Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant Feronda Smith was charged with, among other things, armed robbery and first-degree felony murder after the police found known drug dealer Larry Pass, Jr., dead in Pass’s own home. At trial, two prosecution witnesses claimed to have been present when defendant allegedly shot Pass. The first witness was codefendant Tarence Lard, who testified for the prosecution as part of a plea agreement for his part in the crime. The second witness was Mark Yancy, who maintained his innocence with respect to the shooting but admitted collecting Pass’s drugs, helping dispose of the murder weapon, and using cocaine with defendant and Lard after the shooting. Yancy and Lard contradicted one another in important ways, although both testified that Yancy and defendant had had a violent dispute over money in the weeks leading up to the murder. No other evidence connected defendant to the crime or confirmed that he had ever been at the scene, and no murder weapon was ever recovered. Yancy was a paid informant, and had been compensated for his assistance in a FBI inquiry into Pass' murder. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether the prosecution breached a duty to correct the substantially misleading, if not false, testimony of Yancy's about his formal and compensated cooperation in the government’s investigation. "Given the overall weakness of the evidence against the defendant and the significance of the witness’s testimony," the Supreme Court concluded that there was a reasonable probability that the prosecution’s exploitation of the substantially misleading testimony affected the verdict. Therefore the Court reversed and remanded this case for a new trial. View "Michigan v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Jackson was convicted by a jury on six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing a young member of the church where he served as pastor. At trial, the complainant’s aunt testified that she had approached the complainant to discuss the possible abuse in light of her own experiences and after talking with another woman who had also worked with defendant and had subsequently left the church. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that this testimony indicated that defendant had engaged in sexual relationships with the complainant’s aunt and her acquaintance, and was inadmissible evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b). The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion, ruling that admissibility of the testimony was not governed by MRE 404(b) because the testimony was not evidence that defendant had engaged in prior sexual conduct with underage parishioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although the testimony was evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b), it fell within an exception to that rule for res gestae evidence and thus could be admitted without reference to or compliance with the rule. Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the testimony was other-acts evidence as contemplated by MRE 404(b), and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. However, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals majority that the trial court’s failure to subject the testimony to scrutiny under MRE 404(b) was nonetheless correct because the testimony fell within a "res gestae exception" to that rule. Because the testimony at issue constituted evidence of "other acts" as contemplated by MRE 404(b), its admission was governed by that rule and its procedural requirements. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ determination that the defendant’s convictions should be affirmed, as defendant has failed to show entitlement to relief on the basis of this error. The Court therefore affirmed defendant’s convictions, but vacated that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority reasoning that the testimony at issue could be admitted without reference to or compliance with MRE 404(b) by virtue of a res gestae exception" to that rule. View "Michigan v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Defendant Timothy Jackson was convicted by a jury on six counts of first-degree criminal sexual conduct for sexually abusing a young member of the church where he served as pastor. At trial, the complainant’s aunt testified that she had approached the complainant to discuss the possible abuse in light of her own experiences and after talking with another woman who had also worked with defendant and had subsequently left the church. Defense counsel objected and moved for a mistrial, arguing that this testimony indicated that defendant had engaged in sexual relationships with the complainant’s aunt and her acquaintance, and was inadmissible evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b). The trial court overruled the objection and denied the motion, ruling that admissibility of the testimony was not governed by MRE 404(b) because the testimony was not evidence that defendant had engaged in prior sexual conduct with underage parishioners. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that although the testimony was evidence of other acts under MRE 404(b), it fell within an exception to that rule for res gestae evidence and thus could be admitted without reference to or compliance with the rule. Upon review, the Michigan Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that the testimony was other-acts evidence as contemplated by MRE 404(b), and that the trial court erred in concluding otherwise. However, the Court disagreed with the Court of Appeals majority that the trial court’s failure to subject the testimony to scrutiny under MRE 404(b) was nonetheless correct because the testimony fell within a "res gestae exception" to that rule. Because the testimony at issue constituted evidence of "other acts" as contemplated by MRE 404(b), its admission was governed by that rule and its procedural requirements. The Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals’ determination that the defendant’s convictions should be affirmed, as defendant has failed to show entitlement to relief on the basis of this error. The Court therefore affirmed defendant’s convictions, but vacated that portion of the opinion of the Court of Appeals majority reasoning that the testimony at issue could be admitted without reference to or compliance with MRE 404(b) by virtue of a res gestae exception" to that rule. View "Michigan v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Rahim Omarkhan Lockridge was convicted by jury of involuntary manslaughter for the death of his wife.His minimum sentence range calculated under the sentencing guidelines was 43 to 86 months. The trial court concluded that there were factors not accounted for in scoring the guidelines, including a probation violation, killing his wife in front of their three children, leaving the children at home with their mother dead on the floor, and prior domestic violence. Citing these as reasons to depart from the minimum sentence range, the court sentenced defendant to a term of 8 years (96 months) to 15 years (the statutory maximum sentence). Defendant appealed, challenging both the scoring of the guidelines and the trial court’s decision to exceed the guidelines minimum sentence range. While his case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court decided "Alleyne v United States," (133 S Ct 2151 (2013)), which extended the rule of "Apprendi v New Jersey," (530 US 466 (2000)), and held that a fact that increases either end of a defendant’s sentencing range must have been admitted by the defendant or found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt. After allowing defendant to file a supplemental brief challenging the guidelines scoring on "Alleyne" grounds, the Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s sentence in three separate opinions and rejected the Alleyne challenge. The Michigan Supreme Court granted defendant's application to address the constitutional question presented by his Alleyne challenge. The Court found that in this case, defendant’s guidelines minimum sentence range was irrelevant to the upward departure sentence he ultimately received. Accordingly, the Court held that he could not show the prejudice necessary to establish plain error under "Michigan v. Carines," (597 NW2d 130 (1999)), and affirmed his sentence. View "Michigan v. Lockridge" on Justia Law

The Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions and others brought an action in the Court of Claims against the State and various state agencies and officers, alleging that portions of 2011 PA 264, which amended the State Employees’ Retirement Act (SERA, MCL 38.1 et seq.), were unconstitutional because the resulting changes to retirement benefits altered rates of compensation or conditions of employment, which were within the exclusive authority of the Civil Service Commission to regulate. The Court of Claims granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that SERA retirement benefits were properly classified as both “rates of compensation” and “conditions of employment,” neither of which was subject to legislative alteration. The Supreme Court reversed. "While the [Civil Service Commission] has considerable constitutional powers to manage the civil service system and to preserve its sphere of constitutional authority, the commission has no legislative powers. It may neither enact legislation nor revise an enactment, nor may it dictate that the Legislature repeal or modify an enactment. Therefore, we hold that because the commission has acquiesced in the application of SERA to the employees of the civil service system, plaintiff’s objections fail to establish a basis for relief." View "Michigan Coalition of State Employee Unions v. Michigan" on Justia Law

The International Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, and Agricultural Implement Workers of America and others brought an action in the Court of Appeals against Nino Green and other members of the Michigan Employment Relations Commission, the Governor, and the Attorney General, seeking a declaratory judgment that portions of 2012 PA 349 (which amended the public employment relations act (PERA, MCL 423.201 et seq.), to prohibit public employers from requiring their employees to join a union or pay union-related expenses) were unconstitutional with respect to employees in the classified state civil service. The Court of Appeals held that the challenged portions of 2012 PA 349 were constitutional. Although the Supreme Court concluded that public collective bargaining was a method by which the Civil Service Commission (could choose to exercise its constitutional duties, the Court held that the commission could not effectively require civil servants to fund the commission’s own administrative operations. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals on different grounds. View "UAW v. Green" on Justia Law

Richard Hartwick was charged with manufacturing marijuana and possessing it with the intent to deliver it. Hartwick was a registered qualifying patient under the Michigan Medical Marijuana Act (MMMA). He served as his own primary caregiver and the primary caregiver for five other registered qualifying patients to whom he was properly connected under the MMMA. The police, acting on a tip, confronted Hartwick and later conducted a consent search of his home where the police discovered a disputed number of marijuana plants and approximately 3.69 ounces of marijuana. Hartwick moved to dismiss the charges, claiming immunity under section 4 of the MMMA, and the affirmative defense under section 8. In the alternative, Hartwick sought permission to present a section 8 defense at trial. The trial court denied the motions. Robert Tuttle was charged with three counts of delivering marijuana, one count of manufacturing marijuana, one count of possessing marijuana with the intent to deliver it, and two counts of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. Tuttle was a registered qualifying patient under the MMMA who served as his own primary caregiver. It was unclear whether he was properly connected as the primary caregiver to one or two other registered qualifying patients. Tuttle was arrested for selling marijuana on three occasions to an individual with whom Tuttle was not properly connected under the MMMA. Tuttle claimed immunity under section 4 and the affirmative defense under section 8 of the MMMA. The trial court rejected both claims and denied Tuttle’s request to present a section 8 defense at trial. According to the court, immunity was not appropriate because Tuttle’s illegal conduct (selling marijuana to an individual outside the protection of the MMMA) tainted Tuttle’s conduct with regard to the other charges. The trial court denied Tuttle use of the affirmative defense in section 8 because Tuttle failed to present prima facie evidence of each element of the defense. The Michigan Supreme Court granted certiorari review in these cases, not "to limit or extend the [MMMA's] words," but "merely bring them meaning derived from the plain language of the statute." After review of the specific facts of each defendant's case and their claims of immunity under the MMMA, the Supreme Court concluded: (1) the Court of Appeals properly held that Hartwick was not entitled to raise the affirmative defense under section 8 because he failed to present prima facie evidence of each element of the defense; (2) the Court of Appeals erred by concluding that Tuttle’s unprotected conduct with the unconnected individual tainted what might otherwise be protected conduct on which additional separate charges were based; (3) the Court of Appeals properly held that Tuttle could not claim the affirmative defense under section 8 because he failed to establish prima facie evidence of at least one of the elements of the defense for each of his possibly connected patients. For Hartwick, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to determine Hartwick's entitlement to section 4 immunity. For Tuttle, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded to the trial court to determine Tuttle's entitlement to section 4 immunity. View "Michigan v. Hartwick" on Justia Law

Adam Stevens was convicted by jury of second-degree murder and second-degree child abuse. The charges stemmed from the death of defendant’s three-month-old son, Kian. The prosecution alleged that defendant caused Kian’s death by either shaking him or slamming him against an object. Defendant alleged that he tripped and fell while holding Kian, and that as he fell, he lost control of Kian, who fell to the floor. Defendant denied shaking or slamming Kian. Defendant appealed his convictions and sentences. On appeal, defendant argued that he was denied a fair trial because the trial judge, through his questioning of defendant and defendant’s expert, demonstrated partiality in front of the jury. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed. After review of the trial court record, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, concluding that the trial judge’s conduct with respect to defendant’s expert witness pierced the veil of judicial impartiality, depriving defendant of the right to a fair trial. View "Michigan v. Stevens" on Justia Law

Brandon Cain was of two counts of first-degree premeditated murder, two counts of felony murder, two counts of torture, two counts of unlawful imprisonment, carrying a firearm during the commission of a felony, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At the start of the trial, the court stated to the jury, “I will now ask you to stand and swear to perform your duty to try the case justly and to reach a true verdict.” The court clerk then proceeded to swear in the jury, but mistakenly read the oath given to prospective jurors before voir dire (that they would answer the questions concerning juror qualifications truthfully) rather than the juror’s oath set forth in MCR 2.511(H)(1). There was no objection to the failure to administer the proper oath. Defendant raised the issue of failing to properly swear the jury for the first time on appeal, moving for peremptory reversal of his convictions. The Court of Appeals granted the motion in an unpublished order, concluding that the failure to properly swear the jury was a structural error requiring a new trial. The prosecution sought leave to appeal, which the Supreme Court granted. Because the jurors were conscious of the gravity of the task before them and the manner in which that task was to be carried out, the two primary purposes served by the juror’s oath, the Supreme Court concluded the error of failing to properly swear the jury in this case did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. As such, the Court reversed the appellate court's ruling. View "Michigan v. Cain" on Justia Law

Defendant Joseph Miller was convicted by a jury of operating while intoxicated (OWI), and operating while intoxicated causing serious impairment of another person’s body function (OWI-injury), for an accident that resulted when he grabbed the steering wheel of the car that his girlfriend was driving. The trial court sentenced defendant to two concurrent terms of five years’ probation, with the first nine months to be served in jail. Defendant appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed defendant’s conviction for OWI-injury but vacated defendant’s OWI conviction on the ground that it violated defendant’s constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals denied the prosecution’s motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court granted the prosecution’s application for leave to appeal. After review, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy by convicting defendant of both OWI and OWI-injury. "When read as a whole, MCL 257.625 expresses a clear legislative intent not to allow conviction of and punishment for multiple offenses arising from the same incident except where explicitly authorized by the statute, and MCL 257.625(1) and MCL 257.625(5) do not specifically authorize multiple punishments." The Supreme Court concluded the Court of Appeals correctly vacated defendant’s conviction, but for the wrong reason. View "Michigan v. Miller" on Justia Law