Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Schuyler Chenault was convicted by jury of felony murder and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The only question at trial was the identity of the shooter. The girlfriend of the victim identified defendant as the shooter. She gave police videotaped interviews, but defendant's counsel did not receive copies of those recordings. The girlfriend's statements did not mention that another person was also present at the shooting: only defendant, the girlfriend and this third party witnessed the shooting, and there was no physical evidence to tie anyone to the shooting. Defendant moved for a new trial and requested a copy of the recordings of the taped interview. Defense counsel also added claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct regarding the failure to provide the recordings. The trial court granted defendant's motion for a new trial, but the Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that defense counsel did not exercise due diligence, and that defendant had not been denied effective assistance of counsel because there was no prejudice. Agreeing with the appellate court's analysis, the Supreme Court affirmed that court's reversal of the trial court. View "Michigan v. Chenault" on Justia Law

In "Michigan v. Fobb," the Court of Appeals held that an extortion conviction under the "against his will" prong of MCL 750.213 could only be maintained when the act defendant sought to compel entailed "serious consequences" to the victim. The issue before the Supreme Court in this case required the Court to revisit the Fobb decision. Defendant James Early Harris, Jr. was convicted by a jury of extortion, carrying a dangerous weapon with unlawful intent, assaulting, resisting, or obstructing a police officer, and three counts of carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony. Defendant agreed to pay Willie Neal $400 to fix the transmission on defendant's truck. Neal began working on the truck in the driveway that defendant shared with a neighbor, but stopped when it began to rain. Upset by Neal’s refusal to work in the rain, defendant went into his house and returned with a gun. Defendant told Neal that he would "silence him" unless Neal resumed working on the truck or returned a portion of defendant’s down payment for the work. Neal refused, and defendant returned home. When police officers arrived, they found defendant in the driveway carrying a rifle. Relying on Fobb, defendant argued that he could not be convicted of extortion because the act defendant sought to compel (continued work on the truck) was not of serious consequences to the mechanic. But the plain language of the extortion statute, MCL 750.213, defined extortion in terms of whether the defendant maliciously threatened a person with harm in order to "compel the person so threatened to do . . . any act against his will." The Supreme Court concluded defendant's conduct satisfied the requirements set forth in MCL 750.213, and affirmed his conviction of extortion. Furthermore, the Court overruled the Court of Appeals decisions in "Michigan v. Fobb" and "Michigan v. Hubbard" to the extent that those decisions required that the act or omission compelled by the defendant be of serious consequence to the victim. View "Michigan v. Harris" on Justia Law

Addison Township issued Jerry Barnhart a misdemeanor citation for operating a shooting range without a zoning compliance permit. The case proceeded to a bench trial. After the township presented its case, the court granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict dismissing the case, ruling that defendant's activities were protected under MCL 691.1542a(2). The Circuit Court affirmed. In an unpublished opinion the Court of Appeals reversed dismissal of the citation and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration in light of the panel’s interpretation of the term "sport shooting range" and for a determination whether defendant was in compliance with "generally accepted operation practices" as required by the statute. On remand, the township moved to enforce the ordinance, and defendant moved for a declaratory judgment and dismissal. The district court granted defendant's motion, concluding that defendant was operating a sport shooting range in compliance with generally accepted operation practices. The circuit court remanded the case to the district court to examine the provisions of the sport shooting ranges act (SSRA) as a whole and to consider whether MCL 691.1542a(2) applied to all local ordinances or only those attempting to regulate shooting ranges. On remand, the district court again ruled in favor of defendant. The circuit court reversed, holding that defendant’s activities were not protected under MCL 691.1542a. The Court of Appeals affirmed. After its review, the Supreme Court found that in order for MCL 691.1542a(2) to apply to a shooting range, it must: (1) be a sport shooting range that also existed as a sport shooting range as of July 5, 1994; and (2) the sport shooting range must operate in compliance with the generally accepted operation practices. The Court of Appeals erred in interpreting MCL 691.1541(d) when it held that a shooting range owner could not have a commercial purpose in operating a sport shooting range. Defendant's shooting range was entitled to protection under MCL 691.1542a(2). The case was once again remanded for dismissal. View "Addison Township v. Barnhart" on Justia Law

Fradco, Inc., contested a final assessment issued by the Department of Treasury that disallowed a sales tax deduction following an audit. Through its resident agent, Fradco requested the department send all information regarding tax matters to the certified public accountant (CPA) that Fradco designated. The department mailed a copy of its preliminary decision and order of determination to Fradco's CPA. It sent the final assessment only to Fradco's place of business. Fradco's CPA inquired about the final assessment and was informed a month later that a final assessment had been issued, that no appeal had been taken, and that the matter was now subject to collection. The letter did not include a copy of the assessment. The department sought summary judgment in Fradco’s appeal, arguing that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the appeal had not been filed within 35 days after the final assessment. The tribunal denied the motion, concluding that state law provided a parallel notice requirement whenever a taxpayer properly filed a request that notices be sent to a representative and that notice to Fradco alone had not been sufficient to start the 35-day period. Similarly, SMK, LLC, contested a final assessment issued by the Department of Treasury. SMK had hired a CPA and designated him to represent it for purposes of the sales tax audit, giving him limited authorization to inspect or receive confidential information, represent SMK, and receive mail from the department. The department faxed the CPA a notice stating that the audit package had been submitted. It sent a final assessment to SMK via certified mail, although SMK claimed that it did not receive the final assessment. The CPA made several inquiries to the department and received no answers from the department. Five days after the appeal period had allegedly run, the department sent SMK's CPA the final assessment and a letter stating that the deadline for appeal had passed. The Supreme Court granted the department leave to appeal and ordered that the Fradco and SMK appeals be heard together. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that if a taxpayer has appointed a representative, the Department of Treasury must issue notice to both the taxpayer and the taxpayer’s official representative before the taxpayer’s 35-day appeal period under MCL 205.22(1) begins to run. View "Fradco, Inc. v. Dept. of Treasury" on Justia Law

Defendant Ronald Earl was convicted by a jury of bank robbery and two counts of possession of less than 25 grams of a controlled substance. At the time defendant committed the offenses, MCL 780.905 required that all defendants convicted of a felony pay a $60 crime victim’s rights assessment. The statute was amended effective December 16, 2010, to raise the assessment for convicted felons to $130. At defendant’s sentencing in 2011, the court ordered defendant to pay the $130 crime victim’s rights assessment under MCL 780.905(1)(a). Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded the increased victim's rights fund assessment did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clauses of the state and federal constitutions. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. View "Michigan v. Earl" on Justia Law

John Ter Beek filed an action against the City of Wyoming, seeking to have a city zoning ordinance declared void and an injunction entered prohibiting its enforcement. Ter Beek was a qualifying patient and held a registry identification card under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA). He wanted to grow and use marijuana for medical purposes in his home and argued that section 4(a) of the MMMA, MCL 333.26424(a), preempted the ordinance. Both parties moved for summary judgment. Ter Beek argued that because the federal controlled substances act (CSA) prohibited the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana, the ordinance likewise prohibited the use, manufacture, or cultivation of marijuana for medical use and therefore conflicted with and was preempted by the MMMA. The city argued instead that the CSA preempted the MMMA. The court granted the City's motion, agreeing that the CSA preempted the MMMA. Ter Beek appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, concluding that the ordinance conflicted with sec. 4(a) of the MMMA and that the CSA did not preempt 4(a) because it was possible to comply with both statutes simultaneously and the state-law immunity for certain medical marijuana patients under 4(a) did not stand as an obstacle to the federal regulation of marijuana use. The City appealed. The Supreme Court concluded section 4(a) of the MMMA was not preempted by the federal controlled substances act, but 4(a) preempted the ordinance because the ordinance directly conflicted with the MMMA. View "Ter Beek v. City of Wyoming" on Justia Law

Chandra Valencia Smith-Anthony was convicted by a jury of larceny from the person. While monitoring closed-circuit television monitors at a department store, the store's loss-prevention officer observed defendant acting suspiciously while shopping and proceeded to follow her. The officer saw defendant select a perfume box set from a display and later slip it into one of her bags. Defendant was stopped by the officer when she left the store with the item in her bag. In a split opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction, concluding that the prosecution had failed to establish the from-the-person element of larceny from a person because there was no evidence that defendant had committed the larceny within the officer's area of immediate presence or control as required by the statute. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals properly reversed defendant's conviction because there was insufficient evidence to support it. View "Michigan v. Smith-Anthony" on Justia Law

Stanley Duncan was charged with five counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct and four counts of second-degree criminal sexual conduct. His wife Vita Duncan was charged with two counts of first- and second-degree criminal sexual conduct. A three-year-old victim was qualified to testify at the separate preliminary examinations held for each defendant. Both were bound over for a single jury trial. The victim was called to the stand, but became visibly agitated and unable to answer the court's questions regarding telling the truth and telling a lie. The court then ruled the victim was not competent to testify, suffering from "a then existing mental infirmity." The prosecution asked the court to declare the victim unavailable, but the court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution's applications for leave for appeal. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution's motion for consideration: the child victim was unavailable within the meaning of Michigan's Rule of Evidence 804(a)(4), and the trial court abused its discretion when it concluded the child was not unavailable. Accordingly, the Court reversed the appellate court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Duncan" on Justia Law

Defendant Donald Michael Hardy was convicted after pleading guilty to one count of carjacking. His sentence was 12 to 50 years' imprisonment. Hardy filed a motion for resentencing, challenging the OV scoring and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the circuit court denied. Hardy then appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the sentence. Defendant Devon DeCarlos Glenn, Jr. was convicted after pleading guilty to armed robbery and felonious assault. He was sentenced to 15 to 30 years' imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction and 18 to 48 months' imprisonment for the felonious assault conviction. The Court of Appeals vacated Glenn's sentence and remanded for resentencing, concluding that although Glenn's conduct used more violence than was strictly necessary to complete an armed robbery, it was not egregious enough in relation to the other conduct listed in the sentencing guidelines to justify the score the circuit court gave him. Both defendants appealed their sentences to the Supreme Court; after review, the Supreme Court found no error in the circuit court's scoring of Hardy's sentence. However, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' decision in Glenn's case and remanded for recalculation of his sentence. View "Michigan v. Glenn" on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court held that the circuit court abused its discretion by failing to redact the majority of the detectives' out-of-court statements from the interrogation of Defendant John Musser where they commented on his credibility. Most of the statements made had no probative value, and their admission undermined the reliability of the jury's verdict because the jury may have relied on those statements in reaching its verdict. The Court felt the limiting jury instruction did not cure this error. Accordingly, the Court vacated defendant's convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Musser" on Justia Law