Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Kenneth Admire was seriously injured when the motorcycle he was riding collided with a car being operated by an insured of Defendant Auto-Owners Insurance Company. Following the accident, Kenneth required wheelchair-accessible transportation. Through his guardian Russ Admire, brought an action against Auto-Owners Insurance Company, seeking payment of personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits under the no-fault act. Auto-Owners had agreed to pay the full cost of purchasing a van modified to accommodate Kenneth’s wheelchair. Kenneth’s guardian gave Auto-Owners notice of his intent to purchase a new van. In response, Auto-Owners stated that it was not obligated to pay the base purchase price of a new van, but that it would pay for the necessary modifications if Kenneth’s guardian purchased a new vehicle for him. Kenneth’s guardian purchased the new van for Kenneth, and after the cost of the modifications was reimbursed and the trade-in value was applied, Kenneth was left with $18,388.50 in out-of-pocket expenses for the modified van. Kenneth brought suit seeking reimbursement for the out-of-pocket expenses. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Kenneth, but the Supreme Court reversed: Auto-Owners met its statutory obligation to pay for the transportation expenses recoverable under the statute, by paying for the van’s modifications and reimbursing him for mileage to and from his medical appointments. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that the base price of the van was compensable. View "Admire v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co. " on Justia Law

Defendant Rodney Lee Koon was stopped for speeding. During the stop, defendant voluntarily produced a marijuana pipe and informed the arresting officer that he was a registered patient under the MMMA and was permitted to possess marijuana. A blood test to which defendant voluntarily submitted several hours later revealed that his blood had a THC content of 10 ng/ml. The State charged defendant with operating a motor vehicle with the presence of a schedule 1 controlled substance in his body under MCL 257.625(8). The prosecution sought a jury instruction that the presence of marijuana in defendant's system resulted in a per se violation of the Michigan Vehicle Code. Defendant argued that the zero-tolerance provision could not possibly apply to MMMA registered patients because the MMMA prevented the prosecution of registered patients for the medical use of marijuana, including internal possession, and only withdraws its protection when the patient drives while "under the influence" of marijuana. Moreover, the MMMA resolved conflicts between all other acts and the MMMA by exempting the medical use of marijuana from the application of any inconsistent act. The district court and circuit court agreed with defendant. The Court of Appeals reversed, reasoning that the MMMA yielded to the Legislature's determination in MCL 257.625(8) that it is unsafe for a person to drive with any marijuana in his or her system. The issue before the Supreme Court centered on whether the MMMA's protection superseded the Michigan Vehicle Code's prohibition and allowed a registered patient to drive when he or she has indications of marijuana in his or her system but is not otherwise under the influence of marijuana. The Court concluded that it did. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals, reinstated the judgment of the Circuit Court, and remanded this case to the District Court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Koon" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Bruce Whitman had been employed by defendant City of Burton as the police chief from 2002 until 2007. Codefendant Charles Smiley, the Mayor, declined to reappoint plaintiff. Plaintiff then filed suit under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA), alleging that he was not reappointed because he had threatened to pursue criminal charges against the mayor if the city did not comply with a city ordinance and pay him for unused sick, personal and vacation time he accumulated in 2003. Defendants contended that plaintiff had agreed to forgo any payout for accumulated leave in order to avoid a severe budgetary shortfall and that plaintiff was not reappointed because the mayor was dissatisfied with plaintiff's performance as police chief. A jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff; the trial court denied defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. Defendants then appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that plaintiff's claim was not actionable under the WPA because he had acted to advance his own financial interests and not out of an altruistic motive of protecting the public. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that nothing in the WPA's language addressed an employee's motivation for engaging in protected conduct, nor did any language mandate that the employee's primary motivation for pursuing a claim under the Act be a desire to inform the public of matters of public concern. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for consideration of remaining issues on which that court did not formally rule, including whether the causation element of the WPA had been met. View "Whitman v. City of Burton" on Justia Law

Elba Township brought an action against the Gratiot County Drain Commissioner seeking to enjoin the commissioner from consolidating the drainage districts associated with the No. 181-0 drain and its tributary drains. Elba Township argued that the consolidation proceedings had violated the Drain Code because the No. 181-0 drain petition for consolidation lacked the statutorily required number of freeholder signatures and the notice of the hearing by the board of determination had been deficient. Plaintiffs David Osborn, Mark Crumbaugh, Cloyd Cordray, and Rita Cordray intervened, similarly seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and claiming that the petition was defective and that the notice of the meeting of the board of determination was defective, resulting in a violation of their due process rights. With regard to the due process claim, plaintiffs’ primary complaint was that some of the property that would be affected by the drainage project lay outside the townships listed in the notice, although the notice stated that it was being sent to persons liable for an assessment. The drain commissioner moved for summary judgment, arguing that the appropriate number of signatures had been gathered and that the notice given appropriately informed those affected by the proposed consolidation of the date, time, and place of the board-of-determination hearing. Elba Township and plaintiffs filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court granted the drain commissioner’s motion, finding that only 5 freeholder signatures were required on the petition rather than the 50 signatures the township claimed. Elba Township and the Osborn plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s exercise of equitable jurisdiction, but reversed on the merits. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the lower courts improperly exercised equitable jurisdiction over the signature-requirement question but properly exercised such jurisdiction over the question of notice. "The former question is purely statutory and, as such, there were no grounds on which the lower courts could properly exercise equitable jurisdiction. Though the exercise of equitable jurisdiction over the latter question was proper, we conclude that constitutional due process did not entitle plaintiffs to receive notice of the 'board of determination' hearing. The trial court’s order granting summary judgment for defendant was reinstated. View "Elba Township v. Gratiot County Drain Commissioner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Beckie Price sued Defendant High Pointe Oil Company, Inc. claiming, among other things, for damages for the mental anguish, emotional distress, and other psychological injuries sustained when High Pointe negligently pumped 400 gallons of oil into the basement of her house. The incident created a hazard such that Plaintiff's house had to be razed. High Pointe moved for summary judgment, aruging that noneconomic damages resulting from real property damage were not compensable. The circuit court denied part of High Pointe's motion, concluding that damages could be recovered in a negligence action. The jury awarded Plaintiff $100,000 for noneconomic damages; High Pointe moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The circuit court denied High Pointe's motion, and the company subsequently appealed. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that no Michigan case has ever allowed a plaintiff to recover noneconomic damages resulting solely from the negligent destruction of property, either real or personal. "Rather, the common law of this state has long provided that the appropriate measure of damages in cases involving the negligent destruction of property is simply the cost of replacement or repair of the property." The Court reversed and remanded the case for entry of summary judgment in High Pointe's favor. View "Price v. High Pointe Oil Company, Inc." on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court in this case concerned whether defendant Kadeem White was subjected to "interrogation" or "express questioning or its functional equivalent" after he invoked his right to remain silent. Defendant allegedly turned a drug buy into an armed robbery by pulling out a gun instead of making the purchase. He and the victim allegedly struggled over the gun, the gun went off, and the victim was killed. Defendant was then taken into custody. Because the Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that defendant was not subjected to such questioning after he invoked his right to remain silent, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals, which correctly reversed the trial court's decision to suppress defendant's voluntarily given confession. View "Michigan v. White" on Justia Law

The Isabella County Prosecuting Attorney filed a complaint for a temporary restraining order, a show-cause order, a preliminary injunction, and a permanent injunction, seeking to enjoin the operation of Compassionate Apothecary, LLC (CA), a medical-marijuana dispensary that was owned and operated by Brandon McQueen and Matthew Taylor. McQueen was a registered qualifying patient and a registered primary caregiver for three qualifying patients under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA). Taylor was the registered primary caregiver for two qualifying patients. They operated CA as a membership organization. The prosecuting attorney alleged that McQueen and Taylor’s operation of CA did not comply with the MMMA, was contrary to the Public Health Code (PHC), and, thus, was a public nuisance. The court denied the prosecuting attorney’s requests for a temporary restraining order, a show-cause order and injunction, concluding that the operation of CA was in compliance with the MMMA because the patient-to-patient transfers of marijuana that CA facilitated fell within the act’s definition of the “medical use” of marijuana. The prosecuting attorney appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, concluding that defendants’ operation of CA was an enjoinable public nuisance because the operation of CA violated the PHC, which prohibits the possession and delivery of marijuana. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals reached the correct result because the act does not permit a registered qualifying patient to transfer marijuana for another registered qualifying patient’s medical use. Accordingly, the prosecuting attorney was entitled to injunctive relief to enjoin the operation of defendants’ business because it constituted a public nuisance. View "Michigan v. McQueen" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether Defendant-Appellant Joseph Vaughn was entitled to a new trial because the circuit court closed the courtroom during voir dire in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. In 2002, Defendant was arrested on weapons and attempted murder charges when he shot at a retired police officer and a neighbor. Upon review of the circuit court record, the Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to a public trial is subject to the forfeiture rule articulated in "Michigan v Carines" (597 NW2d 130 (1999)) and that the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that defendant's failure to assert his public trial right necessarily "forecloses the later grant of relief." In applying the "Carines" forfeiture rule to defendant's appeal, however, the Court concluded that defendant was not entitled to a new trial because he did not establish that his forfeited claim of error "seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Furthermore, the Court concluded that defendant was not entitled to a new trial on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the Court vacated the Court of Appeals' opinion to the extent that it was inconsistent with this opinion, and affirmed defendant's convictions.View "Michigan v. Vaughn" on Justia Law

This case presented the question of whether Defendant Ramon Bryant was denied his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community. A fair-cross-section claim under the Sixth Amendment requires a defendant to make a prima facie case as set forth by the United States Supreme Court in "Duren v Missouri," (439 U.S. 357 (1979)). The Court of Appeals concluded that defendant had satisfied the three Duren prongs, establishing a violation of his right to an impartial jury drawn from a fair cross section of the community, and granted defendant a new trial. In its review, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred because defendant failed to show under the second prong that the representation of African-Americans in venires from which juries were selected was not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of African-Americans in the community. The Court held "that when applying all the relevant tests for evaluating the representation data, a court must examine the composition of jury pools or venires over time using the most reliable data available to determine whether representation of a distinct group is fair and reasonable. Having considered the results of these tests using the most reliable data set, which included the composition of jury pools or venires over a three-month period, [the Court concluded] that defendant failed to show that the representation of African-Americans was not fair and reasonable." View "Michigan v. Bryant" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Pamela Mattison, gave birth to twins who were conceived by artificial insemination after their father, Jeffery Mattison, had died. She sought social security survivors' benefits for the children based on Jeffery's earnings. The Social Security Administration denied her application, and an administrative law judge affirmed that decision. Plaintiff then filed an action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan challenging the decision. That court has asked the Michigan Supreme Court to rule on whether the children could inherit from Jeffery under Michigan intestacy law. Having heard oral argument, the Supreme Court granted the district court's request to answer the question and held that under Michigan intestacy law, plaintiff's children could not inherit from Jeffery. The matter was returned to the district court for further proceedings. View "In re Mattison v. Social Security Comm." on Justia Law