Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted leave in two cases to address the question whether a person injured while driving a motor vehicle that the person had taken contrary to the express prohibition of the owner may avail himself or herself of personal protection insurance benefits (PIP benefits) under the no-fault act, notwithstanding the fact that MCL 500.3113(a) bars a person from receiving PIP benefits for injuries suffered while using a vehicle that he or she "had taken unlawfully, unless the person reasonably believed that he or she was entitled to take and use the vehicle." Upon review, the Supreme Court held that any person who takes a vehicle contrary to a provision of the Michigan Penal Code (including MCL 750.413 and MCL 750.414, the "joyriding" statutes) has taken the vehicle unlawfully for purposes of MCL 500.3113(a). Furthermore, the Court held that the use of the phrase "a person" in MCL 500.3113(a) "clearly and plainly" includes a family member who has taken a vehicle unlawfully, thereby precludes that person from receiving PIP benefits. View "Spectrum Health Hospitals v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co. of Michigan" on Justia Law

In July 2004, while walking through a gas station parking lot, plaintiff was struck by a motor vehicle driven by defendant, who was insured by Allstate Property and Casualty Insurance Company. At the time, plaintiff lived with Harrietta Johnson, her ex-mother-in-law. Neither woman owned a vehicle, and neither was insured. Plaintiff filed a third-party tort claim against defendant, seeking damages for replacement services pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c). The trial court granted summary judgment in defendant's favor, concluding that plaintiff could not recover damages for replacement services pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c).The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether, in a third-party tort action, damages for replacement services are recoverable pursuant to MCL 500.3135(3)(c). Because "replacement services" is not among the categories listed in MCL 500.3135(3)(c), damages for replacement services are not recoverable in such an action. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment in part and reinstated the trial court's grant of summary disposition in defendant's favor on plaintiff's economic damages claim for replacement services expenses. View "Johnson v. Recca" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether expert witness testimony regarding interrogation techniques and psychological factors claimed to generate false confessions was admissible under MRE 702 and MRE 403 and whether exclusion of this testimony violated the Sixth Amendment right to present a defense. The circuit court excluded the testimony of two experts regarding the occurrence of false confessions and the police interrogation techniques likely to generate them as well as the psychological characteristics of defendant that allegedly made him more susceptible to these techniques. Upon review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion by excluding the expert testimony regarding the published literature on false confessions and police interrogations on the basis of its determination that the testimony was not reliable, even though the subject of the proposed testimony was beyond the common knowledge of the average juror. The Court also held that the circuit court abused its discretion by excluding the proffered testimony regarding defendant's psychological characteristics because it failed to consider this evidence separately from the properly excluded general expert testimony and therefore failed to properly apply both MRE 702 and MRE 403 to that evidence. Accordingly, the Court remanded this case to the circuit court for it to determine whether evidence of defendant's psychological characteristics was sufficiently reliable for admissibility under MRE 702. Furthermore, the Court held that the circuit court's application of MRE 702 did not violate defendant's constitutional right to present a defense. View "Michigan v. Kowalski" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether Michigan State University (MSU) Ordinance 15.05 is facially unconstitutional. This case arose from a parking citation that Defendant Jared Rapp received when his car was parked in an MSU parking structure. On the day the citation was issued, MSU parking enforcement employee Ricardo Rego was working on campus. Defendant confronted Rego and asked if Rego was the one who had issued the citation. Defendant was shouting, which led Rego to believe that defendant was acting aggressively. Rego got into his service vehicle and called the campus police. Approximately 10 to 15 minutes passed before the police arrived. During that time, Rego sat in his service vehicle and completed the process for having an adjacent vehicle towed, while defendant stood outside the service vehicle and took pictures of Rego with a camera phone. Defendant was charged with the misdemeanor offense of violating MSU Ordinance 15.05. A district court jury convicted defendant of violating the ordinance. On appeal, the circuit court reversed the conviction on the basis that the ordinance was unconstitutionally overbroad on its face. The circuit court also granted defendant’s motion brought pursuant to MCR 7.101(O) to tax costs against the prosecution. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court’s conclusion that the ordinance is unconstitutional under "City of Houston, Texas v Hill," (482 US 451 (1987)). Because the Supreme Court agreed with the circuit court’s analysis and concluded that the language in the ordinance making it an offense to “disrupt the normal activity” of a protected person is facially overbroad as articulated by the United States Supreme Court in "Hill," the Court reversed the portion of the Court of Appeals’ judgment pertaining to the constitutionality of MSU Ordinance 15.05, and reinstated the circuit court’s decision with regard to this issue to the extent that the circuit court held that the quoted language was facially unconstitutional. The Court affirmed that portion of the appellate court's judgment that held costs could not be assessed to the prosecution in criminal matters. View "Michigan v. Rapp" on Justia Law

In this joint and several liability medical malpractice case, Defendant Dr. Martin Tuma sought a reduction of the final judgment rendered against him by the amount of his codefendants' settlement. The issue before the Supreme Court concerned the common-law "setoff rule," whereby a jointly and severally liable tortfeasor is entitled to a setoff from any adverse verdict in the amount of the cotortfeasor's settlement, and the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, which limits a medical malpractice plaintiff's recovery of noneconomic damages. Both the circuit court and Court of Appeals held pursuant to "Markley v Oak Health Care Investors of Coldwater, Inc." that the common-law setoff rule applied and that the setoff must be applied to the jury's verdict before application of the cap on noneconomic damages. Upon review, the Supreme Court agreed with the lower courts that "Markley" was correctly decided and thus held that the Legislature did not abolish the common-law setoff rule in the context of joint and several liability medical malpractice cases. "[The Court affirmed] the Court of Appeals in this regard and further clarif[ed] that where the Legislature has retained principles of joint and several liability, the common-law setoff rule applie[d]. The lower courts' sequencing of the setoff and the noneconomic damages cap, however, result[ed]in an outcome contrary to the Legislature's requirement that medical malpractice plaintiffs 'shall not' recover more noneconomic losses than the amount determined by MCL 600.1483. . . . Because application of the setoff to the jury's verdict can result in a recovery beyond those statutorily mandated damages limitations," the Court held further that a joint tortfeasor's settlement must be set off from the final judgment after application of the noneconomic damages cap of MCL 600.1483, as well as the collateral source rule. View "Velez v. Tuma" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a Michigan Department of State (DOS) certificate of mailing is testimonial in nature, and whether its admission without accompanying witness testimony violated the Confrontation Clause of the state and federal constitutions. The DOS generated the certificate of mailing to certify that it had mailed a notice of driver suspension to a group of suspended drivers. The prosecution sought to introduce this certificate to prove the notice element of the charged crime, driving while license revoked or suspended (DWLS), second offense. Upon review of the matter, the Supreme Court held that a DOS certificate of mailing is not testimonial because the circumstances under which it was generated would not lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for use at a later trial. Instead, the circumstances reflected that the creation of a certificate of mailing, which is necessarily generated before the commission of any crime, is a function of the legislatively authorized administrative role of the DOS independent from any investigatory or prosecutorial purpose. Therefore, the DOS certificate of mailing may be admitted into evidence absent accompanying witness testimony without violating the Confrontation Clause. View "Michigan v. Nunley" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether MCR 6.302 and constitutional due process require a trial court to inform a defendant pleading guilty or no contest to first-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSC-I) or second-degree criminal sexual conduct (CSCII) that he or she will be sentenced to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring, if required by MCL 750.520b(2)(d) or MCL 750.520c(2)(b). Defendant David Cole was charged with two counts of CSC-II under MCL 750.520c(1)(a). The trial court agreed not to exceed a five-year minimum term of imprisonment for each charge, with the sentences to run concurrently. At the plea hearing, the prosecution read both CSC-II counts and described them as being punishable by up to 15 years in prison and requiring mandatory testing for sexually transmitted diseases. Defendant indicated to the trial court that he understood the CSC-II charges and that he faced a maximum penalty of 15 years' imprisonment. The trial court stated that it had agreed to a five-year concurrent cap on the minimum sentence, but that it had made no other agreement with regard to the plea or the sentence. The trial court never informed Defendant that, if sentenced to prison, he would be subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring. Defendant moved to amend the judgment of sentence or permit withdrawal of his plea, arguing in part that the failure to advise him of the mandatory penalty of lifetime electronic monitoring rendered his plea involuntary. The trial court denied the motion, and Defendant sought leave to appeal. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and remanded to allow Defendant the opportunity to withdraw his plea. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring is part of the sentence itself. Therefore, at the time a defendant enters a guilty or no-contest plea, the trial court must inform the defendant if he or she will be subject to mandatory lifetime electronic monitoring. In the absence of this information about a direct and automatic consequence of a defendant's decision to enter a plea and forgo his or her right to a trial, no defendant could be said to have entered an understanding and voluntary plea. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals on this issue. View "Michigan v. Cole" on Justia Law

Defendant James Buie was convicted in 2001 of sexually assaulting BS and two female minors: LS, age 13, and DS, age 9. The assaults occurred after BS, seeking to trade sex for cocaine, invited defendant into the apartment where she was babysitting LS and DS. In lieu of the desired bargain, Defendant held BS at gunpoint and raped her, LS, and DS. LS and DS were unable to identify the man who assaulted them, but at trial BS identified defendant as the perpetrator of the crimes. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether witness testimony taken by two-way, interactive video was properly admitted during defendant’s trial. The Court's consideration implicated two issues: (1) whether Defendant's constitutional right to be confronted with the witnesses against him was violated by the admission of video testimony; and (2) whether the admission of video testimony violated MCR 6.006(C). Because the Court concluded that Defendant waived his right of confrontation under the United States and Michigan Constitutions and that the court rule was not violated, it reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment and remanded the case back to the appellate court for consideration of Defendant’s remaining issues. View "Michigan v. Buie" on Justia Law

This case required the Supreme Court to revisit and reemphasize, several aspects of the test governing motions for a new trial, set forth in "Michigan v. Cress" (664 NW2d 174 (2003)). The Court began with "the unremarkable observation that when the Defendant possesses knowledge of evidence at the time of trial, that evidence cannot be characterized as 'newly discovered' under the first part of the 'Cress' test." In addition, the Court clarified that knowledge of evidence at the time of trial necessarily implicates the third part of the "Cress" test, which requires the Defendant to undertake "reasonable diligence" to discover and produce the evidence at trial. Furthermore, the Court emphasized that the Defendant carries the burden of making the requisite showing regarding each of the four parts of the "Cress" test. "Adherence to these principles-- each of which is discernable from our caselaw-- is necessary to maintain the balance between generally upholding the finality of criminal judgments, and unsettling such judgments in the unusual case in which justice under the law requires." In this case, the Court concluded that the Court of Appeals "strayed" from these principles by overlooking that Defendant and defense counsel were both well aware at the time of trial alleged newly discovered evidence could have supported the defense and impermissibly relieved Defendant of her burden of showing that she could not, through the exercise of reasonable diligence, have discovered and produced the evidence at trial. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, reinstated the trial court's order denying Defendant's motion for a new trial, and remanded to the Court of Appeals for consideration of Defendant's remaining issues. View "Michigan v. Rao" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Defendant Auto Club Insurance Association's bypass application for leave to appeal in this case to determine whether the minority/insanity tolling provision of MCL 600.5851(1) applied to toll the one-year-back rule in MCL 500.3145(1) of the no-fault act. Plaintiff Doreen Joseph sought to recover no-fault benefits for losses dating back 32 years before she brought her action. In denying Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment, the circuit court relied on "Univ. of Mich. Regents v Titan Ins Co." to hold that the minority/insanity tolling provision tolls the one-year-back rule. The Court once again held that the minority/insanity tolling provision, which addresses only when an action may be brought, does not preclude the application of the one-year-back rule, which separately limits the amount of benefits that can be recovered: "We recognize the necessity for, and value of, stability in the law and take no pleasure in overruling a precedent of recent vintage by this Court. But 'Regents' itself simply failed to apply our then recent decision in 'Cameron,' resulting in a decision that patently failed to enforce the requirements of the statutes that it interpreted. Because the holding in Regents contravened the Legislature's clear and unambiguous language in MCL 500.3145(1) and MCL 600.5851(1), Regents is overruled and we reinstate 'Cameron.'" The case was remanded back to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Joseph v. Auto Club Insurance Ass'n" on Justia Law