Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The issue these cases presented to the Supreme Court were: (1) whether "Miller v Alabama," (132 S Ct 2455 (2012)), should have been applied retroactively (pursuant to either the federal or state test for retroactivity) to cases in which the defendant's sentence became final for purposes of direct appellate review before Miller was decided; and (2) whether the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution or Const 1963, art 1, section 16 categorically barred the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender. Defendant Raymond Carp was 15 years old when he participated in the 2006 bludgeoning and stabbing of Mary Ann McNeely. He was charged with first-degree murder and tried as an adult. A jury convicted Carp of this offense, and in accordance with the law at the time he was sentenced to life imprisonment without parole. Because Carp did not seek review in the United States Supreme Court, his conviction and sentence became final for the purposes of direct appellate review in June, 2009. Defendant Cortez Davis was 16 years old at the time of his offense. Along with a cohort, while brandishing firearms, Davis accosted two individuals in Detroit for the purpose of robbery. Two witnesses testified that when one of the victims attempted to flee, Davis and his cohort fired five or six shots, killing the victim. Davis was charged with felony first-degree murder and convicted by a jury. At sentencing, the trial court initially ruled that Michigan's statutory sentencing scheme for first-degree murder could not constitutionally be applied to juvenile homicide offenders because it was “cruel and unusual” to impose a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile who was “capable of rehabilitation.” Davis was ultimately sentenced to 10 to 40 years in prison. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for resentencing pursuant to Michigan's statutory sentencing scheme, and at resentencing, the trial court imposed the required sentence of life without parole. The conviction and sentence became final for the purposes of direct appellate review in 2000. Unlike Carp and Davis, whose sentences became final for purposes of direct review before Miller was decided, at least 10 defendants were convicted and sentenced before Miller, but their cases were on direct appeal at the time Miller was decided. Dakotah Eliason was one of those defendants. At age 14, Eliason, without provocation and after hours of deliberation, fired a single deadly shot into the head of his stepgrandfather as he slept in his home. Eliason was charged with first-degree murder, convicted by a jury, and sentenced in October 2010 to life without parole. While Eliason's appeal was pending before the Court of Appeals, Miller was decided. In assessing the effect of Miller on Michigan's sentencing scheme for juvenile first-degree-murder offenders, the Court of Appeals held that a trial court must as a result of Miller perform an individualized sentencing analysis based upon the factors identified in the Miller case. Eliason appealed to the Supreme Court to challenge the sentencing procedures and options defined by the Court of Appeals, contending that the trial court should have the further option of imposing a sentence of a term of years. Eliason additionally argued that Const 1963, art 1, sec. 16 categorically barred the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile. After considering these matters, the Michigan Supreme Court held that the rule announced in Miller did not satisfy either the federal test for retroactivity set forth in "Teague v Lane," (489 US 288 (1989)), or Michigan's separate and independent test for retroactivity set forth in "Michigan v Sexton," (580 NW2d 404 (1998)), and "Michigan v Maxson," (759 NW2d 817 (2008)). Furthermore, the Court held that neither the Eighth Amendment nor Const 1963, art 1, section 16 categorically barred the imposition of a life-without-parole sentence on a juvenile homicide offender. View "Michigan v. Carp" on Justia Law

Matthew McKinley was convicted by a jury of larceny over $20,000, malicious destruction of property over $20,000, and inducing a minor to commit a felony in connection with a series of thefts of commercial air conditioning units. The trial court sentenced defendant, as a fourth-offense habitual offender, to concurrent terms of 12 to 25 years in prison on each count and reserved a decision regarding restitution. Following a hearing, and over defense counsel’s objection to the amount of restitution assessed, the court entered an amended judgment of sentence to reflect the imposition of $158,180.44 in restitution. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant’s conviction for larceny over $20,000, but otherwise affirmed his convictions and sentences in an unpublished opinion. The panel rejected defendant’s argument that Michigan’s restitution scheme was unconstitutional because it permitted trial courts to impose restitution on the basis of facts not proved to the trier of fact beyond a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court limited to the issues on appeal to whether an order of restitution was equivalent to a criminal penalty and whether Michigan’s statutory restitution scheme was unconstitutional insofar as it permitted the trial court to order restitution based on conduct for which a defendant was not charged that had not been submitted to a jury or proven beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court held that a trial court’s restitution award that is based solely on conduct for which the defendant was not charged may not be sustained. View "Michigan v. McKinley" on Justia Law

George Tanner was charged with open murder and mutilation of a dead body. After his arrest, he was taken to jail and read his Miranda rights. Defendant invoked his right to counsel and questioning ceased. The next day, while speaking with a jail psychologist, defendant stated that he wanted to “get something off of his chest.” The psychologist informed jail staff of defendant’s request. The jail administrator then spoke with defendant. Defendant told the administrator that he wanted to speak with someone about his case and asked if the administrator could obtain an attorney for him. The administrator stated that he could not provide an attorney for defendant, but could contact the police officers who were handling the case. The administrator then contacted both the police and the prosecutor. The prosecutor apparently informed the court of defendant’s request for an attorney, and the court sent an attorney to the jail. After the attorney and the police officers arrived at the jail, the jail administrator took the police officers to speak with defendant and asked the attorney to wait in the jail lobby while the officers determined defendant’s intentions. Defendant was again read his Miranda rights, which he waived without again requesting an attorney and without being made aware of the attorney’s presence at the jail. Defendant then made incriminating statements concerning his involvement in the murder. Defense counsel moved to suppress the statements, and the court granted the motion. The prosecution sought leave to appeal. The Court of Appeals denied the application. The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was whether the rule announced in "Michigan v Bender," (551 NW2d 71 (1996)), should have been maintained. Bender required police officers to promptly inform a suspect facing custodial interrogation that an attorney is available when that attorney attempts to contact the suspect. If the officers failed to do so, any statements made by the suspect, including voluntary statements given by the suspect with full knowledge of his Miranda rights, are rendered inadmissible. The Supreme Court respectfully concluded Bender was wrongly decided and that it should have been overruled. The Court reversed the trial court’s suppression of certain incriminating statements made by defendant, which was justified solely on the grounds of Bender, and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Tanner" on Justia Law

In December 2009, defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree felony murder, second-degree murder, assault with intent to commit great bodily harm less than murder, carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony, and two counts of unlawful imprisonment. The jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree premeditated murder, and first-degree home invasion. Because first-degree home invasion was the only felony that defendant was charged with that could have supported the conviction for first-degree felony murder, the initial jury verdict was, plainly, inconsistent. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's convictions, holding that the trial court erred by denying defendant's constitutional right to represent himself. The Court of Appeals remanded this case to the trial court for a new trial, and the Supreme Court denied the prosecution's application for leave to appeal. The prosecution then filed an amended information setting forth the charges on retrial. The defendant was re-charged with each of the charges of which he was initially convicted. Defendant moved to dismiss the first-degree felony-murder charge, arguing that the Double Jeopardy Clause prevented a second prosecution on that charge because he stood acquitted of the only predicate felony, which was one of the elements of felony murder. The trial court granted defendant's motion to dismiss, agreeing that a second jury could not reconsider the home-invasion element of felony murder given the preclusive effect of his acquittal of home invasion. The Court of Appeals granted the prosecution's interlocutory application for leave to appeal and reversed the trial court's order in an unpublished opinion per curiam, holding that because the jury's verdict was inconsistent, that inconsistency negated the application of the collateral-estoppel doctrine in the second prosecution. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether a defendant whose conviction for felony murder was reversed on appeal could be retried for that charge when he was also acquitted of the only felony that supported it. The Michigan Supreme Court concluded that the collateral-estoppel strand of Double Jeopardy Clause jurisprudence prevented the prosecution from re-charging the defendant with felony murder. Because the defendant’s acquittal of the only supporting felony triggered collateral estoppel, the Double Jeopardy Clause precluded a second felony-murder prosecution of defendant. View "Michigan v. Wilson" on Justia Law

Defendant was a passenger in an automobile that was stopped by the police for a traffic violation. As defendant exited the vehicle, officers observed defendant drop a silver automatic handgun into the map pocket of the car door and quickly close the door. Defendant was 21 years old at the time and had no prior criminal history. After establishing that defendant did not possess a permit to carry a concealed weapon, he was arrested and subsequently charged with the crime of carrying a concealed weapon (CCW). The prosecutor permitted defendant to plead guilty to the reduced charge of attempted CCW and recommended a probationary sentence. At sentencing, defense counsel urged the court to delay sentencing for one year, at which time defendant would be "very close to graduating from college" and the prosecutor's office might change its mind and either dismiss the case entirely or permit defendant to plead guilty to a misdemeanor. The prosecutor objected to a delayed sentence and asked that defendant be sentenced to probation. The trial court expressed concern that defendant would "end up with a felony," thus limiting his employment opportunities. Expressing its unhappiness with the prosecutor's position, the court stated that it would consider "the delayed sentence with one day over a year; then [the court] would have lost jurisdiction." The next time the parties returned to court, defense counsel requested that sentencing be delayed for one year to give defendant the opportunity to show that he deserved "significant leniency" from the court. The prosecutor continued to object to delayed sentencing, stating that the prosecutor's office did not intend to reduce the criminal charge any further. The trial court stated that it found it "disturb[ing]" that the prosecutor opposed defendant's proposed sentence. The trial court announced that it would exercise its discretion and delayed the imposition of defendant's sentence for one year. On appeal, the prosecutor argued the trial court had no legal authority to dismiss the case over the prosecution's objections, because MCL 771.1 did not permit dismissal of the case. The Court of Appeals found no merit to the prosecutor's appeal. The issue before the Supreme Court was whether MCL 771.1(2) divested sentencing judge of jurisdiction if a defendant is not sentenced within one year after the imposition of a delayed sentence. The Supreme Court held that it did not. "The one-year limitation designates the maximum amount of time that sentencing may be delayed in order to provide defendant the chance to establish his worthiness of leniency. After one year, sentencing may no longer be delayed for that purpose, and the judge is required to sentence defendant as provided by law." The appellate court's decision was overruled and the case remanded to the trial court for defendant's sentencing. View "Michigan v. Smith" on Justia Law

Chrysler Group, LLC and plaintiff LaFontaine Saline Inc. (LaFontaine), an authorized Chrysler automobile dealer, entered into a Dealer Agreement in 2007, granting LaFontaine the non-exclusive right to sell Dodge vehicles from its location in Saline, Michigan, and defined LaFontaine’s Sales Locality as "the area designated in writing to [LaFontaine] by [Chrysler] from time to time as the territory of [LaFontaine’s] responsibility for the sale of [Chrysler, Jeep, and Dodge] vehicles, vehicle parts and accessories . . . ." This case centered on whether the 2010 amendment of the Motor Vehicle Dealer Act (MVDA) (expanding the relevant market area) from a six-mile radius to a nine-mile radius, applied retroactively. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that it did not. The Court therefore vacated the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for reinstatement of summary judgment in favor of Chrysler. View "LaFontaine Saline, Inc. v. Chrysler Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Matthew Makowski filed an action in the Court of Claims against the Governor and the Secretary of State, seeking a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief to reverse then-Governor Jennifer Granholm's decision to revoke her commutation of plaintiff's nonparolable life sentence that had been imposed for his first-degree murder and armed robbery convictions. The Governor had signed the commutation, it was signed by the Secretary of State and affixed with the Great Seal. Four days later, the Governor decided to revoke the order, and all copies of the commutation certificate were destroyed. Plaintiff alleged that the commutation was final when it was signed, sealed, and delivered to the Department of Corrections, and argued the Governor lacked the authority to revoke a completed commutation. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to review the governor's exercise of discretion over commutation decisions. Plaintiff appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Governor's exercise of the commutation power presented a nonjusticiable political question. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded the Constitution did not give the Governor the power to revoke a validly granted commutation: "[b]ecause the Governor signed plaintiff's commutation and delivered it to the Secretary of State, where it was signed and affixed with the Great Seal, plaintiff was granted an irrevocable commutation of his sentence." View "Makowski v. Granholm" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented to the Supreme Court was the constitutionality of Michigan’s one-parent doctrine. The one-parent doctrine essentially imposes joint and several liability on both parents, potentially divesting either of custody, on the basis of the unfitness of one. "Merely describing the doctrine foreshadows its constitutional weakness." Upon petition by the Department of Human Services (DHS), the trial court adjudicated respondent-mother, Tammy Sanders, as unfit but dismissed the allegations of abuse and neglect against respondent-appellant-father, Lance Laird. Laird moved for his children to be placed with him. Although Laird was never adjudicated as unfit, the trial court denied Laird’s motion, limited his contact with his children, and ordered him to comply with a service plan. The trial court relied on the one-parent doctrine and the Court of Appeals’ decision in "In re CR," (646 NW2d 506 (2002)), from which that doctrine derives. Laird argued that the one-parent doctrine violated his fundamental right to direct the care, custody, and control of his children because it permits the court to enter dispositional orders affecting that right without first determining that he was an unfit parent. The Supreme Court agreed: because application of the one-parent doctrine impermissibly infringed the fundamental rights of unadjudicated parents without providing adequate process, the Court held that it was unconstitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. View "In re Sanders" on Justia Law

Defendant Chad Garrison, stole four snowmobiles and two trailers from vacation homes in Cheboygan County. He pleaded guilty to one count of larceny of property valued at $1,000 or more, but less than $20,000, as a second-offense habitual offender. While the case was pending, the three victims of defendant’s theft traveled back and forth from their primary residences in order to secure their stolen property and attend a restitution hearing. At the hearing, the victims testified that they had incurred travel expenses related to these trips in the cumulative amount of $1,125. The sentencing court included $977 of this amount in its restitution order over defense counsel’s objection. Defendant appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the restitution issue. The Court determined that neither the Crime Victim's Rights Act nor MCL 769.1a authorized courts to include victims’ travel expenses in a restitution award. The Court concluded that the sentencing court abused its discretion by doing so in this case. The Supreme Court disagreed with the appellate court, concluding that the statutes do authorize such payments because they require courts to order full restitution, i.e., restitution that is complete and maximal. Therefore, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals on this issue and remanded this case to the Cheboygan Circuit Court for reinstatement of the original restitution order. View "Michigan v. Garrison" on Justia Law

The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court centered on the proper test for applying the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Brady v Maryland. In "Michigan v. Lester," (591 NW 2d 267 (1998)), the Court of Appeals adopted a four-factor test that added a requirement of defendant diligence to the traditional Brady test. Neither the Supreme Court of the United States nor the Michigan Supreme Court endorsed that element. Defendant’s convictions for felony murder, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony arose out of the shooting death of Kevin Harris in 2008. Harris was a cocaine dealer, who often used Jared Chambers as a middleman to connect with buyers. Chambers occasionally contacted Harris through Harris’ girlfriend, Heather Holloway. The sole question at trial concerned the identity of the shooter. Only defendant, Holloway, and Chambers witnessed the shooting and they did not agree about what happened: defendant identified Chambers as the shooter while Holloway and Chambers identified defendant. There was no physical evidence to tie either defendant or Chambers to the shooting. The defense theory was that Chambers shot Harris, and that Holloway identified defendant as the shooter out of fear of Chambers. On the last day of trial, the prosecution called its final witness. When questioned, that witness was surprised that Holloway’s second written statement did not confirm that she had mentioned Chambers and was confident that the video recordings would verify his recollection. He was also surprised to learn that the recordings had not been provided to defendant. After trial, defense counsel filed a motion for a new trial and requested a copy of the interview recordings. Counsel amended the motion to add claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and prosecutorial misconduct regarding the failure to provide the recorded statements. There was no dispute that the defendant never had the recordings. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion for a new trial, concluding that his due process rights were violated pursuant to Brady because the suppressed videotaped recordings undermined confidence in the outcome of the trial. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The Supreme Court held that a diligence requirement was not supported by Brady or its progeny. Thus, the Court overruled Lester and reaffirmed the traditional three-factor Brady test. Because defendant could not establish that the suppressed evidence was material, however, his Brady claim failed. View "Michigan v. Chenault" on Justia Law