Justia Michigan Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

David Sole brought an action against the Michigan Economic Development Corporation under the Michigan Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking the disclosure of information regarding the tax credits that defendant had allowed General Motors LLC (GM) to claim under the Michigan Economic Growth Authority Act (the MEGA Act), which gave defendant the authority to award businesses tax credits through the Michigan Strategic Fund. Defendant had provided plaintiff with a 2016 agreement between GM and defendant regarding the tax credits, but it had redacted the amount of the “tax credit cap,” which defendant claimed was exempt from disclosure under the Michigan Strategic Fund Act. The Court of Claims granted summary judgment in favor of defendant on the basis that the information was exempt from disclosure under MCL 125.2005(9). The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court found that while the “tax credit cap” fit within the terms of MCL 125.2005(9), it was nonetheless subject to disclosure under MCL 125.2005(11). Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ judgment to the contrary. View "Sole v. Michigan Economic Development Corp." on Justia Law

James Township, Michigan filed a nuisance action against Daniel Rice , alleging Rice violated the township’s blight ordinance as well as the Michigan Residential Code by having junk cars, unpermitted construction, and fences of an improper height on his property. Rice moved to dismiss the portions of the citation related to the improper height of his fence and the unpermitted construction, arguing that, under the Right to Farm Act (RTFA), the township was prohibited from enforcing against farms or farm operations local ordinances governing those structures. The township opposed the motion, arguing that the property was not protected by the RTFA because it had not previously been used for farming. Following a hearing, the district court, found that Rice’s use of the property constituted a “farm” or “farm operation” for purposes of the RTFA and that the RTFA was an affirmative defense to those portions of the civil citation. The district court dismissed the specified portions of the citation and denied the parties’ individual requests for costs and fees. Rice moved for reconsideration, arguing that, under MCL 286.473b, he was entitled to costs and expenses, as well as reasonable and actual attorney fees; the district court denied the motion. The district court later dismissed the remaining portions of the citation and dismissed the action with prejudice. Rice appealed and the circuit court affirmed the district court’s order. The Court of Appeals denied Rice’s application for leave to appeal the circuit court’s order. In lieu of granting leave to appeal, the Michigan Supreme Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for consideration as on leave granted. On remand, in an unpublished per curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court’s legal conclusions, holding that an award of costs , expenses, and fees was not mandatory under MCL 286.473b, but the Court of Appeals remanded the case to the district court for articulation of the district court’s reasons for the discretionary denial. The Michigan Supreme Court found no such discretion under the RTFA, and Rice was entitled to his fees. The appellate court’s judgment was reversed. View "Township of James v. Rice" on Justia Law

Meemic Insurance Company filed a subrogation claim against Angela Jones, seeking to recover from Jones money it had paid to CitiMortgage, Inc., the mortgagee of a residential house owned by Jones and insured by Meemic, after fire damaged the property. In September 2015, Jones was living at the house when it was damaged by a fire. Meemic paid her $2,500 in partial payment of the claim for insurance benefits. During Meemic’s ensuing investigation, Jones admitted that at the time she secured the policy in 2014, she did not reside at the house but, instead, rented it to a third party. Meemic claimed that Jones’s failure to disclose in the initial policy that her home was being rented to others constituted a material misrepresentation. On the basis of the misrepresentation, Meemic rescinded and voided the insurance policy from its inception and returned Jones’s policy payments. After rescinding the policy, Meemic paid $53,356.49 to CitiMortgage under the lienholder contract of the policy. Jones filed an action against Meemic, claiming breach of contract and sought to recover under the insurance policy. Meemic moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had properly rescinded the policy given Jones’s misrepresentation in the initial policy. The motion was ultimately granted, and Jones' complaint was dismissed with prejudice. In 2018, Meemic filed the underlying action against Jones seeking to recover the $2,500 advance payment made to Jones and the $53,356.49 it had paid to CitiMortgage under the lienholder contract. Jones moved for summary judgment, arguing that she was relieved from any obligations under the insurance policy because Meemic had rescinded the insurance policy; Meemic opposed the motion and filed a countermotion for summary judgment. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Meemic, and Meemic appealed. The Michigan Supreme Court held: an insurer who rescinds a homeowner’s insurance policy that contains a mortgage clause may seek subrogation from the insured under its rescinded policy for the amount paid to the mortgagee under the lienholder contract. The Court of Appeals judgment was reversed because it erred by concluding that Meemic’s rescission of the risk contract precluded it from denying payment to Jones and then asserting rights under the subrogation provision of the lienholder contract. View "Meemic Insurance Co. v. Jones" on Justia Law

Mecosta County Medical Center, d/b/a Spectrum Health Big Rapids (and others) sued Metropolitan Group Property and Casualty Insurance Company and State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company at the Kent Circuit Court, seeking personal protection insurance (PIP) benefits related to a single-car crash involving Jacob Myers. Myers co-owned the vehicle involved in the crash with his girlfriend; his girlfriend’s grandmother had purchased a no-fault insurance policy on the vehicle through Metropolitan Group. Myers assigned plaintiffs his right to collect PIP benefits in the amount of his treatment bills. After the assignment, Myers sued Metropolitan Group and State Farm at the Wayne Circuit Court for PIP benefits related to other costs arising from the crash. Plaintiffs sued defendants at the Kent Court to recover on the assigned claim. Defendants moved for summary judgment against Myers at the Wayne Court. State Farm argued that because Myers did not live with the State Farm policyholders he was not covered by their policy. Metropolitan Group asserted that Myers was not entitled to coverage because he did not personally maintain coverage on the vehicle. The Wayne Court granted both motions and dismissed Myers’s PIP claim with prejudice. Myers did not appeal. While defendants’ motions were pending with the Wayne Court, Metropolitan Group also moved for summary judgment at the Kent Court on the same basis as its motion in the Wayne Court. However, the Wayne Court granted defendants’ motions before the Kent Court considered Metropolitan Group’s motion. After the Wayne Court granted summary judgment for defendants, defendants filed additional motions for summary judgment at the Kent Court, arguing plaintiffs’ claims were barred under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel because the Wayne Court had concluded that Myers was ineligible for PIP benefits. The Kent Court granted the motion, holding that plaintiffs’ claims were barred by res judicata and collateral estoppel. Plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Appeals reversed in a split, unpublished opinion. The appellate majority held that an assignee was not bound by a judgment against an assignor in an action commenced after the assignment occurred. The Michigan Supreme Court affirmed, finding that plaintiffs were not in privity with Myers with respect to the judgment entered subsequently to the assignment, and therefore, plaintiffs could not be bound by that judgment under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. View "Mecosta County Medical Center v. Metropolitan Group Property, et al." on Justia Law

Consumers Energy Company filed an action against Brian and Erin Storm, and Lake Michigan Credit Union, seeking to condemn a portion of the Storms’ property for a power-line easement. The Storms challenged the necessity of the easement under the Uniform Condemnation Procedures Act (UCPA). The trial court concluded that Consumers had failed to establish the public necessity of the easement on the Storms’ property and entered an order dismissing Consumers’ action and awarding attorney fees to the Storms. Consumers appealed that order as of right to the Court of Appeals. The Storms moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that under MCL 213.56(6), Consumers could only appeal the trial court’s public-necessity determination by leave granted. The Court of Appeals initially denied the motion by order, but the order was entered without prejudice to further consideration of the jurisdictional issue by the case -call panel. The Court of Appeals case-call panel issued an opinion in which it agreed with the Storms that the Court of Appeals lacked jurisdiction; the Court of Appeals therefore dismissed the portion of Consumers’ appeal challenging the trial court’s determination of public necessity. Despite dismissing the public-necessity portion of Consumers’ appeal, the Court of Appeals addressed Consumers’ challenge to the trial court’s award of attorney fees and vacated the attorney-fee award. The Michigan Supreme Court determined the Court of Appeals should have considered the condemning agency’s appeal as of right and reached the ultimate question of whether the trial court erred by holding that there was no public necessity for the proposed acquisition. “Therefore, it is not yet apparent that the proposed acquisition was improper such that the property owners would be entitled to reimbursement so as to avoid being ‘forced to suffer because of an action that they did not initiate and that endangered, through condemnation proceedings, their right to private property.’” Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the analysis construing MCL 213.66(2) in Part III of the Court of Appeals’ opinion, and remanded to that court for further proceedings. View "Consumers Energy Company v. Storm" on Justia Law

Leslie Murphy, a former shareholder of Covisint Corporation, brought an action against Samuel Inman, III and other former Covisint directors, alleging they breached their statutory and common-law fiduciary duties owed to plaintiff when Covisint entered into a cash-out merger agreement with OpenText Corporation in 2017. Defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff lacked standing because his claim was derivative in nature and he did not satisfy the requirements for bringing a derivative shareholder action under MCL 450.1493a. Plaintiff responded that he was permitted to bring a direct shareholder action under MCL 450.1541a, and that defendants owed common-law fiduciary duties to plaintiff as a shareholder. The trial court granted defendants’ motion, ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to bring a direct shareholder action because he could not demonstrate an injury to himself without showing injury to the corporation, nor could he show harm separate and distinct from that of other Covisint shareholders. The court also rejected plaintiff’s common-law theory because it arose out of the same alleged injury as his statutory claim. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed, however, finding that a shareholder who alleges the directors of the target corporation breached their fiduciary duties owed to the shareholder in handling a cash-out merger could bring that claim as a direct shareholder action. The Court of Appeals erred by concluding that plaintiff’s claim was derivative. View "Murphy v. Inman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Deborah Foster sought to hold defendant Ray Foster, in contempt of court for failing to abide by a provision in their consent judgment of divorce. The judgment stated that defendant would pay plaintiff 50% of his military disposable retired pay accrued during the marriage or, if defendant waived a portion of his military retirement benefits in order to receive military disability benefits, that he would continue to pay plaintiff an amount equal to what she would have received had defendant not elected to receive such disability benefits. Defendant subsequently elected to receive increased disability benefits, including Combat-Related Special Compensation (CRSC) under 10 USC 1413a. That election reduced the amount of retirement pay defendant received, which, in turn, reduced plaintiff’s share of the retirement benefits from approximately $800 a month to approximately $200 a month. Defendant did not comply with the offset provision by paying plaintiff the difference. The trial court denied plaintiff’s request to hold defendant in contempt, but ordered him to comply with the consent judgment. Defendant failed to do so, and plaintiff again petitioned for defendant to be held in contempt. Defendant did not appear at the hearing, but argued in a written response that the federal courts had jurisdiction over the issue. The court found defendant in contempt, granted a money judgment in favor of plaintiff, and issued a bench warrant for defendant’s arrest because of his failure to appear at the hearing. At a show-cause hearing in June 2014, defendant argued that 10 USC 1408 and 38 USC 5301 prohibited him from assigning his disability benefits and that the trial court had erred by not complying with federal law. The court found defendant in contempt and ordered him to pay the arrearage and attorney fees. The Michigan Supreme Court held that the type of federal preemption at issue in this case did not deprive state courts of subject-matter jurisdiction. As a result, the Supreme Court concluded defendant’s challenge to enforcement of the provision at issue was an improper collateral attack on a final judgment. View "Foster v. Foster" on Justia Law

The American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU) filed a complaint against the Calhoun County Jail and Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), alleging CCSO violated Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) when it denied the ACLU’s request for documents. The ACLU sought disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal, finding the records at issue were exempt public records from disclosure under the statute. The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, finding error in that court holding a federal regulation had the legal force of a federal statute; "federal regulation is not a federal statute." The case was remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan v. Calhoun County" on Justia Law

Fraser Township filed a complaint against Harvey and Ruth Ann Haney, seeking a permanent injunction to enforce its zoning ordinance and to prevent defendants from raising on their commercially zoned property, hogs or other animals that would violate the zoning ordinance, to remove an allegedly nonconforming fence, and to plow and coat the ground with nontoxic material. Defendants brought a hog onto their property as early as 2006, and defendants maintained hogs on their property through the time this lawsuit was filed in 2016. Defendants moved for summary disposition, arguing that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred by the six-year statutory period of limitations in MCL 600.5813. The trial court denied the motion, concluding that because the case was an action in rem, the statute of limitations did not apply. The Court of Appeal reversed, finding that the statute of limitations applied. Finding that the appellate court erred in concluding the statute of limitations applied, the Michigan Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the trial court's order denying defendants' motion for summary judgment. View "Township of Fraser v. Haney" on Justia Law

This action involved a request for documents under Michigan’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). Plaintiff, the American Civil Liberties Union of Michigan (the ACLU), submitted a FOIA request to defendant, the Calhoun County Sheriff’s Office (the CCSO), seeking disclosure of all records related to the December 2018 detention of United States citizen Jilmar Benigno Ramos-Gomez. Ramos-Gomez’s three-day detention at the Calhoun County Correctional Facility occurred pursuant to an Intergovernmental Service Agreement (IGSA) executed between United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and the jail. The CCSO denied the ACLU’s request, asserting that the requested records were exempt from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d) because they related to an ICE detainee. The issue this case presented for the Michigan Supreme Court's review centered on whether a federal regulation with a nondisclosure component, 8 CFR 236.6 (2021), could be the basis for exempting public records from disclosure under MCL 15.243(1)(d). The Supreme Court held that it could not, "for the simple reason that a regulation is not a statute." The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals’ holding to the contrary, and the Court overruled Soave v. Dep’t of Ed, and Mich Council of Trout Unlimited v. Dep’t of Military Affairs, as to their erroneous interpretations of MCL 15.243(1)(d). The case was remanded back to the Calhoun Circuit Court for further proceedings. View "American Civil Liberties Union Of Michigan v. Calhoun County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law