robbery, it was not egregious enough in relation to the other conduct listed in the sentencing guidelines to justify the score the circuit court gave him. Both defendants appealed their sentences to the Supreme Court; after review, the Supreme Court found no error in the circuit court's scoring of Hardy's sentence. However, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in Glenn's case and remanded for recalculation of his sentence. View "Michigan v. Glenn" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to redact the majority of the detectives' out-of-court statements from the interrogation of Defendant John Musser where they commented on his credibility. Most of the statements made had no probative value, and their admission undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict because the jury may have relied on those statements in reaching its verdict. The Court felt the limiting jury instruction did not cure this error. Accordingly, the Court vacated defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Musser" on Justia Law

Defendant Samuel Elliott was convicted of armed robbery for holding up a gas station. He had been on parole for a prior conviction, and was arrested the day after the alleged robbery for a parole violation. Defendant's brother called police to inform them of Defendant's misdeed. Police interrogated Defendant until he invoked his right to counsel. While in jail, Defendant confessed his crime to a parole officer when she asked about the gas station robbery and the ramifications of having violated parole. The parole officer did not inform Defendant of his Miranda rights before questioning him. Defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress his statements made to the parole officer at trial. The appellate court reversed, finding the statements should have been suppressed. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not err in its conclusion that because Defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation by the parole officer, even if she was a law enforcement officer, neither Defendant's right to be given a series of warnings before custodial interrogation nor his right to have counsel present during custodial interrogation was violated. View "Michigan v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Defendant Rayfield Clary was convicted by jury of assault with intent to commit murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant's first trial ended in mistrial; after his second, he appealed the outcome. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, concluding that defendant had been improperly impeached with his silence. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that the prosecution’s references at trial to defendant’s postarrest, post-Miranda silence with the police were improper. View "Michigan v. Clary" on Justia Law

Defendant David Burns was tried by jury and convicted of first-degree sexual conduct. The victim, his four-year-old daughter, told a bible school teacher, who happened to be a forensic interviewer and sexual-assault nurse examiner. The teacher conditionally testified at trial regarding the child's out-of-court statements before the child herself was called to testify. The prosecutor then tried to have the child testify, but was unsuccessful. The teacher's testimony was admitted, on the grounds that defendant told the child "not to tell" of the alleged abuse, rendering her unavailable to testify, and making the teacher's statement admissible under the forfeiture-by-wrongdoing rule. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the State failed to establish by a preponderance defendant had both specific intent to cause the child's unavailability, and that the wrongdoing in fact caused her unavailability. The State appealed, but the Supreme Court agreed with the appellate court and affirmed that court's reversal. View "Michigan v. Burns" on Justia Law

Defendant Rodney Lee Koon was stopped for speeding. During the stop, defendant voluntarily produced a marijuana pipe and informed the arresting officer that he was a registered patient under the MMMA and was permitted to possess marijuana. A blood test to which defendant voluntarily submitted several hours later revealed that his blood had a THC content of 10 ng/ml. The State charged defendant with operating a motor vehicle with the presence of a schedule 1 controlled substance in his body under MCL 257.625(8). The prosecution sought a jury instruction that the presence of marijuana in defendant's system resulted in a per se violation of the Michigan Vehicle Code. Defendant argued that the zero-tolerance provision could not possibly apply to MMMA registered patients because the MMMA prevented the prosecution of registered patients for the medical use of marijuana, including internal possession, and only withdraws its protection when the patient drives while "under the influence" of marijuana. Moreover, the MMMA resolved conflicts between all other acts and the MMMA by exempting the medical use of marijuana from the application of any inconsistent act. The district court and circuit court agreed with defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the MMMA yielded to the Legislature's determination in MCL 257.625(8) that it is unsafe for a person to drive with any marijuana in his or her system. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the MMMA's protection superseded the Michigan Vehicle Code's prohibition and allowed a registered patient to drive when he or she has indications of marijuana in his or her system but is not otherwise under the influence of marijuana. The Court concluded that it did. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated the judgment of the Circuit Court, and remanded this case to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Koon" on Justia Law