Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Alexander Steanhouse was convicted by jury for assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), and receiving and concealing stolen property. The court departed from the sentencing guidelines’ recommended minimum range and sentenced Steanhouse to 30 to 60 years’ imprisonment for AWIM, to run concurrently with a sentence of one to five years’ imprisonment for receiving and concealing stolen property. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded under the procedure adopted in Michigan v Lockridge, 498 Mich 358 (2015), from United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005), to determine whether the sentences were reasonable. Mohammad Masroor was convicted by jury on 10 counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I), and five counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II). The court departed from the sentencing guidelines’ recommended minimum range and imposed concurrent prison terms of 35 to 50 years for each of the CSC-I convictions and 10 to 15 years for each of the CSC-II convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed Masroor’s convictions but ordered a Crosby remand and directed the trial court to apply the proportionality standard adopted in Steanhouse. Both defendants appealed, and the Michigan Supreme Court: (1) held the legislative sentencing guidelines are advisory in all applications; (2) held the proper inquiry when reviewing a sentence for reasonableness was whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating the “principle of proportionality” set forth in Michigan v Milbourn, 461 NW2d 1 (1990); (3) declined to import the approach to reasonableness review used by the federal courts into Michigan jurisprudence; (4) agreed with the Court of Appeals that defendant Steanhouse did not preserve his Sixth Amendment challenge to the scoring of the guidelines and that Masroor did preserve his challenge, but declined to reach the question whether Michigan v Stokes, 877 NW2d 752 (2015), correctly decided that the remedy was exactly the same regardless of whether the error was preserved or unpreserved in light of the fact that both defendants received departure sentences, and that, therefore, neither defendant can show any harm from the application of the mandatory guidelines; (5) reversed, in part, the judgments of the Court of Appeals in both cases to the extent they remanded to the trial court for further sentencing proceedings under United States v Crosby, 397 F3d 103 (CA 2, 2005), finding the proper approach for the Court of Appeals was to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion by violating the principle of proportionality; and (6) because of its ruling in (5), in lieu of granting leave to appeal in the defendants’ appeals the Court remanded for plenary consideration of whether the departure sentences imposed by the trial courts were reasonable under the standard articulated here. View "Michigan v. Steanhouse" on Justia Law

Defendant Tmando Denson was convicted by jury of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than murder. The charges stemmed from an altercation defendant had with a 17-year-old who was dating defendant’s 15-year-old daughter: defendant discovered the two in the daughter’s bedroom, partially undressed. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court’s review was whether evidence of defendant’s prior act was admissible under MRE 404(b) to rebut claims of self-defense and defense of others: that he honestly and reasonably believed his use of force was necessary to defend himself or another. The Court held the trial court erred when it admitted defendant’s prior act because the prosecution failed to establish that it was logically relevant to a proper noncharacter purpose. The Court also concluded this error was not harmless. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Denson" on Justia Law

Justin Comer pleaded guilty to criminal sexual conduct in the first-degree (CSC-I) and second-degree home invasion. He was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 51 months to 18 years for the CSC-I conviction and 51 months to 15 years for the second-degree home invasion conviction. The judgment of sentence included a line to be checked by the trial court, indicating: “The defendant is subject to lifetime monitoring under MCL 750.520n.” This line was not checked, and the trial court did not otherwise indicate that defendant was subject to lifetime electronic monitoring. At issue before the Michigan Supreme Court was whether the trial court’s failure to impose lifetime electronic monitoring as a part of defendant’s sentence for CSC-I rendered defendant’s sentence invalid and, if so, whether the trial court could correct the invalid sentence on its own initiative 19 months after the original judgment of sentence had entered. The Court held that defendant’s sentence was invalid because MCL 750.520b(2)(d) required the trial court to sentence defendant to lifetime electronic monitoring. Furthermore, the Court held that under MCR 6.435 and MCR 6.429, the trial court erred by correcting defendant’s invalid sentence on its own initiative absent a motion from either party. This case was remanded back to the trial court to reinstate the original judgment of sentence. View "Michigan v. Comer" on Justia Law

The scope of the implied license to approach a house and knock is time-sensitive; it generally does not extend to predawn approaches. While approaching a home with the purpose of gathering information is not, standing alone, a Fourth Amendment search. However, an information-gathering approach combined with a trespass is a Fourth Amendment search. Michael Frederick and Todd Van Doorne were separately charged with various drug offenses after seven officers from the Kent Area Narcotics Enforcement Team made unscheduled visits to the defendants’ respective homes during predawn hours. Officers woke defendants and their families for the purpose of questioning each defendant about marijuana butter that they suspected the defendants possessed. Both defendants subsequently consented to a search of their respective homes, and marijuana butter and other marijuana products were recovered from each home. Defendants moved to suppress the evidence, and the trial court denied the motions, concluding that the officers had not conducted a search by knocking on defendants’ doors during the predawn hours and that the subsequent consent searches were valid. The Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases and issued a split opinion. The majority concluded that the officers’ predawn “knock and talk” visits were within the scope of the public’s implied license because homeowners would be unsurprised to find a predawn visitor delivering a newspaper or seeking emergency assistance, but the dissenting judge concluded that the police conduct violated the Fourth Amendment because the searches, which occurred during hours at which a homeowner would not expect visitors, were outside the scope of a proper knock and talk procedure. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether defendants’ consent to search was attenuated from the officers’ illegal search. View "Michigan v. Frederick" on Justia Law

Points may be assessed for OV 5 even absent proof that a victim’s family member has sought or received, or intends to seek or receive, professional treatment. Tiwaun Calloway was convicted by jury of second-degree murder on an aiding-and-abetting theory for his role in a man’s death. The trial court sentenced Calloway to 20 to 50 years of imprisonment. At sentencing, the court scored Offense Variable 5 (OV 5) at 15 points for the serious psychological injury suffered by two of the victim’s family members as a result of the victim’s death. Calloway sought delayed leave to appeal. While his leave application was pending, Calloway moved in the trial court for reissuance of the judgment of sentence under MCR 6.428. The trial court granted the motion, and Calloway filed a claim of appeal from the reissued judgment. The Court of Appeals granted Calloway’s delayed application for leave. The appeals were consolidated. The Court of Appeals affirmed Calloway’s conviction, but the Court vacated Calloway’s sentence after it determined that OV 5 should have been scored at zero points. Both Calloway and the prosecution appealed: Calloway, to appeal his conviction, and the State, to appeal the Court of Appeals’ decision regarding OV 5. The Michigan Supreme Court found adequate proof of that the victim's family member suffered serious psychological harm requiring professional treatment, the Court determined the appellate court erred in reversing the trial court's 15 point-assessment for OV 5. View "Michigan v. Calloway" on Justia Law

This case centered on whether a trial court, in its discretion, could hold an evidentiary hearing to collaterally review a magistrate’s finding of probable cause on the basis of a defendant’s challenge to the veracity of a warrant affidavit in light of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Franks v Delaware, 438 US 154 (1978). The Court of Appeals interpreted “Franks” as barring a trial court from granting a defendant an evidentiary hearing to challenge the veracity of a search warrant affidavit following the warrant’s execution “unless the defendant makes ‘[the] substantial preliminary showing’ ” as set forth in “Franks.” The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and held that “Franks” controlled the circumstances under which “the Fourth Amendment requires that a hearing be held at the defendant’s request,” but Franks did not bar a trial court from exercising its discretion to grant evidentiary hearings concerning the veracity of search warrant affidavits under other circumstances. Because the prosecutor did not appeal the trial court’s conclusion that the warrant affidavit was not supported by probable cause, the only issue before the appellate court was whether the trial court abused its discretion by holding the evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it granted defendant’s motion for an evidentiary hearing. View "Michigan v. Franklin" on Justia Law

John Barrera was charged with two counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct, and two counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-II) for sexually assaulting his wife’s granddaughter. Defendant pleaded no contest as a fourth-offense habitual offender to two counts of CSC-II and two counts of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III). At sentencing, defendant objected to the scoring of several Offense Variables (OVs). The court overruled all of defense counsel’s objections to the scoring of the OVs except for the objection to the score for OV 12. Specifically, over defense counsel’s objection, the court scored OV 8 at 15 points because defendant asported the victim to a place of greater danger during his commission of the crimes (defendant took the victim to his bedroom where he sexually assaulted her). In an unpublished order, the Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit defendant’s delayed application for leave to appeal. Defendant then sought leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court. After review, the Supreme Court held that movement of a victim incidental to the commission of a crime qualified as asportation under OV 8. Therefore, the Court overruled the controlling case to the extent that they stood for the contrary proposition, and the Court concluded that the trial court properly scored OV 8 at 15 points. In light of the trial court’s error in scoring OV 11, the Court remanded this case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Barrera" on Justia Law

In the early morning hours of May 5, 2014, a ruckus at a Brighton bar resulted in a call to the police. Two officers from the Brighton Police Department responded: Christopher Parks, a full-time police officer, and Douglas Roberts, a reserve police officer. Defendant Ryan Feeley was arrested and charged with resisting and obstructing a police officer. Defendant objected to the prosecution’s request for a bindover, arguing that: (1) Roberts did not have an articulable suspicion for stopping defendant in the first place, and (2) defendant could not be held criminally liable for resisting and obstructing under MCL 750.81d because Roberts, being a reserve police officer, was not a “police officer” within the meaning of that statute. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ ruling that reserve police officers were not police officers for purposes of MCL 750.81d(7)(b)(i). The case was remanded to the Court of Appeals to address whether the district court correctly ruled that the reserve police officer in this case lacked the authority to conduct a stop of defendant. View "Michigan v. Hall" on Justia Law

Defendant Brandon Hall was hired by a prospective judicial candidate to gather nominating signatures of qualified voters in the 2012 election for the 58th District Court. By the evening before the May 1, 2012 deadline to file the nominating petitions, defendant had not gathered the 1,000 signatures necessary to nominate the candidate. That night, defendant filled in blank nominating petitions with false names and addresses and then signed the petitions with those false names. Defendant was aware that false elector names and signatures appeared on the petitions but nonetheless signed each as the circulator, certifying that each petition had been properly circulated and actually signed by qualified voters. The petitions were ultimately filed with the Bureau of Elections on May 1. The State charged defendant with 10 counts of forgery under MCL 168.937, bringing a separate felony count for each of the 10 forged nominating petitions. Defendant was arraigned on these charges. The prosecutor moved to bind the case over to the Ottawa Circuit Court for trial, and defendant objected. Defendant argued that the stipulated facts accepted by the district court supported only misdemeanor charges under MCL 168.544c. After a hearing on the motion, the district court denied the motion to bind defendant over for trial on the felony charges. The district court concluded that MCL 168.937 only imposed felony liability for prohibited conduct expressly identified as “forgery” elsewhere in the Michigan Election Law. After its review, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that there was no conflict between MCL 168.544c and MCL 168.937. Instead, the Legislature has provided differing punishments for two distinct offenses, and each applied independently to prohibit defendant’s conduct. Accordingly, the Court reversed the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the 58th District Court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Feeley" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Supreme Court's review centered on whether a homeowner, or another person rightfully possessing a home, commits criminal larceny by removing fixtures from the home after it has been foreclosed on and sold at a sheriff’s sale, but before the statutory redemption period has expired. Defendant Timothy March was arrested and charged with such a crime. He argued in an attempt to quash the information against him that the fixtures were not the proper subject of the crime of larceny, and that he could not have wrongfully taken property of another because he retained legal title and the right of possession throughout the redemption period, during which time the removal of the fixtures had occurred. The prosecution conceded that defendant had the right to possess the house during the redemption period, so the charges were eventually dismissed. The Court of Appeals reversed, however, finding that the “owner” of property included not only the titleholder of that property, but also “any other person whose consent was necessary before the property could be taken.” Therefore, the sheriff's sale purchaser "owned" the fixtures because his consent was necessary before they could be taken by defendant. This "consent" ground, as deduced by the Court of Appeals in its analysis of Michigan caselaw and the applicable statutes, was incorrect, according to the Supreme Court. "The right to consent could not serve as a proxy for the right to possession, because neither of the sources of legal authority on which the court relied gives rise to the right to possession. MCL 600.3278 does not endow the purchaser with a possessory right, nor does the equitable title held by [the sheriff's sale purchaser]." View "Michigan v. March" on Justia Law