Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Leo Ackley was convicted by jury of first-degree felony murder and first-degree child abuse after his live-in girlfriend's three-year-old child died under his care. At trial, the prosecution called five medical experts who testified that the child had died as the result of a head injury that was caused intentionally, while defense counsel called no experts, despite having been provided court funding for expert assistance and the name of a well-known forensic pathologist who could support the defense theory that the injuries had resulted from an accidental fall. Defendant appealed, arguing he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel for his lawyer's failure to challenge the government's experts. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' decision in this case, the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that defense counsel’s failure to attempt to engage a single expert witness to rebut the prosecution’s expert testimony, or to attempt to consult an expert with the scientific training to support the defendant’s theory of the case, fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and created a reasonable probability that this error affected the outcome of the defendant’s trial. Defendant's convictions were vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Ackley" on Justia Law

Defendant Cynthia Mazur, wife of David Mazur, was both a registered qualifying patient and a registered primary caregiver for two medical marijuana patients. David grew marijuana in their marital home. Officers of the Holly Police Department, acting on a tip, searched the residence for marijuana. Marijuana plants, dried marijuana, and pipes with marijuana residue were found. In executing the search, an officer questioned defendant, who used the first-person plural pronoun "we" when describing the marijuana operation. Although the use of this pronoun led the officers to conclude that defendant was a participant in her husband's marijuana operation, defendant contended her involvement was limited to writing the date of harvest for marijuana plants on several sticky notes. Both defendant and David were charged with marijuana-related offenses. The issue defendant's appeal presented for the Supreme Court's review required an examination of immunity under the Michigan Medical Marihuana Act (MMMA); specifically whether the application of the MMMA's immunity provisions applied to individuals who were neither registered qualifying patients nor primary caregivers. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that a defendant claiming that he or she is solely in the presence or vicinity of the medical use of marijuana is not entitled to immunity under MCL 333.26424(i) when the medical use of marijuana was not in accordance with the act. Nor is a defendant entitled to immunity under MCL 333.26424(i) when the defendant's conduct goes beyond assisting with the use or administration of marijuana. However, the Court held that "marihuana paraphernalia," as that phrase was defined in MCL 333.26424(g), included items that were both specifically designed or actually employed for the medical use of marijuana. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Mazur" on Justia Law

In Case Number 149772, Michelle Fairley brought an action against the Michigan Department of Corrections after an MDOC employee driving an MDOC vehicle struck her car, seriously injuring her. Counsel filed a notice of intent to file a claim against MDOC in the Court of Claims, but Fairley herself did not sign the notice, as required by MCL 600.6431(1). MDOC moved for summary judgment on grounds that the notice was defective, and the Court of Claims denied the motion. In Case Number 149940, Lori Stone brought an action against the Michigan State Police, when she was seriously injured when her stopped vehicle was struck by two patrol cars. Stone also filed a notice of intent to file a claim against the MSP in the Court of Claims; the notice did not indicate that it had been verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths, as required by MCL 600.6431(1). MSP moved for summary judgment on grounds that the notice was defective, but the Court of Claims granted this motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the statute did not require evidence of the oath or affirmation on the face of the notice. The Supreme Court consolidated the cases to determine whether a claimant's failure to comply with the notice verification requirements of MCL 600.6431 provided a complete defense to an action against the state or one of its departments. The Court concluded that a notice lacking any indication that it was signed and verified before an officer authorized to administer oaths is defective and, contrary to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion, was a complete defense that could be raised at any time by a defendant entitled to governmental immunity. Accordingly, and in lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals in both Stone v Michigan State Police and Fairley v Department of Corrections and remanded the cases to the Court of Claims for reinstatement of the order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the former and for entry of an order granting defendant’s motion for summary judgment in the latter. View "Fairley v. Dept. of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Michigan Supreme Court granted leave to appeal to address the constitutionality of 2012 PA 300, which modified the retirement benefits of current public school employees. Plaintiffs, which were various labor organizations representing such employees, raised three constitutional challenges: (1) whether the act violated the prohibitions of uncompensated takings in the Michigan and United States Constitutions, Const 1963, art 10, section 2 and US Const, Ams V and XIV; (2) whether the act impaired the obligation of contracts in violation of the Michigan and United States Constitutions, Const 1963, art 1, sect. 10 and US Const, art I, sect. 10, cl 1; and (3) whether the act violated the guarantee of due process in the Michigan and United States Constitutions, Const 1963, art 1, sect. 17 and US Const, Am XIV, sect. 1. After considering each of these challenges, the Michigan Court held that the act did not violate any provision of either the Michigan or the United States Constitution. View "AFT Michigan v. Michigan" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were taxpayers and school districts seeking a declaratory judgment that the amount of funding appropriated by the Legislature to fund new and increased recordkeeping requirements was materially deficient. Consistent with the Supreme Court's construction of the "Headlee Amendment" and its court rules, the Court required that plaintiffs bringing an action charging inadequate funding of a legislative mandate under the Headlee Amendment must allege and prove not only that the funding was insufficient, but the type and extent of the harm. In this opinion, the Court made clear that this burden included the requirement that the plaintiff show the specific amount of underfunding where the Legislature has made at least some appropriation of funds. The special master in this case applied this burden of proof and dismissed plaintiffs’ claims when plaintiffs stated at trial that they would not provide proofs establishing the specific amount of underfunding. The Court of Appeals reversed, requiring plaintiffs only to provide evidence that the methodology used by the Legislature to determine the amount of the appropriation was materially flawed, and remanded the case to the special master for further proceedings. The Supreme Court found that the Court of Appeals’ standard was inconsistent with its requirement that a plaintiff alleging inadequate funding must show the type and extent of the funding shortfall. Plaintiffs were properly instructed regarding the burden of proof by the special master before trial and failed to offer proofs concerning the specific amount of the alleged shortfall. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals and entered a judgment in favor of defendants. View "Adair v. Michigan" on Justia Law

The Wayne County Employees Retirement System and the Wayne County Retirement Commission filed suit against Wayne Charter County and the Wayne County Board of Commissioners, alleging that a county ordinance defendants enacted in 2010 concerning the retirement system violated Const. 1963, art 9, sec. 24 and the Public Employment Retirement System Investment Act (PERSIA). The ordinance placed a $12 million limit on the balance of the retirement system’s reserve for inflation equity known as the Inflation Equity Fund (IEF), which was funded by investment earnings on pension assets. The ordinance also placed a $5 million limit on a discretionary distribution of money from the IEF known as the “13th check,” which had been made annually in varying amounts to eligible retirees and survivor beneficiaries to help fight the effects of inflation. The ordinance required any amount in the IEF exceeding the $12 million cap to be debited from the IEF and credited to the assets of the defined benefit plan, where it would be used to offset or reduce the annual required contribution (ARC) that the county was required to make to the defined benefit plan. The county filed a counterclaim alleging, among other things, that the retirement commission had violated its fiduciary duties by mismanaging the retirement system’s assets. The trial court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory objections to the ordinance, and plaintiffs appealed. After its review, the Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals correctly held that the $32 million offset against the county’s ARC violated PERSIA for the reasons stated in the Court of Appeals opinion. The portion of the Court of Appeals opinion concluding that the intrasystem transfer of retirement system assets would violate PERSIA without the corresponding offset to the ARC was vacated, as were the portions of the opinion discussing the constitutional implications of the amended ordinance in relation to Const. 1963, art 9, sec. 24 and the determination that the transferred funds, once returned to the IEF, must be used only for the purposes of that fund. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court in all other respects, and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Wayne County Employees Retirement System v. Wayne Charter County" on Justia Law

Plaintiff initiated a FOIA request, and ultimately this FOIA lawsuit, to receive materials related to pending criminal proceedings that were in defendants’ possession, including video surveillance recordings created by private businesses. Defendants asserted that the surveillance recordings were not public records within the meaning of FOIA and, as a result, did not need to be disclosed. The parties did not dispute that video recordings were “writings” within the meaning of FOIA. Nor did they dispute that these particular video surveillance recordings were “in the possession of” and “retained by” defendants, both of which are public bodies. What was in dispute was whether the recordings were in the possession of or retained by defendants “in the performance of an official function, from the time [they were] created.” "What ultimately determines whether records in the possession of a public body are public records within the meaning of FOIA is whether the public body prepared, owned, used, possessed, or retained them in the performance of an official function. To this point, the Supreme Court agreed with the dissenting Court of Appeals judge that the recordings at issue in this case were public records because they were in the possession of or retained by defendants “in the performance of an official function, from the time [they were] created.” The Supreme Court reversed the appellate and trial courts' decisions inconsistent with its holding in this case, and remanded the case for entry of an order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Amberg v. City of Dearborn" on Justia Law

Defendant Deandre Woolfolk was convicted by a jury for first-degree murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of a felony for his part in a fatal shooting that took place two hours before his 18th birthday. He was sentenced for life without the possibility of parole for the murder conviction, and a consecutive two-year term for the possession charge. Defendant appealed, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment because he was not yet 18 when the crime was committed. The Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions but remanded for resentencing. The State appealed, but the Supreme Court affirmed, finding that for the purposes of "Miller," defendant remained under the age of 18 at the time he committed murder, and therefore was entitled to be treated in accordance with the Miller rule. View "Michigan v. Woolfolk" on Justia Law

Levon Bynum was charged with first-degree murder, two counts of assault with intent to murder, carrying a concealed weapon, and felony-firearm following a shooting that had occurred outside a party store in Battle Creek. Bynum and some of the others present were alleged to be members of the Boardman Boys gang, whose territory bordered the party store. Bynum claimed that he acted in self-defense. An officer in the Battle Creek Police Department's Gang Suppression Unit, was proffered at trial as an expert witness on gangs, gang membership, and gang culture with a particular expertise about Battle Creek gangs. The court allowed the officer's testimony and his PowerPoint presentation, concluding that the evidence was relevant to prove Bynum's motive for shooting the victims. Defense counsel did not specifically object to any of this testimony after the initial, general objection to the testimony, and the jury found Bynum guilty as charged. Bynum's appellate defense counsel subsequently moved for a new trial, arguing the ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to object to the officer's testimony as improper propensity evidence. The court rejected the ineffective-assistance claim because it was satisfied that trial counsel's objections had preserved the claimed error in the testimony. The court also held that the expert witness testimony was appropriate. Bynum appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed Bynum's convictions in an unpublished opinion per curiam. The Supreme Court held that if the prosecution presents fact evidence to show that the crime at issue is gang-related, expert testimony about gangs, gang membership, and gang culture may be admitted as relevant under MRE 402 and of "assist[ance] [to] the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue" under MRE 702. In applying MRE 402 and MRE 702 to the facts of this case, the Supreme Court concluded the trial court appropriately exercised its role as gatekeeper in determining that expert testimony about gangs and gang culture would assist the jury in understanding the evidence. The Court also held that MRE 404(a) precludes testimony that is specifically used to show that, on a particular occasion, a gang member acted in conformity with character traits commonly associated with gang members. The expert witness in this case exceeded these limitations when he provided his opinion that defendant committed the crimes at issue because he acted in conformity with his gang membership. The Court therefore affirmed the result of the Court of Appeals and remanded this case to the Circuit Court for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Bynum " on Justia Law

A jury convicted Jeffery Douglas of first-degree criminal sexual conduct (victim under the age of 13) and second-degree criminal sexual conduct (victim under the age of 13). The charges arose from statements by his daughter, KD, that defendant had made her touch his penis on one occasion and perform fellatio on him on a separate occasion. Defendant appealed, challenging the admission of certain testimony and claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court of Appeals held that defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel during both the pretrial and trial proceedings and that the cumulative effect of the trial errors denied him a fair trial. The Court of Appeals vacated defendant's convictions and sentences and remanded the case to the trial court for reinstatement of a plea offer made by the prosecution before trial. The Court of Appeals ordered that if defendant refused to accept the plea offer, he was entitled to a new trial. The State appealed. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that a new trial was warranted in light of the errors by both the court and defense counsel at trial. The Court held, however, that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the prosecution’s prior plea offer must be reinstated, as the Supreme Court saw no reversible error in the trial court’s determination to the contrary. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Michigan v. Douglas" on Justia Law