Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was stopped by the police for a traffic violation. As defendant exited the vehicle, officers observed defendant drop a silver automatic handgun into the map pocket of the car door and quickly close the door. Defendant was 21 years old at the time and had no prior criminal history. After establishing that defendant did not possess a permit to carry a concealed weapon, he was arrested and subsequently charged with the crime of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW). The prosecutor permitted defendant to plead guilty to the reduced charge of attempted CCW and recommended a probationary sentence. At sentencing, defense counsel urged the court to delay sentencing for one year, at which time defendant would be "very close to graduating from college" and the prosecutor's office might change its mind and either dismiss the case entirely or permit defendant to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. The prosecutor objected to a delayed sentence and asked that defendant be sentenced to probation. The trial court expressed concern that defendant would "end up with a felony," thus limiting his employment opportunities. Expressing its unhappiness with the prosecutor's position, the court stated that it would consider "the delayed sentence with one day over a year; then [the court] would have lost jurisdiction." The next time the parties returned to court, defense counsel requested that sentencing be delayed for one year to give defendant the opportunity to show that he deserved "significant leniency" from the court. The prosecutor continued to object to delayed sentencing, stating that the prosecutor's office did not intend to reduce the criminal charge any further. The trial court stated that it found it "disturb[ing]" that the prosecutor opposed defendant's proposed sentence. The trial court announced that it would exercise its discretion and delayed the imposition of defendant's sentence for one year. On appeal, the prosecutor argued the trial court had no legal authority to dismiss the case over the prosecution's objections, because MCL 771.1 did not permit dismissal of the case. The Court of Appeals found no merit to the prosecutor's appeal. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether MCL 771.1(2) divested sentencing judge of jurisdiction if a defendant is not sentenced within one year after the imposition of a delayed sentence. The Supreme Court held that it did not. "The one-year limitation designates the maximum amount of time that sentencing may be delayed in order to provide defendant the chance to establish his worthiness of leniency. After one year, sentencing may no longer be delayed for that purpose, and the judge is required to sentence defendant as provided by law." The appellate court's decision was overruled and the case remanded to the trial court for defendant's sentencing. View "Michigan v. Smith" on Justia Law

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Chrysler Group, LLC and plaintiff LaFontaine Saline Inc. (LaFontaine), an authorized Chrysler automobile dealer, entered into a Dealer Agreement in 2007, granting LaFontaine the non-exclusive right to sell Dodge vehicles from its location in Saline, Michigan, and defined LaFontaine’s Sales Locality as "the area designated in writing to [LaFontaine] by [Chrysler] from time to time as the territory of [LaFontaine’s] responsibility for the sale of [Chrysler, Jeep, and Dodge] vehicles, vehicle parts and accessories . . . ." This case centered on whether the 2010 amendment of the Motor Vehicle Dealer Act (MVDA) (expanding the relevant market area) from a six-mile radius to a nine-mile radius, applied retroactively. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it did not. The Court therefore vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for reinstatement of summary judgment in favor of Chrysler. View "LaFontaine Saline, Inc. v. Chrysler Group, LLC" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff-appellant Matthew Makowski filed an action in the Court of Claims against the Governor and the Secretary of State, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to reverse then-Governor Jennifer Granholm's decision to revoke her commutation of plaintiff's nonparolable life sentence that had been imposed for his first-degree murder and armed robbery convictions. The Governor had signed the commutation, it was signed by the Secretary of State and affixed with the Great Seal. Four days later, the Governor decided to revoke the order, and all copies of the commutation certificate were destroyed. Plaintiff alleged that the commutation was final when it was signed, sealed, and delivered to the Department of Corrections, and argued the Governor lacked the authority to revoke a completed commutation. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the governor's exercise of discretion over commutation decisions. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Governor's exercise of the commutation power presented a nonjusticiable political question. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Constitution did not give the Governor the power to revoke a validly granted commutation: "[b]ecause the Governor signed plaintiff's commutation and delivered it to the Secretary of State, where it was signed and affixed with the Great Seal, plaintiff was granted an irrevocable commutation of his sentence." View "Makowski v. Granholm" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of Michigan’s one-parent doctrine. The one-parent doctrine essentially imposes joint and several liability on both parents, potentially divesting either of custody, on the basis of the unfitness of one. "Merely describing the doctrine foreshadows its constitutional weakness." Upon petition by the Department of Human Services (DHS), the trial court adjudicated respondent-mother, Tammy Sanders, as unfit but dismissed the allegations of abuse and neglect against respondent-appellant-father, Lance Laird. Laird moved for his children to be placed with him. Although Laird was never adjudicated as unfit, the trial court denied Laird’s motion, limited his contact with his children, and ordered him to comply with a service plan. The trial court relied on the one-parent doctrine and the Court of Appeals’ decision in "In re CR," (646 NW2d 506 (2002)), from which that doctrine derives. Laird argued that the one-parent doctrine violated his fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of his children because it permits the court to enter dispositional orders affecting that right without first determining that he was an unfit parent. The Supreme Court agreed: because application of the one-parent doctrine impermissibly infringed the fundamental rights of unadjudicated parents without providing adequate process, the Court held that it was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. View "In re Sanders" on Justia Law

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Defendant Chad Garrison, stole four snowmobiles and two trailers from vacation homes in Cheboygan County. He pleaded guilty to one count of larceny of property valued at $1,000 or more, but less than $20,000, as a second-offense habitual offender. While the case was pending, the three victims of defendant’s theft traveled back and forth from their primary residences in order to secure their stolen property and attend a restitution hearing. At the hearing, the victims testified that they had incurred travel expenses related to these trips in the cumulative amount of $1,125. The sentencing court included $977 of this amount in its restitution order over defense counsel’s objection. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the restitution issue. The Court determined that neither the Crime Victim's Rights Act nor MCL 769.1a authorized courts to include victims’ travel expenses in a restitution award. The Court concluded that the sentencing court abused its discretion by doing so in this case. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, concluding that the statutes do authorize such payments because they require courts to order full restitution, i.e., restitution that is complete and maximal. Therefore, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue and remanded this case to the Cheboygan Circuit Court for reinstatement of the original restitution order. View "Michigan v. Garrison" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court centered on the proper test for applying the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v Maryland. In "Michigan v. Lester," (591 NW 2d 267 (1998)), the Court of Appeals adopted a four-factor test that added a requirement of defendant diligence to the traditional Brady test. Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Michigan Supreme Court endorsed that element. Defendant’s convictions for felony murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony arose out of the shooting death of Kevin Harris in 2008. Harris was a cocaine dealer, who often used Jared Chambers as a middleman to connect with buyers. Chambers occasionally contacted Harris through Harris’ girlfriend, Heather Holloway. The sole question at trial concerned the identity of the shooter. Only defendant, Holloway, and Chambers witnessed the shooting and they did not agree about what happened: defendant identified Chambers as the shooter while Holloway and Chambers identified defendant. There was no physical evidence to tie either defendant or Chambers to the shooting. The defense theory was that Chambers shot Harris, and that Holloway identified defendant as the shooter out of fear of Chambers. On the last day of trial, the prosecution called its final witness. When questioned, that witness was surprised that Holloway’s second written statement did not confirm that she had mentioned Chambers and was confident that the video recordings would verify his recollection. He was also surprised to learn that the recordings had not been provided to defendant. After trial, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial and requested a copy of the interview recordings. Counsel amended the motion to add claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct regarding the failure to provide the recorded statements. There was no dispute that the defendant never had the recordings. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that his due process rights were violated pursuant to Brady because the suppressed videotaped recordings undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court held that a diligence requirement was not supported by Brady or its progeny. Thus, the Court overruled Lester and reaffirmed the traditional three-factor Brady test. Because defendant could not establish that the suppressed evidence was material, however, his Brady claim failed. View "Michigan v. Chenault" on Justia Law

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In February 2008, the Department of Human Services (DHS) removed COH, ERH, JRG, and KBH from their mother’s care. The children were initially placed in two separate foster homes; however, in October 2008, all of the children were placed with Holy Cross Children’s Services. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court concerned the interplay between MCL 722.954a and MCL 712A.19c, and whether the preference for placement with relatives created by MCL 722.954a was relevant to a court’s consideration of a petition to appoint a guardian under MCL 712A.19c(2). Because the Court concluded that the two statutes applied at different and distinct stages of child protective proceedings, the Court held that hold that there was no preference for placement with relatives as part of a guardianship determination under MCL 712A.19c(2). Accordingly, because the Court of Appeals in this case applied a preference in favor of creating a guardianship with a relative in support of its decision to reverse the trial court, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals erred. View "In re COH, ERH, JRG, KBH" on Justia Law

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The issue in this case involved two landowners’ facial challenge to the constitutionality of 18-59 of the Brighton Code of Ordinances (BCO), which created a rebuttable presumption that an unsafe structure could be demolished as a public nuisance if it was determined that the cost to repair the structure would exceed 100 percent of the structure’s true cash value as reflected in assessment tax rolls before the structure became unsafe. Specifically, the issue before the Supreme Court in this case was whether this unreasonable-to-repair presumption violated substantive and procedural due process protections by permitting demolition without affording the owner of the structure an option to repair as a matter of right. As a preliminary matter, the Court clarified that the landowners’ substantive due process and procedural due process claims implicated two separate constitutional rights, and that each claim must be analyzed under separate constitutional tests. The Court of Appeals erred by improperly conflating these analyses and subsequently determining that BCO 18-59 facially violated plaintiffs’ general due process rights. When each due process protection was separately examined pursuant to the proper test, the Supreme Court found that the ordinance did not violate either protection on its face. View "Leon v. City of Brighton" on Justia Law

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The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court centered on the application of Michigan’s Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA) to a contract employee whose contract was not renewed ostensibly because of the employee’s whistleblowing activities. A contract employee whose term of employment has expired without being subject to a specific adverse employment action identified in the WPA and who sought reengagement for a new term of employment occupied the same legal position as a prospective employee. The WPA, by its express language, only applied to current employees; the statute offered no protection to prospective employees. Because the WPA did not apply when an employer decided not to hire a job applicant, it likewise had no application to a contract employee whom the employer declined to rehire for a new term of employment. "The plaintiff in this case has no recourse under the WPA because he alleges only that his former employer declined to renew his contract, not that the employer took some adverse action against him during his contractual term of employment." View "Wurtz v. Beecher Metropolitan District" on Justia Law

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Anthony Henry and Keith White filed suit against Laborers’ Local 1191, Michael Aaron (the union’s business manager), and Bruce Ruedisueli (the union’s president), alleging that their indefinite layoff from employment at the union was unlawful retaliation under the Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (WPA). Henry and White had worked as business agents for the union until their terminations. They alleged that defendants asked several union members to repair the façade of the Trade Union Leadership Council building. The union recorded payments for the work as picket duty even though the members did not engage in picket duty on those days. Henry and White believed that Aaron was involved in criminal activity, including fraud, an illegal kickback scheme, and misappropriation of union funds. They also believed that the union had required members to work without proper safety precautions and without receiving union wages. Henry and White subsequently contacted the United States Department of Labor with their suspicions and informed the union of their decision to report the allegations. The Department of Labor investigated the allegations and referred the matter to an assistant United States attorney, who declined to intervene. Aaron later notified Henry and White that they had been indefinitely laid off from employment at the union. During the pendency of Henry and White’s action, Michael Dowdy and Glenn Ramsey (also business agents for the union) were terminated from their employment. Dowdy and Ramsey filed a separate WPA action against the union, Aaron, claiming that they had been terminated for their cooperation in the Department of Labor’s investigation and disclosing to investigators facts substantiating the allegations of criminal misconduct. Defendants moved for summary disposition in the Henry/White lawsuit and for partial summary disposition in the Dowdy/Ramsey lawsuit, alleging that the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) preempted plaintiffs’ WPA claims and that, as a result, the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear them. The court denied both motions, concluding that the WPA’s protection of an employee against an employer’s retaliatory employment actions did not contravene the LMRDA. Defendants appealed in each case, reasserting their claim of LMRDA preemption and raising the new defense that the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) independently preempted the circuit court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals consolidated the appeals and affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Upon review, the Supreme Court held that neither the NLRA nor the LMRDA preempted WPA claims premised on reporting suspected criminal misconduct. The NLRA did not cover the reporting of suspected criminal misconduct, while the LMRDA does not provide a union official with discretion to cover up suspected criminal misconduct by retaliating against employees who report their allegations. However, plaintiffs’ allegations of retaliation for their reporting of improper wages and an unsafe work environment cover conduct "arguably prohibited" by the NLRA and, as a result, must be litigated exclusively before the NLRB. As such, the Court affirmed in part the decision of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "Henry v. Laborers Local 1191" on Justia Law