Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In three consolidated cases, the Michigan Supreme Court addressed the question of whether defendants’ false statements made while serving as law enforcement officers during an internal affairs investigation could be used against them in criminal proceedings. This case arose out of a "disturbing" encounter between Dajuan Hodges-Lamar and defendants, who at the time were police officers for the city of Detroit. While on duty in November 2009, defendant Hughes approached Hodges-Lamar while he was seated in a car at a gas station. Hughes initially appeared to question Hodges-Lamar, but quickly proceeded to assault him while defendants Harris and Little, who were also on duty, stood by and did nothing to stop the assault. Hodges-Lamar filed a complaint with the Detroit Police Department, which spurred an internal investigation by the Detroit Police Department’s Office of the Chief Investigator (OCI). All three defendants were called to testify at a Garrity hearing. The OCI presented defendants with an advice-of-rights form drafted by the Detroit Police Department. All three defendants made false statements at the Garrity hearing. Defendants Harris and Little denied that Hughes had any physical contact with Hodges-Lamar. Hughes admitted that he removed Hodges-Lamar from Hodges-Lamar’s car during questioning, but Hughes maintained that he did not use any unnecessary force against Hodges-Lamar. A video recording of the incident surfaced after defendants had made their statements, wholly at odds with the statements provided by defendants. Hughes was charged with common-law felony misconduct in office, misdemeanor assault and battery, and obstruction of justice. Defendants Harris and Little were each charged with one count of common-law obstruction of justice. Defendants brought motions in district court to dismiss the obstruction-of-justice charges. The district court concluded that defendants’ statements were protected by the disclosures by law enforcement officers act (DLEOA), even if the information provided was false or misleading. The court determined that without defendants’ statements the obstruction-of-justice charges could not be sustained and dismissed those charges. The prosecution appealed in the circuit court, which concluded that the district court had not abused its discretion by dismissing the obstruction-of-justice charges. The Court of Appeals reversed, but the Supreme Court found no error in the district court's dismissal, and reinstated that court's judgment. View "Michigan v. Hughes" on Justia Law

As a result of a 2007 misdemeanor conviction of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct, defendant was required to register on the Michigan Sex Offender Registry semiannually for 25 years. Defendant failed to properly register and in February 2010 pleaded guilty of SORA-1, a felony, and was sentenced to 5 years’ probation, with the first 4 months served in jail. In 2012, defendant listed a vacant house as his residence for SORA purposes, and he was arrested for failing to comply with SORA. In June 2013, a jury convicted defendant of SORA-2. Although MCL 28.729(1)(b) provided for a maximum sentence of 7 years, the trial court sentenced defendant under MCL 769.10(1)(a) as a second-offense habitual offender to 2 to 10.5 years’ imprisonment. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review was whether defendant as a SORA second offender could be subject to a sentence enhancement under the Habitual Offender Act (HOA). The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the sentence imposed for defendant’s SORA-2 conviction could be enhanced under the habitual-offender statutes because the Legislature created separate offenses for subsequent violations of SORA. View "Michigan v. Allen" on Justia Law

Defendant Antonio Gloster was convicted by jury of aiding and abetting armed robbery. Defendant had driven four men to a market in Hamtramck. While defendant stayed in the car, two of the men assaulted a woman and attempted to steal her necklace. Defendant then picked the men up and drove away. The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a sentencing court could assess a defendant 15 points for “predatory conduct” under Offense Variable (OV) 10 (exploitation of a vulnerable victim), solely on the basis of the predatory conduct of a defendant’s co-offenders. The Supreme Court concluded that it could not. "In direct contrast to other OVs, MCL 777.40 contains no language directing a court to assess a defendant the same number of points as his co-offenders in multiple-offender situations. We decline to import such language into OV 10, as it is a well-established rule of statutory construction that this Court will not read words into a statute that the Legislature has excluded." View "Michigan v. Gloster" on Justia Law

Defendant Paul Seewald and alleged coconspirator Don Yowchuang worked in the district office of former Congressman Thaddeus McCotter during McCotter’s 2012 reelection campaign. Michigan election law required McCotter to submit at least 1,000 valid voter signatures before the Secretary of State could certify his placement on the ballot. Defendant and Yowchuang bore some responsibility for collecting those signatures and submitting them to the Secretary of State. The day before the nominating petitions were due, defendant and Yowchuang realized that several of the petitions had not been signed by their circulator, and agreed to sign the petitions as circulators, even though they had not circulated the petitions themselves. Defendant was charged with nine counts of falsely signing nominating petitions (misdemeanor), and one count of conspiring to commit a legal act in an illegal manner (felony). Following a preliminary examination, the trial court bound defendant over to the Wayne Circuit Court as charged. Defendant moved to quash the information on the felony charge. The circuit court granted his motion and dismissed the felony charge against him, concluding that there had been no conspiracy to commit a legal act. The Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, agreeing that the prosecution could not show an agreement to commit a legal act. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal. The issue before the Supreme Court reduced to what alleged conduct was sufficient to warrant a bindover on the peculiar charge of “conspiring to commit a legal act in an illegal manner.” In an "anomalous" reversal of roles, defendant argued that his aim was illicit through and through, that he never agreed to commit any legal act. Rather he conspired to commit an illegal act illegally; and that double illegality should have set him free. The prosecution argued that while defendant’s agreed-to means were illegal, his conspiratorial ends were legal; and that legality was sufficient to try him as a felon. The irony was not lost on the Supreme Court. After examining the conspiracy statute, the Court held that the conduct alleged provided probable cause for trial on the charge. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to the Wayne Circuit Court for reinstatement of the district court's order to bind defendant over and for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Seewald" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a traffic stop of defendant Charles Dunbar made after police officers observed that his vehicle’s registration plate was partially obstructed by a bumper-mounted towing ball, a civil infraction under MCL 257.225(2) and (7). During the stop, the officers smelled burnt marijuana within the vehicle, leading to a search of the vehicle during which they discovered contraband, including marijuana, cocaine, and a handgun. Defendant subsequently moved to suppress that contraband as the fruit of an illegal seizure because, according to defendant, the officers lacked a lawful basis on which to stop his vehicle. The trial court denied defendant’s motion, concluding that his obstructed plate violated MCL 257.225(2) and therefore provided a lawful basis on which to stop his vehicle. The Court of Appeals, however, concluded that MCL 257.225(2) did not prohibit the obstruction of a registration plate by a towing ball and reversed. The Supreme Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals and reversed its judgment. View "Michigan v. Dunbar" on Justia Law

Jason Triplett was convicted by jury on counts of domestic violence, carrying a concealed weapon and felonious assault. The charges arose after he threatened to use his utility knife to escape from two men who had stopped their vehicle when they spotted defendant and his wife fighting on the side of the road. The trial court instructed the jury that self-defense was a defense to the charge of felonious assault but that it was not a defense to carrying a concealed weapon (CCW). The Court of Appeals affirmed. Contrary to the Court of Appeals’ determination, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the common-law affirmative defense of self-defense was indeed available to a defendant charged with CCW for concealing an instrument which is a dangerous weapon only because it is used as a weapon. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, vacated defendant’s CCW conviction, and remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Triplett" on Justia Law

Defendant Feronda Smith was charged with, among other things, armed robbery and first-degree felony murder after the police found known drug dealer Larry Pass, Jr., dead in Pass’s own home. At trial, two prosecution witnesses claimed to have been present when defendant allegedly shot Pass. The first witness was codefendant Tarence Lard, who testified for the prosecution as part of a plea agreement for his part in the crime. The second witness was Mark Yancy, who maintained his innocence with respect to the shooting but admitted collecting Pass’s drugs, helping dispose of the murder weapon, and using cocaine with defendant and Lard after the shooting. Yancy and Lard contradicted one another in important ways, although both testified that Yancy and defendant had had a violent dispute over money in the weeks leading up to the murder. No other evidence connected defendant to the crime or confirmed that he had ever been at the scene, and no murder weapon was ever recovered. Yancy was a paid informant, and had been compensated for his assistance in a FBI inquiry into Pass' murder. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether the prosecution breached a duty to correct the substantially misleading, if not false, testimony of Yancy's about his formal and compensated cooperation in the government’s investigation. "Given the overall weakness of the evidence against the defendant and the significance of the witness’s testimony," the Supreme Court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the prosecution’s exploitation of the substantially misleading testimony affected the verdict. Therefore the Court reversed and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Jackson was convicted by a jury on six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing a young member of the church where he served as pastor. At trial, the complainant’s aunt testified that she had approached the complainant to discuss the possible abuse in light of her own experiences and after talking with another woman who had also worked with defendant and had subsequently left the church. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that this testimony indicated that defendant had engaged in sexual relationships with the complainant’s aunt and her acquaintance, and was inadmissible evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b). The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion, ruling that admissibility of the testimony was not governed by MRE 404(b) because the testimony was not evidence that defendant had engaged in prior sexual conduct with underage parishioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although the testimony was evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b), it fell within an exception to that rule for res gestae evidence and thus could be admitted without reference to or compliance with the rule. Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the testimony was other-acts evidence as contemplated by MRE 404(b), and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. However, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals majority that the trial court’s failure to subject the testimony to scrutiny under MRE 404(b) was nonetheless correct because the testimony fell within a "res gestae exception" to that rule. Because the testimony at issue constituted evidence of "other acts" as contemplated by MRE 404(b), its admission was governed by that rule and its procedural requirements. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ determination that the defendant’s convictions should be affirmed, as defendant has failed to show entitlement to relief on the basis of this error. The Court therefore affirmed defendant’s convictions, but vacated that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority reasoning that the testimony at issue could be admitted without reference to or compliance with MRE 404(b) by virtue of a res gestae exception" to that rule. View "Michigan v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Jackson was convicted by a jury on six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing a young member of the church where he served as pastor. At trial, the complainant’s aunt testified that she had approached the complainant to discuss the possible abuse in light of her own experiences and after talking with another woman who had also worked with defendant and had subsequently left the church. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that this testimony indicated that defendant had engaged in sexual relationships with the complainant’s aunt and her acquaintance, and was inadmissible evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b). The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion, ruling that admissibility of the testimony was not governed by MRE 404(b) because the testimony was not evidence that defendant had engaged in prior sexual conduct with underage parishioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although the testimony was evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b), it fell within an exception to that rule for res gestae evidence and thus could be admitted without reference to or compliance with the rule. Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the testimony was other-acts evidence as contemplated by MRE 404(b), and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. However, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals majority that the trial court’s failure to subject the testimony to scrutiny under MRE 404(b) was nonetheless correct because the testimony fell within a "res gestae exception" to that rule. Because the testimony at issue constituted evidence of "other acts" as contemplated by MRE 404(b), its admission was governed by that rule and its procedural requirements. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ determination that the defendant’s convictions should be affirmed, as defendant has failed to show entitlement to relief on the basis of this error. The Court therefore affirmed defendant’s convictions, but vacated that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority reasoning that the testimony at issue could be admitted without reference to or compliance with MRE 404(b) by virtue of a res gestae exception" to that rule. View "Michigan v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Rahim Omarkhan Lockridge was convicted by jury of involuntary manslaughter for the death of his wife.His minimum sentence range calculated under the sentencing guidelines was 43 to 86 months. The trial court concluded that there were factors not accounted for in scoring the guidelines, including a probation violation, killing his wife in front of their three children, leaving the children at home with their mother dead on the floor, and prior domestic violence. Citing these as reasons to depart from the minimum sentence range, the court sentenced defendant to a term of 8 years (96 months) to 15 years (the statutory maximum sentence). Defendant appealed, challenging both the scoring of the guidelines and the trial court’s decision to exceed the guidelines minimum sentence range. While his case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court decided "Alleyne v United States," (133 S Ct 2151 (2013)), which extended the rule of "Apprendi v New Jersey," (530 US 466 (2000)), and held that a fact that increases either end of a defendant’s sentencing range must have been admitted by the defendant or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. After allowing defendant to file a supplemental brief challenging the guidelines scoring on "Alleyne" grounds, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s sentence in three separate opinions and rejected the Alleyne challenge. The Michigan Supreme Court granted defendant's application to address the constitutional question presented by his Alleyne challenge. The Court found that in this case, defendant’s guidelines minimum sentence range was irrelevant to the upward departure sentence he ultimately received. Accordingly, the Court held that he could not show the prejudice necessary to establish plain error under "Michigan v. Carines," (597 NW2d 130 (1999)), and affirmed his sentence. View "Michigan v. Lockridge" on Justia Law