Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Nancy Peeler (Docket No. 163667), Richard Baird (Docket No. 163672), and Nicolas Lyon (Docket No. 164191) were charged with various offenses for actions they took as state employees during the Flint water crisis. The cases did not proceed by the prosecutor issuing criminal complaints. Instead, at the request of the Attorney General’s office, the prosecutor proceeded under MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4, which authorized the use of a “one-man grand jury.” Judge David Newblatt served as the one-man grand jury, considered the evidence behind closed doors, and then issued indictments against defendants; defendants’ cases were assigned to a circuit court judge. Peeler and Baird moved to remand their cases for a preliminary examination, but the court denied the motion, holding that indicted persons have no right to a preliminary examination. Peeler and Baird filed interlocutory applications for leave to appeal with the Court of Appeals, but the appellate court denied the motion. Lyon moved to dismiss the charges against him, arguing that he had a statutory right to a preliminary examination, that MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4 did not confer the one-man grand jury with charging authority, and that those statutes violated the separation-of- powers doctrine and the right to due process. The circuit court denied the motion. Lyon sought an interlocutory application for leave to appeal that decision. Peeler and Baird sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ denial of their applications to the Michigan Supreme Court, and Lyon sought leave to appeal the circuit court’s decision to the Michigan Supreme Court prior to a decision by the Court of Appeals. The Supreme Court concluded the circuit court erred by denying Peeler’s and Baird’s motions to remand for a preliminary examination. Further, while MCL 767.3 and MCL 767.4 authorized the use of a one-man grand jury to investigate, subpoena witnesses, and issue arrest warrants, those statutes did not authorize that one-man grand jury to issue an indictment initiating a criminal prosecution. The circuit court therefore also erred by denying Lyon’s motion to dismiss. View "Michigan v. Peeler" on Justia Law

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John Moss was convicted of third-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-III) after he pleaded no contest to the charge. The charge stemmed from allegations made by defendant’s adoptive sister. In exchange for his plea, the trial court dismissed the other charges that had been brought against defendant, including another count of CSC-III, and a fourth-offense habitual-offender enhancement. Defendant and the complainant did not have a birth parent in common, but they were both adopted by the same woman. After sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his plea, arguing for the first time that he was not related to the complainant by either blood or affinity. The trial court denied the motion, determining that, although the adoptive siblings were not related by blood, they were related by affinity. Defendant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals; the Court denied the application in an unpublished order. Defendant then sought leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals to address whether a family relation that arises from a legal adoption was either effectively a blood relation, or a relation by affinity, as those terms were used in MCL 750.520b through MCL 750.520e. On remand, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion, reasoning that defendant and the complainant were effectively related by blood. With that finding, the appeals court considered it unnecessary to address whether defendant and the complainant were related by affinity, but it did so anyway because of the remand order and concluded that they were not related by affinity. Defendant again sought leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed, finding that defendant and the complainant, were adoptive siblings, and were not related by blood for purposes of the statute. "[T]he Court of Appeals erred by concluding otherwise." Because the order directing oral argument on the application only asked the parties to address whether defendant and the complainant were related by blood, the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that defendant and the complainant were not related by affinity was left undisturbed. Because an adequate factual basis for defendant’s plea did not exist in light of the Courts’ legal rulings, the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Moss" on Justia Law

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Defendant Hamin Dixon pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a cell phone. Defendant was serving a sentence at a state correctional facility when prison staff found him in a bathroom stall near a cell phone. A cell phone charger was later found during a search of defendant’s shared prison cell. Defendant was charged with possession of a cell phone in a prison and pleaded guilty to attempted possession in exchange for dismissal of the possession charge and withdrawal of the prosecution’s request for habitual-offender sentencing. The court sentenced defendant to 11 to 30 months in prison and assessed 25 points under Offense Variable (OV) 19, MCL 777.49(a). Defendant later moved to correct an invalid sentence, arguing that the court should have assessed zero points under OV 19 because there was no evidence that his conduct had threatened the security of the prison. The court denied the motion, concluding that there was no set of circumstances under which possession of a cell phone would not threaten the security of a prison. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding that because the sentencing court found no facts beyond constructive possession, there was no evidence that defendant’s conduct threatened the security of the prison, so OV 19 was improperly scored. View "Michigan v. Dixon" on Justia Law

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Defendant Kevin White, Jr., was charged with aiding and abetting the delivery of a controlled substance causing death, for allegedly selling drugs in Macomb County that later caused the fatal overdose in Livingston County. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that under Michigan v. McBurrows, 504 Mich 308 (2019), venue was proper only in Macomb County. The court denied the motion, but stayed the proceedings so that defendant could appeal the decision. After granting defendant’s application for an interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that venue was proper in Livingston County under MCL 762.8, which allowed certain felonies to be prosecuted in any county that the defendant intended the felony or acts done in perpetration of the felony to have an effect. Defendant sought leave to appeal this decision, and the Michigan Supreme Court peremptorily reversed the Court of Appeals, holding that there was no evidence that defendant knew that the drugs would be consumed in Livingston County. On remand, the Court of Appeals once again affirmed the trial court in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Defendant applied for leave to appeal, and the Supreme Court ordered and heard oral argument on whether to grant the application or take other action. The Supreme Court held that the county in which the criminal act of the principal occurred was a proper venue, therefore affirming the Court of Appeals. View "Michigan v. White, Jr." on Justia Law

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Defendant Theodore Wafer was convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, statutory involuntary manslaughter, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), for the killing of Renisha McBride. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 15 to 30 years for second-degree murder and 7 to 15 years for manslaughter, to be served consecutively to the two-year term of imprisonment for felony-firearm. In the early morning hours one day in November 2013, McBride crashed her vehicle into a parked car. Around 4:00 a.m., McBride arrived at defendant’s home, and defendant heard someone banging on his door. Defendant retrieved his shotgun, believing that someone was trying to break into his house. He opened the door a few inches and fired his gun when he saw a person approaching the door, shooting McBride in the face and killing her. Defendant appealed his convictions, alleging, among other things, that the multiple punishments for second-degree murder and statutory involuntary manslaughter violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s convictions for these two offenses did not violate double-jeopardy protections because each offense contained different elements. Defendant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court initially denied leave to appeal, but upon reconsideration, heard argument on whether to grant defendant’s application or take other action regarding his double-jeopardy claim. The Court determined conviction of both second-degree murder and statutory involuntary manslaughter for the death of a single victim violated the multiple-punishments strand of state and federal double-jeopardy jurisprudence. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals judgment was reversed, defendant’s statutory manslaughter conviction vacated, and the case remanded for resentencing. View "Michigan v. Wafer" on Justia Law

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Defendant Donald Davis, Jr., was convicted by jury on multiple felonies in connection with the shooting death of Devante Hanson. During a recess on the second day of the trial, the mother of the victim’s child made contact with a juror in the hallway. When the trial resumed, the court ordered the woman and all other spectators, with the exception of the victim’s mother, removed from the courtroom and directed them not to return for the remainder of the trial. After his conviction, defendant appealed and moved to remand for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that he had been denied his constitutional right to a public trial and that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object to the closure of the courtroom. The Court of Appeals granted the motion. On remand, following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, stating that it had not actually closed the courtroom to the public and that the doors were never locked. In addition, the court concluded that while it had poorly worded its directive to the spectators not to return during the trial, defendant was not prejudiced by the removal because no one supporting defendant had been affected by the removal order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the courtroom had been “cleared” rather than closed, that defendant had waived his right to a public trial when defense counsel failed to object to the clearing of the courtroom, and that even if the courtroom had been closed and the error had been forfeited rather than waived, defendant would not have been entitled to relief because any error in this regard would not have warranted reversal. The Michigan Supreme Court found that the trial court’s closure of the courtroom for nearly the entirety of defendant’s trial after a single, benign interaction between an observer and a juror constituted plain error. Because the deprivation of a defendant’s public-trial right was a structural error, the error necessarily affected defendant’s substantial rights. This structural error presumptively satisfied the plain-error standard’s requirements for reversal, and neither the prosecution’s arguments nor the record evidence rebutted that presumption. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Davis" on Justia Law

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Donald Davis was convicted by jury on multiple felonies relating to the shooting death of Devante Hanson. During a recess on the second day of the trial, the mother of the victim’s child made contact with a juror in the hallway. When the trial resumed, the trial court ordered the woman and all other spectators, with the exception of the victim’s mother, removed from the courtroom and directed them not to return for the remainder of the trial. After his conviction, defendant appealed and moved to remand for an evidentiary hearing, arguing that he had been denied his constitutional right to a public trial and that his trial counsel had been ineffective for failing to object to the closure of the courtroom. The Court of Appeals granted the motion. On remand, the trial court denied defendant’s motion for a new trial, stating that it had not actually closed the courtroom to the public and that the doors were never locked. In addition, the court concluded that while it had poorly worded its directive to the spectators not to return during the trial, defendant was not prejudiced by the removal because no one supporting defendant had been affected by the removal order. The Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that the courtroom had been “cleared” rather than closed, that defendant had waived his right to a public trial when defense counsel failed to object to the clearing of the courtroom, and that even if the courtroom had been closed and the error had been forfeited rather than waived, defendant would not have been entitled to relief because any error in this regard would not have warranted reversal. Davis petitioned the Michigan Supreme Court, which vacated the trial court's judgment. The Supreme Court found the trial court’s closure of the courtroom for nearly the entirety of defendant’s trial after a single, benign interaction between an observer and a juror constituted plain error. Because the deprivation of a defendant’s public-trial right was a structural error, the error necessarily affected defendant’s substantial rights. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Davis" on Justia Law

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The League of Women Voters, Progress Michigan, the Coalition to Close Lansing Loopholes, and Michiganders for Fair and Transparent Elections brought an action in the Court of Claims against the Michigan Secretary of State, challenging the constitutionality of 2018 PA 608, which changed the procedures by which the people of Michigan could circulate petitions to invoke the referendum, initiative, and constitutional-amendment processes set forth in Michigan’s Constitution and statutory election laws. The Court of Claims struck down the geographical limitation in MCL 168.471 as well as the checkbox requirement of MCL 168.482(7); however, it ruled that the affidavit requirement, MCL 168.482a, was constitutional. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part the Court of Claims’ decision, striking as unconstitutional the geographic limitation in MCL 168.471 and the requirement in MCL 168.482(4) that petitions include language identifying the signer’s congressional district. The Court of Appeals also reversed the Court of Claims as to the checkbox and affidavit requirements, holding that the checkbox requirement in MCL 168.482 was constitutional but the affidavit requirement in MCL 168.482a overly burdened the free-speech rights of the petitions’ sponsors. Plaintiffs sought leave to appeal, arguing that the checkbox requirement, MCL 168.482(7), was unconstitutional. The Department of the Attorney General sought leave to appeal the Court of Appeals’ holdings as to the 15% geographic requirement, MCL 168.471, and the affidavit requirement, MCL 168.482a. Defendant Secretary of State sought leave to appeal in order to request that, regardless of the outcome, the decision be applied only prospectively. The Michigan Supreme Court held the 15% cap on signatures from any one congressional district and the pre-circulation affidavit requirement for paid circulators violated the Michigan Constitution. The checkbox requirement, however, passed constitutional muster. "In light of the chaos and injustice that would ensue were the opinion to be applied retroactively," the decision was given prospective effect only. View "League Of Women Voters Of Michigan, et al. v. Secretary Of State" on Justia Law

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Jeremiah and his wife Micheline Leffew, were convicted by jury trial in the for first-degree home invasion and third-degree home invasion. Defendants went to the home of Michael Porter with Jeremiah’s mother, Donna Knezevich, to pick up Lisa Seibert, Knezevich’s partner. When defendants and Knezevich arrived at Porter’s residence, Porter briefly answered the door before closing it; Seibert did not leave. Defendants and Porter disagreed as to whether Porter had prevented Seibert from leaving the home. Defendants testified that Porter had dragged Seibert into a room in the back of the home and forcibly held her down in a chair, while Porter claimed that he had picked Seibert up and put her in a chair to help her get her bearings after she had become unsteady on her feet. Both defendants testified that they heard Seibert scream for help and that they had then entered the home without Porter’s permission. Micheline had entered the home first after kicking in the back door, and she was immediately hit over the head with a glass ashtray by Porter, causing bleeding and a seizure. Jeremiah entered the home after seeing his injured wife on the floor and got into a physical altercation with Porter. The fight eventually ended when, according to Jeremiah, he threatened Porter with a knife while pleading with him to let his family go; or, according to Porter, the fight ended when Knezevich called out to Jeremiah, after Jeremiah had struck Porter with a knife and cut Porter’s wrist. Defendants’ attorneys both argued that defendants’ intrusions into Porter’s home were justified because of their reasonable fear that Seibert was in imminent danger, but neither attorney requested a jury instruction on defense of others. Defendants appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed defendants’ convictions. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding Defendants were prejudiced and received ineffective assistance of counsel when their attorneys failed to request a jury instruction on the defense of others. The case was remanded for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Leffew" on Justia Law

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Defendant Theodore Wafer was convicted by jury of second-degree murder, statutory involuntary manslaughter, and carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony (felony-firearm), for the killing of Renisha McBride. Defendant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms of 15 to 30 years for second-degree murder and 7 to 15 years for manslaughter, to be served consecutively to the two-year term of imprisonment for felony-firearm. McBride crashed her vehicle into a parked car around 1:00 a.m. in November 2013. Around 4:00 a.m., McBride arrived at defendant’s home, and defendant heard someone banging on his door. Defendant retrieved his shotgun, believing that someone was trying to break into his house. He opened the door a few inches and fired his gun when he saw a person approaching the door, shooting McBride in the face and killing her. Defendant appealed his convictions, alleging, among other things, that the multiple punishments for second-degree murder and statutory involuntary manslaughter violated the Double Jeopardy Clauses of the United States and Michigan Constitutions. In an unpublished opinion, the Michigan Court of Appeals concluded that defendant’s convictions for these two offenses did not violate double-jeopardy protections because each offense contained different elements. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, finding conviction of both second-degree murder and statutory involuntary manslaughter for the death of a single victim violated the multiple-punishments strand of state and federal double-jeopardy jurisprudence. View "Michigan v. Wafer" on Justia Law