Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant-Appellee McKinley Hyten obtained a provisional driver's license in April 2004. In January 2007, Defendant's driver's license was suspended because of multiple moving violations and two minor traffic accidents. In light of what she perceived as assurances from her probation officer, Defendant anticipated that her license would be restored at a district court hearing scheduled for later that year. Defendant's mother Anne Johnson gave Defendant a vehicle, and given the anticipated restoration of the driver's license, sought to obtain automobile insurance for Defendant. Johnson telephoned an independent insurance agent who, after being told that the license had been suspended, informed Johnson that Defendant could not be insured until her license had been restored. Nonetheless, an application for insurance from Titan Insurance Company was filled out on Defendant's behalf, postdated to August 24, 2007. August 22, 2007, Defendant signed the application for insurance. At an August 24, 2007, hearing, Defendant's driver's license was not restored. Plaintiff-Appellee Titan Insurance Company was not informed of this fact. Subsequently, in February 2008, Defendant was driving the insured vehicle and collided with the vehicle of Howard and Martha Holmes, causing injuries to both. Titan then learned Defendant did not have a valid driver's license when the policy was issued. In anticipation that the Holmeses would be filing claims against Defendant for their injuries, Titan filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment. The trial court granted Defendant's motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, asserting that once an insurable event occurred and a third party (the Holmeses) possessed a claim against the insured arising out of that event, the insurer was not entitled to reform the policy to avoid paying the third party. Titan appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals: in accordance with the Supreme Court's precedent in "Keys v Pace,"(99 NW2d 547 (1959)), the Court found "nothing in the law to warrant the establishment of an 'easily ascertainable' rule." The Court overruled "State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co v Kurylowicz," (242 NW2d 530 (1976)) and its progeny, and remanded the case for further proceedings.View "Titan Ins. Co. v. Hyten" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted leave in two cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (PIP benefits) under the no-fault act, notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP benefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she "had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code (including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, the "joyriding" statutes) has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Furthermore, the Court held that the use of the phrase "a person" in MCL 500.3113(a) "clearly and plainly" includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precludes that person from receiving PIP benefits. View "Spectrum Health Hospitals v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Michigan" on Justia Law

The issues before the Supreme Court in this case was whether the services provided by plaintiff's wife constituted services "for an injured person's care," whether the Court of Appeals properly remanded this case to the circuit court for findings of fact regarding the extent to which expenses for services for plaintiff's care were actually incurred, and whether the circuit court erred by awarding an hourly rate that corporate agencies charge for rendering services, rather than an hourly rate that individual caregivers receive for those services. Upon review, the Court held that "allowable expenses" must be "for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation." Because the Michigan no-fault act does not create different standards depending on who provides the services, this requirement applies equally to services that a family member provides and services that an unrelated caregiver provides. For this case, the Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals correctly determined that plaintiff may recover "allowable expenses" to the extent that they encompass services that are reasonably necessary for plaintiff's care when the care is "related to [plaintiff's] injuries." However, because the circuit court erred by awarding damages for allowable expenses without requiring proof that the underlying charges were actually incurred, the Court agreed with the decision of the Court of Appeals to remand this case to the circuit court for a determination whether charges for allowable expenses were actually incurred. In determining the hourly rate for attendant care services, the circuit court "clearly erred" by ruling that plaintiff was entitled to an hourly rate of $40 for attendant care services because that rate was entirely inconsistent with the evidence of an individual's rate of compensation, including the compensation that plaintiff's wife, actually received as an employee hired to care for plaintiff. The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Douglas v. Allstate Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Kevin Krohn suffered a severe spinal fracture that left him a paraplegic. Plaintiff brought suit under the state no-fault act seeking personal protection insurance benefits from Defendant Home-Owners Insurance Company to cover costs incurred for a surgical procedure performed in Portugal. The procedure was experimental and was not considered a generally accepted treatment for Plaintiff's injury. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether the experimental procedure was a reasonably necessary service for Plaintiff's care, recovery or rehabilitation under state law. Upon review of the record below, the Court concluded that if a medical treatment is experimental and not generally accepted within the medical community, an insured seeking reimbursement for the treatment must present objective and verifiable medical evidence to establish that the treatment was efficacious. In this case, the Court found the procedure was an "understandable" personal decision that offered Plaintiff only a medically unproved "possibility" for an efficacious result. The Court held the procedure was not an allowable expense for insurance reimbursement. The Court affirmed the appellate court that ruled in favor of Defendant. View "Krohn v. Home-Owners Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether a limitations period applied to an action for breach of a construction contract. The Court of Appeals held that the limitations period applied in this case, and that the statute's six-year limit expired before Plaintiff Miller-Davis Company filed its complaint. The appellate court reversed the judgment of the trial court that had awarded Plaintiff damages. Plaintiff argued on appeal to the Supreme Court that a different statute of limitations for breach of contract controlled, and the period prescribed by that statute was the applicable statute for this action. Upon review of the two statutes of limitations, the Supreme Court agreed with Plaintiff. The limitation in both statutes is six years, however, the period runs from "the date the claim first accrued." The Court reversed the appellate court's judgment because there was a question about the date Plaintiff's action accrued. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Miller-Davis Co. v. Ahrens Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded that Defendants Richco Construction, Inc. (Richco) and Ronald Richards, Jr. were personally notified of the default judgment against them and denied their motion to set aside that judgment. The suit arose from a contractual relationship between Plaintiff Lawrence M. Clarke, Inc. (Clarke) and Defendant. Clarke worked on a residential subdivision in 2003, and hired Richco as a subcontractor to work on the sewer system. Richco's work did not satisfy the local governing municipality, and after efforts to repair were unfruitful, Clarke contracted with another party to finish the work. Clark filed a breach of contract and fraud complaint against Richco. The process server attempted to serve Richco at its business address on file with the state, but Richco had vacated the premises and left no forwarding address. Clarke continued in its efforts to locate Richco and refiled its complaint. The trial court permitted alternative service through mailing notice to last-known addresses and a classified advertisement in the local paper. With no response, Clarke moved for a default judgment that the court granted. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by finding that Richco was personally notified, and that Richco was entitled to relief from the default judgment. The Court reversed and remanded the case back to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Lawrence M. Clarke, Inc. v. Richco Construction, Inc." on Justia Law

This appeal challenged the small employer group health coverage act (Act), which establishes requirements for insurance carriers to offer health insurance benefit plans to small employers in Michigan. Priority Health sought a declaratory judgment from the Office of Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS) so that it could allocate a small portion of insurance premiumsâ costs to employers, lessening the financial burden on employees. Priority Health would not renew contracts with employers who did not agree to pay a portion of the premiums. Both the Court of Appeals and the Commissioner of the Office of Financial and Insurance Services (OFIS) concluded that âminimum employer contribution provisionsâ are inconsistent with the Act. They reasoned that an employerâs failure to pay a minimum percentage of its employeesâ premiums is not among the reasons in the Act that a carrier can use to refuse to renew an insurance plan. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court and OFISâ interpretation of the Act. The Court found that just because the Michigan Legislature did not include an employerâs refusal to pay according to a minimum contribution provision as among the reasons for not renewing a contract for benefits, the [Priority Health] provision was unreasonable or inconsistent with the Act. In general, âunless a provision directly conflicts with the enumerated reasons [of the Act], it may be included in a plan so long as it is reasonable and not inconsistent.â The Court remanded the case to the OFIS for further proceedings.

Plaintiff Great Wolf Lodge of Traverse City, LLC (Lodge) is a water park that sits on former farmland. In 2000, the Lodge annexed a new portion of the former farmland to expand its premises. Defendant Cherryland Electric Cooperative (Cherryland) ran an electric line to the former farm. Cherryland insisted that it had exclusive rights to provide electric service to the Lodge. The Lodge did not protest Cherrylandâs assertion in order to keep its expansion project on track. The new Cherryland contract called for discounted rates. Over the course of the contract, Cherryland unilaterally raised the rates. The Lodge filed suit seeking a refund of excess rates it paid to Cherryland, and to have the ability to choose its own electric service provider. A hearing officer would rule in favor of the Lodge on the rate refund, but would not allow it to choose its own service provider, citing Cherrylandâs âright of first entitlementâ that dated back to when it provided service to the farm. The appellate court reversed the hearing officer. One of the issues on appeal to the Supreme Court was whether Cherrylandâs âright of first entitlementâ stopped when the property ownership changed hands. The Court concluded that the right is not extinguished when ownership changes. The Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, and reinstated the decision of the hearing officer.