Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This action involved a request for documents under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU), submitted a FOIA request to defendant, the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), seeking disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether a federal regulation with a nondisclosure component, 8 CFR 236.6 (2021), could be the basis for exempting public records from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d). The Supreme Court held that it could not, "for the simple reason that a regulation is not a statute." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary, and the Court overruled Soave v. Dep’t of Ed, and Mich Council of Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, as to their erroneous interpretations of MCL 15.243(1)(d). The case was remanded back to the Calhoun Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union Of Michigan v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

The League of Women Voters, Progress Michigan, the Coalition to Close Lansing Loopholes, and Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections challenged the constitutionality of 2018 PA 608, which changed the procedures by which the people of Michigan could circulate petitions to invoke the referendum, initiative, and constitutional-amendment processes set forth in Michigan’s Constitution and statutory election laws. Specifically, 2018 PA 608 amended MCL 168.471 to state that no more than 15% of the signatures used to determine the validity of a petition could be from any one congressional district; it amended MCL 168.482 by adding Subsection (7), which required petitions to include checkboxes that would indicate whether the circulator of the petition was a paid signature gatherer or a volunteer; and it added MCL 168.482a, which provided that signature gatherers who were being paid had to, before circulating any petition, file a signed affidavit to that effect with the Secretary of State. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the Court of Claims’ decision, striking as unconstitutional the geographic limitation in MCL 168.471 and the requirement in MCL 168.482(4) that petitions include language identifying the signer’s congressional district. The Court of Appeals also reversed the Court of Claims as to the checkbox and affidavit requirements, holding that the checkbox requirement in MCL 168.482 was constitutional but the affidavit requirement in MCL 168.482a overly burdened the free-speech rights of the petitions’ sponsors. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal, arguing that the checkbox requirement, MCL 168.482(7), was unconstitutional. The Michigan Supreme Court held the 15% cap on signatures from any one congressional district and the precirculation affidavit requirement for paid circulators violated the Michigan Constitution. The checkbox requirement, however, passed constitutional muster. "In light of the chaos and injustice that would ensue were the opinion to be applied retroactively, the decision was given prospective effect only." Any signature gathered after January 24, 2022, must be on a petition that conforms to the requirements of MCL 168.482(7). View "League Of Women Voters Of Michigan v. Michigan Secretary Of State" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Leffew and his wife, Micheline, were convicted by jury of first-degree home invasion and third-degree home invasion, respectively. In September 2017, the Leffews moved to Michigan where they stayed with Jeremiah’s biological mother, Donna Knezevich, and her partner of more than 25 years, Lisa Seibert. A few months before Micheline’s and Jeremiah’s arrival, Seibert and Knezevich had opened their relationship to include Michael Porter. On November 14, 2017, Seibert would later describe an argument as a “little squabble” that got “pretty heated:” Police arrived, and Seibert, on Knezevich’s insistence, left the family home and stayed with Porter. A few days later, though, tempers cooled and Knezevich sought to reconcile. She called Seibert, who was still staying at Porter’s home, and proposed marriage. Seibert accepted and asked Knezevich to pick her up. Knezevich, happy to oblige, went to Porter’s house, accompanied by Jeremiah and Micheline. The parties' accounts of what happened next diverge; but the Leffews were convicted: Micheline of third-degree home invasion based on her commission of a misdemeanor (malicious destruction of a building) while breaking into the home and Jeremiah of first-degree home invasion based on entering the home without permission and committing an assault against Porter; Jeremiah was also convicted of felonious assault. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded Defendants were prejudiced and received ineffective assistance of counsel when their attorneys failed to request a jury instruction on the defense of others. Defendants were entitled to a new trial. The Court of Appeals was reversed and the matter remanded for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Leffew" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Robert Propp was convicted by jury of first-degree premeditated murder. The victim, defendant’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child, was found dead in her own bed. Defendant, who had spent the night with the victim, gave the police several conflicting accounts of what had happened in the preceding hours; however, it was undisputed that the victim had died by neck compression. Before trial, defendant moved for funds to retain an expert in the area of erotic asphyxiation, claiming that the testimony was necessary to support his claim that the victim’s death was accidental. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning that the record did not support that theory. The prosecution then moved to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim as well as prior acts against his ex-wife; the majority of the evidence came in the form of statements the victim had made to friends and family members concerning her relationship with defendant. Defendant objected, arguing that the other-acts evidence was either inadmissible hearsay, or more prejudicial than probative. The court granted the prosecution’s motion in its entirety, and the jury ultimately found defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. In affirming the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion for funds to retain an expert, the Court of Appeals reasoned that because defendant sought appointment of an expert to assert the “affirmative defense” that the victim had died accidentally, he was required, but had failed, to demonstrate a substantial basis for the defense. Defendant appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding: (1) the defense of accident to first-degree premeditated murder was not an affirmative defense; and (2) the trial court erred as a matter of law by failing to consider MRE 802 when determining that the challenged other-acts evidence was admissible. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals’ holding regarding the other-acts evidence had to be reversed and the case remanded for the Court of Appeals to determine whether the rules of evidence would otherwise bar the admission of the other-acts evidence. View "Michigan v. Propp" on Justia Law

Defendant Robert Propp was convicted by jury of first-degree premeditated murder. The victim, defendant’s ex-girlfriend and the mother of his child, was found dead in her own bed. Defendant, who had spent the night with the victim, gave the police several conflicting accounts of what had happened in the preceding hours; however, it was undisputed that the victim had died by neck compression. Before trial, defendant moved for funds to retain an expert in the area of erotic asphyxiation, claiming that the testimony was necessary to support his claim that the victim’s death was accidental. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the record did not support that theory. The prosecution then moved to introduce evidence of defendant’s prior acts of domestic violence against the victim as well as prior acts against his ex-wife; the majority of the evidence came in the form of statements the victim had made to friends and family members concerning her relationship with defendant. Defendant objected, arguing that the other-acts evidence was either inadmissible hearsay or more prejudicial than probative. The court granted the prosecution’s motion in its entirety, and the jury ultimately found defendant guilty as charged. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court o Appeals erred by holding that defendant was required to make the additional showing necessary for affirmative defenses in order to be entitled to expert assistance and by holding that rules of evidence other than MRE 403 do not apply to other-acts evidence admitted under MCL 768.27b. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals in part, reversed the judgment in part, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Propp" on Justia Law

Nicholas Reynolds pleaded no contest to two counts of child sexually abusive activity (CSAA); one count of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III); and one count of assault by strangulation. The circuit court sentenced defendant to 160 to 240 months for the CSAA convictions, 108 to 180 months for the CSC-III conviction, and 72 to 120 months for the assault-by-strangulation conviction. The court ordered that these sentences run concurrently with each other but consecutively to defendant’s sentence for an Illinois child-pornography conviction for which he was on parole when he committed the crimes at issue here. Defendant moved the circuit court to correct an invalid sentence, arguing that his minimum sentencing guidelines range should have also been scored using his convictions for CSAA. The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant then sought leave to appeal in the Court of Appeals, but his application was denied. He then sought leave to appeal with the Michigan Supreme Court, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s sentences. Defendant contended the Court of Appeals erred by holding that he was not entitled to a remand for resentencing because CSAA and CSC-III were both Class B offenses, and defendant’s presentence investigation report (PSIR) should have scored the guidelines for both offenses under MCL 771.14(2)(e). The Michigan Supreme Court agreed with defendant, reversed in part, and remanded to the circuit court for resentencing on defendant’s CSAA convictions. View "Michigan v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

The Detroit News, Inc., Detroit Free Press, Inc., and others filed suit against the Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission, alleging that the commission violated the Michigan Const. 1963, art 4, section 6 by withholding certain data and supporting materials used to develop its proposed redistricting plans and by conducting business during a closed meeting. Plaintiffs sought: (1) a declaratory judgment that Article 4, section 6 required the commission to disclose all supporting materials that it uses to develop its plans; (2) a writ of mandamus compelling the release of supporting materials withheld; (3) a declaratory judgment that Article 4, section 6 required the commission to conduct all of its business in open meetings; and (4) a writ of mandamus requiring the release of the recording of a closed-session meeting and requiring that all future business meetings be open to the public. "From the titles of the memoranda discussed at that meeting, it is beyond dispute that the meeting involved the development of the redistricting maps. Such work is unquestionably within the Commission’s core 'business,' and it therefore needed to be conducted in the open." with respect to disclosure of 10 memoranda that the Commission claimed were privileged attorney-client communications, the Supreme Court concluded that, in light of the constitutional text requiring disclosure of materials that support development of redistricting plans, seven of the memoranda had to be published as “supporting materials” under Const 1963, art 4, section 6(9). "The other three are not 'supporting materials' and therefore need not be disclosed." View "The Detroit News, Inc. v. Independent Citizens Redistricting Commission" on Justia Law

Gerald Magnant and John Davis were each charged with violating MCL 205.428(3) of the Michigan Tobacco Products Tax Act (the TPTA), for transporting 3,000 or more cigarettes without the transporter’s license required by MCL 205.423(1). Defendants were nonsupervisory employees of the Keweenaw Bay Indian Community (KBIC). Michigan State Police pulled over a KBIC-owned pickup truck for speeding. Davis was driving, and consented to a search of a utility trailer, representing to the trooper that it contained “supplies” and “chips.” The trailer actually contained 56 cases holding over 600,000 “Seneca” cigarettes marked with KBIC stamps but not with the Michigan Department of Treasury tax stamps required by the TPTA. Magnant was a passenger, and admitted he helped load the trailer. The parties stipulated that Davis, Magnant, and the KBIC were not licensed to transport tobacco products under the TPTA. Defendants jointly moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that the relevant statutes were unconstitutionally vague because they did not give individual employees, as opposed to businesses, adequate notice that they were subject to the TPTA licensing requirement for transporting cigarettes. A circuit court denied the motion, holding that the language of the TPTA provided adequate notice that an “individual” can be a “transporter” subject to the licensing requirement. The Michigan Supreme Court held that an individual acting as a “transporter” need not have specific awareness of the law that creates the licensing requirement; a conviction for violating MCL 205.428(3) must, at a minimum, be supported by a showing that the individual (1) knew he or she was transporting a regulated amount of cigarettes and (2) knew of facts that conferred “transporter” status upon him or her. In this case, however, the prosecution failed to present any evidence establishing or implying that defendants were aware of facts that conferred transporter status on them. Judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and defendants' joint motion to quash a bindover decision was granted. View "Michigan v. Magant" on Justia Law

In 2004, defendant Gregory Washington was convicted by jury of second-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to commit murder (AWIM), possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. In a 2006 unpublished opinion, an appellate court affirmed defendant’s convictions but remanded the case for resentencing because the trial court had failed to articulate substantial and compelling reasons for its departure from the second-degree murder sentencing guidelines. Before defendant was resentenced, he petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court for review. While the Supreme Court was considering defendant’s application, the trial court resentenced defendant, and he petitioned the Court of Appeals for review of the new sentence. The Supreme Court ultimately denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal his original convictions. After the Court of Appeals also denied defendant’s application for leave to appeal, he filed his second petition to the Supreme Court, which was again denied. Defendant then moved the trial court for relief from judgment, which was denied. Defendant appealed that decision to the Court of Appeals; the Supreme Court denied appeal of the Court of Appeals’ denial. In June 2016, after exhausting all available postconviction relief, defendant filed a second motion for relief from judgment with the trial court, arguing that the trial court had lacked jurisdiction to resentence him in 2006 because his application for leave to appeal in the Supreme Court was pending at the time. The trial court agreed and granted the motion, vacated defendant’s sentence, and ordered resentencing. The prosecution appealed. The Court of Appeals, upheld the trial court’s ruling in a published per curiam opinion, holding that although defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment was barred by MCR 6.502(G), the trial court had lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to enter the second sentence. The Supreme Court concluded the trial court indeed lacked subject-matter jurisdiction when it resentenced defendant in 2006 while his application for leave to appeal was still pending with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court also held the trial court did not err 10 years later in 2016 when it granted defendant relief on that ground, which was raised in defendant’s successive motion for relief from judgment. The matter was remanded for the trial court for resentencing consistent with its 2016 order. View "Michigan v. Washington" on Justia Law

Taxpayers for Michigan Constitutional Government and several individuals brought an original action to the Court of Appeals against the state of Michigan; the Department of Technology, Management, and Budget; and the Office of the Auditor General to enforce section 30 of the Headlee Amendment, Const 1963, art 9, which prohibited the state from reducing its budget for total state spending paid to all units of local government, taken as a group, below that proportion in effect in fiscal year 1978–1979. Plaintiffs: (Count I) alleged the state violated section 30 by classifying as state spending paid to local government monies paid to school districts pursuant to Proposal A, Const 1963, art 9, section 11; (Count II) alleged the same assertion as to monies paid to public school academies (PSAs) pursuant to Proposal A and MCL 380.501(1); (Count III) alleged the state improperly classified as section 30 state spending those funds paid to maintain trunk-line roads; and (Count IV) sought a determination that state funds directed to local governments for new state mandates could not be counted toward the proportion of state funds required by section 30. The Court of Appeal dismissed Count III without prejudice upon stipulation of the parties; all parties moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims. The appellate court granted the state defendants motion on Counts I and II; plaintiffs' motion was granted as to Count IV. Finally, the court granted plaintiffs mandamus relief and directed the state to comply with reporting requirements found in MCL 21.235(3) and MCL 21.241. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded the appellate court erred when it held that PSAs were “school districts” as the term was used in the Headlee Amendment. Further, the Court held PSAs were themselves not a “political subdivision of the state” as voters would have understood the term when the Headlee Amendment was ratified. The Court thus reversed the conclusion reached in Part III(C) of the Court of Appeals opinion that PSAs were “school districts” and remanded to the Court of Appeals for its reconsideration of this issue. The Supreme Court vacated the panel’s grant of mandamus in Part III(E), and directed the Court of Appeals to provide further explanation of its decision to grant this extraordinary remedy. View "Taxpayers for Michigan Constitutional Govt. v. Michigan" on Justia Law